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Abstract
In the United States, following the case of Brown v. Board of Education (1954),1
federal judges with responsibility for public school desegregation but no expertise in
education or schools management appointed experts from the social sciences to act as
court advisors. In Boston, MA, educational sociologists helped Judge W. Arthur
Garrity design and implement a desegregation plan which required the restructuring
of the city's public school system and judicial oversight lasting for a period of twenty
years raising questions of legitimacy which have become more important over time.
Moreover, the Boston plan embraced an initial commitment to educational
enhancement, but the educational outcomes were subsequently marginalized by a
desegregation jurisprudence conceptualized in terms of race rather than education and
thus largely doomed to fail.
This inquiry takes as its focus a series of memos written by the expert advisors to the
judge. They cover more or less every aspect of the Boston schools case but came into
the public domain only once the case was closed and the judge donated his chambers
papers to the Healey Library, University of Massachusetts in 1997. Little studied by
scholars to date, these papers permit questions to be explored in a way which was not
possible at the time and provide a focus for exploring contemporary concerns. To that
extent, this research breaks new ground.
This work draws on the archival resource to develop narratives of the experts' work
which move from the initial underlying legitimacy concerns of traditional liberal
analysis towards perspectives which foreground the indeterminacy of legal rights and
are thus skeptical of the long-term value of rights-based constitutional litigation. The
outline of a theory of the role of the court experts in schools desegregation with which
this work concludes constitutes an attempt to theorize the relationship between the
judge and his assistants in such a way as to make a further contribution to these
debates.
Brown Y. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
11
III
Table of Contents
Abstract ii
Table of Contents iv
Introduction 1
I. The Boston Schools Case I
II. Aims of this Investigation 2
HI. Research Questions and Significance 2
IV. Constructing a Framework of Analysis 3
V. Methodology 5
A. Source Material and Rationale: The Archival Record 5
B. Referencing and Citation 7
C. Interview Material and Rationale 8
D. Practical Considerations 9
E. Academic Considerations 9
F. Research Strategy and Structure 10
G. Method 12
H. Theoretical Toolkit. 14
I. The Value of Discourse Theory and the Case Study Method for this
Research 15
VI. Desegregating the Boston Schools: An Overview 16
A. The Pre-Morgan Events 17
B. The Morgan Litigation: Time Line 19
Part One: Legitimacy and the Use of Court Experts in Boston 27
I. Introduction: Research Questions and the Significance of Legitimacy 27
II. Structure 28
Chapter One: Court Experts in an Adversarial System of Justice 33
I. Court Experts and the Desegregation Toolkit 33
II. Adjudication in an Adversarial Model of Justice 35
III. The Technical Advisor as a Member of the Judge's Staff 39
IV. Edgar Coziness: Appearance versus Substance .42
V. Justification and Prophylaxis .45
VI. Balancing Process and Outcomes: A Judicial Tightrope 50
Chapter Two: Narratives of Impropriety 53
I. Conceptualizations of Legitimacy in Boston 53
II. The School Committee Narrative: Dentler and Scott Represent
Excessive Judicial Power 54
III. Dentler and Scott and the Judge's Ear: The Alternative Narrative 60
IV. A Justificatory Framework 63
Chapter Three: Civic Opposition, Structural Inadequacies and
Uncompromising Litigiousness .......•............................................................... 65
I.Civic Opposition: South Boston High School 65
A. The SBH Memos: Framing the Remedy 67
B. The Transcripts 68
C. The Experts' Recommendations 68
D. The Receivership Order 70
iv
E. Afterword: A Smoking Gun and a Note on Methodology 71
II. Structural Inadequacy: Reform of the School Department 72
A. The Experts Urge Reform of the School Department - Judge
Garrity's Court Behavior Evidences their Influence 74
B. The Inadequacies of the School Department Impinge on
Assignments: Judge Garrity Distributes the Experts' Report 77
C. Judge Garrity Establishes the Department of Implementation -
Superintendent Fahey Attempts a Coup - The Court is Over a Barrel 78
D. The 1977 Assignment Crisis: The Experts' Memorandum is
Docketed - Judge Garrity Orders the City Defendants to Comply
with the Experts' Recommendations 83
E. The Judge as Political Operator.. 86
III. Uncompromising Litigiousness: A Strategy of Disengagement.. 88
A. Special Master Proposal... 91
B. The Special Master Proposal and the Dentler Memos 94
C. Opposition Mounts 95
IV. Da Capo: Legitimacy and the Court Expert... 97
Appendix: Research Exercise - South Boston High School: Questions
for Dr. Reid 103
Part Two: Race and Education in Boston 116
I. Introduction 116
II. Structure 119
III. School Closings: The Problem of "White Flight''' 122
IV. The Latin Schools: Elitism and Educational Disadvantage 124
Chapter One: The Boston Plan 127
I. A New Type of Plan 127
II. Robert Dentler and School Desegregation Planning: A Lifelong
Speciality 129
III. The Boston Plan and Educational Quality 136
IV. The Sociological Connection between "Race" and "Education." 137
V. Key Features of the Plan 139
A. Districting and Assignment... 140
B. Educational Enrichment 142
C. College-School Pairings 144
D. Community Involvement 145
VI. The Missing Elements: Teaching and Learning 145
Chapter Two: From Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional
Adjudication: The Meaning of Desegregation in Social Science
Research and Law 148
I. Introduction: The Paradox of Desegregation Jurisprudence 148
II. Law and Social Science in Schools Desegregation 153
A. The Differing Imperatives of Social Science and Law 155
B. Resegregation and Race-Conscious Policies 159
III. Lobbying the Supreme Court: The "Harm-Benefit Thesis" as
Litigation Strategy 160
A. The Topeka Brief and the Harm ofSegregation 161
B. Social Science and Desegregating the North: The Columbus Brief
and "The Web of Institutional Discriminations" 166
v
C. The Harm-Benefit Thesis and Unitary Status: The Freeman and
Jenkins Briefs 169
D. Does the Court Take Note? The Harm-Benefit Thesis and a Public
Law Remedial Model 172
E. Pedagogical Sociology and Judicial Activism: The Search for
Legitimacy 175
F. The Changing Priorities of Constitutional Adjudication 178
IV. Education versus Integration in Boston 181
A. The Campaign for Racial Balance in Boston 183
B. Lawyers versus Clients: Should Brown Have Been Decided
Differently? 187
V. Conclusion 190
Chapter Three: The Politics of School Closings 191
I. Introduction 191
A. The Long Search for a Unified Facilities Plan 191
B. The Wood Plan 192
n. The Dentler & Scott Memos 198
A. The Burden of School Closings 198
B. The Politics of School Closings and Court Strategy 200
C. The Linkage and Beacon School Proposals 207
D. Commentaries on the Wood UFP 209
E. Fighting on Two Fronts: The Equalization Issue 216
F. Cutting the Gordian Knot 217
G. Desegregation and Educational Planning: The First Circuit's
Warning 218
III. The Aftermath: Equalization versus Integration 221
IV. Conclusion: Law, Race and Education in Boston 223
The Limits of Rights Discourse in Boston: Toward a Theory of the Court
Expert in Schools Desegregation Suits 228
I. Introduction: Was it all Worthwhile? 228
II. The Latin Schools and the Limits of Judicial Process 231
Ill. The Desegregation Plan: the Set-Aside and the Problem of Selection 235
IV. Court Withdrawal and the Latin Schools 238
V. Modifying the Racial/Ethnic Assignment Guidelines 240
VI. Disengagement and Final Orders 242
VII. The Limits of Rights Discourse 246
VIII. Towards a Theory of the Court Expert in Schools Desegregation
Suits 254
Bibliography 258
I. Cases 258
II. Archival Resources 263
III. United States Constitutional Amendments 263
IV. Journal Articles 263
V. Books 268
VI. Dissertations and Papers 272
VII. Online Resources 273
VI
Introduction
I.The Boston Schools Case
When Judge W. Arthur Garrity Jr., chosen at random to hear allegations by NAACP
(National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoplej-backed plaintiffs of
systematic discrimination against black students in the Boston public schools, handed
down his decision in Morgan v Hennigan, he embarked upon a relationship with the
Boston public school system and its politics which lasted for over twenty years but the
immediate effect was to provoke a political crisis.' The scale of the ensuing violence
was exceptional even by reference to the turbulence which had accompanied the
desegregation process in the South.3 The litigation and the civil disobedience which it
provoked became a cause celebre gaining notoriety for the city and hero status for the
presiding federal judge. As elected members of the school committee with overall
responsibility for the Boston public schools made clear their intention to take no
action towards desegregation except under direct court order, they forced the judge to
take over what was in effect a major piece of social policy reform: the restructuring
and repositioning of the Boston public school system.
No education expert himself, Judge Garrity opted at an early stage for assistance in
the form of four "masters", of whom two were lawyers and two social scientists, and
gave them the task of devising a desegregation plan. To equip himself to exercise his
own independent evaluation, he secured the appointment of two "court experts",
academics with expertise in educational policy, on partial secondment from the
University of Boston, who acted more or less as his personal advisers. It was these
court experts as key members of the judge's personal team who provided the judge
with the expertise he needed to accomplish the task he had undertaken.
In the course of the litigation that followed, Judge Garrity handed down over four
hundred orders most of which were heavily contested by a range of interested parties.
Morgan v. Hennigan 379 F. Supp.410 (D. Mass. 1974) aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan
509 F.2d 580 (1st Cif. I974),cert denied, 421 U.S.963 (1975), enforced, 388 F. Supp. 581 and
40 I F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aff d, 530 F. 2d 431 (Ist Cif. 1976).
In Little Rock, Arkansas, order had to be restored by federal troops when State Governor
Orvil Faubus authorised the use of the national guard to resist the admission of black children
to the Little Rock Central High School. See Cooper v. Aaron, 368 U.S.I, 8-10 (1958).
These orders were drafted by the judge by and in consultation with his experts.
Widely seen as powers behind the judicial throne but not subject to any of the
traditional forms of accountability, their advice remained largely behind the scenes
and unpublished. It is the assumption of this research that this advice which the judge
treated as confidential to him is an important part of the documentary record of this
case and thus worthy of study in its own right. It is further assumed that examination
of the relationship between the judge and his experts will cast light on the arguments
of liberal political theory concerning the inherently anti-democratic nature of judicial
activism and add to the debate concerning the so-called limits of rights discourse by
providing a concrete example of the difficulties of translating articulations of
constitutional rights into long-lasting measures of social change which operate to
improve the conditions of life of the plaintiffs for whose benefit the rights have been
asserted.
II. Aims of this Investigation
The aims of this investigation are three-fold:
• To undertake an examination of the relationship between court expert and
federal judge in the Boston Schools desegregation case by reference primarily
to the documentary record.
• To consider the extent to which the relationship raises issues of judicial
impropriety or excess of authority.
• To theorise the relationship in such a way as to contribute to debates in legal
theory concerning the value of rights-based litigation as a mechanism for
achieving lasting social change.
III. Research Questions and Significance
The focus of this research is the relationship between Judge W.Arthur Garrity J., the
federal judge charged with supervising the desegregation of the Boston Schools and
his team of advisers, specifically his "court experts", the social scientists Robert
Dentler and Marvin Scott who assisted his efforts to design and implement an
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effective remedy. The research inquires: "why and how did the experts help the judge
desegregate the Boston schools'?" As, to date, no detailed study of their work has been
undertaken answers to these questions will be of importance to everyone who has an
interest in the troubled history of Boston's public schools. They assume a more
general importance if we ask a number of additional questions.
The first set of questions arises from the nature of the relationship between the judge
and his advisers and raises issues of propriety. Was the relationship within the proper
bounds of judicial behavior'? If not, why not and why was the judge not challenged?
The second set of questions arises out of the first but includes more general questions
which relate to debates in legal theory about the strategic value of constitutional
litigation. These perspectives might seek to explain the failure of the Boston school
litigation to bring about lasting change by reference to the alleged limits of rights-
based strategies or rights discourse in the struggle to bring about social change. This
research envisages two reciprocal questions: What, if anything, can we say about the
Boston experience from this perspective? What does the Boston experience tell us
about the nature of law and the possibilities of legal change?
IV. Constructing a Framework of Analysis
Questions of legitimacy in relation to the exercise of judicial power are properly
located within the mainstream of liberal political thought which continues to draw
heavily on the traditions of John Locke and John Stuart Mill concerning the proper
limits to be placed upon the power of the state. 4 Within this tradition, explanations of
the nature and boundaries of the judicial role lay stress upon the importance of the
proper separation of the judicial function from the other functions of government and
rely on conceptualizations of "due process" based upon a commitment to
adversarialism and natural justice as the proper characteristics of judicial procedure'
This type of discourse also accords weight to the importance of rights as a
mechanism for mediating the relationship between citizen and state. Although recent
See JOliN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 1960 (Peter Las1ett ed. 1960); JOHN
STUART MILL ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS(John Greyed. 1991).
See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE(1979).
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contributions to the literature chart an increasingly global acceptance of the value of
the constitutionalization of rights in the liberal democratic state, the history of the
desegregation experience in the United States lends support to sceptics who query the
ability of law and legal process to bring about social change which endures."
Particularly influential has been the work of former NAACP Legal Defense Fund
attorney and Harvard law professor Derrick Bel1.7 Bell's skepticism of the value of
the NAACP's long-standing commitment to desegregation as a mechanism for
improving the quality of education for black children found resonance in the Boston
case, influencing the strategies of the black plaintiffs' attorney and contributing to the
difficulties experienced by the judge in withdrawing from the case.
It is the assumption of this research that whilst the first set of research questions
concerning the issue of propriety falls squarely within the preoccupations of
mainstream liberal theory, the second set of research questions requires a critical
perspective. By challenging the promise of equal justice for all, the so-called
indeterminacy thesis puts into question the assumptions of mainstream liberalism and
foregrounds the role of contested power in producing litigated outcomes. A
perspective which views the civil rights suit as a site in which the content of
constitutional rights falls to be negotiated offers the basis for analysis of the role of
experts in school desegregation cases as an important part of the mechanism by which
content is given to the scope of the constitutional rights of the Fourteenth
Amendment.f The basic argument to be developed arises out of the interaction
6 See eg RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM(2004).
See eg Derrick A.Bell, Remembrances of Racism Past: Gelling Beyond the Civil Rights
Decline in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 73-82 (Herbert Hill & James. E
Jones eds. 1993).(hereinafter "Bell, Remembrances"). See also DERRICK A. BELL,SILENT
COVENANTS: BROWN v BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL
REFORM, 196-7 (2004) (hereinafter "Bell, Silent Covenants") (returning to the limits of the
Brown decision.: "Rewiring the rhetoric of equality (rather than laying bare Plessy's white-
supremacy underpinnings and consequences) constructs state-supported racial segregation as
an eminently fixable aberration. And yet, by doing nothing more than rewiring the rhetoric of
equality, the Brown Court foreclosed the possibility of recognizing racism as a broadly shared
cultural condition. In short, the equality model offered reassurance and short-term gains, but
contained within its structure the seeds of its destruction"}.
U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV S. 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
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between the judge and experts as representative of rival discourses of law and social
science and is explored in my paper entitled "From Pedagogical Sociology to
Constitutional Adjudication: The Meaning of Desegregation in Social Science and
Law" which appeared in the fall edition of the Michigan Journal of Race and Law for
2008. My paper draws heavily on sections of this work and a copy is attached hereto."
v. Methodology
A. Source Material and Rationale: The Archival Record
This research examines the relationship between court expert and federal judge in the
Boston school desegregation case by reference primarily to the documentary record.
This is identified as comprising three principal components all of which are now
housed in the Archives and Special Collections Department of the Healey Library,
University of Massachusetts (UMASS), Boston:
The series of memoranda written between 1975 and 1995 by court
experts Dr. Robert A. Dentler and Dr. Marvin B. Scott. These form part
of the Judge's chambers papers which he presented to the Library shortly
before he died. 10
2 The four hundred plus court orders handed down by federal court judge
w. Arthur Garrity Jr. in the Boston Schools case. These cover all aspects
of the desegregation process and reflect the degree of micromanagement
on the part of the judge which makes the Boston case distinctive.
3 The court transcripts. These provide a verbatim record of court
proceedings and thus a narrative context for the judge's orders and the
experts' memoranda.
The judge's chambers papers are extensive and arranged in seventy series comprising
fifty-seven ISO cartons. The court experts' memoranda alone comprise thirty-nine
folders. There is a helpful Finding Aid prepared by staff of the Archives and Special
Anne Richardson Oakes, From Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional Adjudication: The
Meaning of Desegregation in Social Science Research and Law 14 MICH J. RACE & L. 61
(2008) .
The papers were donated on December 8 1998. The judge died on September 16 1999 aged
79.
to
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Collections Department of the Healey Library, UMASS. II It seems however, that the
memoranda are not complete, having been edited by Robert Dentler with Judge
Garrity's permission and certain papers rernoved.l
As far as the court transcripts are concerned, there are in fact two sets which are
available for consultation but it has been a set-back to discover that there are
significant gaps in each. 13 The Archives and Special Collections Department, Healey
Library, University of Massachusetts houses the papers of the Center for Law and
Education which acted for the black plaintiffs in the Morgan litigation. Its papers were
donated to the Healey Library on October 30, 1995, by Robert Pressman of the Center
who acted in the litigation from start to finish. The papers include a set of transcripts
of the various hearings in the schools case but these are incomplete. There is another
set of transcripts in the Federal Archive at Waltham, MA. and two trips were
undertaken in the course of this research in the hope that the volumes missing from
the Center papers might be duplicated in the federal collection. Some gaps have been
filled in this way but others remain which are more or less identical in both
collections. I have been unable to discover the reason for this, but the fact of the
missing material coupled with the need to find a way of managing the large volume of
material has had consequences for the design of my research strategy. Thus for
example, the treatment of the Boston plan relating to teacher and staff desegregation,
parent participation and the various aspects of special needs provision which include
bilingual and vocational and occupational education is peripheral only. Similarly, the
budgetary problems of the school committee and the city which had considerable
impact on the course of the litigation are not dealt with here. Readers seeking
narrative details of the former are referred to Dentler and Scott's own account
published in 1981, while Adam Nelson's 2005 investigation of the impact of federal
funding on the Boston public schools and its relationship with the growth of special
II W. Arthur J Garrity Jr. Papers Finding Aid, Archives and Special Collections Department,
Healey Library, University of Massachusetts, Boston.
Interview with Robert A. Dentler, 14 September 2005, University of Massachusetts. Boston,
MA (hereinafter "Dentler 2005").
The Archives and Special Collections Department. Healey Library, University of
Massachusetts houses the papers of the Center for Law and Education which include a set of
transcripts. The Center acted for the black plaintiffs in the Morgan litigation. There is another
set of transcripts in the National Archives and records Administration's Federal Archive at
Waltham, MA.
12
i3
6
needs provision during this period contains interesting accounts and much detailed
material concerning the latter. 14
B. Referencing and Citation
Given the large volume of paper material, I have attached considerable importance to
the issues of identification and referencing. Having opted for American orthography
throughout in the interests of maintaining consistency between commentary and
source material, which is virtually all American, I have taken a similar approach in
relation to citation. There are two systems in use in American law schools, the so-
called "Bluebook" citation manual 15 which is used for court documents and is
preferred by law journals, and the citation manual published by the Association of
Law Writing Directors CALWO). This work uses the eighteenth edition of the
"Bluebook" supplemented in relation to the Garrity chambers papers by the Healey
Library archive reference where appropriate. Thus the reference "90 Garrity
XXXVII" indicates the number allocated to the series "Masters and Experts 1973-
1997", additional letters connoting the sub-series and folder number. Court documents
are identified first by docket number and date as required by the Bluebook and then
by reference to the Garrity papers. In similar fashion the court transcripts are
identified by court docket number and date as required by the Bluebook. In order to
access the transcripts, the Healey Library reference is required. This is "84 Center for
Law & Education: Morgan v. Hennigan Case Records, 1964-1994 Series V,
Transcripts" (84 Center for Law & Educ.) and this should be taken as the default
reference. On the rare occasions when the Healey Library records were incomplete
14 ROBERT A. DENTLER & MARVIN B. SCOTT, SCHOOLS ON TRIAL: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF THE
BOSTON DESEGREGATION CRISIS (1981) ADAM R. NELSON, THE ELUSIVE IDEAL EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN BOSTON'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1950-1985 (2005).
The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (18th ed.). The Bluebook is one of two general
citation manuals in use in American law schools, the other being the ALWD Citation Manual.
In the absence of specific court rules, court documents and most law journals generally require
Bluebook observance. I am indebted to Professor Gary Edles for contributing the following
comments: I) The II th Circuit requires Bluebook or ALWD Manual, observance. Some
circuits require state court decisions to be cited a particular way - e.g., they want both the state
and regional reporter citations given -- but otherwise they do not specify anything. The
Supreme Court and South Georgia follow their own often peculiar citation format, which does
not always correspond to the Bluebook. 2) The ALWD (Association of Legal Writing
Directors) Citation Manual has emerged in the past decade or so as an alternative to the
Bluebook and its producers claim that it eliminates the confusion, inconsistency, and
discrepancies found in the former. For example, in ALWD there is no difference between the
way things are cited in a legal brief and a scholarly article. At a rough estimate 90% or more
of law reviews still use the Bluebook. Since it is published by the law review editors at
Harvard, Yale, University of Pennsylvania, and Columbia, this is likely to continue.
15
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but the Federal Archive supplied the material this is indicated as appropriate by the
reference "NARA" (National Archive and Records Administration).
c. Interview Material and Rationale
This research has made only limited use of interview material. The research-gathering
process involved three visits to Boston, MA plus a visit to Indianapolis, IN and a total
of eight weeks intensive research in the UMASS archive. With the help of the
archivist and her assistant, it was possible to compile a more or less complete record
of the content of the extant Dentler and Scott memos, the Garrity orders and the court
transcripts in so far as they are available.
Interviews with the court experts themselves were regarded as a priority. Robert
Dentler who was then in poor health and is now deceased was interviewed twice, once
in 2005 at UMASS and the second time the following year at his home in Lexington,
MA. Marvin Scott was visited at Butler University, Indianapolis, IN in 2007. The
decision to structure Part II of this research around the theme of "race versus
education" was a direct outcome of my discussions with Robert Dentler. Whereas Dr
Dentler remained closely involved with the Boston schools case throughout the period
of judicial supervision, Dr Scott left prematurely in 1981. His knowledge of the later
stages of the case, particularly the attempts by the court to disengage and the exit
strategy which the Judge devised in order to bring this about, is thus necessarily
limited. He did, however, confirm the assumption on which Part II rests that what was
important for him on both professional and personal levels, was "integration" rather
than "desegregation" and he provided help with constructing a narrative account of
the first part of the remedial process.
Insights from all three interviews have generated material which has assisted the
construction of narrative and have influenced the selection of topic areas for particular
analysis (see section on Method below). I have gained supplementary narrative
material from the unpublished doctoral work of Marcia Muminghan who as
Superintendent Robert Wood's assistant was a direct participant in the negotiations
that took place between the school department, the court and the state that I examine
in Part I and the Wood plan discussed in Part II. Her account draws on interviews
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which she conducted with some of the major players together with her own
experience and may thus be regarded as first-hand.16 The primary focus of this work
however remains the documentary record. The decision to focus the research in this
way reflects both practical and academic considerations.
D. Practical Considerations
The extended nature of the litigation which lasted more than twenty years means that
the cast of personnel involved in the case is very large and the narrative issues
relatively well documented, at least in relation to the earlier part of the litigation. The
principal actors (some of whom are by now no longer alive) were interviewed
extensively in contemporaneous newspaper coverage. Day to day news reportage
appeared in the Boston Globe and other local newspapers and most of the published
studies and accounts to date have drawn heavily on this material.l Two journalistic
accounts reached wide audiences. IX Robert Dentler and Marvin Scott, the "experts",
published their own account in 1981.19 Whilst it is undoubtedly the case that there are
lawyers and educators still working in the Boston area whose personal contributions
would enhance a general understanding, the practical difficulties of attempting this
kind of research from the UK are considerable. Documentary research is both
manageable and, I argue next, academically desirable.
E. Academic Considerations
Academic analysis (as opposed to commentary) of the Boston Schools case has to
date been limited. A search of Dissertation Abstracts International (DAI) reveals a
large number of doctoral and masters dissertations dealing with aspects of schools
desegregation and a number which deal in particular with the Boston experience. In
the main, however, the perspective is that of education and the focus is that of
evaluation: what has the experience achieved for Boston's public schools? There are
16
17
See Marsha Marie Murninghan, Court Disengagement in the Boston Public Schools: Toward
aTheory of Restorative Law (unpublished Ed. D. Thesis Harvard University, 1983 ) (on file
with Kenrick Library, Birmingham City University, Birmingham U.K.).
1. MICHAEL Ross & WILLIAM M. BERG, " I RESPECTFULLY DISAGREE WITH THE JUDGE'S
ORDER" THE BOSTON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CONTROVERSY (1981).
ANTHONY J. LUKAS, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN TIlE LIVES OF THREE
AMERICAN FAMILIES (1985); ALAN Luro, LIBERTY'S CHOSEN HOME: THE POLITICS OF
VIOLENCE IN BOSTON (1977). See also THOMAS COTTLE, BUSING (1976).
ROBERT A. DENTLER & MARVIN B. SCOTT, SCHOOLS ON TRIAL; AN INSIDER ACCOUNT OF THE
BOSTON DESEGREGATION CASE (1981).
IX
19
9
two exceptions which do take a legal perspective but nothing to date with a focus of
the kind outlined here. 20 Most of the material identified above has never been
systematically considered by researchers in general and legal researchers in particular.
Judge Garrity allowed researchers access to correspondence he received from
members of the public, but refused all requests for interviews or public comment
while the case remained on the active docket. After 1985 when he handed
responsibility for day to day management back to the School Committee (whilst
retaining jurisdiction until he finally closed the case in the early 1990s), he did begin
to grant interviews and to speak publicly on the case though few records remain. To
date however, scholarly attention has focused primarily on the issue of conflict seen
from historical " and social anthropological perspectives.v' In focusing on material
hitherto excluded from the public record and the questions which it raises, this
research treads upon new ground.
F. Research Strategy and Structure
This investigation pursues two main lines of enquiry: why did the judge use experts
and how did the judge use experts? The goal is to arrive at a theoretical explanation
which will contribute to the discussion concerning the value of rights-based litigation.
To that end, the work is structured in two parts around two main themes: "legitimacy"
and "race and education". Part I addresses the first set of research questions (why and
how did the judge use court experts?) by reference to the issue of legitimacy. The
question here is to what extent the confidential nature of the rapport which was
established, particularly with Robert Dentler, undermined the presumption of judicial
neutrality which is a fundamental attribute of due process in an adversarial system. By
consistently refusing defendants' attempts to depose "the Deans",23 Judge Garrity
shielded them from the adversarial process which requires that all information be
produced in open court and available for testing by the familiar processes of
22
Murninghan, supra note 16 and Donald Norman Jensen, School Desegregation in Boston: The
Courts and Public Policy (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University 1979) (copy on file
with author).
RONALD P. FORMISANO, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE CLASS AND ETHNICITY IN THE
1960s AND 1970s (1991).
BRIAN J. SHEEHAN, THE BOSTON SCIIOOL INTEGRATION DISPUTE SOCIAL CIIANGE AND LEGAL
MANEUVERS (1984).
His common term of reference to Drs. Dentler and Scott who were respectively Dean and
Associate Dean of Education at Boston University, MA.
20
21
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examination and cross-examination. Moreover the judge evaded repeated attempts to
require him to define in open court the precise nature of the experts' role and the
extent of their powers.i"
At the time he received no serious challenge from the First Circuit on this account but
more recently, the judicial climate has changed.f The Rehnquist court withdrew its
support for the process of institutional reform and the use of civil rights law suits to
bring about social policy reform. 26 Circuit courts have become correspondingly more
circumspect in their support for judges who use advisors in such cases. In a number of
more recent cases outside the field of schools desegregation Circuit courts have
upheld allegations of impropriety where judges have had one-sided communications
with their advisors outside the courtroom." The question can now be asked: does the
documentary record support an inference that the relationship between the judge and
his advisors exceeded the boundaries of what would now be considered acceptable
judicial behavior?
Consideration of these issues leads into Part II and the second main theme: race and
education. This I analyze in terms of a conflict between two imperatives: the
legitimacy imperative of law and the "harm-benefit thesis" of social science. I argue
24 Infra, Part I.
The "First Circuit" is one of 12 regional, or "circuit," Courts of Appeal which sit directly
below the Supreme Court in America's federal judicial hierarchy and hear appeals from
federal district courts within their geographic jurisdiction. Each circuit court is autonomous
within its own region, i.e., the precedential decisions of one circuit court are not binding on
the others. Collectively, however, they are akin to the Court of Appeals in Britain. See
generally, PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTIONTO ADMINISTRATIVEJUSTICE INTHE UNITED
STATES 83-85 (1989). The federal district court in Massachusetts is geographically part of the
First Circuit.
The practice of attempting to reform public institutions, usually schools, prisons and hospitals,
via injunctive relief from the federal courts, for the purpose of enforcing the constitutional
rights of a class of plaintiffs is sometimes referred to as "structural reform litigation". The use
of the term 'structural injunction' belongs to Owen Fiss. See OWEN FISS, INJUNCTIONS415-82
(1972) See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281; Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term - Forward: The Forms of
Justice93 HARV. L. REV. 1(1979).
Edgar v. K.L. et al. 93 F. 3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996) (removal of judge and experts ordered on
basis of "cozy relationship" which undermined the appearance of neutrality); In re: Phillip A.
Brooks 383 F. 3d 1036 (D.e. Cir. 2004) (petition to remove Judge denied because he had
stated that he did not receive ex parte communications from Special Masters and Court had no
reason to conclude that he abused his discretion by refusing to recuse himselt). See also
Cabell v. Norton 357 U.S. App. D.C. 306, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (removal of Special
Master ordered on grounds of ex parte communications); cf., Bradley v. Milliken 620 F.2d
1143 (6th Cir. 1980) (no impropriety where post-trial the trial judge attended a meeting with a
political body that would be charged with implementing the relief).
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that the basic requirement of civil litigation that the successful plaintiff must have a
remedy entails that, as an aspect of legitimacy, the objective of the court must be to
return the plaintiff to the position that she would have occupied but for the
defendant's fault. Two consequences follow: a) the existence of a remedy is
predicated on a finding of fault and b) the nature and extent of the fault shapes the
form of the remedy. The significance for schools desegregation litigation is that
Supreme Court jurisprudence defines "fault" in terms of "racial discrimination". In
the absence of evidence of intentional discrimination, legitimacy considerations
limited the extent to which Judge Garrity and his advisers could bring about
educational reform; the case was a "race" case and not an "education" case. I explore
these themes in relation to specific aspects of the Boston plan and its implementation,
paying particular attention to the issues of school closings and the Boston Latin
schools.
The advantage of this strategy is that it permits theorization of the first set of research
questions (why and how did the experts help the judge) in a way which leads into the
second set of questions (What does the Boston experience tell us about the nature of
law and the possibilities of legal change?). To see the term "desegregation" as a site
of contested meaning which the judge and the court expert work together to fill is to
understand why it is that Professor Bell has argued that the value of civil rights
litigation is inherently limited.28 In accordance with this approach, the legitimacy
issues associated with my first questions are resolved at the end of Part I and are not
revisited in my final chapter which does not set out to present a summary of research
findings in what may be described as the conventional manner of empirical research.
Instead the aim here is to develop a contextual matrix within which to locate an
outline of an interpretive theory of the role of the court expert with which this work
concludes.
G. Method
The themes outlined above are explored in relation to five main issues: the
restructuring of the school department, the receivership of South Boston High School
(SBH), the development of a strategy of court disengagement, the desegregation of
28 See Bell, Remembrances and Bell, Silent Covenants supra note 7.
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the examination schools, and the search for an acceptable facilities plan. The research
reconstructs the narrative background of all five areas by reference to court transcripts
and other published material, supplemented as appropriate by interview material, and
identifies the advice given by the experts which it attempts to correlate with the
judge's orders.
In relation to the first and second research aims which seek to uncover and assess the
extent of the experts' influence on the decision-making process, the focus is the
restructuring of the school department, the receivership of South Boston High School,
and the development of a strategy of disengagement. A specific example relating to
the difficulties relating to disturbances at South Boston High School illustrates the
method and result. Racial conflict at the school required an urgent response from the
court and was eventually resolved by removing the head teacher and staff and placing
the school under the control of a receiver directly answerable to the federal court. This
decision was preceded by a week of hearings in the course of which evidence was
received from a range of interested parties, some of whom were directly questioned
by the judge. The memoranda disclose that the Judge received from Robert Dentler a
list of questions which in his opinion should be put to the principal, Dr Reid. The
court transcripts reveal that, to the extent that the questions were not raised by the
attorneys involved, the judge himself took the initiative in questioning the witness.
The inference of Dr Dentler's influence is readily drawn. Other example situations
show Dr Dentler making suggestions to the judge concerning the timing and content
of particular orders and submitting to him preliminary drafts. Comparison of the terms
of the orders as published or other action taken by the Judge with the
recommendations provide a basis for initial conclusions by reference to the criteria
outlined above.
The third research aim ([t]o theorise the relationship in such a way as to contribute to
debates in legal theory concerning the value of rights-based litigation as a mechanism
for achieving lasting social change) is similarly addressed via specific issues, in this
case the particular difficulties presented by the requirement for a facilities plan and
the problems of desegregating the elite Latin schools. Again, the intention is to
undertake a comparison of the judge's orders with the experts' memoranda. This time,
however, the expectation was that the experts' recommendations were not accepted by
13
the judge and the anticipated outcome of the investigation was to expose the disparity
between the educational agenda of the experts and the constitutional mandate which
confined the judge to matters of intentional racial discrimination. Uncovering the
extent to which legal constraints prevailed over educational aims highlights the
malleability of the term 'desegregation' which then becomes the basis for a theory of
the court expert and a return to Professor Bell's views on the limits of rights-based
action as outlined above. 29
H. Theoretical Toolkit
To explore the assertion that the role of the court expert is to assist the judge in giving
content to the term "desegregation", I have relied on two theoretical perspectives
which foreground the malleability of the law and legal meaning. The first is the so-
called "indeterminacy thesis" associated with the Critical Legal Studies Movement
and currently echoed by Critical Race Theorists and asserts the indeterminacy of legal
rights as representing the limits of the possibilities of civil rights litigation. 30 I use
these arguments to contend the negotiability of the term "desegregation" which opens
up a role for social science and the social scientist.
I then re-conceptualize this argument by reference to concepts drawn from post-
structural theory, specifically the role of discourse as a vehicle for generating and
resolving social antagonism and thus as a channel of social power." I see the
desegregation dispute in terms of a clash between two rival discourses; the discourse
of law and the discourse of the social sciences. Carol Smart has argued that the power
of law lies in its ability to "colonize" and absorb the knowledge of other disciplines,
in this case specifically the social sciences.v' Law is a legitimizing discourse that for a
period gave authority to the attempt by education professionals to transform the
nation's schools for the benefit of black children. But law is also a hegemonic
29
30
See Bell, Remembrances and Bell, Silent Covenants, supra note 7.
See eg Lawrence B. Solum L., On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987); Ken Kress (1989) Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV.283
(1989) Mark V. Tushnet Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the United States, 13
JOURNAL01' PULITICALPHILOSOPHY99 (2005).
These arguments are generally associated with the French post-structuralist, Foucault See
generally, Anne Barron, (Legal) Reason and its 'Others ': Recent Developments in Legal
Theory in JURISPRUDENCEAND LEGAL THEORY, COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (James
Penner et aI., cds. 2002).
See CAROL SMART, FEMINISMANDTilE POWEROFLAW 20 (1989).
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discourse with its own imperatives which will take priority over those of other
disciplines. I use this argument to explain the ultimate inability of the social scientist
to prevent the re-emergence of the pattern of resegregated schooling which
characterized the last decade of the twentieth century and will continue into the
foreseeable future.
Finally, I draw on post-structural theory to justify the use of the case study as an
appropriate strategy of interpretative endeavor. Specifically, I reference the work of
Howarth and Torfing who urge the value of discourse theory in general and the case
study method in the toolkit of empirical study of the "core topics" of the social and
political world.33
I. The Value of Discourse Theory and the Case Study Method for
this Research
Barron has commented on the tendency of critical legal theory in the last decade to
attempt direct engagement with the themes of contemporary cultural theory which
draws heavily upon the methodological and philosophical inquiries of late twentieth
century European thought." In line with this trend, this research draws upon some of
the analytical tools of post-structuralist theory to construct explanations of the role of
the court experts in the Boston schools case and their relationship with the judge.
Specifically it employs the concepts of discourse, hegemonic struggle, the empty
signifier and the hermeneutic community as a tool for explaining the mechanisms for
transfer of power, specifically, in this case, the transfer of the power from the
imperatives of one type of discourse (the social sciences) to those of another (the law)
and with it, the transfer of political power from elected representatives to the
unelected federal judge.
It also embraces a commitment to the value of the case study as a tool of
interpretation in the examination of social phenomena. Howarth has said that the main
33 Jacob Torfing, Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments and Challenges in DISCOURSE
THEORY IN EUROPEAN POLITICS: IDENTITY POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE (David Howarth and
Jacob Torfing, eds., 2005). By "core topics" he means topics from the mainstream of the
political and social sciences, ie "other than the 'allegedly 'soft' topics such as gender,
ethnicity and social movements", Torfing, id. at 25.
See Barron, supra note 3 I .34
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aim of discourse theory is to move beyond the descriptive towards the interpretive. 35
The task is to produce "new interpretations either by rendering visible phenomena
previously undetected by dominant theoretical approaches, or by problematizing
existing accounts and articulating alternative interpretationsv." This is a task to which
the case study with its ability to focus on the tension between the particular as
opposed to the general is peculiarly suited. Locating this research within Howarth's
fourfold typology of case studiea" the Boston schools litigation as an extreme case
becomes a dramatic focus to this attempt to offer an interpretation of the
desegregation endeavor in terms of the discursive opposition which lies at its heart.
VI. Desegregating the Boston Schools: An Overview
Although Boston never officially segregated its public schools by race, arguably the
struggle for racial integration began in 1849 when black parent Benjamin Roberts
brought suit against the city in the name of his daughter, Sarah, challenging the city's
practice of maintaining separate schools for black students and seeking admission for
Sarah to a white school more conveniently situated to her home than the run-down
black school to which she had been assigned. In ruling that segregated schools were
not per se unconstitutional Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw set a precedent for the decision
of the Supreme Court in Plessy v Ferguson'[ establishing the doctrine of "separate but
equal" which governed the country's race relations until the landmark ruling of Brown
v Board of Education that the existence of segregated educational facilities, no matter
how equal, were inherently unconstitutional. 39
Whilst the detail of the struggles that have beset the Boston public school system has
been well-documented by historians, political scientists, educators and journalists and
is in general terms outside the scope of this research, some knowledge of the scale and
narrative contours constitutes a necessary part of the contextual background. To that
35 David Howarth (2005) Applying Discourse Theory: The Method of Articulation in Howarth
& Torfing (eds) supra note 33 at 320.
Id.
See Howarth supra note 35 at 330-331 (identifying I) "extreme or deviant cases" 2) "critical
cases", 3) "maximum variation cases", and 4) "paradigmatic cases").
Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1849); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896).
Brown v Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
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end I have drawn on the accounts provided by Formisano.i'' Lukas41 and above all
Ross and Berg42 to now summarize briefly in narrative form the twentieth century
events which culminated in Judge Garrity's decision in June 1974 that the city of
Boston was unlawfully maintaining a discriminatory dual system. Ross and Berg's
account is a more-or-less day-by-day record drawn primarily from contemporary
newspaper reportage and has been particularly useful for this purpose. On reaching
the point of Judge Garrity's decision, I depart from a narrative in favour of a time line
in the hope that this will make for ease of reference by the reader as she progresses
through the text that follows.
A. The Pre-Morgan Events
The path that led directly to the federal courtroom may be said to have started in 1965
with the decision of the Massachusetts Board of Education to appoint a committee to
study the effects of racial segregation in the state's public schools. At that time the
Boston public school system contained forty-five majority non-white schools.43 As a
result of the Kiernan Report's conclusion that racial imbalance in the public schools
was educationally harmful and should be eliminated, the state of Massachusetts
enacted the nation's first Racial Imbalance Act.44 The Boston school committee was
unsuccessful in its efforts to attack the law as unconstitutional" but steadfastly
resisted State Board attempts to require it to produce a Racial Imbalance Plan. The
school committee and state board engaged in protracted adversary administrative and
court proceedings provoking a Department of Justice Office of Civil Rights review in
1970 and in fall 1971 sanctions as the State Board withheld an initial sum of $14
million of funding, the total withheld rising eventually to $52 million.46
In August 1971 in order to meet the Board of Education requirements, the Boston
school committee voted that the Lee School, newly constructed in black Dorchester,
should open with racially balanced enrolments, but a month later, following protests
by white parents whose children had been compulsorily assigned to the Lee, the
40
41
42
43
44
4S
46
See Fonnisano, slIpra note 21.
See Lukas, supra note 18.
See Ross & Berg, supra note 17.
Id., at 252.
MASS.GEN.LAWS ANN. Ch 71 SS37C, 37D (2008).
School Committee of Boston v. Board of Education, 352 Mass. 693 (1967).
See Sheehan, supra note 22 at 79-87.
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school committee reversed its decision and the state Board of Education withheld
funding in retaliation." The school committee sued in the Suffolk County Superior
Court for recovery, the State Board counter-suing on Fourteenth Amendment grounds,
thus escalating the conflict to a constitutional issue.4x In September 1971 attorneys
Leubsdorf and Adams of Foley, Haag & Eliot, representing black clients, met
attorneys Flannery, Pressman and Jones representing the NAACP who were
developing a class action suit on constitutional grounds and decided to merge their
two suits.49 In March 1972 suit was filed in the Federal District Court alleging
governmental discrimination in creating and maintaining a segregated public school
system.i'' Judge W. Arthur Garrity Jr. chosen by random selection was assigned to
hear the case.
Early in the following year Charles Glenn, Director of the State Education
Department's Bureau of Equal Educational Opportunity, prepared a racial balance
plan twinning white South Boston with Roxbury, a black area of the city. Professor
Louis Jaffe of Harvard Law School conducted public hearings and made
recommendations in favour of the state." In October 1973 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court ordered the school committee to put the state drawn plan into
effect the following September and in February 1974 the Archdiocesan Board of
Education ostensibly lent support by prohibiting all but a few special transfers into the
parochial schools. 52 As the policy exempted 172 Catholic schools in the suburbs,
many of which promptly admitted "refugees" from the city, this strategy has
subsequently been described as "deeply flawed." 53
On April 3 1974 a crowd of 25,000 people headed by leaders of the anti-busing
coalition demonstrated on Boston Common for repeal of the Racial Imbalance Act.54
The state legislature passed a measure repealing the Racial Imbalance Act which was
47
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53
54
Ross & Berg, supra note 17 at 79.
Id., at 80-82.
See Lukas supra note 18 at 219.
Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974).
Ross & Berg, supra note 17 at 82-83.
See Lukas, supra note 18 at 400
Id.
See Ross & Berg, supra note 17 at 124.
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sent to Governor Sargent on May I.55On May 10 1974 Governor Sargent announced
a veto of the bill and his intention to introduce replacement legislation employing
voluntary rather than mandatory methods of achieving racial balance. An amended
version of the Act was passed into law on July 26 1974 but by then had been
overtaken by Judge Garrity's finding, released on June 21, that the Boston public
school system was an unconstitutional dual system which in the words of the Supreme
Court was required to be "eliminated root and branch".56
B. The Morgan Litigation: Time Line
June 21,1974
August 1974
Federal District Judge W. Arthur Garrity Jr. releases his
liability opinion in the case of Morgan v. Hennigan+' In a
judgment of 152 pages he finds that the Boston school
committee, the city of Boston and the Massachusetts State
Board of Education have intentionally discriminated against the
black plaintiffs on the grounds of race. He orders that the
school committee:
"be permanently enjoined from discriminating upon the basis of
race in the operation of the public schools in the city of Boston
and from creating, promoting or maintaining racial segregation
in any school or facility in the Boston public school system
[... ] [and to begin] forthwith the formulation and
implementation of plans which shall eliminate every form of
racial segregation in the public schools of Boston including all
consequences and vestiges of segregation previously practiced
by defendants.'?"
As a temporary measure he orders the state racial imbalance
plan to be implemented for the school year 1974-7 (Phase 1).59
The anti-busing pressure group ROAR (Restore Our Alienated
Rights) led by Louise Day Hicks asks for a meeting with the
two senators, Kennedy and Brooke, in the John F Kennedy
Building before the rally planned for September 9. Senator
Kennedy attends the rally, is heckled and pelted with eggs and
tomatoes by a crowd of eight to ten thousand and is forced to
take refuge in the Federal Building, the glass doors of which
shatter under the attacks of the crowd.6o
55
56
57
ldatl27.
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.430, 438 (1995).
Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, (D. Mass. 1974).
Id. at 484.
Id.
Formisano, supra note 21 at 76.
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September 12, 1974
October 31, 1974
December 16, 1974
December 18, 1974
January 20, 1975
January 20, 1975
January 27,1975
January 31, 1975
February 7, 1975
The Boston public schools open. Buses carrying black children
home from South Boston High School are pelted with eggs,
beer bottles, soda cans & rocks. School bus windows are
shattered and nine students injured" In the aftermath Governor
Sargeant mobilizes the National Guard. The Pentagon places on
standby the 82nd Airborne Division troops stationed in Fort
6~Bragg, Ne. ~
Judge Garrity requires the school committee to submit a
desegregation plan by December 16 1974. 63 Five days before
the deadline a seventeen year old white boy is stabbed by a
black student at South Boston High School. The leader of
ROAR Louise Day Hicks is unable to control the crowd.64
The Boston school committee vote 3-2 to defy the judge and
refuse to submit a plan drawn up by officers of the school
department. 65
Judge Garrity threatens the school committee with receivership
and civil contempt proceedings.l"
The Plaintiffs submit a desegregation plan'"
The Boston Home and School Association (BHSA) file a
d . I 6t!esegregation p an
The Boston school committee file a plan allowing parents
several options including provisions for once weekly (for
elementary pupils) or fortnightly (for middle level pupils) visits
by paired black and white schools to a "Third Site" resource
center for training and experience in race relations.i"
Judge Garrity orders the appointment of Drs Robert A. Dentler
and Marvin B. Scott as court experts.i"
Judge Garrity appoints a panel of four masters under Rule 53
Fed. R. Civ. P. to consider the plans already submitted
commencing with the school committee's January 27 plan. hold
hearings and to make recommendations to the court. The
6) Ross & Berg, supra note 17 at 197-263.
Id, at 263.
See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 225-227 (D.Mass. 1975).
Ross & Berg, supra note 17 at 315-316.
Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. at 215-227.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ross & Berg, supra note 17 at 367.
Kerrigan. 401 F. Supp. at 227.
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March31,1975
April ro, 1975
April 17, 1975
April 18, 1975
April 1975
May 10,1975
June 1975
masters are required to consult the court experts in evaluating
the plans.
The masters hold hearings over a two-week period and after
hearing argument addressed to a draft report, issue their final
report on March 31 1975.71
The masters submit their plan to Judge Garrity"
Hearings on objections to the masters' report are convened.
Judge Garrity calls for updated data from the school
committee.73
The district court Issues its draft revision of the masters'
report'"
The district court hears comments.75
Marion Fahey is named as the new superintendent of schools76
The court issues its desegregation plan/decision on Phase II.
The court plan creates citywide magnet district and community
school districts as well as closing numerous schools, creating
college/university-school pairings, requiring more busing and
reassigning students once again. The plan, however, leaves out
East Boston. The plan also creates citizen participation groups
and calls for a Citywide Coordinating Council (CCC) to
monitor implementation of desegregation court orders. The
plan has many firsts for school desegregation cases: it is the
first time a citizen group is given authority to monitor, and the
first time a desegregation case combined quality of education
with desegregating the schools. The court also appoints an ad
hoc committee of three attorneys to assist in obtaining support
from colleges and universities and to conduct discussions
regarding implementation with college and university
personnel. 77
The court authorizes the court-appointed experts to resolve
some remaining issues relating to facilities utilization, program
allocation and enrolment limits. Subsequently each of these
actions are challenged before the First Circuit78
Id.
Id.
See Dentler & Scott, supra note 14 at 25-26.
See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 225-227 (D. Mass. 1975).
Id.
See Sheehan, supra note 22 at 152-153.
See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F.Supp. 216 (D. Mass.1975).
See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (I st Cir. 1976)
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November 1975 Plaintiffs move to close South Boston High School (SBHS)
alleging that black students were being denied a peaceful,
integrated and non-discriminatory education. The court holds
lengthy hearings and makes several visits to the school. 79
December 9, 1975 The court orders the temporary receivership of SBHS effective
as from 10/12/75. Area Superintendent Joseph McDonough is
appointed receiver. Superintendent Fahey is given enhanced
powers regarding safety and implementation. so
December 11, 1975 The court removes school committee authority over the Office
of Implementation and places it under the control of the
Superintendent."
January 9, 1976 Superintendent Marion Fahey takes over as receiver of South
Boston High School82
January 14, 1976 The First Circuit upholds the court desegregation plan'"
April 5, 1976 Black lawyer Theodore Landsmark is attacked by a
Charlestown mob advancing on the Federal Courthouse. The
picture makes the national and international press.f"
April 1976 Jerome Winegar is appointed Head of South Boston High
School.85
May 1976 The court announces Phase lIB of the desegregation project
emphasizing continuity and stability. The order leaves intact
the major elements of Phase II such as the nine school districts,
magnet schools and university involvement, but orders a
number of minor changes to reflect a reduced and increasingly
non-white student body. 86
September 1976 Phase lIB begins amidst confusion over the costs of financing
the desegregation plan estimated at $22 million. Teachers strike
against reductions in force following Mayor White's decision
to cut the budget request from the school committee by $30
millionS?
79 See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F.Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975).
Id.
See Transcript of Hearing of Dec. 9 1975,94, Morgan v. Kerrigan, No.72-911-G (D. Mass.
1975) (NARA).
See Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d. 527 (1st Cir.1976).
See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 40 I (Ist Cir. 1976).
See Formisano, supra note 21 at 150.
Id. at 117.
Morgan v. Kerrigan, Memorandum and Orders Modifying Desegregation Plan No.72-911-G
(D.Mass. May 3 1976).
Sheehan, supra note22 at 165-169.
KO
81
82
K3
K4
KS
86
K7
22
May 6, 1977
September 1977
November 1977
March 21, 1978
July 1978
August 1978
June 1979
October 3, 1979
Phase III orders are issued calling for the establishment of
conditions to enable the court to terminate its jurisdiction. The
court orders the creation of a permanent Department of
Implementation (01) with responsibility for implementing court
orders and calls for the parties to work together as joint
planners to produce a United Facilities Plan (UFP) which will
be a long-range plan for construction and repair of facilities.
The DI is in existence by July 1977.88
Phase III begins. Monitoring duties are transferred from the
court-ordered Citywide Coordinating Committee to the
Department of Implementation.F'
John O'Bryant becomes the first African-American to serve on
the Boston school committee since 1901. Anti-busing leaders
Louise Day Hicks, John Kerrigan and Elvira "Pixie" Palladino
fail to gain re-election to City Council. With the election of a
moderate school committee direct opposition to busing fades
but is replaced by opposition to school closings and revision of
the geocodes which are the basis for student assignments. A
coalition of teachers and parents begins to emerge. Dentler and
Scott later state: "no development in the entire case compares
with this one in significance" 90
School closings issues dominate the court agenda. The court
rejects the proposed UFP and calls for a plan which will meet
future needs and gain the understanding and support of parents
and community groups.
After a nationwide search Dr. Robert Wood is appointed as
Superintendent of Schools, the first such appointment from
outside the Boston public school system."
The court terminates the receivership of South Boston High
School92
Judge Garrity lists the criteria for federal district court
withdrawal from the Morgan case.
The Joint Planners publish a draft UFP which becomes known
as the "Green Book".93
xx Morgan v. McDonough, Memorandum and Orders Modifying Desegregation Plan No. 72-
911-G (D. Mass. May 6 1977).
Id.
Dentler & Scott, supra note 19 at203.
Robert Wood, Looking Back Without Anger: Reflections on the Boston School Crisis 120NEW
ENG. J.PUB.POL'y 19,20 (2005).
Morgan v. McDonough, 456 F.Supp. 1113 (D. Mass. 1978).
Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F. 2d 265,269-272 (Ist Cif. 1982).
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November 29, 1979 As a result of Superintendent Wood's intervention, plans for
"linkage" and "beacon" schools are put forward for approval.
The number of schools put forward for closing is reduced from
sixteen to ten. 94
January 1980 Hearings are held into the Wood plan. The proposals are
supported by the school committee but the court expresses
dissatisfaction.95
April 2, 1980 Judge Garrity rejects the proposals for linkage and beacon
schools and adds two more to the list of schools scheduled for
closing. School defendants seek a stay of the school closing
orders and appeal to the Court of Appeals contending the
District Court exceeded its authority"
April 30, 1980 Attorney Johnson for the plaintiffs withdraws opposition to the
motion for a stay of the school closings orders which is then
granted."
September 1980 With the rejection of his plan Superintendent Wood loses the
confidence of the school committee and is fired - ostensibly for
budgetary reasons."
June 1981 Judge Garrity asks all parties in the desegregation case to
prepare a Consent Decree so that he can withdraw from the
case. Negotiations chaired by State Education Commissioner
A . 99nng commence.
July 1981 Marvin Scott retires from the case for ~ersonal reasons. Robert
Dentler continues as sole court expert. 1 0
February 1982 Attorney Johnson withdraws from the consent decree
negotiations. Thomas Atkins, General Counsel for the NAACP,
moves for permission to replace him. Judge Garrity agrees that
both attorneys may represent the plaintiffs.'?'
June 1982 Judge Garrity loses faith in the consent decree negotiations and
b k . d' . f h di 102em ar s upon active irection 0 t e isengagement process.
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August 1982
September 1982
December 1982
July 1985
September 1985
Judge Garrity issues his draft final order designed to establish a
transitional mechanism for terminating the court's involvement
with the Boston public schools and proposing to appoint Robert
Dentler as s£ecial master with responsibility for compliance
monitoring. I 3
Attorney Johnson for the plaintiffs files a motion for a
"freedom of choice" desegregation plan. The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit upholds Judge Garrity's orders rejecting the
linkage and beacon proposals but warns the district court not to
interfere with educational matters that are properly the province
of the state: desegregation is not per se a mandate to equalize
schools.'?'
In the face of universal opposition, Judge Garrity abandons
proposals to appoint Robert Dentler as special master. He gives
the Department of Implementation responsibility for
desegregation implementation and the State Board of Education
responsibility for compliance monitoring. He establishes a
dispute resolution mechanism but retains default jurisdiction. lOS
Dr Laval S. Wilson becomes the first African-American
selected by the Boston school committee to be
. d 106supennten ent.
Judge Garrity Issues draft final judgment and notice of
h . 107eanng.
Judge Garrity having terminated permanently the court's
original remedial orders regarding student transportation,
bilingual education, school safety, and security, and school
discipline, issues "final orders" in areas where compliance has
not yet been achieved including vocational and occupational
education, school facilities, student assignments, staff
desegregation and parent and student organizations and
requiring implementation of the Unified Facilities Plan
(approved contemporaneously). 108
Between May 1990 and July 1994 the final judgment is
amended four times, three times by the district court and once
I 109by the Court of Appea s
103 See Morgan v. McDonough, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. August 3 1982) (Memorandum and
Draft Orders Toward Closing the Case).
See Morgan v.McDonough, 689 F.2d 265, 275-277( Ist Cir. 1982).
See Morgan v. McDonough, 554 F. Supp. 169 (D. Mass. 1982).
ADAM R. NELSON,THE ELUSIVE IDEAL: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN
BOSTON'S PUBLICSCHOOLS,1950-1985 239-40 (2005).
See Morgan v. Nucci, 620 F. Supp. 214,220 (D. Mass. 1985).
See Nucci. 617 F. Supp. 1316.
See Morgan v. Gittens, 915 F. Supp. 457, 460 n.2 (D. Mass. 1996).
104
105
lOb
107
lOX
109
25
September 1987
December 1988
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit holds that the Boston
public school system has attained unitary status regarding
student assignments and vacates the district court orders. The
orders requiring continued compliance with hiring practices to
ensure a faculty and staff consisting of not less than 25% black
and 10% other minority personnel are affirmed as these will
expire naturally when the targets are reached.U"
Consultants Michael Alves and Charles V. Willie, hired by
Mayor Raymond Flynn to develop a new student assignment
plan, propose a Controlled Choice plan which is accepted by
the Boston school committee. Shortly afterwards the school
committee votes to continue the set-aside for black and
Hispanic students of 35% of seats at the examination schools,
thereby converting it into a voluntary affirmative action
program. I II
February 1991 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismisses an appeal
by the teachers union against Judge Garrity's orders regarding
faculty and staff desegregation. The record showed that
unitariness in these areas had still not been achieved.I'''
August 1996 Judge Garrity grants Julia McLoughlin, a student challenging
the voluntary affirmative action program on equal protection
grounds, a preliminary injunction enjoining the school
committee from denying her admission to Boston Latin
School.lI3
November 19, 1998 The First Circuit finds the admissions policy for the public
examination schools which included racial/ethnic guidelines to
be insufficiently narrowly tailored to withstand strict scrutiny
and therefore unconstitutional. 114
July 12,2004 The First Circuit dismisses appeals from district court rulings
that the city's neighbourhood school assignment plan which
was facially race-neutral was "rationally related to achieving
legitimate governmental interests in fostering excellence,
equity and diversity through access and educational opportunity
throughout the public school system" and therefore did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. I IS
110
III
See Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313 (I st Cir, 1987).
See McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Cee, 938 F.,Supp. 1001,,1006-1007 (1996).
See Morgan v. Burke, 926 F.2d 86 (1st Cir. 1991); ccrt. denied Boston Teachers Union v.
Morgan, 503 U.S. 983 (1992).
See McLaughlin v. Boston School Committee, 938 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Mass. 1996).
See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (lst Cir. 1998).
See Anderson v. City of Boston, 375 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2004).
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Part One: Legitimacy and the Use of Court Experts in Boston
I. Introduction: Research Questions and the Significance of
Legitimacy
(A) judge's actions must conform to that narrow band of conduct
considered appropriate for so antimajoritarian an institution.
Whenever a court appears to manipulate the rules of litigation for the
atlainment of social outcomes, its authority wanes. 116
This section addresses research questions one and two: "why and how did the judge
use experts?" by reference to the issue of legitimacy. It assumes that Judge Garrity
used experts a) because this was the standard pattern of dealing with school
desegregation suits where school boards were uncooperative and b) because he
required expert assistance to help him understand and evaluate complex issues of
educational policy and management, 117 but suggests that the use of experts in this way
is problematic from the perspective of fundamental conceptions of due process as they
prevail throughout the common law world. Specifically, considerations of
adversarialism and the need to set limits to the judicial role are reflections of the
concern with the legitimation of public power which permeates traditional legal
ideology and represents the traditional focus of liberal political theory. I IS This is a
tradition which conceptualizes justice in terms of due process, and correct outcomes as
a function of the consistent application of rules and adjudicative procedures based
upon a commitment to principles of neutrality and participation.'!" From this
perspective a confidential relationship between judge and private advisor is
problematic to the point of illegitimacy.
116
11K
Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerhroker: Superintending Structural Change in
Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43, 104 (1979).
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F. 2d 401, 430 (1st Cir. 1976). Boston School Committee objected to
district court orders requiring court experts to supervise student assignments and the nature of
instruction. Per the First Circuit citing Hart v. Community School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F.
Supp. 699, 764-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d. Cir. 1975): 'Wc see nothing
unusual in these orders. Experts are commonly used to assist the court in planning
desegregation [... Land under the circumstances of this case were justifiably used to assure
implementation as well'. 530 F.2d at 430.
Nicola Lacey, The Jurisprudence of Discretion in THE USES OF DISCRETION, 370 (Keith
Hawkins cd. 1994).
The so-called rules of natural justice: nemo iudex in causa sua potest (no-one can be judge in
his own cause) and audi alteram partem (hear both sides).
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Legitimacy arguments in connection with the use of judicial power can be couched in
terms of absence or excess of power on the one hand or improper exercise or abuse of
power on the other'f". In Boston Judge Garrity deflected challenges to his experts
which were couched in terms of legitimacy but represented thinly disguised attempts
to reject his authority.Y' School committee arguments of absence or excess of power
failed because the underlying purpose was civil disobedience and the First Circuit
was supportive of the judge.122 Since then more recent judicial pronouncements
provide a framework for alternative arguments formulated in terms of abuse which
might have been more successful. This chapter examines the underlying assumptions
of these arguments and considers the relationship between Judge Garrity and his court
experts by reference to the Dentler and Scott memos. This material which was not
available to attorneys at the time but is now in the public domain forms the basis for
the narrative constructions which follow.
II. Structure
This section has three main chapters. Chapter I introduces the role of the court expert
in the context of a desegregation suit then problematizes it by reference to
considerations of adversarialism and due process as they apply to the use of judicial
assistants in a common law jurisdiction. It notes that although the use of court experts
in desegregation planning was sanctioned by the Supreme Court,123 in different
contexts and more recently case law has recognized its problematic potential.l"
For the purposes of developing a critical matrix, I identify two themes for discussion.
The first derives from the suggestion of the Seventh Circuit in Edgar v. K.L 125that
"excessive coziness" between judge and expert can undermine the presumption of
judicial neutrality. The extent to which the use of court experts or advisors will raise
an appearance of partiality when the appointment is not per se improper and has
120 See DJ. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL DISCRETION,
(1992) at 8 and note the parallels with Professor Dworkin's terminology of strong versus weak
discretion discussed in Galligan at 14. The literature is reviewed at 18, n. 9. See also Hawkins
(ed.) supra note 118 for a useful collection of essays which analyze both the concept of
discretion in judicial and extra-judicial contexts and the limitations to which it may be subject.
Infra, Section II.
Id.
Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. I (1971) (aff'g without comment the
decision of MacMillan J. at 306 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D.N.C. 1969».
Infra note 139 and accompanying text.
93 F. 3d 256 (7th Cir.1996).
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indeed been actively encouraged in complex or difficult cases is not clear.126 I suggest
that the apparent willingness of some courts to adopt justificatory arguments to
legitimize ex parte communications between judge and experts reflects instrumental
considerations relating to the efficiency of the decision-making process but concerns
with the appearance of neutrality arise out of a normative commitment to adjudicative
fairness which underpins common law conceptualizations of due process. 127
The second arises out of recent attempts by some circuits and notably by Ninth Circuit
Judge Tashima to develop procedural guidelines for transparency and disclosure
where a court uses a technical advisor and raises similar issues.l " I argue that
requirements designed to bring onto the record the nature and content of all advice
received address considerations of adversarialism which are primarily instrumental in
character; evidence which has been tried and tested in open court produces good
decisions and transparency facilitates appellate review,129 but the relationship of
prophylaxis to issues of appearance has been insufficiently explained and discloses a
tension between the normative and instrumental concerns of due process which
remains largely unresolved.
126 See Justice Breyer's concurrence in General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149-521 (1997)
citing with approval an amici brief filed on behalf of the New England Journal of Medicine to
the effect that "[jjudges should be strongly encouraged to make greater use of their inherent
authority ... to appoint experts". Justice Breyer's concurrence was relied upon in MediaCom
Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17, 29 (D. Mass. 1998) and Ass'n of Mexican-
American Educators v. California (AMAE), 231 F.3d 572, 590 (9th Cir. 2000).
See also Justice Breyer's remarks at the American Association for the Advancement of
Science's annual meeting in Philadelphia: Justice Breyer calls for Experts to Aid Courts in
Complex Cases, New York Times, Feb 17 1998 at A17. The Court-Appointed Scientific
Experts (CASE) project launched in 1998 by the American Association for the Advancement
of Science ("AAAS") offers help to federal judges seeking to appoint experts and may lead to
an increase in the use of technical advisors. See Robert L. Hess II, Note, Judges Cooperating
With Scientists: A Proposal for More Effective Limits on the Federal Trial Judge's Inherent
Power to Appoint Technical Advisors, 54 VAND. L. REV. 547, 580-582 (200 I) and
www.aaas.org/spp/case/case.htm.
See Gerry Maher, Natural Justice as Fairness in Tns LEGALMIND: ESSAYSFORTONY
HONORE, 103, 110-119 (Neil McCormick & Peter Birks eds. 1986) (arguing that the
normative basis for natural justice arises out of 'respect for the moral personality of those
involved in decisions which may adversely affect their interests' when, as members of civil
society, they have given up their right to judge in their own cause and thus become entitled to
an unbiased judge. Id at 118, 116 and note his suggested parallels with Laurence H. Tribe's
reasoning in respect of the due process provisions of the United States Constitution, Id. at 115,
n.29).
AMAE. 231 F.3d at 611 (9th Cif. 2000) Judge Tashima dissenting; applied in Techsearch,
L.L.C. v. Intel Corporation, 286 F.3d 1360, 1378, 1379.
See AMAE. 231 FJd 572, 611.
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In chapters II and III I move the focus from the general to the particular as represented
by the Boston schools case via the mechanism of narrative development. Chapter II
considers a narrative of illegitimacy as it was articulated by counsel for the Boston
school committee. The narrative was formulated in terms of judicial excess but the
judge's chambers papers donated to the Archives and Special Collections Department
of the Healey Library at the University of Massachusetts Boston Library one year
after the case was closed in 1997 reveal for the first time the extent of the confidential
relationship between the judge and his advisors and suggest an alternative framed in
terms of abuse.130 Chapter III draws upon the court experts' confidential briefing
memoranda which span a period of over twenty years to develop this second narrative
by reference to specific themes which characterized the Boston litigation and defined
its problematic character. To the extent that they shaped the experts' work, these
themes provide both context and focus for this inquiry and the contours of a
retrospective appraisal.
It has been asserted that the right to an independent adjudicator 'constitutes the floor
of due process.' 131 In the United States as elsewhere in the common law community,
the commitment is generally to an objective standard and an analytical framework
which poses questions of judicial independence or neutrality in terms of the
perception of a hypothetical observer.132 This reflects common law conceptualizations
130 Federal Circuit courts apply an abuse of discretion standard of review in recusal cases (See
RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES, § 33.1 (2d. ed. 2007) (hereinafter 'Judicial Disqualification'» This is a lenient
standard of review which is deferential to the trial judge'S decision. (MICHAEL E. TIGAR &
JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL ApPEALS: JURISDICTIONAND PRACTICE, § 5.06 (3d ed. 1999). See
generally Reilly v. U.S., 863 F.2d 149, 156-57 (Ist Cir. 1988). Accord In re School Asbestos
Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 778 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319
U.S. 21, 31 (1943) and Daniel 1. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil
Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1816-20 ([The inherent jurisdiction] "may not be exercised
in a way that amounts to an abuse of discretion. as determined by the appropriate appellate
court." Id. at 1820); Less deferential standards including 'de novo', 'plain error' and 'clearly
erroneous' standards have been applied by state courts in recusal cases (See Flamm, Judicial
Disqualification, § 33.1).
I do not however use the term in this sense but rather to connote the difference between
absence of power on the one hand and failure to exercise a power in accordance with 'correct'
considerations. See Galligan, supra note 120. The agenda of this paper is to highlight the need
for new guidelines to shape review in this context. On this see In re Kensington Intern. Ltd,
368 F.3d 289, 301 n.12 (3d Cir. 2004).
The Garrity papers are filed as Series 90 Garrity, Archives and Special Collections, Healey
Library, University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA (hereinafter 90 Garrity).
Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Due
Process. 95 YALE L.J. 455, 479 (1986). For the origins of the requirements of due process in
'the rich tradition of English constitutionalism' see John V. Orth, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A
BRIEF HISTORY. 8 (2003).
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994); Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition
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of natural justice as they have developed since the time of Lord Chief Justice Coke:
justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done,133 but articulation of the
precise requirements raises questions to which both foreign and national courts have
struggled to provide workable answers: Who is the observer? What does she know?
What is she looking for? The Supreme Court has recently had an opportunity to
grapple with these issues'<" but United States' formulations do not differ in principle
from those of fellow jurisdictions and all raise difficult questions concerning the
relationship between substance and appearance in common law grounded principles
of adjudicative fairness. 135
In cases involving the use of court experts where questions of judicial propriety arise
from the closeness of the relationship and generally also involve the status of ex parte
communications, the shift of emphasis from appearance to justification which the case
law discloses has implications for the wider issue. When the purpose of inquiry is
formulated in terms of perception and justification (did the special circumstances of
the case justify the appearance of 'partiality'") the answer is likely to depend upon the
view the review court takes concerning issues of fact: Was there in fact an improper
delegation of judicial function? Was the judge in fact improperly influenced by
matters which were not tested via the normal mechanisms of adversarial procedure?
The danger then is that the distinction between substance and appearance upon which
conceptions of judicial propriety have traditionally drawn is eroded. In attempting
some conclusions this paper revisits the legitimacy theme with which this inquiry
\33
Corp., 486 US 847, 860 (1988). For analyses of recusal standards in foreign common law
jurisdictions see R. Matthew Pearson, Duck Duck Recuse? Foreign Common Law Guidance &
Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASIL & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1814-1829
(2005).
See Lord Coke's formulation:" quia aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa, imo
iniquum est aliquem sui rei esse judicem" (because no one ought to be a judge in his own
cause, it is wrong for anyone to be the judge of his own property) in Dr. Bonham's Case, 77
Congo Rep. 646, 8 Coke 114(a) (1610). For a well-known formulation of this principle see
Lord Hewart LC] in R V. Sussex 11 ex p. McCarthy, [1924] I K.B. 256, 259 "(it) is of
fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done" and Justice Frankfurter's reformulation: "justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice" (Offutt V. United States, 348 U.S. II, 14 (1954». See generally
Redish & Marshall supra note 131 and at 480 (arguing that_concern about "potential
adjudicatory bias" came into constitutional jurisprudence via the English common law and
that the terms of Article III of the United States Constitution "reflect the framers' sensitivity to
the problem"). Richard E. Flamm suggests that early English common law required recusal
only where there was a direct proprietary interest and that the extension of British recusal
jurisprudence to concern with bias was a nineteenth century development. See
http://www.cce-mcle.aom/tests/ss6005a.htm and Flamm, (Judicial Disqualification) supra
note 130 at § 1.4.
Caperton V. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., _U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009).
See Pearson, supra note 132 at 1814-1829.
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began and asks once again whether the pursuit of legitimate ends can justify the
adoption of procedures which fit uncomfortably with fundamental intuitions of due
process and thus threaten the legitimacy of the ends they have been employed to
achieve.
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Chapter One: Court Experts in an Adversarial System of Justice
I.Court Experts and the Desegregation Toolkit
By 1975 when Judge Garrity had to devise a strategy to deal with the defiance of the
Boston school committee, the court expert or advisor had become a recognized part of
the desegregation toolkit. In 1969 in a case which provided the pattern for Northern
schools desegregation, Judge McMillan rejected a plan submitted by the school board
for Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC and ordered the appointment of a "consultant" to
prepare a new plan and make desegregation recommendations in accordance with the
legal and practical guidance outlined in his opinion. 136This was not however, the
first time that this had been done. In Oklahoma, when the city Board of Education
refused a request to employ experts who were "competent, qualified, unbiased,
unprejudiced, and independent of any local sentiment", IJ7 Judge Bohanon issued an
order directing four experts to carry out a study and file a desegregation report which
was then adopted by the Court138• In New York, Judge Weinstein, claiming to follow
Judge McMillan, appointed housing expert Curtis J. Berger as his advisor with the
status of "Special Master,,139 and undertook a review of federal court authority in this
field, concluding that both the inherent remedial jurisdiction and Rule 53 of the
Federal Rules of Procedure permitted the appointment of expert advisors to "bridge
the gap between the court as impartial arbiter of plans placed before it and advocates
protecting their clients' positions that are often narrower than that of society at
large.,,140
In Boston, Judge Garrity responded to the refusal of the elected school committee to
submit a constitutionally acceptable desegregation plan by appointing a panel of four
masters assisted by two experts to conduct hearings and produce a plan in accordance
136
137
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. OfEduc., 306 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D.N.e. 1969), 1308.
See generally DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING, WRITING AND RACE: TilE DESEGREGATION
OF THE CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS (1995). For a discussion of McMillan's order, see B.
SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOLBUSING CASE ANDTHE SUPREME COURT (1986) Ch
I.
Dowell v, School Bd. of Oklahoma City Public Schools, 244 F. Supp. 971, 973 (244 D.e.
ou 1965).
Id. at 973.
For a discussion of the nature of the task and the way in which he went about it see Curtis 1.
Berger, Away From the Courthouse and Into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78
COLUMBIAL. REV. 707 (1978).
Hart v. Community School Board, 383 F. Supp. 699, 764 (E.D.N.Y.1974).
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with guidelines set out by him.141 When members of the school committee asserted
that they would obey only the direct orders of the court, the judge assumed direct
responsibility for the implementation of the court desegregation plan and retained the
experts to assist him, although he never formally defined their role. Such was the
magnitude of the task that the judge retained active involvement for a period of 10
years 142and default jurisdiction thereafter. During much of this time the court experts
became the judge's private advisors and the visible manifestation of his authority
outside of the federal court room.
Whilst Judge Garrity was successful in resisting challenges to his experts' authority
and indeed did everything he could to enhance their apparent status 143 he was
undoubtedly aware that District Judge Battisti's use of academic advisors in
Cleveland had attracted the disapproval of the Sixth Circuit. 144 Noting that the
academic advisor appointed to assist the special master had met with the court and the
judge's law clerks on a number of occasions and that he had written memoranda and
drafted orders for the judge, the appeal court concluded that the academic "functioned
frequently as an advisor to the court on constitutional law issues. These activities and
communications did not occur in open court and the parties had no opportunity to
question [him] as a witness.,,145 To that extent there had been a "partial abdication"
by the judge of his judicial role.146
141
142
See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 227 (D. Mass. 1975).
In 1982 he returned responsibility for implementation to the school committee subject to the
supervision of the State Board of Education. See Morgan v. McDonough, 554 F. Supp. 169
(D. Mass. 1982). In 1985 he removed the case from the active docket whilst retaining default
jurisdiction. Morgan v. Nucci, 620 F. Supp. 214 (D. Mass. 1985).
By for example, insisting that they be addressed by their academic titles. See Dentler (2006)
infra note 197.
Reed v. Cleveland Board of Education, 607 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 747.
Id. "[W]e do not approve the practice of appointing legal advisors to a master or the court. To
the extent that the master was not qualified to make recommendations to the court because of
a lack of experience in constitutional law, he should have submitted such legal issues to the
court. The court could rely on his own experience and learning and the assistance of his staff
and all counsel in the case. The District Judge clearly had no intention to abdicate his judicial
responsibility in this case. Nevertheless, to the extent that he relied on advice received in
chambers from a "legal expert" there was a partial abdication of his role. [ ... ] [T]he adversary
system as it has developed in this country precludes the court from receiving out-of-court
advice on legal issues in a case. He must depend on his own resources, which include the
work of his staff and the offerings of counsel". Id. at 747-748.
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II. Adjudication in an Adversarial Model of Justice
Models of adjudication commonly distinguish between the procedure of the civil law
deriving from Roman law which characterizes the legal systems of the countries of
mainland Europe and their former colonies and the procedure of the common law
which is found throughout most of the Anglophone world and in particular in the
U.K. and North America. Civil law procedure is said to be "inquisitorial" whilst that
of the common law is termed "adversarial". The difference lies in the role of the
Court, specifically the role of the judge. The inquisitorial model is said to posit a
much more active role for the judge than that of "adversarialism" which sees the
judicial role as primarily passive in character. 147
Recent research has tended to question the extent to which such a juxtaposition
accurately represents the degree of difference between the two models and points to
the effects of late twentieth century changes which suggest that the two models may
be moving towards convergence.l'" Nevertheless it is true to say that as ideal types
there are significant differences of emphasis with implications for conceptualizing the
role of the judge. Broadly speaking an adversarial system is one in which the judge
assumes the passive role of a neutral adjudicator. Responsibility for the production of
evidence rests with the parties who have control over the way in which they construct
147 P. DEVLIN, THE JUDGE (1979). See also Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstones of the Judicial Process.
KANSAS J. OF L.& PUB. POLICY, Spring, 1993; G.E.P. Brouwer, Inquisitorial and Adversarial
Procedures: A Comparative Analysis. 55 AUSTRALIAN L.1. 207 (1981); Amalia D. Kessler
Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure. Due Process and the Search for an Alternative
to the Adversarial. 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005). A classic text is Lon L. Fuller, The
Adversary System. in TALKS ONAMERICAN LAW, 30 (Harold J. Berman ed. 1961).
Kessler supra note 147 at 1248-1250.
As Professor Resnik has pointed out adversarialism in the United States has always been
qualified: The American system was not, of course, purely adversarial. Inquisitorial traits
included the right of the state, as personified by trial judges, to exercise some control over the
evidentiary process: judges could summon or exclude witnesses and comment on testimony.
Nevertheless, our tradition is considered more adversarial than most, and its basic principle is
that the parties, not the judge, have the major responsibility for and control over the definition
of the dispute." Judith Resnik. Managerial Judges. 96 HARV. L. REV. 374,381-82 (1982)
(hereinafter "Resnik, Managerial Judges"). See also Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether
Adjudication, 86 BOSTON U. L. REV. 110 I, 1125 (2006) (hereinafter "Resnik, Whither and
Whether") (commenting on the move from formal adjudication in favor of alternative methods
of ADR, support for which can be in some measure attributed to dissatisfaction with
adversarial process).
In the United Kingdom, the introduction in 1998 of new Civil Procedure Rules represented an
attempt to bring about a change of culture away from the party control of classic
adversarialism in favor of a new culture of judicial case management in the interests of
efficiency. See Deirdre Dwyer, Changing Approaches to Expert Evidence in England and
Italy. INTL. COMMENTARYON EVIDENCE, Vol. I No.2 (2003) Art. 4 at 3-10.
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their case and the evidence which they choose to present+". This model contrasts with
the examining magistrate or juge d'instruction of civil law inquisitorial procedure
which gives much greater control in procedural matters to the presiding judge.150
Under an adversarial system, the receipt of information by a judge outside of the
courtroom from a source which was not made available to the parties for cross-
examination is prima facie contrary to common law due process conceptualizations of
the principle of judicial neutrality.i " In the United States, where the constitutional
guarantee of due process derives from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.P'' these
principles find specific reflection in 28 U.S.C. § 455 which provides that a federal
judge must disqualify himself 'in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned', 153 and specifically where the judge has 'personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts,154 in which case partiality is presurned.P"
The provisions overlap but are nevertheless distinct and the existence of
circumstances specified in § 455(b) mandates recusal even though the judge takes the
149
150
151
See generally Resnik, Managerial Judges. supra note 148 at 380-82.
Id.
See Reed v. Cleveland Board of Education, 607 F.2d 737, 747-8 (6th Cir. 1979) supra note
144; In Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, 176 A.L.R. 644 (2000) the Australian
High Court asserted: "Fundamental to the common law system of adversarial trial is that it is
conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal. Perhaps the deepest historical roots of
this principle can be traced to Magna Carta (with its declaration that right and justice shall not
be sold) and the Act of Settlement 1700 (with its provisions for the better securing in England
of judicial independence). It is a principle which could be seen to be behind the confrontation
in 1607 between Chief Justice Coke and King James about the supremacy of law. It could be
seen to be applied when Bacon was stripped of office and punished for taking bribes from
litigants. Many other examples could be drawn from history. It is unnecessary, however, to
explore the historical origins of the principle. It is fundamental to the Australian judicial
system."
See generally Brian Flanagan, Scalia, Hamdan and the Principles of Subject Matter Reel/sal,
19 DENNING L.J. 149, 154 n. 23 (2007) (noting that the objective appearance of partiality
constitutes the standard for judicial recusal in several common law jurisdictions.).
"No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." U.S.
CONST.amend. V;_"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST.amend. XIV § I. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955) (HAfair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.").
28 U.S.c. § 455(a).
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(I).
See United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1988) "Viewing subsections
455(a) and (b) together, we come to the conclusion that a judge must recuse himself when two
kinds of circumstances are present. First, recusal is mandatory when any fact reasonably
suggests the judge appears to lack impartiality. Second, recusal is mandatory when past or
present associations of the judge specifically enumerated in § 455(b) create the presumption
the judge lacks impartiality. ]f either circumstance exists, recusal is mandatory.
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view that they do not create an appearance of impropriety.P" In similar vein 157Canon
3A(4) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges prohibits a judge from
initiating or considering ex parte communications from "persons who are not
participants to the proceedings't'<' although the provisions of the Code are advisory
and failure to comply does not necessarily attract sanctions.l'"
The Supreme Court has considered the scope of § 455 on two occasions.l'" ruling that
it is not limited by a requirement of an "extrajudicial source factor,,161 but is an
objective test of appearancc'" to be judged from "the perspective of a reasonable
observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.,,163 These
156 Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 n.8 (1988). Note also that
whereas waiver is permitted under 28 U.S.c. § 455(a), this is not the case with § 455(b): See
28 U.S.c. § 455(e).
In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 783 (3d CiT. 1992): '[Ajppcarances of
partiality are likely if conduct is inconsistent with the related canons of judicial ethics
regarding judges' out-of-court associations with actual and potential litigants.'
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 3A(4) Commentary 150 F.R.D. 307,
313 (1992). Canon 3A(4) reads in full: A judge should accord to every person who is legally
interested in a proceeding, or the person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and,
except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte communications on the
merits, or procedures affecting the merits, of a pending or impending proceeding. A judge
may, however, obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a
proceeding before the judge if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and
the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond. A judge
may, with consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their counsel in an
effort to mediate or settle pending matters. Canon 3A( 4) 150 F.R.D. 307, 310-311.
On the history of § 455 see Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 543-548 (1994) and
Flanagan, supra note 151 at 37.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 144 which applies in cases of actual bias or prejudice and provides a
procedure whereby either party by filing an affidavit can force the disqualification of a judge.
The section only applies to district judges. For the relationship between § 455 and § 144 see
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECUSAL: ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 &
144, I (2002) (noting that "[tJhe relationship between the two has been a source of some
confusion.").
See Anthony M. Kennedy, Judicial Ethics and the Rule of Law, 40 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 1067,
1073 (1996). It should be noted that 'the rule enjoining ex parte communications with
nonparties has typically not been interpreted to preclude judges from having ex parte
discussions with their judicial colleagues, particularly when they are presiding over related
proceedings'. Flamm, supra note 130 at § 14.5.5.
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp, 486 U.S. 847 (1988); Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540 (1994).
I.e., knowledge acquired outside a courthouse. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554-555.
"[Wjhat matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance" Liteky, 510 U.S. at
548. See also Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. at 860 '[Tjhe goal of
section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality' .
See also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980): [The requirement of judicial
neutrality] preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness, "generating the feeling, so
important to a popular government, that justice has been done," quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (Frankfurter 1. concurring).
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000) (Rehnquist J. as a single
justice.) See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 861.
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formulations parallel similar tests in place in other common law jurisdictions and now
it seems apply to members of the state judiciary by virtue of the Due Process clause
of the 14th Amendment, 164 but as the Caperton dissent protested and the Fourth
Circuit has observed, "[ an] objective standard creates problems m
implementation." 165
Specifically, the requirements for an "informed" observerl66 and "a genuine
question't'" produce a recusal jurisprudence in which nonnative concerns with the
appearance of justice compete with instrumental concerns to protect judges from
"unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation" 168 or "judge-shopping" 169 or,
where a judge uses experts or advisors for assistance in difficult or complex cases, to
allow them to produce outcomes which are reliable and in which the litigants can
have confidence.l/'' The danger then is, as the Seventh Circuit has observed, that "the
appearance of impropriety standard [ ... ][collapses] into a demand for actual
impropriety'l'{' and a mismatch opens up between recusal decisions and the
perceptions of the ordinary person in the street. Judges, said the Seventh Circuit, must
bear in mind that the "reasonable well-informed observer of the judicial system" may
be "less inclined [than themselves] to credit judges' impartiality and mental
164 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., _U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2262 (quoting Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (l986):The proper constitutional inquiry was not
"whether in fact [the justice] was influenced" but "whether sitting on [that] case[ ... ] 'would
offer a possible temptation to the average [... ] judge to [... ] lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true"'(internal citations omittedj).. See also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133.
136 (1955): "[T]o perform its high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance
of justice"); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co .• 393 U.S. 145. 150 (1968):
"any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but
also must avoid even the appearance of bias."
Re Mason, 916 F.2d 384. 386 (7th Cir.1990).
See e.g .• U.S. v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir.)1998: "the hypothetical reasonable
observer is not the judge himself or a judicial colleague but a person outside the judicial
system." Cf. Re Mason. 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990). See generally Federal Judicial
Center: Recusal, supra note 158 at 15-16.
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 1155.
See United States v. Greenough. 782 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir.1986) noting: "There are twin. and
sometimes competing, policies that bear on the application of the § 455(a) standard. The first
is that courts must not only be, but must seem to be. free of bias or prejudice [.... ]A second
policy is that a judge, having been assigned to a case. should not recuse himself on
unsupported, irrational. or highly tenuous speculation. If this occurred the price of maintaining
the purity of the appearance of justice would be the power of litigants or third parties to
exercise a veto over the assignment of judges." Id. at 1558.
See Mason, 916 F.2d at 386; see also Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir.
1998), United State v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1990), In re Mann, 229 F.3d 657, 658
(7th Cir.2000).
See infra Part E.
Re Mason. 916 F.2d at 386.
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discipline".172 This is one explanation for the indignant tone of Justice Scalia's
refusal to recuse himself in a case involving his friend Vice President Cheney and his
assertion that the decision whether a judge's impartiality can "'reasonably be
questioned'" is to be made in light of the facts as they existed, and not as they were
surmised or reported.l " Recusal provisions, it now seems, do not cover the
appearance of favoritism "as reflected in the nation's newspaper editorials" where the
judge has stated that nothing untoward took place.174 In this area of law as in others
the apparent willingness of courts in appropriate cases to conflate matters of
appearance with those of substance, and thereby erode the distinction between the
two represents a "recurring trope,,175 in traditional common law formulations and I
return to these issues later. 176
III. The Technical Advisor as a Member of the Judge's Staff
A judge can claim privilege for internal deliberative processes'Y and Canon 3A(4)
does not preclude consultations with "court personnel whose function is to aid the
judge in carrying out adjudicative responsibilities"!" but the precise application of
this provision to the technical advisor remains unclear.
172 See Mason, 916 F.2d at 386. The Supreme Court made a similar point in Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp, 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988): 'The problem is that people who have
not served on the bench are often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning
the integrity of judges.'
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (2004) quoting Microsoft
Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, c.r., respecting recusal).
Justice Scalia refused to recuse himself in a case brought against National Energy Policy
Development Group (NEPDG) and individual members, including the Vice President of the
United States, where movant Sierra Club asserted "the American public, as retlected in the
nation's newspaper editorials, has unanimously concluded that there is an appearance of
favoritism,[and] any objective observer would be compelled to conclude that Justice Scalia's
impartiality has been questioned." 541 U.S. at 923 (citing Motion to Recuse 3-4) See
Comment, Duck. Duck, Goose: Hunting For Better Recusal Practices in the United States 84
N.C. L. REV. 181,190-193 (2005).
See Cheney, 541 U.S. 913 (discussed in Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-
Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN.L. REV.531 (2005).
Note, Satisfying the "Appearance of Justice ": The Uses of Apparent impropriety in
Constitutional Adjudication, 117 HARV.L. REV. 2708, 2708 (2004).
Infra Section I Part IV. See generally ANDREWSTARK,CONFLICTSOFINTERESTINAMERICAN
PUBLICLIFE (2000) 213-217 (arguing that the "reasonable well-informed observer" may
constitute too high a threshold and canvassing possible alternatives, eg an "unknowing and
disrespectful public" or "the most suspicious and cynical members of society.").
Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1996). See generally Kevin C. Milne, Note, The
Doctrine of Judicial Privilege: The Historical and Constitutional Basis Supporting a Privilege
for the Federal Judiciary, 44 WASH. & LEEL. REV.213, 213 (1987).
150 F.R.D. 307,313.
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In In re Peterson'[' , the "watershed case anent technical advisors,,180, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that federal trial judges possess "inherent power to provide
themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties,"
including the power to "appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in
the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a
cause.,,181 In Reed v. Cleveland Board of Education the Sixth Circuit, recognizing that
"[Tjhe adversary system as it has developed in this country precludes the court from
receiving out-of-court advice on legal issues in a case", required a judge to "depend
on his own resources, which include the work of his staff and the offerings of
counsel".182
For Senior District Judge Pettine in Reilly v. u.s. IX3 a non- testifying technical court
advisor was clearly a member of the judge's staff. Becoming in effect "a specialized
law clerk,,,184 the expert "sits throughout the trial or otherwise familiarizes himself
with the relevant testimony and evidence and then advises the court in camera." 185A
five-fold range of legitimate functions was detailed:
First, the technical advisor translates and interprets for the court the
technical language used in the case. Second, he offers an exposition
and delineation of the technical disagreement between the parties.
Third, he relates this disagreement to the broader principles of the
science or technical art involved. Fourth, he presents his own opinion
on the technical facts and related matters at issue. Finally, he may
conduct pertinent experiments, either on his own or in co-operation
with others.l'"
This offers a basis for approaching the activities of the experts in the Boston case but
provides no guidelines for determining questions of propriety concerning the conduct
of the relationship. On appeal, the First Circuit expressed the view that the advisor
acts "as a sounding board for the judge-helping the jurist to educate himself in the
179
INO
IXI
IX2
IX3
IK4
In re Peterson 253 U.S. 300, 312, 313 (1920).
Reilly v. United States, 863 F. 2d 149, 158 (1st Cir. 1988).
In re Peterson 253 U.S. 300, 312.
Reed v. Cleveland Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 747-8 (6th Cif. 1979).
Reilly v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 150 (D.R.I.1988).
682 F. Supp. at 152. See also Reilly, 863 F.2d at 158: the technical advisor was 'someone with
whom the judge could engage in "freewheeling discussion'''( citation omitted).
Id. at 152.
Id.
IXS
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jargon and theory disclosed by the testimony and to think through the critical
technical problems,,187 but the court warned that the advisor may not '''undertake an
independent mission of finding facts" outside the record of the case'188.
An opportunity for further consideration was passed over in Ballard v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue189 when the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to rule on the
propriety of excluding the report of a Special Trial Judge (STJ) from the final
decision of the Tax Court. The Commissioner argued that the STJ's report formed
merely a "step" in the court's internal "confidential decisional process" which could
properly be withheld from the record.190 Both petitioners and respondents apparently
conceding that due process does not require disclosure of internal communications
such as those between the judge and her clerk that take place within the judge's
chambers, 191the Ballard Court ruled that the STJ's report should form part of the
record but confined its decision to interpretation of the Tax Court's own procedural
rules and left the wider due process issues unresolved.l'"
The Tax Court is not of course an Article III court and the status of a court-appointed
expert should not be compared with that of a STJ who is a constitutionally appointed
"inferior officer,,193 with the authority to hear the cases assigned to him. The court-
appointed expert makes no judicial findings of fact, like those of federal magistrate
judges and court-appointed special masters. Nevertheless, as Circuit Judge Tashima
has recognized, the analogy with the law clerk is imperfect.!" The law clerk is at the
beginning of her career and works under the supervision and direction of the district
judge who is the expert in the law.195 The judge is well-placed to "filter" out bad legal
187
IR8
IR9
190
191
Reilly v. United States, 863 F. 2d 149,158 (1st Cir.1988).
Id. quoting Johnson v. United States, 780 F.2d 902, 910 (11th Cir.1986).
Ballard v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 544 U.S. 40 (2005)~
Id., at61.
See specifically Reply Brief for Petitioner, Estate of Burton W. Kanter et al. v. Cornm'r of
Internal Revenue, 2004 WL 735030 at 3, 9. The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court is
reported at 544 US 40 sub nom. Ballard v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue.
Ballard, 544 U.S. at 1284.
Within the meaning of the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution Art. II. See Freytag
v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 880-882 (1991).
AMAE v. State of Cali fomi a, 231 F.3d 572, 613-614 (9th Cir. 2000) Tashima J (dissenting).
See also Katherine Kmiec Turner, No More Secrets: Under Ballard v. Cmmr., Special Trial
Judge Reports Must Be Revealed, 1. NAT'LA. ADMIN.LAWJUDGES247, 262 (2006).
AMAE, 231 F.3d 572,613-614. See also Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses:
Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, (1998) (canvassing the
suggestion that appointment of an advisor as a law clerk might come within the scope of
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advice or research.l'" Moreover, the clerk stays with the judge for only a year, two
years at the most. By contrast, the court expert, by definition, is appointed for
expertise and retained, in the case of protracted litigation over a period of years. In
the Boston schools case, Judge Garrity had many law clerks some of whom have been
credited with the design of significant desegregation measures.l'" The working
relationship between Judge Garrity and expert Robert Dentler however spanned the
best part of twenty years in the course of which their mutual professional regard
developed into a personal friendship'" and must be regarded as something
qualitatively different. In such a case, an inference of, at the least, heavy reliance
readily arises.
IV. Edgar Coziness: Appearance versus Substance
As Judge Tashima has pointed out, over-reliance by the judge on his expert advisor
compromises not only his neutrality but also, where the extent of the expert's
influence is not apparent from the record and the parties have no opportunity to
respond to the advice received, the possibility of appellate review.i'"
196
Canon 3A(4), Commentary, 150 F.R.D. at 313 and rejecting the parallel). Id. at n. 378 and
accompanying text.
AMAE, 231 F.3d 572, 613-614. The Sixth Circuit has taken the view that off-the-record
briefings and reports received by a judge from her law clerk are not necessarily immune from
requirements of disclosure. See Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416 (6th
Cir. 1981) (holding that a law-clerk's report of an off-the record observation intended to assist
the judge to understand the evidence attracted a presumption of prejudice but that this was
overcome where there was no evidence that the judge had considered the report as evidence or
that his fact-finding had been improperly influenced.). Id. at 420.
Of particular interest are Tom Hayes who designed the assignment guidelines, (see ROBERTA.
DENTLER& MARVINB. SCOTT,SCHOOLSONTRIAL:AN INSIDEACCOUNTOF THEBOSTON
DESEGREGATIONCASE41-42 (1981 ),) and Karen Green, nee Falkender, whose interest in
negotiation, Robert Dentler has claimed in interview, helped the Judge devise a strategy for
disengagement. (Interview with author at his home in Lexington, MA, September 21, 2006
(hereinafter "Dentler 2006")).
Judge Garrity wrote numerous references for Dentler expressing his regard in the highest
possible terms. The series also contain personal letters from Dentler alluding to visits and
hospitality between the two families (correspondence on file with Archives & Special
Collections, Healey Library, UMASS, Boston, MA, under reference 90 Garrity XXXVII
Masters & Experts: Personnel 1975-97 f. 1).
See Tashima J (dissenting) AMAE, 231 F. 3d at 614:'[ ... ] factual issues, no matter how
technical, are committed to the factfinder and, to be reviewed properly, must be based on the
record made in the trial court.' Id.
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Before the decision of the Supreme Court in Litek/oo neutrality issues in cases
concernmg technical advisors were seen as limited by an "extra-judicial source"
requirement, i.e. ex parte communications and discussions were regarded as "judicial
activities" and thus not within the scope of the statutory recusal provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 455(a)_201 Since that decision the argument no longer stands202 but the
Justices have yet to provide guidelines for appeal courts in these cases. In Edgar v.
K.L. et al,203the Seventh Circuit considered that a judge overstepped the mark in a
mental health case on the basis that his private meetings and ex parte communications
with a panel of court-appointed experts had compromised his impartiality. The
relationship had become "excessively cozy,,;204 a reasonable observer would have had
concerns about the court's ability to conduct the trial irnpartially.i'" Thus where the
district judge had blocked discovery and declined to state on the record his own
memories of what had happened, his claim of judicial privilege invited the inference
f i . 106o impropriety."
Although the experts in this case were appointed under Fed. R. Evid. 706(a) as
opposed to the inherent jurisdiction or Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a), as in the Boston case, the
parallels in terms of the nature of the task undertaken by the judge and the apparent
closeness of the relationship make "Edgar coziness'v'" an attractive indicium or
performance indicator for a narrative based on 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) "appearance"
issues where the experts were known to be partisan and the judge made no secret of
the confidence that he reposed in them.20s Closer reading however indicates that what
really seems to have troubled the Seventh Circuit in Edgar was the substantive issue
200 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
See Bradley v. Millikin, 620 F.2d 1143, 1157 (6th Cir. 1980), discussed infra note 228 and
accompanying text. Accord Davis v. Board of School Com'rs of Mobile County, 517 F.2d
1044,1052 (5th Cir. 1975) and Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hospital and Training School, 757 F.
Supp. 1231, 1240-41 (D.N.M. 1990).
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554-555. See note 161 supra and accompanying text. In relation to §
455(b) (I) however, "alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an
extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the
judge learned from his participation in the case", United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563,583.
Edgar v. K.L. et al., 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Duff v. Governor of
Illinois, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997).
Edgar, 93 F.2d at 260.
Id.
Edgar, 93 F.2d at 258.
Edgar, 93 F.2d at 260.
See Edgar, 93 F.2d at 260.
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that the judge had in fact and impermissibly accepted contestable conclusions which
had not been tested in court.209
The private briefings to the judge in his chambers raised similar concerns. Whether
the effect was to give the judge impermissible "personal knowledge" did not depend
primarily upon whether the information was acquired inside or outside the
courthouse. The determining factor was whether or not the information was available
for testing and contesting via the adversarial process.i'" Thus:
(0)ff-the-record briefings in chambers have no trace in the record - and
in this case the judge has forbidden any attempt at reconstruction.
What information passed to the judge, and how reliable it may have
been, are now unknowable. This is "personal" knowledge no less than
if the judge had decided to take an undercover tour of a mental
institution to see how the patients were treated. Instead of going
himself, this judge appointed agents, who made a private report of how
they investigated and what they had leamed.i!'
Mandatory disqualification under § 455(b)(l )212 followed. The Seventh Circuit took
the view that not only should the judge be disqualified but so should the experts -
they had been influenced by secret submissions from advocacy groups and counsel
supporting plaintiffs in other litigation against the state. "Experts appointed and
supervised by a court carry special weight because of their presumed neutrality.,,213
The experts had assumed a partisan role.214
Two more recent Ninth Circuit decisions evidence a similar focus. In A & M Records
v. Napster Inc.215 the appellate court dismissed a challenge where the technical
advisor did not "displace the district court's judicial role" nor "unilaterally issued
209
210
211
Id.
The distinguishing feature between "personal knowledge" and knowledge gained in a judicial
capacity is that information from the latter source enters the record and may be controverted
or tested by the tools of the adversary process. Knowledge received in other ways. which can
be neither accurately stated nor fully tested. is "extrajudicial." Edgar. 93 F.2d at 259
(following Liteky v. United States 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
Edgar. 93 F.3d at 259.
28 U.S.C § 455(b) (1).
Edgar. 93 F.3d at 262.
Edgar. 93 F.3d 256, 261: One expert 'has shed any pretense that he is playing a scientific role'
when he urged the Judge to release the panel's report so that it could serve as a "flag for
advocacy groups to rally around to assert political] pressure." Id.
A & M Records v. Napster Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th CiT.2002).
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findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding [defendant Napster's]
compliance'Y'" In Federal Trade Comm 'n v. Entforma Natural Products, Inc.217 a
similar challenge did however succeed where the court found that although the record
was sparse, there was evidence of actual improper reliance.i'" In neither judgment is
there concern that the fact of the relationship per se might raise § 455(a) appearance
Issues.
v. Justification and Prophylaxis
Case law discloses two other analytical tools to complete the critical matrix but as
neither satisfactorily distinguishes between substantive and appearance issues they
are not problem-free.
The first is the justificatory emphasis apparent in some appellate decisions notably
where the court considers that the objections raised smack of "sandbagging'r '" or the
district judge has encountered a degree of opposition. In Reilly itself, a medical
negligence case, the First Circuit whilst confirming that appointments of non-
testifying technical advisors should be the exception and not the ruJe220 was
supportive of the district judge in the absence of evidence to suggest that the district
court had "allowed the boundaries to be overrun".221 The fact that the advisor had
216 A & M Records, 284 F.3d at 1097.
Federal Trade Comrri'n v. Entforma Natural Products, Inc., 362 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir.2004).
Entforma, 362 F.3d at 1214, n 10: 'The district court judge indicated that "If the court-
appointed expert agrees with the defendants, I suspect I'm going to agree with him. If he
agrees with the plaintiffs, I suspect I'm going to agree with him".
Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 160 (lst Cir. 1988): "The government, knowing of the
court's plan to consult with a technical advisor, waited to see which way the wind blew. Only
when the case turned out disastrously from the government's viewpoint did appellant decide to
voice its litany of concerns about the circumstances of the appointment."
Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156: "We concur wholeheartedly that appointments of technical advisors
should be exception and not rule, and should be reserved for truly extraordinary cases where
introduction of outside skills and expertise, not possessed by district judge, will hasten just
adjudication of dispute without dislodging delicate balance of juristic role; modality is, if not
last, near-to-Iast resort, to be engaged only where district court is faced with problems of
unusual difficulty, sophistication, and complexity, involving something well beyond regular
questions of fact and law with which judges must routinely grapple". 863 F. 2d at 156.
The Court confirmed that Fed. R. Evid. 706 which requires expert witnesses to share findings
with the parties and submit to depositions and cross-examination did not apply to non-
testifying court advisers; 863 F. 2d at 155.
Id. at 158.
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received no written instructions and submitted no written report was not to be
regarded as fatal where the challenge to the judge was motivated by opportunism. m
More recently, the D.C. Circuit in what it described as a piece of "contentious and
complicated litigation,,223 has ruled that disqualification of a district judge for ex parte
communications with his agents, a special master and a special master-court monitor,
was not warranted because a reasonable and informed observer would not have
questioned the judge's impartiality.r'" Although during four years of litigation the
judge met with his agents many times to oversee and coordinate their efforts, the
appellate court accepted his unequivocal assurance that he knew of no substantive
information that was provided during any of their consultations. 225Petitioners' claim
for discovery of the ex parte communications themselves was dismissed as
"extraordinary" where the judge had expressly stated they regarded matters which
were procedural and not substantive.i'"
Two decisions from the desegregation era, u.s. v. Yonkers Board of Education,227 a
housing case, and Bradley v. Millikin, a school case, 228 evidence a similar approach.
In Yonkers, where the district court appointed an outside housing advisor to provide
expert advice and assistance regarding the implementation of the court's orders and to
coordinate the activity of various parties, including government agencies, the Second
Circuit affirmed denial of a motion for recusal on the basis of judge's ex parte
communications with his advisor where the information received did not relate to
disputed evidentiary facts: 229
We conclude that ex parte contacts by the (outside advisor) are merely
part of the performance of (the judge's) prescribed duty and did not
create an appearance of partiality on the part of the district court
judge.23o
222
223
Id. at 161.
In re Brooks. 383 F. 3d 1036, 1043 (CA.D.C. 2004) (denying petition from a writ of
mandamus requiring recusal of District Court Judge Lamberth).
In re Brooks, 383 F. 3d 1036,1041-1043.
In re Brooks, 383 F. 2d at 1043.
Id., at 1043-44. But see the later decision of the Supreme Court in Ballard v. Comm'r., 544
U.S. 40 (2005) (Ginsburg 1., Rehnquist and Thomas JJ. dissenting) supra note 189 and
accompanying text.
U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. ofEduc., 946 F.2d (2d Cir. 1991).
Bradley v. Millikin, 620 F.2d 1143(6th Cir. 1980).
u.s. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 180,184 (2d Cir. 1991). See a/so discussion in Cobell
v. Norton, 237 F. Supp. 2d 71, 90 (D.D.C. 2003).
Idat 184.
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Similarly the Court affirmed the district judge's denial of a motion to compel
discovery of communications between the advisor and the judge: "a degree of
confidentiality is justifiable in light of attempts to block implementation of (the
consent decree) by the City and other groups". 231
In Bradley the Sixth Circuit upheld Judge DeMascio's refusal to recuse himself on
the grounds that his ex parte contacts and discussions with court-appointed experts
and community groups violated Canon 3A(4) where the remedial phase of the
litigation had been protracted and arduous232 the judge had conducted himself in an
exemplary manner233 and the court's authority to utilize experts was not in issue, the
Sixth Circuit asserting simply: "We do not believe Judge DeMascio's use of experts,
or his receipt through them of community and expert views, required recusal".234 The
court did however express its concern about the absence of a documentary record and
required that all future expert assistance should be recorded in written reports, with
copies to all parties.i"
"Paucity of information in the record,,236 was an issue in Association of Mexican-
American Educators (AMAE) v. California, when the Ninth Circuit, refused to fault a
district judge on the grounds of improper interaction with his non-testifying technical
advisor where there was no evidence that the judge had failed to do his job
properly.237 Circuit Judge Tashima in dissent protested the majority's "cursory and
231
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Idat 185.
Bradley, 620 F.2d 1143, 1158.
620 F. 2d at 1158. See also Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. and Training School, 757 F. Supp.
1231,1239-1240 (D.N.M. 1990) (District judge refused to recuse himself on the grounds of ex
parte communications with his court-expert where the judge stated that he had not been
influenced by nor relied on the expert's findings or opinions, a reasonable person would not
have doubted the judge's impartiality and the challenge was an attempt to avoid the
consequence of an anticipated adverse decision.). But ctU.S. v. Craven, 239 F.3d 91, 10I-I 03
(I st Cir. 200 I) (In a criminal case ex parte communications with court-appointed psychologist
prior to sentencing constituted error; the sentence would be vacated and the case remanded to
another judge for sentencing).
Bradley v. Millikin, 620 F.2d 1143, 1158 (6th Cir. 1980).
620 F. 2d at 1158. In relation to 28 U.S.c. § 455(a) the court ruled that the judge's activities
were judicial and thus outside the scope of the statute (620 F. 2d at 1157). Post Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), these arguments no longer stand.
AMAE v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000).
AMAE, 231 F.3d at 591.
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mistaken treatment of the technical advisor issue"m which failed to give proper
account of the risks of over-reliance on the expert by the judge and potential partiality
or absence of neutrality on the part of the advisor.239 In this case, such a review was
not possible for the simple reason that there was no appropriate documentary
record.24o
If the content of the communications between the trial judge and the
advisor is hidden from the parties (and appellate review), and where
the parties have no opportunity to respond to the advisor's statements,
[... ][ ... ] we are utterly unable, on this record, to review the propriety
of [the advisor's] advice to the district court because we have no idea
what role he played in the district court's fact-finding process.?"
The risks can be minimized by attention to procedure. Thus "minimally" a district
court appointing a technical advisor should:
1) utilize a fair and open [appointments] procedure [... ], 2) address any
allegations of bias, partiality or lack of qualification; 3) clearly define
and limit the technical advisor's duties; 4) make clear to the technical
advisor that any advice he gives to the court cannot be based on any
extra-record information; and 5) make explicit, either through an
expert's report or a record of ex parte communications, the nature and
content of the technical advisor's advice.242
This attempt to formulate procedural guidelines had been anticipated by the First
Circuit in Reilly and now appears to form part of Ninth Circuit law but the underlying
purpose is far from clear. 243 The Reilly Court spoke of "prophylactic measures" and
of "fundamental fairness" 244 but did not explain whether the prophylaxis was directed
towards substance or appearance or both. Subsequent Ninth Circuit endorsement has
23M
239
240
241
AMAE, 231 F.3d at 609.
AMAE. 231 F.3d at 611.
Id.
Id. citing Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping; Technical Advisors and Scientific Evidence.
110 HARV. L. REV.941 (1997).
AMAE. 231 F.3d at 611.
AMAE, 231 F.3d at 611 Judge Tashima dissenting; applied in Techsearch, L.L.c. v. Intel
Corporation, 286 F.3d 1360, 1378-1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (predicting that these guidelines
would now form part of Ninth Circuit law). See also Federal Trade Commission v. Enforma
Natural Products, Inc., 362 F.3d 1204, 1215 (9th Cir.2004): "We take this opportunity to join
a number of courts that have endorsed Judge Tashima's recommendations". In Conservation
Law Found. v. Evans, 203 F. Supp. 2d 27, 31. n.3 (D.D.C.2002) the court noted that it had
been guided "in large part by the extremely thoughtful and oft-cited dissent of Judge Tashima
in [AMAE]".
Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 159-160 (1988).
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stressed the importance of procedure in facilitating appellate review suggesting that
the target is substantive impropriety rather than appearances=" but as the Third
Circuit has pointed out fairness as appearance itself has two aims and the
requirements of § 455 246 address "not only fairness to the litigants but also the
public's confidence in the judiciary, which may be irreparably harmed if a case is
allowed to proceed before a judge who appears to be tainted. ,,247 Procedural
safeguards designed to prevent substantive impropriety or to facilitate correction on
appellate review address the first of these aims but not the second.
Moreover it is difficult to understand how either prophylaxis or justification can have
much of a role within an analytical matrix which purports to make no ontological
distinction between appearance and substance. As has been pointed out, the fact that a
process appears improper ought in principle to make it actually improper.i" If as the
cases suggest, appellate courts are willing to sanction occasional judicial forays
outside the confines of adversarial process on the grounds of the particular
circumstances of the case, the answer must be that they have done so pragmatically
and because they recognize with Judge Tashima that the role played by a technical
advisor is "unique".249 The question is whether in so doing they have succumbed to
the temptation to "look into the mirror,,25o of their own experience and understanding
and in so doing moved too far from the perceptions of the ordinary members of the
public upon which confidence in the administration of justice must ultimately depend.
245 Enforma Natural Products, inc., 362 F.3d at 1215: 'On remand, the district court should
consider safeguards implementing some or all of these safeguards [regarding the use of
technical advisors] to assure the parties that the court is proceeding openly and fairly.
Employment of these standards will aid in appellate review if such review becomes
necessary' .
28 USCA § 455.
In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859-60).
Note, supra note 175 at 2710 and see ANDREWSTARK,CONFLICTOFINTERESTINAMERICAN
PUBLICLIFE,21-35 (2000) (explaining that 'appearance' standards, as opposed to 'conflict of
interest' prohibitions should not be regarded as prophylactic).
AMAE v. California, FJd 572, 614 n.18 (9th Cir. 2000).
R v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Kirstall Valley Campaign, [1996] 3 All
E.R. 304, 316 (Sedley J.) idiscussing the test formulated by the UK House of Lords in R. v.
Gough [1993] 2 All E. R. 724 at 737-738: "The House also eliminated from the process of
adjudication the imaginary reasonable man, recognising that in imputing to him all that is
eventually known to the court and asking him for his impression, the court is looking into a
mirror.")
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VI. Balancing Process and Outcomes: A Judicial Tightrope
If the reluctance of courts to conceptualize relations between judge and advisor in
impropriety terms stems from pragmatic grounds, what is at issue is the relative
priority to be accorded to the reliability of outcomes over the norms of adversarial
process.i" "Justice", asserts Judge Weinstein, who himself used experts for assistance
in structural reform cases,252 "is not blind, nor should it be."m A judge must take an
informed approach to judging 254and neutrality and passivity are not the same thing.255
Supreme Court expert testimony jurisprudence now "tacitly" concedes to trial judges
a more active participation in the information-gathering process but has yet to provide
guidelines which will enable judges to identify the boundaries of acceptable judicial
behavior vis-a-vis the experts upon whom they rely.256
Left largely to their own devices, appeal courts appear to have recognized the
practical problems which judges have faced and have been prepared to accept some
deviations from procedural norms in appropriate cases but the response has been
pragmatic and the limits have not been clearly articulated. The effect is to leave
judges feeling their way between conflicting imperatives guided by little more than
the knowledge that if they avoid "coziness,,257 and don't "allow [... ] the boundaries to
be overrun,,258 appellate courts mayor may not be supportive.
When, as in the schools cases, a judge uses expert advisors to assist in what may be,
in effect, a managerial task she walks a tightrope of particular difficulty. She must
251 See Adam J. Siegel, Note, Selling Limits on Judicial. Scientific. Technical and Other
Specialized Fact-finding in the New Millennium, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 196 (2002) (citing
Bradley v. Millikin, 620 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1980), Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hospital and
Training School, 757 F. Supp. 1231 (D.N.M. 1990) and United States v. Bonds, 18 F.3d 1327
(6th Cir. 1994). See also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd, v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999): "[T]he
trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about
determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable." Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 and
"The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert's
reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to
investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether that expert's relevant testimony is
reliable". Id., at 152.
See Hart v. Community School Board, 383 F. Supp. 699, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) discussed
supra note 140 and accompanying text.
Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation. 88 NW. U. L. Rev. 469, 539
( 1994).
Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning Speaking and Acting - Part I -Tentative FirSI
Thoughts: How May Judges Learn? 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 539,541 (1994).
See Fuller, supra note 147 at 41.
Siegel, supra note 251 at 214.
Edgar v. K.L. et al., 93 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cif. 1996).
Id. at 158.
252
253
254
255
256
257
25R
50
ensure compliance with the orders of the court in such a way as to give meaningful
content to the rhetoric of the rule of law but at the same time must pay more than lip
service to the requirements of judicial process because these represent the core of the
court's claim to legitimacy.
In Boston, where Judge Garrity chose to face down opposition to his orders by
assuming personal oversight of the desegregation process, his decision to appoint
court advisers is not remarkable; this was not a task which he would otherwise have
been able to undertake and there were established precedents.F" However, Judge
Garrity's relations with his experts were unusual even by school desegregation
standards.26o Deans Dentler and Scott attended weekly meetings in the judge's
chambers. Dr Dentler alone wrote two hundred memos'?' but the judge treated the
majority as privileged and only a handful were released to the parties.i'" That the
judge was unaware of the dangerous ground he trod is inconceivable; on January 30
1975, before the experts had been appointed, Judge Garrity responded vigorously to a
school committee motion challenging alleged in camera conferences with
representatives of the Community Relations Service of the U.S. Justice
Departmentf" :
[T]he Court has never in this case or any other case for that matter
heard parties ex parte and without everyone being present. Everything
that has been submitted in connection with any substantive issue in this
case has been presented and considered in open court and only in open
court and that will continue to be the practice, because the principle
259
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Part A supra.
Interviewed in September 2005, Dr Dentler contrasted Judge Garrity's approach with that of
other desegregation judges with whom he had subsequently worked: "By contrast, the federal
judge who retained me in St. Louis was so wary that he wouldn't meet with me and his other
expert in his chambers. We felt isolated. I would fly to St. Louis, we'd go up into the
courthouse - where we had an office - once in a while we would sec him in the hall as we
would cross. He'd say, 'Good morning.' And that was it - and I felt, how can we confer with
this man?"
Interview with Dr Robert Dentler at University of Massachusetts, Boston campus, September
14,2005 (hereinafter Dentler (2005)).
"I know I wrote 200 because he gave me the full set and told me to feel free to cull some
before we got it ready for transmittal here. Out of the 200 - the attorneys wanted to see all of
them" Id.
Id.
Transcript of Hearing of January 301975,33, Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72 -911-G (D. Mass.)
(on file with Archives & Special Collections, Healey Library University of Massachusetts,
Boston, MA, under reference 84 Center for Law & Education.: Morgan v. Hennigan Case
Records, 1964-1994 Series V, Transcripts (hereinafter 84 Center for Law & Educ.I).
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[... ] is a very important one, [ ... ] In fact, that is a guiding principle in
every court and this one as well as any other.
As the case progressed he was in regular touch with District Judge Battisti264 whose
use of academic advisors in Cleveland had attracted the disapproval of the 6th
Circuit265 and he took evident steps to safeguard his position; the documentary record
of his communications with his "team" is minimal only and Dr Dentler has confirmed
that for the most part communications were oral. The Judge kept hand written
agendas for the chambers conferences but the detail was communicated by telephone.
266
Asked about his work for the judge, Robert Dentler remarked:
Well, he could hide me when he wished. He could withhold my
memos. I came to every hearing - there were many of them - but I
could sit there in silence - or, on other occasions, he would put me to
work at the hearing. Why he made those different choices, I don't
know but he was wily and maneuvered - he was under constant
attack.267
If, as has been suggested.i'" the Boston schools case was above all else an exercise in
political maneuvering, the deployment of court experts was key to the judge's
survival. From the point of view of legitimacy however, it represents an Achilles heel,
a vulnerability to the charge of impropriety which the judge was able to see off in the
short-term but which in the longer term remains troublesome and not easy to deflect.
264
265
Dentler (2005). supra note 260.
See Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1979).
Dentler (2005), supra note 260.
Id.
See J. BRIAN SHEEHAN, THE BOSTON SCHOOL INTEGRATIONDISPUTE: SOCIALCHANGE AND
LEGALMANEUVERS, (J 984) (analyzing the Boston schools case as an attempt by a political
and business elite to restructure the educational system to suit its own purposes and thus as a
"manifestation of the class conflicts arising out of the transformation of Boston into a service
and financial center". Id. at 8-9.).
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Chapter Two: Narratives of Impropriety
I. Conceptualizations of Legitimacy in Boston
I'll try to tell you how Ifee! about forced busing. Judge Garrity does
not allow us into his court room. I never heard of Judge Garrity until
he made his fateful decision. He seems to have more power than any
dictator that ever crawled on the face of this earth. 269
[. ..] Dentler and I basically took over the School Department [. ..], we
were running it day to day. And I had a big say in who did whal. [. ..]
We were there overseeing the day 10 day opera lions - everything that
went on in the Schools. [. ..J [Tjhey couldn't do anything without us.
tsr: h I ki . d k . h . 270rr It out our 00 tng at It an nowtng w at was gomg on.
Conceptions of legitimacy can be framed in different ways. For the people of Boston
and the school committee officials whom they had elected, legitimacy meant the right
of the community to control the education of its children. Judge Garrity's decision
represented an interference with that right, and was widely seen and resented in terms
of illegitimate excess of power. President Ford's announcement that "the court
decision [ ... J was not the best solution to quality education in Boston",271 lent support
to that view and hardened the resolve of the school committee to fight the federal
court_272As the chief architects of the court's reworking of the Masters' Plan, Deans
Dentler and Scott had already attracted hostile attention. As prime movers of its
implementation and the visible face of the court's reach outside of the federal court
room, school committee attorneys attacked the judge via his representatives whose
work thus came itself to shape the contours of the litigation.
269 Mrs Lorraine Faith, mother of Michael Faith, a white student as South Boston High, who had
been arrested on an assault and battery charge and was later in the day stabbed in the stomach
by a black student while inside the school on December II 1974. Mrs Faith's remarks were
made on WBZ-TV and are cited in 1. MICHAEL Ross AND WILLIAM M. BERG, 'I
RESPECTFULLYDISAGREEWITH THE JUDGE'S ORDER': THE BOSTON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
CONTROVERSY (1981) at 330.
Professor Marvin Scott, interviewed at Butler University, Indianapolis, IN. 25th September
2007(on file with author) (hereinafter "Scott 2007").
Asked whether he had considered providing federal assistance to Boston, President Ford
responded as follows: "At the outset, I wish to make it very, very direct. I deplore the violence
that I have read about and seen on television. I think that is most unfortunate. I would like to
add this however; the court decision in that case, in my judgment, was not the best solution to
quality education in Boston. I have consistently opposed forced busing to achieve racial
balance as a solution to quality education and, therefore, I respectfully disagree with the
judge's order." Reported in the Boston Globe 9th October 1974 and cited in Ross & Berg
supra note 269 at 241.
Id.
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School committee arguments formulated in terms of excess of power were a response
to the apparent de facto assumption of control of the school department which began
when Scott on a direct order of the court hired thirty temporary secretaries and
installed them at tables at 26 Court Street, the new school department headquarters.r "
From here Scott proceeded to take charge of student assignments" while Dentler
assumed "a kind of overseer's role,,275 with senior administrative staff and head
teachers who regarded him as a substitute for the judge.i'" School committee strategy
was to get the judge to define the experts' role and thereby secure an admission that
he was taking power away from elected officials and/or that Dentler and Scott were
exceeding their powers. Attorneys Connolly and Sullivan for the school committee
pressed their points hard and on at least three occasions forced Judge Garrity into an
oral response. In the end they were outmatched by the political skills of the judge who
evaded their attempts to pin him down. The written order they were seeking never
materialized and the First Circuit was supportive of the Judge.277
II. The School Committee Narrative: Dentler and Scott Represent
Excessive Judicial Power
Judge Garrity's appointments faced school committee challenge right from the start.
At a hearing on February 5 1975 school committee attorneys objected to Masters
Keppel and Willie on the grounds that they had indirect links with the Harvard Center
for Law and Education whose attorneys were acting for the black plaintiffs278. On 4th
March they moved for the removal of Dr Dentler and Master Edward J McCormack
Jr. on the grounds that their membership of and financial contributions to the NAACP
gave rise to a conflict of interest and that the proceedings before the masters should be
expunged from the record.279 Judge Garrity observed that the NAACP was not a party
273
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Dentler & Scott, supra note 197.
Id. at 59.
Dentler (2006), supra note 197.
Id. "Marvin Scott and I went to School Headquarters weekly to review compliance. They
thought we were substitutes for Garrity and we didn't disillusion them."
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 40l(lst Cir. 1976).
Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. March 14 1975) (Memorandum and Order on
School Committee's Motions Regarding Expert and Masters) (90 Garrity, XXXVII b f.7).
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to the action and dismissed the motion, but this was a preliminary skirmish. no As the
following account, based largely on court transcripts, reveals, Judge Garrity's tactic
was to deflect the narrative of excess of power by emphasizing the extent to which he
remained in control of the experts; they were his assistants, implementing his
guidelines and reporting to him. Their function was to enable him to discharge his
constitutional responsibilities in the face of school committee default.
The immediate background to the attempt to build a case against the judge was the
court's Phase 2 order handed down on May lOth 1975.2111 This required student
assignments to be carried out "by a staff unit designated by the superintendent, under
the supervision of court representativcs'r'V and ordered the "School Department" to
produce an Orientation and Application Booklet.283 On May 12 1975 Dentler and
Scott wrote to Superintendent Leary attaching a "timetable of the work we will
supervise between May 12 and July 11", and requesting the immediate designation of
a senior person "authorized to conduct assignment and related business under our
supervision't.i" Two days later, Judge Garrity announced in court that they were to
continue as court experts "to supervise all planning and implementation" of the court
plan:
The Court is going to rely upon Deans Dentler and Scott throughout
the implementation course. This does not mean that the Court is
delegating its authority to these gentlemen, but the Court will want
their recommendations on every aspect of this matter.285
In a public statement, school committee Chairman John J. McDonough objected to
the experts' "arrogance" in attempting to takeover the school department and stated
2XO Id. On appeal, the First Circuit found no merit in school committee arguments, observing that,
since masters and experts are subject to the control of the court and since there was a need to
hire individuals with expertise in particular subject matters, masters and experts should not be
held to the strict standards of impartiality that are applied to judges. The First Circuit noted
that as three of the four individuals challenged had benefited financially from their
relationship with members of the school committee, appearances might just as readily be
suggestive of bias in the school committee's favor. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401,426, n.
41 (I st Cir. 1976).
Morgan v. Kerrigan 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975).
Id. at 257.
Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216.
Dentler & Scott, (May 12 1975 ) (90 Garrity XXXVII Masters & Experts Dentler & Scott
Memos 1975 flS).
Transcript of Hearing of May 14 1975, 67,Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911 -G (D. Mass) (84
Center for Law & Educ.).
2Xl
2X2
2X3
284
2X5
55
that he wanted the judge to better define their jurisdiction.i'" A school committee
motion for clarification of the experts' role filed on 16th May, asserted that the experts
now "obviously consider( ed) the facilities and staff of the school department as [ ... ]
under their personal control." The gist of the complaint was that Judge Garrity had
assured the defendants that the role of the experts was consultative only but that by
[0]rdering the superintendent to designate a "staff unit" responsible for
student assignment, the crux of the desegregation process, and by
further mandating that (the unit) will be supervised by Messrs Dentler
and Scott, the Court has clearly wrested from the defendant school
committee its statutory authority to administer the school system.287
Under Massachusetts law, the complaint continued, the superintendent of schools was
the executive officer of the school committee which had final responsibility for the
management of all the public schools. If the effect of the court order was to make the
superintendent "the master not the servant" and the experts' function was to direct or
oversee the desegregation process, then this constituted a usurpation of the powers of
the school committee. If, on the other hand, the experts' role was merely to observe
and evaluate, with access to school department facilities and employees, then "the
experts have overstepped the bounds on their authority't.i'"
Judge Garrity's papers reveal a briefing note from his clerk dated May 23 1975
suggesting dodging the question:
[... ]A general principled statement of the experts' powers seems likely
to restrict the experts uncomfortably as used by people who want to
give the statement its most restrictive and troublesome effect. In fact
the experts will make decisions; but one cannot state that the court
delegates to them its power289 [... ] I would concentrate on the question
286 Boston Globe (May 15 1975) (copy on file with Garrity Papers), 90 Garrity XXXVIIf. flS)).
See also Ross & Berg supra note 271 at 488 quoting McDonough: "They're not going to
come into the Boston School department and take over and brush aside the administration that
has already been set up."
Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. May 16 1975) (Defendant School Committee's
Motion for Clarification of Experts' Role) (90 Garrity XXXV lIb f7)).
Id.
Tom (Hayes) to Judge Garrity, Terry, Messrs. Scott and Dentler. Thoughts on the Experts'
Role for a Response to School Committee Motion Asking Clarification. May 23 1975 (90
Garrity XXXVIIb f. 7).
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of fc0wer over the assignment process and not generalize far beyond
it? 0
This was advice which effectively the judge took. The draft order which accompanied
the memo stated that the school committee had lost none of its statutory
responsibilities, but was merely required to make student assignments under the
court's supervision. This did not mean that the court would supervise every aspect of
school operation but the court would rule on specific situations only as and when they
arose; 291 "Further specificity could only serve to unnecessarily restrict what must
remain a flexible working relationship if it is to be effective.,,292
Whilst the judge continued to evade the issue, Mr. Connolly for the school defendants
persevered, reminding him on June 6 1975 that he was still waiting for the order
clarifying the power of the experts. Judge Garrity promised to "speak carefully and
definitively" at a hearing or file a memo but would give a preliminary outline of their
role The filing of the implementation plan, he said, represented a "shifting of the
gears". "It really changes the role of the experts from advisors of the Court in drafting
what they feel to be the best plan and which they have been in consultation with the
Court on, of course, endless hours, but their planning role terminated on the loth of
May." They still had a planning function but this was now subsidiary to their
collaborative function with the School Committee, in particular with Dr Leftwich, the
officer in charge of implementation. 293
On June 11 1975 Mr. Connolly explained that uncertainties relating to the powers of
the Deans were inhibiting the appointment of a director of the Assignment Unit. Six
of those working on implementation matters had refused the appointment. "Are they
going to be second-guessed by Dr Scott and Dr Dentler? We have asked the Court on
numerous occasions to clarify this order so we can begin to operate?,,294 Judge Garrity
responded that the answer lay in the plan. Assignments had to be carried out subject to
290 Id.
Id.
Id.
Transcript of Hearing of June 6 1975, 39-40, Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-9ll-G (D. Mass.
1975) (84 Center for Law & Educ.).
Dr Charles Leftwich was the BPS system's only black Associate Superintendent. He was
placed in overall charge of implementation. - see Dentler & Scott supra note 197 at 58.
Transcript of Hearing of June 6 1975 sl/pra note 293 at 6.
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the court's approval. This should not be regarded as second-guessing. "I simply look
on this as a review which the Court is required to make under the law to be sure that
the plan [... ] is carried out". He had to have agents to do this but they reported
directly to him:
The agents of the Court who will be working with, in the sense of
collaborating with and consulting with, the director and other members
of this Assignment Unit are two deans of a college of education who
are knowledgeable about these things. They report to me and on the
basis of their reports and recommendations, I will either approve or
disapprove what is done [ ... ]295
The judge continued to emphasize his constitutional responsibilities. He explained
that whilst Phase I was supervised by the Massachusetts Supreme Court and was no
concern of his, Phase 2 was different. The assignment guidelines were his:
The assignment guidelines are mine. They are not Dean Dentler's or
Dean Scott's. These I wrote after consulting with the Deans and on the
basis of the masters' recommendations. I can tell you that these are as
personal as anything in the plan. These are mine [ ... ]'296
The Deans were to let Judge Garrity know whether the guidelines were complied with
and to provide help to the Assignment Unit in construing them as they were "pretty
technical".297 Mr. Connolly persisted, explaining the chilling effect the presence of the
Deans had on staff and candid debate in the Unit. Morale was lowered and
professionalism undermined. He concluded: "[ ... ]It is our feeling that we do not need
Dean Dentler and Dean Scott to be interfering in our day-to-day decisions. ,,298
The judge responded: "They are not there all the time. [ ... ] [I]t was I who kept
pushing Deans Dentler and Scott to get this information. It wasn't their coming to me
with stories. I have been pursuing them, not the reverse". Moreover, questions from
Educational Planning Unit (EPU) staff indicated an "incomplete and erroneous"
misunderstanding of a key provision of the plan relating to assignments which the
Deans had been able to clear up.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 11.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 13.
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Now I agree, people don't like to work with someone standing over
their shoulder. I don't. You don't. None of us does. [ ... ] I do
understand that and positively that is not what Deans Dentler and Scott
are going to be doing,[ ... J They are there to do no more than what I tell
them to do. They are not running this, the Court is running it [... ]299
On June 12, school committee attorneys filed another motion for clarification and
asking for a written order. On June 20 Judge Garrity issued an order authorizing the
court experts to resolve outstanding issues relating to facilities utilization, program
allocation and enrolment units, their determination to be subject to review by the court
"as soon as feasible".300 At the hearing of June 23, counsel again reminded the judge
that the school defendants were still waiting for clarification of the experts' powers.
Judge Garrity noted that he had done this three times already but would make a
further "clarifying comment" about the role of the experts and the relationship of the
plan and the school committee. The desegregation plan had not and the Court would
not impinge on areas of school committee authority but the school committee had no
power to change the plan and to that extent the power of the school committee had
been superseded.?"
At this point counsel for the school committee appear to have given up on this
particular line of attack. The issue of the experts' role resurfaced next in the Court of
Appeals one year later as one plank amongst several of the school committee
challenge to the desegregation plan302. Once again, objections to the experts were
formulated in terms of excess of power. The specific targets were a) the requirement
that student assignments be carried out "under supervision of representatives of the
court,,303, b) the requirement that "(t)he nature of instruction given in the schools must
also receive the attention of the court and its representatives'Y'" and c) the order of
June 20305. The First Circuit was unsympathetic and given the context this does not
299
300
Id. at 15
Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. June 20 1975) (Order on Boston School
Committee Proposal for Facility Utilization, Program Allocation and Enrollment Limits) (90
Garrity XLd f68).
Transcript of Hearing of June 23 1975, 24-25, Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D.
Mass.1975) (84 Center for Law & Education).
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 40l(1st Cir.1976).
Order of May 10 1975 - see Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401,430.
Memorandum of decision of June 4 1975. See Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401,430.
Id.
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surpnse. The first two orders, they said, were not unusualr'l" the third gave the
experts "an unusual if brief amount of power" but was justified "by the school
committee's actual violations of the court's substantive and procedural orders and its
unwarranted delay in the face of the urgent necessity of finalizing these decisions."J07
The experts should "return to their university'Y" once a unitary school system had
been established but the speed with which this goal could be accomplished rested
largely in the hands of the committee itself.309.
The school committee narrative, however, missed the point; examination of the
chambers papers demonstrates the potential for an alternative narrative couched in
terms of adversarialism and judicial neutrality. The fact that school committee
attorneys concentrated on the excess of power issues deflected attention with the
result that the adversarialism/neutrality case was never properly made. In the
following section the alternative narratives are uncovered and the attempt to
substantiate such a case more fully developed.
III. Dentler and Scott and the Judge's Ear: The Alternative
Narrative
The school committee narrative of excess of power was a response to the visible
presence of the experts within the school department. What the school committee did
not see, but suspected, was the extent of the advice that the experts were providing to
the judge in weekly meetings in his chambers and in memoranda written in response
to the judge's request.v'" The judge kept these meetings confidential to himself,
committed little to paper, and conveyed his instructions by phone:
306 "We see nothing unusual in these orders. Experts are commonly used to assist the court in
planning desegregation [... J and under the circumstances of this case were justifiably used to
assure implementation as well. It is regrettable that there was a need to closely monitor the
assignment process, but it is the Committee's own doing. To have neglected it, or to have
failed to assure that instruction was non-discriminatory would have been irresponsible of the
court." Kerrigan,530 F.2d 401,430.
Id.
As the school committee urged, See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F. 2d 401, 43l.(lst Cif. 1976).
Id. at 431.
A third member of the Judge's team was Martin Walsh of the Community Relations Service
of the U.S. Justice Department. The Judge drew on his services as appropriate. Dr Robert
Dentler, 14th September 2005 supra note 260.
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[H]e would call and say, "Are you ready for a meeting next week?
What kind of sandwich would you like me to order?" He would place
those himself. I don't think he was even keen to have it known in the
cafeteria that we were meeting. He would say, "I want to concentrate
next time on the teachers. ,,311
He likewise withheld the memos, at least in the early stages.m Dentler explained his
thinking:
There has to be something privileged to prevent disclosure. His
position was; "These are not to you - they're to me. I'll decide if they
include you or there are issues you have to deliberate - the others are
. lik I d ,,31,Just messages to me, 1 e etters, my correspon ence. .
The proximate cause for the appointment of Robert Dentler and Marvin Scott as court
experts in the Boston schools case was the failure of the school committee to submit a
constitutionally acceptable desegregation plan for implementation in September 1975
by the deadline of December 14 1974 as ordered to do so by the Court.'!" Although a
plan had been drawn up by school officials, the refusal of three school committee
members to authorize its submission on the grounds that they would not support
"compulsory busing" prompted an immediate crisis.3l5 Attorney John Mirick of Hale
& Dorr submitted the unapproved plan without authorization and asked to be removed
from the case; Judge Garrity began contempt hearings against the "Boston Three,,316
who stated in court that they would "take no initiative or affirmative action to
311 Id. "We would come in and he had an old litigator's metaphor: 'All right - I'm getting in the
tub of knowledge and you're going to fill it up with facts - and I'll be sitting there and I'll
absorb what I need. So, what do you know about ... ?' He would act as though we were the
fountain of knowledge."
Towards the closing stages of the case the Judge authorized disclosure of memos which
contained helpful statistical information. See infra notes 410, 463, and accompanying text,
and Section III Part III.
Dentler 2005, supra note 260.
Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-9ll-G (D. Mass. October 31 1974) (Order Establishing Filing
Date and General Contents of Student Desegregation Plan) (90 Garrity XLd Miscellaneous
Postscript Orders 1974-75 f 6S. 90).
Specifically, John Coakley of the Educational Planning Center. See Transcript of Hearing of
December IS 1974,30, Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. 1974) (84 Center for
Law & Educ.).
Ross & Berg, supra note 269 at 336 (1981).
Judge Garrity chose to treat the case against school committee members John Kerrigan, Paul
Ellison and John McDonagh as one of civil contempt rather than criminal contempt and
accepted a 'freedom of choice' plan filed on January 7 1975 as purging their contempt. He
was to be criticized on the grounds that he had shown excessive leniency in this respect. See
also R Smith in LIMITSOF JUSTICE:THE COURT'SROLE IN SCHOOLDESEGREGATION74-
SI(Howard I. Kalodner and James lFishman eds., 1975).
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advocate or supplement a plan which in conscience and principle, they opposed", but
would obey only the direct orders of the court.317 The judge appointed masters to
produce a court plan and experts to assist them but as school committee defiance
crossed the boundaries between minimal compliance and intentional obstruction, the
experts stayed on after the masters retired from the case to assist the judge with
matters of implementation. 318
The memos begin in February 1975 after the Order for Appointment of Experts':"
with a series of six written by Dentler to the Masters to assist them in evaluating the
plans submitted by the Plaintiffs, the school department and the Boston Home and
School Association.r'" The Masters retired from the case six weeks later, having
presented their plan to the Court 321and on April 4 1975 Dentler wrote to the judge
recommending adoption of the plan with revisions.322 In the event, as Dentler and
Scott have written, "it took us, as the experts who continued to advise the court, four
more weeks of work in order to accept the necessity for revision."m The statistical
information upon which the Masters Plan was based and which had been supplied by
the school department was fundamentally flawed. On a challenge by attorneys for the
school committee, Judge Garrity resumed control over the planning process, required
Dentler and Scott to undertake a review and the school department to provide a
citywide master list of all enrollments, showing the home address, school attended,
317 Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. December 16 1975) (Supplementary Findings
and Conclusions On Plaintiffs' Motion Concerning SBHS) (90 Garrity XLd f 68).
He issued orders to that effect On January 31 and February 7 1975.
Morgan v. Kerrigan, Order for Appointment of Experts, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. Jan.
31,1975) (90 Garrity XVII f. 2).
February 4, 1975 Tentative Outline of Criteria for Gauging Effectiveness of Planning
Proposals; February 4 1975 Application of Criteria to BHSA Plan of 1120175; February 5 1975
Critique of the Resource Center in the BSC Plan of 1/20175; February 10 1975 Critique of
Student Desegregation Plan of 12/16174; February 24 1975 Commentary On Busing and
Student Transport.; February 24 1975 Economizing On School Plant. 90 Garrity XXXVIlf.
f.17.
On March 31 1975.
Dentler, (April 4 1975),Recommend Adoption of Final Report of Masters, (90 Garrity
XXXVIIf. f. 17).
Dentler & Scott supra note 197 at 50. NAACP lawyers filed a brief objecting to the Masters
Plan On the grounds that it would leave parts of the city substantially untouched by
desegregation and would place too much of the desegregation burden on black students. They
wanted district lines to be redrawn to achieve a composition of no more than 60/55% of one
race and racial guidelines to ensure that no school should be more than 65% white or black.
The State Board subsequently added its objection to the nine neighborhood districts. See 1.
BRIAN SHEEHAN, THE BOSTON SCHOOL INTEGRATIONDISPUTE: SOCIAL CHANGE AND LEGAL
MANEUVERS (1984) at 109.
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current grade and ethnicity for each student in the system.r" The printout showing
85,913 students formed the basis for the court revisions but as Dentler and Scott later
wrote, the printout proved to be "bogus" and the school department unforthcoming.t"
In an attempt to obtain accurate data from the school department, Dentler wrote to
Judge Garrity on April 23 1975 recommending that he "cut an order" as soon as
possible, directing senior pcrsonnel+" to confer immediately with the two court
experts to develop a definitive list of school facilities and capacity whereupon he and
Scott could produce more or less straight away a definitive list. In Dentler's view this
would not be possible without a direct order from the judge. 327
The order which came two days later,328and was followed on April 28 by a similar
order for the delivery of data regarding the examination schools, gave rise to the
challenge to the court's authority discussed above and became the pattern for what
was to follow.
IV. A Justificatory Framework
Unusual case or no, it is the assumption of this section that the closeness of the
relationship which developed between the judge and his advisors together with the
receipt by him of briefing memoranda which became part of his decision-making base
but were withheld from the adversarial process requires a response, but that this can
be shaped in terms of justification and degree: did the judge's constitutional goals
justify the means he employed to achieve them?
Thus the narratives which now follow are constructed around three themes: CIVIC
opposition, structural inadequacy, and uncompromising litigiousness which together
provide a framework of justificatory parameters. The civic opposition which was the
324 Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-G (D. Mass.April 9 1975) (Supplemental Order Regarding
Master List of Students) (90 Garrity XLd. f 68).
Dentler & Scott supra note 197 at 27.
State Commissioner of Education Anrig, Dr Charles Glenn, Director of the Public Facilities
Department and the two Educational Planning Center (EPC) Associate Directors Coakley and
Murray.
Dentler,(ApriI23 1975) Planning Priorities, (90 Garrity XXXVIIf. f.17).
Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. April 25 1975 (Order as to Planning and
University Support) (90 Garrity XLd Miscellaneous: Postscript: Orders 1974-75 f 68). At the
hearing on Aug. 2 I 1975 Judge Garrity read directly from the report.
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immediate background to the appointment of Drs Dentler and Scott is the context for
a narrative relating to what Kirp has described as "the most dramatic example of
unilateral judicial action": the receivership of South Boston High School (SBHS).329
The absence of effective bureaucratic operational structures within the Boston public
school system grounds a narrative of the experts' involvement in restructuring the
school department which culminated in the establishment of the Department of
Implementation with primary responsibility for carrying out the court plan. The third
narrative, the special master proposal as a tool of court disengagement, takes its
context from the inability or unwillingness of the litigation parties to agree the terms
of an acceptable consent decree to terminate federal court supervision, requiring the
judge to take the lead in devising a disengagement strategy that would preserve the
legacy of the court's desegregative aims and achievements.
329 David L Kirp, The Bounded Politics of School Desegregation Litigation, 51 HARV. Eouc.
REV.395,401 (1981).
64
Chapter Three: Civic Opposition, Structural Inadequacies and
Uncompromising Litigiousness
I.Civic Opposition: South Boston High School
The Boston case has been described as "one of the most confrontational school
desegregation cases in modem American history".33o Civic opposition not seen since
the early aftermath of Brown'" required a judicial response on an unprecedented
scale, reaching a high point in the suspension of the powers of an elected school
committee and the federal receivership of the city's most troublesome high school,
South Boston High (SBHS).332
In June 1975 the U.S. Civil Rights Commission held two weeks of hearings in Boston
following which it recommended that the court consider taking the school system as a
whole into federal receivership.Y' In the event Judge Garrity acted only in relation to
South Boston High School, his receivership order "an extraordinary measure
reluctantly undertaken by an embattled judge who had no choice".334
Trouble at the school had not been unexpected. Located in the heart of the
predominantly working class white Irish enclave of South Boston, run-down and
poorly equipped,335 SBHS had became a symbol of the racial strife which erupted in
the city in the months which followed the implementation of the Phase I Racial
330 Michael A. Rebell in JUSTICE AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN
EDUCATIONLITIGATION,70 (B. Flicker ed. 1990).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955) (Brown II).
For accounts of the violent response to court-ordered busing and of the role of local politicians
in providing leadership and rhetoric to resistant communities, see RONALD P FORMISANO,
BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE CLASS AND ETHNICITYIN THE 1960s AND 1970s (1991), 1.
ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN THE LIVES OF THREE
AMERICANFAMILIES (1985), and THOMAS H O'CONNOR, THE BOSTON IRISH: A POLITICAL
HISTORY(1995).
See also Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975) discussing violent outbursts
including stoning of buses and blocking of roads and J. ANTHONYLUKAS, COMMONGROUND:
A TURBULENTDECADE IN THELiVES OF THREE AMERICANFAMILIES, (1985) 253 (the Pulitzer
prize-winning account describing the impact of presence on streets of state troopers and local
riot police).
At the hearing on August 21 1975 Judge Garrity read directly from the report. See Transcript
of Hearing of August 21 1975, Morgan v. Kerrigan, No 72-911-G (D. Mass. 1975) (84 Center
for Law & Educ.).
Ralph R Smith, Two Centuries and Twenty-Four Months: A Chronicle of the Struggle to
Desegregate the Boston Public Schools in Kalodner & Fishman, eds. supra note 316.
Formisano supra note 332 at 115.
331
332
333
334
335
65
Imbalance Plan.336 In the fall of 1974, buses carrying black children were met by
missiles and racial abuse; police attempts to clear the streets provoked violent
confrontation.V' Following the fatal stabbing of a seventeen-year old white student
inside the school building.r" Judge Garrity observed that the violence and disorder
outmatched that of Little Rock but resisted the mayor's call for the school to be closed
on the grounds that to do so would be to give way to intimidation.339 The following
year however, when implementation of the Court's Phase II Plan brought renewed
scenes of violence and confrontation at the school gates and anarchy within, action
could no longer be deferred.
In their account of their involvement Dentler and Scott state that whilst the situation at
the school was being monitored by staff from the Community Relations Service of the
U.S. Justice Department, throughout September and October 1975 their commitment
was elsewhere.v'" Their direct involvement began in November 1975 against a
background of a pending Plaintiffs' motion for further relief341with a request from the
judge to visit the school and report back "as educators.,,342 The judge whose
determination to face down the Irish political leadership which was opposing the court
was undiminished.I'f set down five days of court hearings.l" On the first day, he
explained that the purpose of the hearing was to consider whether the Court's
desegregation plan was being implemented at SBHS.345 Dentler and Scott were in
336
337
See Morgan v . Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 483 (D. Mass. 1974).
For accounts see Ross & Berg, supra note 269 at 195,197, Formisano, supra note 332 at 78,
82.
Ross & Berg, sl/pra note 269 at 330.
Transcript of Hearing of Jan. 2 1975, 38, Morgan v. Hennigan. No. 72-911-G (D. Mass.
1975) (on file at National Archives and Records Administration. Northeast Region, Waltham,
MA under reference: Case Files, 1972-1991, Accession No: 021-98-0101, Box 36) (hereafter
NARA).
Dentler &. Scott supra note 197 at 176.
Filed on Nov. 18th 1975.
Dentler & Scott (1981) supra note 197 at 176.
"South Boston was the political locus of strife [... [To come from South Boston is to be part of
the Irish political elite that has run the city for a century and a half. [... ] When the plaintiffs
moved to have Judge Garrity close South Boston High School - which was hostile to minority
students - we knew closing it would be to martyr those who had organized opposition. The
plaintiffs' proposed remedy was simply unworkable. It didn't interest Judge Garrity at all- for
him closing was giving up. Closure would be a victory for the Irish political leadership - and
Judge Garrity knew this. The legal elite of the city was dominated by Irish attorneys - Garrity
knew these lawyers well and was himself part of them. But [ ... ] the Irish tradition is that the
Irish don't give up. [... ]The judge saw no utility in closing it." Dentler (2006), supra note 197.
The hearings were scheduled for 21, 22, 24, 26, 28 November 1975.
Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 21 1975,2, Morgan v. Kerrigan, No 72-911-G (D. Mass. 1975)
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court every day.346 They attended conferences with the judge in his chambers at his
request, they accompanied him on the two visits that he made to SBHS, 347and made
recommendations concerning appropriate relief. On December 9 1975, Judge Garrity
ordered that the principal be removed and that the school be placed in the temporary
receivership of Assistant Superintendent Joseph M. McOonagh.Y"
A. The SBH Memos: Framing the Remedy
Interviewed in 2006, Dentler stated that the receivership solution for SBHS came
from the experts:
Marvin Scott and I visited South Boston High School to get a feel for
the place. We began to explain to Judge Garrity that under his
receivership he could appoint those in charge and a headmaster who
could reorganize the curriculum and equip students to go to college.
We felt that the headmaster had to be someone from outside Boston.
Marvin and I recommended receivership. 349
A claim that the receivership solution did not originate from the parties but originated
from a source extraneous to the courtroom, in this case the experts, is prima facie a
claim of influence, engaging the fourth of Judge Tashima's guidelines.F" This
narrative now examines that claim by reference to the court transcripts, the experts'
advice as evidenced in the memos they wrote for the judge and finally by reference to
the receivership order of December 9 and supplementary memorandum of December
l6_351
346
347
Dentler (2005) supra note 260; Scott, (2007) supra note 270.
The visits took place on November 26 and December 2 1975. For Judge Garrity's account see
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141, 1143 (D. Mass. 1975).
Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. Dec. 9, 1975) (Order Concerning South Boston
High School) (90 Garrity XLd f.69).
See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. Dec. 16 1975) (Supplementary
Findings and Conclusions on Plaintiffs' Motion Concerning South Boston High School).
The choice was unusual. Assistant Superintendent McDonough was the brother of School
Committeeman John McDonough - one of the "Boston Three" and widely expected to be
hostile to desegregation. In fact, as Dentler explained "like a few other of the Irish leadership,
he internalized the order (to take affirmative action) and it's 'I will now be a good soldier on
this' [... J We were surprised. He did what he was supposed to do. "{Dentler (2006) supra note
197).
Dentler (2006), supra note 197.
Association of Mexican American Educators (AMAE) v. California, 231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir.
2000): "a district court minimally must: [ ... J (4) make clear to the technical advisor that any
advice he gives to the court cannot be based on any extra-record information." Id. at 611.
Morgan v . Kerrigan, No. 72-9Il-G (D. Mass. Dec. 9, 1975) (Order Concerning South Boston
High School) (90 Garrity XLd. F.69); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F.Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975).
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B. The Transcripts
Three points of significance emerge: i) Judge Garrity was determined to act, ii) he
was considering receivership and iii) the plaintiffs did not ask for receivership.
The plaintiffs' motion asked for "further relief,.352 At the hearing on November 21
Judge Garrity explained that the purpose of the hearing was to find whether the
Court's desegregation plan was being implemented at SBHS. 353The Court would
solicit proposals by the parties as to what action should be taken but would be taking
the receivership suggestion of the Civil Rights Commission filed with the court the
previous day seriously.r'" Counsel for the plaintiffs stated that he had considered
asking for the appointment of someone with "absolute authority to simply go in and
call the shots and be in charge,,355 but in the event asked for a threefold order: I) that
the school be closed or alternatively either moved "lock, stock and barrel" to other
premises, or the staff and students be dispersed to other high schools throughout the
city; 2) that the people promoting school boycotts be identified and (3) a declaration
that two named teachers were in violation of the court order barring discriminatory
conduct.356 He did not ask for the school to be taken into receivership.
c. The Experts' Recommendations
The chambers papers include four written communications (one letter, three memos)
sent by the experts to Judge Garrity in connection with the situation at SBHS. The
following points emerge: I) Dentler and Scott were firmly opposed to closing the
school. 2) They believed that the school could be "turned round" and recommended
"tested and validated" methods. 3) Dentler and Scott were directly involved in
formulation of strategy. 4) Dentler's involvement extended to undertaking preliminary
drafting for the judge. 5) The experts did indeed recommend temporary receivership
for SBHS.
352
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Supra note 341.
Transcript of Hearing of Nov 21 1975, 2, Morgan v. Kerrigan, No 72-911-0 (D. Mass. 1975)
(84 Center for Law & Educ.),
Id. at 74, 77.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. 35.
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The first communication was written on November 16 before the evidentiary hearings
began and expressed Dentler's firm personal conviction that closure should be
resisted and that the school could be turned round:
To have the court sanction the closing of South Boston High would be
to have the court participate in defining the exact degree of public
clamor required of citizens in a Boston neighborhood before the
ultimate arbiter of the rule of law capitulates. [ ... ]To consider closing
South Boston High School at this juncture would be to deny the
availability of tested and validated methods of making a public school
facility secure for habitation, teaching and learning. These methods
include introducing new administrative leadership; introducing new
and more effective staff; identifying and disciplining students who
cannot abide by an appropriate code of conduct; utilizinf conflict-mediation teams and human relations training; and so forth.3 7
Were the court to entertain the plaintiffs motion, he continued, the effect would be to
focus public attention on "conflict and clamor" rather than finding a solution to the
problem. "A better source of action can and should be found.,,358
The second communication was dated November 24, before the evidentiary hearings
had been concluded. In this memo, Dentler set out for the judge a range of remedial
options which included receivership and reflected three assumptions he described as
"basic", viz. that a complete turnover of teaching staff was required, new political
conflicts should be avoided and the lead time should be brief.359 At this stage,
Dentler's preference was for a change of staff falling short of outright reccivership.l'"
In the next memo, written on November 30 after the close of the evidentiary hearings,
Dentler set out to "frame recommendations" for the judge in what he described as "a
more directly usable form." 361 The recommendations set out in seven numbered
paragraphs represent the basis of a draft order giving education and security
responsibilities to the school department implementation office monitoring
357
358
359
Dentler, (Nov. 161975) (90 Garrity XXXVllf fI9.)
Id.
Dentler, (Nov. 24 1975) Re Administrative Options for South Boston High. (90 Garrity
XXXVIIff. 19.)
Id.
Dentler, (Nov. 301975), A Third Message on Remedies (90 Garrity LII. fl).
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responsibilities to the CDAC (Community District Advisory Council) and personnel
replacement and redeployment responsibilities to Associate Superintendent Paul
Kennedy.t'" The memo concludes with the final recommendation:
In order to carry out these numerous changes in educational and
security conditions at SBHS, new administrative leadership is
essential. Therefore, the superintendent is directed to become the
receiver for SBHS and its L Street Annex. As receiver, effective
December 6, 1975, she shall, without reference or consultation to the
school committee, nominate a new headmaster for court review and
transfer the present headmaster to a new assignment in the system
without loss of or change in rate of salary.i'"
The last memo, headed simply "South Boston High School", was written on
December 10, the day after Judge Garrity announced the receivership order from the
bench but before the publication of the complete memorandum of decision which
followed on December 16.364 In this last memo Scott and Dentler set out sixteen
suggestions for the improvement of educational outcomes at SBHS including a
"workable grievance procedure" to be "in the hands of each student", "human relation
training" for all staff with specific proviso that teachers should not be used to search
students and recommendations concerning curriculum development "to fit the needs
and interest of the student body" with specific proposals for extra-curricula activity
and year-round Community Education Programs.i'"
D. The Receivership Order
On December 9 1975 the judge's order was issued from the bench, confirmed the
same day in writing366 and supplemented on December 16 with a written statement of
the court's findings and conclusions.l'" The order placed the school in the temporary
receivership of the court, and appointed not the superintendent but instead the
assistant superintendent, Joseph M McDonagh, as temporary receiver with directions
to review and where necessary replace the entire administrative staff and faculty.l'"
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Id.
Id.at para 7.
Scott & Dentler,(Dec. 10 1975), South Boston High School «90 Garrity LIl. f.l).
Id.
Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. Dec. 9 1975) (90 Garrity XLd. f.69).
Id. See also Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141, (D. Mass. 1975).
Dentler and Scott have stated that the appointment of the Associate Superintendent was on
their recommendation because, in the command hierarchy built into the 1975 court plan, this
70
In the supplemental memorandum of December 16, after setting out more fully the
findings and conclusions upon which the receivership order was based, Judge Garrity
concluded with a statement that changes at SBHS could be accomplished within the
current school year and specific suggestions for educational enhancements clearly
influenced by the Dentler and Scott memos.i'"
E. Afterword: A Smoking Gun and a Note on Methodology.
Attached to Dentler's memorandum of November 30 is an undated memo to the judge
with some annotations in Garrity's handwriting and headed "Possible Questions to
Ask Headmaster Reid".370 The memo contains a list of twelve questions but no
commentary. The court transcripts for the period of the SBHS receivership hearings
are complete, making it possible to track the behavior of the judge in court. The
assumption was that if the transcripts indicated that the judge was taking an active
role in initiating questioning on the lines indicated by Robert Dentler, his courtroom
behavior might be said to have been affected by information or influence which he
had received outside of the courtroom and which had been kept out of the adversarial
process. This would constitute prima facie evidence of what Judge Tashima's
guidelines would now regard as judicial impropriety, or in other words a documentary
"smoking gun". 371
The results of the exercise are set out as an appendix to this chapter. They indicate
that, in the first place, most of the questions were in fact raised directly by counsel for
the parties. However, on November 26 after Dr. Reid's evidence in chief and cross-
examinations the judge engaged in colloquy with him in the course of which he asked
questions which were either specifically directed at missing areas of the testimony or
which were directed to making sure that all aspects of Dentler's question areas were
adequately covered. Examination of the transcripts reveals four question areas
369
officer was the administrator immediately above the offices of principal and headmaster.
Dentler & Scott supra note 197 at 178.
Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. at 1150. Suggestions included: modified clustering guidance
counseling, program scheduling, extra-curricular activities, and grievance procedures Id.
Dentler, November 30 1975, A Third Message on Remedies, (90 Garrity LII f.1)
See Association of Mexican American Educators v. California 231 F.3d 572, 611 (9th Cir.
2000) (Tashima 1. dissenting),(applied in Techsearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corporation 286 F.3d
1360,1378-1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
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(questions 7, 8, 11, and 12) in respect of which there was no evidence that the parties
had previously questioned Dr Reid or that he had made sua sponte comments that
would have forestalled questions. The transcripts clearly reveal the judge directly
responding to these lacunae in the course of his colloquy with Reid of November 26.
Generally however, the incomplete nature of the court record means that this kind of
reductive link between the Dentler/Scott memos and the judge's behavior is difficult
and in many cases impossible to establish and is in any event not necessary if the test
of "judicial impropriety" as outlined in Chapter I is one of appearance rather than
substance. This is the assumption upon which the narratives of this Part now continue.
II. Structural Inadequacy: Reform of the School Department
In their published account Dentler and Scott have explained how school
administration deficiencies combined with endemic corruption and mismanagement to
frustrate the desegregation endeavor.372 From the judge's point of view, the
opposition of elected school officials was just one aspect of a wider problem, namely
the need to secure effective administrative and management structures for the public
school system without which desegregation could not be accomplished in the short
term or maintained in the long term. The court plan required student assignments to
be made by a staff unit designated by the superintendent, under the supervision of
court representatives.Y' It imposed specific requirements for some matters374 upon
"the school department" 375 yet as Dentler reminded the judge, the "school
department" was a fiction of the court's imagination.i" Although funding came from
city hall and the state, the chief administrators were appointed directly by the five
372
375
Dentler &.Scott, supra note 197. Deficiencies ranged from inaccurate student enrolment data,
failures to repair and maintain buildings, construct new ones, and grasp the nettle of excess
capacity, to outright evasion of court orders regarding teacher and administrator hires. Id.
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 261 (D. Mass. 1975).
Including the preparation, under the Court's supervision, preparation, of an "Orientation and
Application Booklet" Id at 257. Other matters related to kindergarten assignments, the
provision of bilingual instruction, the setting of entrance criteria for the Examination Schools.
Id.251, 252, 258.
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member elected school committee as a matter of personal patronage. Each officer
dealt directly with the committee and there was no unified chain of command. 377
Moreover, desegregation planning and implementation required expertise and, in
Dentler's view: "(njo-one in the Boston area had any reason to believe that the Boston
school committee could plan its way out of a portable classroom, let alone make plans
for every school in the system.,,378 Neither the school committee members nor its "top
echelon,,379 of administrators had educational planning experience. There was an
Educational Planning Center with a "small untested staff,,,380 which had produced the
school defendants' plan. Certain individuals demonstrated personal commitment to
the implementation process but their efforts were hindered by a lack of infrastructure
and institutional support. The concern to put in place and secure appropriate
administrative structures with which to implement and then preserve the integrity of
the court's desegregation plan became the key to court withdrawal from the case and
represents a defining theme to the work of the court experts.
With the benefit of hindsight, Dentler and Scott commented that the failure to make
specific provision for a machinery of implementation was a weakness of the court
plan.381 From July 1974 to August 1975, an ad hoc "Implementation Team" consisting
of teachers and administrators already employed within the Boston public schools had
worked on the implementation of the Phase I plan.382 Encouraged by the court, the
school committee proposed in June 1975 and Superintendent Fahey's organizational
plan established in September 1975 an Implementation Office headed by a Director
reporting to an Associate Superintendenr'V but from the start this Office became, in
Judge Garrity's words, "the department orphan [ ... ] treated generally as an
unwelcome guest for the duration of the court's intervention.,,384 It had no control
over its budget, no clear organizational structure, was staffed with personnel on
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temporary assignment from elsewhere and coexisted with separate Transportation and
Assignment Units.385
A. The Experts Urge Reform of the School Department - Judge
Garrity's Court Behavior Evidences their Influence
In the months following announcement of the Phase II Plan386 Dentler and Scott
supervised the implementation process and provided the judge with weekly briefings
concerning progress. On June 3 following a meeting with Desegregation Coordinator
Charles Leftwich they sent a special report advising their belief that "virtually no
progress" was being made under his leadership which was being deliberately
subverted by the school committee.Y' With no command structure, staff and record-
keeping capability, Dr Leftwich was without the "means - authority and resources - to
discharge his responsibilities.v" The impasse threatened the desegregation endeavor.
On June 16 Dentler reported that the Assignment Unit at last had a DirectorJ89 but his
progress report of June 23390 advised that: "[tjhe diligence of the Assignment Unit
members and their co-workers cannot compensate for the fact that they are neither
equipped, trained nor prepared to undertake a task of this scale and complexity." 39)
Judge Garrity's implementation schedule required student assignments to be
completed by June 20 but the deadline could not be met. They finally went out on
July 4, implementation staff supervised by the court experts working round the clock
to "render sensible the proposed assignment of 80,000 srudents't"" Over the summer
Dentler and Scott continued to supervise plans for transportation, facilities use and
student discipline. By the fall they were convinced that radical action was required.
On November 27 1975, in the midst of discussions concerning SBHS and before the
final hearing, Dentler wrote to the judge to express his view that single issue remedies
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were doomed to fail. SBHS was but one of "dozens just like it".393 The underlying
problem was the way in which the Boston public school system as a whole was
administered. The present occasion should be used to strengthen the authority of the
Office of Implementation (01).394
At the hearing on December 9 1975, in addition to making the receivership order
Judge Garrity acted to strengthen the position of Superintendent Fahey with an order
transferring to her the appointive power of the school committee in relation to
implementation and school safety and security matters. His language reflecting the
experts' briefing material, the judge then addressed the status of the 01. That office,
he said, must be separated from the school committee "if this desegregation plan is to
be implemented and ifthere is to be desegregation of the schools. ,,395
In the following extracts the wording of Dentler's memorandum of November 27
1975 is juxtaposed with the words used by Judge Garrity in court on December 9. The
similarity between the two passages is clear.
Dentler was expressing his view that what was needed was radical action to change
the way in which the Boston public school system as a whole was administered. The
Office of Implementation continued into its seventh month "without a mandate, a
budget, or a personnel appointment roster.,,396 Superintendent Fahey's plan would
relegate the 01 "to a third echelon of insignificance'V'" Then comes this passage:
The School Department is a fiction of the court. There is no such entity
listed in the city charter or in the telephone book. At the other extreme,
individual school staffs such as that at South Boston High continue
isolated and ignorant of the imperatives of the court. Their chain of
command moves from District Superintendent to Deputy. They do not
393 Dentler to Judge Garrity, (Nov. 27 1975), Tentative Ideas About Order for Current Phase of
Case. (90 Garrity XXXVIIf. f19).
Id.
Transcript of Hearing of Dec 91975,94, Morgan v. Kerrigan, No.72-911-G (D. Mass. 1975)
(NARA).
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report to a School Department, nor do they have any identifiable
business to take up with the Office of Implementation. 39g
If the office is to be effective, Dentler continued, it must be able to appoint qualified
personnel:
These will not be found amongst the rank and file of the Boston School
system for every function. That system lacks statisticians, human
relations experts, research and development and faculty training
specialists, security experts, and other consulting and full time staff
essential to implementation. These cannot be appointments made by
the school committee or the Superintendent, who is their agent. They
must be made by the Associate Superintendent for Irnplementation.I"
The following words of Judge Garrity in court at the hearing on December 9 1975
demonstrate the influence of Dentler's briefing:
One of the difficulties in implementing this desegregation plan that has
sort of grown in my realization with the passage of the weeks and
months is that the Court's order has been directed to the School
Department, and there really is no such thing as the School
Department. You know, you look in the telephone book, and you
cannot find anything under the School Department. It is people. And
the Court, perhaps mistakenly, relied upon the school committee to aid
its agents, principally [Schools Superintendent] Fahey, but a lot of
other people working with her and under her, to carry out that plan of
implementation, but it has not been done, and one of the fruits of this
policy pursued by school committee in my opinion has been the
situation down in South Boston High School. It could have been
avoided, and it can be corrected and it will be.4oo
Judge Garrity continued:
The Office or Department of Implementation is by court order going to
have funds at its disposal, funds with which to do things, such as to
employ statisticians or other types of - I mention statisticians. There
are so many other types of specialists who are needed to carry out a
desegregation plan. It will have authority to appoint personnel
necessary to carry out the provisions of the plan. I am not talking now
about teachers, I am talking about special persons and things needed.401
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B. The Inadequacies of the School Department Impinge on
Assignments: Judge Garrity Distributes the Experts' Report
Spring 1976 brought projections of a $16 million deficit in the school budget by the
end of the school year and a motion by Mayor White that the school committee
submit plans to reduce expenditure.l'" On 13 February, Scott raised with Judge
Garrity his concerns about school committee proposals to appoint implementation
personnel on a temporary basis. The court, he advised, should look into the matter
further lest the "squeeze" impact negatively on the assignment process for the coming
year. On March 11 1976, after what he later described as "months of urging the
school committee to take the initiative in staffing and funding the 01",403 Judge
Garrity ordered the school committee to establish a budget for the 01 and to freeze in
place 21 professional personnel in the office until October 1976.404
Despite the court's stated determination to ensure that the Office of Implementation
would be given a full-time staff and the necessary funding to enable it to carry out the
court plan, the 01 continued to struggle without the mandate and the infrastructure
which the annual student assignment exercise required. The resulting confusion was
compounded by the large number of student withdrawals and applications for transfer
as parents sought to manipulate the system for their children's advantage. In October
1976 Dentler and Scott wrote to Judge Garrity explaining that the effect of these
tactics was to subvert the assignment guidelines; of the 75,443 students enrolled in the
public school system as of September I, 1976, approximately 8,000 or 10.5 percent
were assigned after the final date of court review and approval.405 Of these 3,000 were
classified as new entrants, and 5,000 as corrective reassignments.t'" Information
provided by the 01 being inadequate, Dentler and Scott had sequestered the records
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For an account see Sheehan, supra note 268 at 166-167: In January the school committee was
projecting a $20 million deficit by June 30. Mayor White claimed that the school department
had hired 800 more teachers and 300 more transitional aides than were required to implement
the plan and filed a motion with Judge Garrity that the school committee be forced to propose
immediate budget cuts. On a showing of Boston Municipal Research Bureau figures of a
surplus of 400 to 500 teachers and additional administrators and transitional aides whose loss
would not adversely impact on the quality of education in the BPS. Judge Garrity ordered the
School Department to submit a plan for reduction of the budget deficit, expected to reach
$16million by the end of the school year.
Morgan v. McDonough, No. 72-9ll-G (D. Mass. May 6 1976) (Memorandum and Orders
Modifying Desegregation Plan) (90 Garrity XLd. nO).
Transcript of Hearing of Mar. II 1976, 56-57, Morgan v. McDonough, No. 72-911-G (D.
Mass. 1976) (84 Center for Law & Educ.).
Dentler & Scott, (Oct. 3 1976) Review of Student Assignrnents., 90 Garrity XXXVIIf. f 20.
Id.
404
405
406
77
and now concluded that 14 percent of the students assigned subsequent to court
approval had probably been assigned in ways that violated the court plan and its rules
governing assignment of students.f"
In their view the major cause of the problem was a "fundamentally defective Office of
Implementation, too weak in authority to control the assignment process, too poorly
staffed to operate effectively [... ] and too fragmented in structure to eliminate errors
which compound from day to day and week to week.,,408 To secure the future of the
plan the court should order the establishment of a Department of Implementation,
"effective December 1 1976".409 On October 7 1976 Judge Garrity distributed the
experts' report and enjoined the Boston School Department and Committee from
processing any more "new entrants" or "corrective assignment" applications without
the prior approval of Dean Dentler and Dean Scott.410 One of their first tasks would be
to develop forms which would provide them with the information they required to
implement the court plan.411
C. Judge Garrity Establishes the Department of Implementation -
Superintendent Fahey Attempts a Coup - The Court is Over a
Barrel
For six months Judge Garrity continued to express the hope that an effective
Department of Implementation could be established without a court order.412 Under
pressure from the School Committee to maximize efficiency, Superintendent Fahey
submitted proposals for reorganization413 but these amounted to little more than filling
vacancies, incorporating the assignment unit, adding two assignment specialists for
special needs and bilingual students, and appointing temporary personnel.l'" On
February 1 1977 Dentler reported that 01 staffing was now down to seven people,
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only a few of whom were knowledgeable about the details of court orders and the
particulars of geocode units, assignment procedures, application booklets etc.
"Rebuilding of staff adequacy" he stated "will take time and practice. It should occur
well before spring or we will all pay the price of randomly accumulated ignorance
translated into motions and arguments in court".415
On February 22 the school committee accepted Superintendent Fahey's plan''!" but
reduced the proposed salaries for 12 implementation specialists by an average of
$10,000 dollars each. Two months later they confirmed the appointments of 01
personnel but for six months only.417
On May 6, 1977 as the annual student assignment exercise approached, the court
acted. Its annual Memorandum and Orders Modifying the Desegregation Plan noted
that the 01 "has had and continues to receive only minimal support from the school
committee".418 Of the initial staff of 21 only six remained, the other 15 having left
without being replaced and the qualifications of some of the remaining six "are at
least open to question'Y'" The Order established a Department of Implementation as a
permanent unit with four divisions'V" under the supervision of the associate
superintendent for support services, a position then held by Charles Leftwich. The DI
was to have a "clear mandate to assume responsibility for all aspects of the court's
desegregation plan, and [... ] the authority to carry out that mandate".421
The immediate effect however was to provoke a political crisis. "In a rare show of
solidarity",422 the school committee and Superintendent Fahey joined forces to oppose
the court order. On May 11, the school committee gave her authority to assign and
reassign personnel and resources without reference to them and Miss Fahey ousted
Associate Superintendent Leftwich, nominated John Coakley as his successor and
placed herself in overall charge of the new DI. 423
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On May 12 1976 Dr Leftwich filed with the court his operating budget and staffing
plan for the new 01 as the May 6 order required him to do. Miss Fahey filed
alternative proposals on May 19. On May 17 plaintiffs moved for immediate
implementation of the orders of May 6.
On May 20 Judge Garrity ordered Dr Leftwich's reinstatement.V" but on May 24 in
effect he was forced to climb down; the order of May 20 was vacated and the May 6
order amended confirming Ms Fahey's overall authority over the new DI and leaving
the school committee and the Superintendent in control of "one of the largest
I ., ,,425emp oyment agencies m town.
Dentler and Scott were backing Dr. Leftwich. On May 16 Dentler had briefed the
judge that the Committee was using the Superintendent to obstruct the formation of
the 01:
Miss Fahey believed she was a captive of penultimate cross-pressures:
(1) The Committee was threatening to use the order as the pretext for
terminating her in 1978 [... J; (2) They were offering her a first chance
to coalesce with them; (3) The court had criticized her 01 proposal and
had rejected it, placing new strength in a DI she feared she would be
unable to control; and (4) Her office was filled with hangers-on who
had been awaiting renewal of their appointments to headquarters
positions, justified on the personnel printouts as assigned to
"desegregation activities" and these individuals called for her
. 426protection,
Dr Leftwich, encouraged by the experts, had "swung into action" in order to meet the
court's tight deadlines.427 "For the first year since the court intervened" Dentler wrote,
"the court experts witnessed effective planning and implementation" but these efforts
were being blocked within school headquarters, hence the submittal of his budget and
staffing plan directly to the court.428 When challenged by Dentler and Scott on the
costings which were high, he explained that this was because school department
officials were threatening to refuse to provide adequate space or equipment, to
facilitate moving equipment such as the computer and, in effect, "to prevent the
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development of the 01". This refusal of cooperation stemmed from job insecurity;
about 25 personnel stood to lose their jobs. Ultimately however, the fault lay with the
school committee and the patronage power available to it:429
The school committee has obstructed formation of the DI, in defiance
of the May 6 order; [i]t has achieved this by pressurizing the
superintendent to go out on the point between the DJ and the court, in
the belief that the court would abandon its objectives before it would
move against the superintendent. [ ... ] The superintendent, as captive,
is incapable of developing or leading an alternative version of the DI.
She will be obliged to staff it with personnel who are agents of
individual school committee members and who are opposed to the
purposes of the court.430
Dentler then warned the judge of the dangers for the court: as a result of the crisis
court deliberation had been put back to May 20 and Phase III assignment deadlines
could not now be met. Miss Fahey and committee members blamed the experts for the
crisis with the result that their liaison function was now at risk and with it the court's
authority:
All five members of the school committee will soon conclude that it is
possible to impede the will of the court without incurring direct costs
legally. This will stimulate a revived quest for innovative maneuvers
and obstructionist tactics. Many of these will expand upon Miss
Fahey's new role as a committee captive.l"
Dentler urged the judge to use his personal influence to secure the cooperation of
Superintendent Fahey and Dr Leftwich432 but in the event, on Judge Garrity's
direction'r''', the meeting which Superintendent Fahey attended later that afternoon in
the courthouse was with Dentler and Scott. Dentler reported back that Dr Leftwich
had mishandled the situation, Miss Fahey was resolved to exercise personal control
over the DI and would "go to any length" to protect her action in removing him,
leaving the court in difficulty.l'" To accept the removal of Dr Leftwich would
429
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jeopardize its authority; to do otherwise would be to attack the superintendent. The
court was "over a barrel - one that is not filled with rainwater." 435
In a briefing memo for the hearing on May 20 Dentler recommended holding finn: the
court should establish the DI with the structure and functions already specified in its
Phase III order, a budget and staffing plan to be produced by the experts within 24
hours of request.t" Dr Leftwich should be confirmed as Associate Superintendent
with overall "direct and daily supervision" of the DI until October I 1977 in
preference to John Coakley on the basis of his familiarity with "deep and numerous
problems experienced during Phase lIB" and his greater competence to perform the
leadership tasks necessary to establish the new department. In this instance, he
stressed, the advice of the court experts should be given exceptionally careful weight:
The attorneys in the case have not monitored the operations of the
Office of Implementation, as they have. The state board and its agents
have not worked directly with John Coakley since 1974 and 1975. The
experts have done SO.437
The specific issue for the hearings of May 20 and 23 was the wording of the May 6
order, specifically Section 7(g)(l) which as originally promulgated gave power to the
associate superintendent to nominate appointments to the DI.438 Judge Garrity's oral
order of May 20 had reinstated Dr Leftwich for the limited purpose of carrying out the
court's orders respecting formulation of the prospective DI, and had directed
Superintendent Fahey and Associate Superintendent Leftwich "to develop jointly and
by agreement a list of potential nominees from which the superintendent would fill
positions in the department of implementation.v''" Dentler's memo which
differentiated between leadership and assignment tasks now gave the judge his
compromise. The supplemental order of May 24 identified "two major urgent tasks"
confronting school department personnel: student assignments for the 1977-78 school
year and the establishment of a department of implementation.T"
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The oral order of May 20 was vacated. A new clause inserted into the May 6 order
confirmed the power of the superintendent to appoint 01 personnel. Dr Leftwich, was
reinstated under her overall command but his role was confined to student assignment
purposes only. All members of the school department were ordered to cooperate with
him in this task.44J Superintendent Fahey's amendments to the court's draft proposals
for organization and budget which had been distributed on May 23 were to be
prepared only after conferring with the court-appointed experts.
Under the tenns of the compromise arrangement, Dr Leftwich's responsibility for
assignments continued until October 1 1977. The Office of Implementation went out
of existence on July 1 1977 and was replaced by the Department of Implementation
with John Coakley as Associate Superintendent for Support Services and Catherine
Ellison as 01 Director.442 Dr Leftwich was subsequently appointed as deputy
superintendent for desegregation implementation in Cleveland.443 John Coakley
remained in office until 1987 by which time the court had retired from active
supervision of the BPS and returned responsibility to the elected officials of the
school committee.r"
D. The 1977 Assignment Crisis: The Experts' Memorandum is
Docketed - Judge Garrity Orders the City Defendants to Comply
with the Experts' Recommendations
In the event, the May orders failed to avert a student assignment crisis which blew up
in August of the same year. The crisis was predictable. Writing to Judge Garrity on 31
Jul/45 Dentler had expressed concern at the lack of progress. The deadline for
corrective assignments for the coming year was August 1. Dr. Scott had discovered
that although only 86 cases had been approved and 300 had been rejected, of the 86
441
442
Morgan v. McDonough, No. 72-9ll-G (D. Mass. May 24 1977) (Supplemental Order
Regarding Office of Implementation and Department of Implementation).
Coakley's title was subsequently changed to that of Senior Officer. Catherine Ellison
continued as his deputy.
Dentler & Scott, supra, note 197.
Spalding, supra note 382. Coakley was succeeded as Senior Officer by Catherine Ellison who
remained in office until 1990. Id.
Dentler, (July 31 1977) Department ofImplementation (DJ) (90 Garrity XXXVIIf. f22).
443
444
445
83
only five were "prima facie acceptable and others were presented without evidence of
case analysis or substantiation.vl" Dentler did not pull his punches:
[DI officer Mr. Canty's preparations] "could not be more casual and
less reviewable in quality, and they fall below the standards achieved
by the old Office of Implementation, low as they were. Mr. Coakley
twice lamented his belief that the DI 'is not as well organized as we
want it to be.' Our impression continues to be that he and the persons
chosen could not, in concert, organize - let alone administer - a
neighborhood lemonade stand. They lack the temperament, experience,
and even the motivation to do their work effectively.t'T"
Dentler's misgivings were well-founded. In August 1977 the court-established
Citywide Parents Advisory Council (CPAC)44!l reported "massive chaos in the city
due to the current state of assignments'v'", A letter to the judge set out the scale of the
confusion - so great that serious consideration had been given to advising parents to
disregard the new assignments and to send their children instead to the schools
attended the previous year,450 and called into question both the competence of the
experts, and the wisdom of the court itself. 451 On August 17 Dentler wrote to the
judge that some method of correcting the impression of violation was "sorely
needed", and offered assistance but expressed the view that "surely the burden of
proof rests with the DI.,,452
On 22 August a joint CPAC and CDAC453statement asserted that the student
assignments for the coming school year had been incorrectly carried out, that the rules
and guidelines for corrective assignments were "arbitrary, capricious and insensitive
to the needs of both parents and students" and demanded immediate action to review
and correct the entire assignment process even at the cost of delaying the start of the
school year.454 The same day Dentler and Scott wrote to Judge Garrity responding
factually to the specific allegations made in the Joint Statement. The judge ordered
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copies to be released to the parties and to the news media.455 On 29 August 1977
Dentler wrote the judge a lengthy report setting out for the record the history of
student assignment disputes since 1974 when parents received as many as five letters
from the Boston school department, each one canceling a previous assignment and
announcing a new one.456 "Violative implementation" on the part of the school
authorities was "so rampant" that the court experts had been drawn into "direct daily
administration of the system" 457 but some of the causes lay in the dynamic character
of student enrolment in the Boston public school system which were not easily
amenable to court resolution. The problem now threatened public confidence in the
"fairness and competence" of the court ..~58
The memo then set out the "short-term remedies" which included some steps already
taken and others which would be simple to take with court approval and could be
concluded by September 1 of that year. Disputes remained concerning the 622 high
school seniors (out of a possible 3,703) who were not assigned to their high schools of
May 1977. Of that number, 127 at their request had been assigned to different schools
reducing the total to 495. An additional 70 had obtained corrective assignments,
reducing the total to 425. Of these:
[slome 288 of the 622 did not file applications. More important Iy 154
who did file were assigned to their second or third preference, in
accordance with the rules. In other words, they are like the 127 who
applied to get out of their previous high schools except that they did
not get their first preference and now, after the fact, some of them
think they prefer return to their old school to enrolment in their second
or third choice.459
Dentler's memo then made specific recommendations:
My recommendation is that we immediately ask the 01, through the
court experts, to contact the residual 425 - except those who applied
and received their second or third preference - and ask if they wish to
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be continued at their previous high school. If their first preference was
their previous school, this should be allowed, of course. 460
The effect on desegregation totals would be "minimal" except at three sites which
would experience an increased black ratio but by no more than 2%.
According to the DI, approximately 170 students altogether applied for
a first preference to continue at their previous school and received
assignments to second or third preference schools. These students, I
think should be reassigned without delay by the DJ, except in the case
of kindergarten students seeking to continue in first grade. 461
There are approximately 1,400 late applications stored in the DJ, which
were not considered. The DJ should, I believe, be allowed to go
through these and reassign students whose applications reflect a first
preference to continue at their previous school, except for
kindergarteners. Other preferences should be denied. 462
Judge Garrity's manuscript instructions ordered copies of the memorandum to be sent
to the parties and the press, approved these "short-term remedies" and ordered them to
be carried into effect "forthwith".463
E. The Judge as Political Operator
What emerges from the above narratives is a picture of a judge with experts
"whispering in his ear." The judge permitted his experts an enviable degree of power
and they enjoyed what seems to have been unrestricted access to him in the discharge
of their functions. It is probably true to say that had they not done so, the judge's
project to outface the school committee could not have been undertaken. The judge
was clearly prepared to moderate the conventions of judicial behavior in an
unprecedented situation. The narratives reveal the freedom permitted to the experts;
moreover the judge was receiving confidential briefings concerning the motivation
and behavior of parties subject to his jurisdiction which in general he chose not to
disclose. On occasions, as in August 1977, the judge ordered the experts'
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Id. at para 3 (e).
Id. at para 3(0.
Id. at para 3(g).
Id. The memorandum is endorsed with Judge Garrity's handwritten instructions: "8/29177
Clerk: please send copies of this memorandum and order to the parties and news media.
WAG" and in margin: "8/29177 The short-term remedies recommended in paragraphs 3(e), (0
and (g) are hereby approved and it is ORDERED that the city defendants through the DJ carry
them out forthwith. Garrity, J."
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recommendations into direct effect as a matter of short-tem expediency.l'" To that
extent his conduct exceeded the ambit of what would be considered to be appropriate
in normal adversarial proceedings today. The question then must be: how did he "get
away with it?" Why did he not face challenge at the time? A partial answer may be
found in the justificatory themes of civic disobedience and structural inadequacy
which underpin the above narratives and which probably did much to insulate the
judge from First Circuit challenge.
Another picture however emerges from these narratives: a picture of the judge as a
political operator. Thus following the May 6 1977 order, when the judge and his team
found themselves outmaneuvered or at least partially so, what is significant is the
nature of the judge's response. He defused Miss Fahey's "coup" and brokered a
compromise by publishing his own draft proposals for DJ organization and budget,
produced of course with material provided by the experts, and setting dates for
hearing objections and counter-proposals.Y" He defused the assignment crisis which
followed by publishing the experts' memo which both set the record straight factually
and made short-term recommendations. In other words he manipulated the conduct of
the litigation by the strategic use of the experts' material which he selectively brought
into the adversarial process. The Order as to Department of Implementation which
Judge Garrity published for discussion on May 23 1977466 was not the first draft that
he had published in this way but was typical of what came to represent his exit
strategy for court disengagement and characteristic of his developing political style. It
is this process which is examined in the next narrative.
464 Supra note 463. In the later stages of the litigation the judge ordered Dentler's memos to be
released in the interests of moving the proceedings along. On April 28 1982 he scheduled for
consideration Robert Dentler's memorandum of 26 April 1982 entitled School Desegregation
and the Tobin K-8 Proposal. See docket entry 3731. See also Morgan v. Nucci, No. 72-911-
G22 n.12 (D. Mass. Sept. 3 1985) (Memorandum and Orders on UFP). (90 Garrity XLV fll):
"The court's finding with respect to the needs of District 5 as well as those of Burke High is
predicated in part on a memorandum prepared by court expert Dr. Robert A. Dentler dated
January 16 1985 which was distributed to the parties on January 18 1985. It describes a
jeopardy shared by students in Districts 4 and 5. Relevant excerpts are set forth in Appendix
B".
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Morgan v. McDonough, 72-911-G (D. Mass. May 23 1977) (90 Garrity XLd. f70).
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III. Uncompromising Litigiousness: A Strategy of Disengagement
With implementation structures securely in place, the focus of the experts' work
shifted to issues of disengagement. Dr Scott retired prematurely from the case in
1981467 at a point when the litigants' inability to resolve the issue of school closings
presented an insuperable obstacle to the development of a consent decree which
would permit court withdrawal. The "uncompromising litigiousness'F'" which
characterized the Boston schools case was in many ways a function of the number of
parties involved. The original three parties of the liability stage (the black plaintiffs,
the school committee and Superintendent, known collectively as "the school
defendants" and the State Board of Education and State Commissioner, "the state
defendants") had been joined at the remedial stage by the Mayor of Boston, the
Boston Public Facilities Commissioners and the Director of the Public Facilities
Department ("the city defendants"), the Boston Teachers Union (BTU), the
Administrators Union(Boston Association of School Administrators and Supervisors-
BASAS), and the Home and School Association (BHSA), in each case as defendant-
intervenors, a Hispanic parents group, El Comite De Padres Pro Defensa De la
Education Bilingue (El Comitej'?", as plaintiff-intervenors and, at a later stage when a
desegregation-related financial crisis caused teacher lay-offs which impacted more
severely on blacks than on whites, a black educators group, Concerned Black
Educators of Boston (CBEB).47o
It has been suggested that, when judges attempt to reform public institutions, the
result can be the emergence of a "controlling group" to whom judges seek to shift
responsibility for the policy choices that this kind of litigation requires.?" In Boston,
whilst the termination of the receivership of South Boston High was achieved by
407
41>9
By letter of resignation dated July 26 1981. See Letter Garrity to Scott Aug. 21 1981 (90
Garrity LVXII f11).
The term is Dentler's. See Dentler, (Aug. 6 1986) (90 Garrity XXXVII tJ6): "In view of the
uncompromising litigiousness of all parties other than the State. the prospect for
disengagement seems very dismal."
Judge Garrity permitted El Comite to intervene as a party plaintiff on January 23 1975.
Plaintiff-intervenors sought to "protect the rights of Hispanic children to receive a bilingual
education under Mass. G.L. c.21 A and under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
s2000d, as set forth in Lau v. Nichols, 1974,414 U.S. 563." Morgan v. McDonough, 511 F.
Supp. 408, 411 (D. Mass. 1981).
See Morgan v. McDonough. 554 F. Supp.169, 173 (D. Mass. 1982).
R. SANDLERANDD. SCHOENBROD.DEMOCRACYBy DECREE 118 (2003).
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consensus.l" consent decree negotiations initiated in June 1981 by State Education
Commissioner Anrig with Judge Garrity's approval and aimed at permitting federal
court withdrawal from active supervision of the public school system, were less
successful. Given the range of competing interests, the failure of the parties to reach
agreement is hardly surprising. The nearest they came to the formation of a
"controlling group" was in April 1980 when a financial crisis produced a polarization
between the apparently conflicting aims of "desegregation as racial percentages" and
"desegregation as educational quality".473 A coalition of interests emerged to oppose
the court's orders for school closings and revised geocodings and attorneys Johnson
for the black plaintiffs and Playter for El Comite474 joined school defendant attorney
Simonds in calling for a stay pending appeal. The qualified support of the First Circuit
saw the Judge through the immediate crisis and thereafter it can be said that one of his
main aims was to prevent the emergence of a controlling group which would subvert
the court's view of what the desegregation process required. 475The assistance of the
court experts was central to this task and I return to this aspect of their work in Part II
of this thesis.
Whatever the merits of the paradigm, Judge Garrity's role in the Boston case cannot
be described as passive. Indeed, the prospect of indefinite court supervision of the
Boston public schools receded only when the judge lost faith in the willingness of the
parties to reach a negotiated settlement and in effect took control of the process of
disengagement. The court, he said, was no longer prepared to wait "with its fingers
crossed" for the parties to submit a consent decree. "This is a case that started in
1972", he announced, "and it is going to end in 1982".470 The court had a
responsibility to bring the case to a close. To that end, he embarked upon a "parallel
planning process" which was, in effect a return to the model he had adopted in
relation to the Masters' Plan and had resorted to subsequently as a mechanism for
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Morgan v. McDonough, 456 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Mass. 1978).
For an account see Dentler & Scott, supra note 197 at 93. See generally Anne Richardson
Oakes, From Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional Adjudication: The Meaning of
Desegregation in Social Science Research and Law, 14 Mich. 1. Race & L. 61,96-105 (2008)
(examining the tension between demands for 'integration' and 'education' in Boston MA).
The organization representing Hispanic parents whom Judge Garrity had permitted to be
joined as plaintiff-intervenors. Supra note 469.
Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F.2d 265 (lst Cir. 1982).
Transcript of Hearing of June 23 1982, Morgan v. McDonough, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass.) (84
Center for Law & Educ.).
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resolving apparent impasse. 477 On August 3 he issued a draft order and timetable,
setting deadlines of August 24 and September 2 1982 for tiling comments and
objections with a hearing date of September g 1982. 47tl The final order published on
December 23 1982 set up what the judge described as a transitional course of
disengagement 479 whereby the court handed back direct responsibility for
implementation of the court plan and compliance monitoring to the school authorities,
retaining fall-back jurisdiction to resolve disagreements "with the assistance of the
. . " 480court expert as m previous years.
Whilst even in 1985 Judge Garrity continued to hope for a resumption of the consent
decree negotiations, it is nevertheless clear that court disengagement from the Boston
public schools case was driven by federal court strategy with Dr Dentler as court
advisor at its heart. 481 As early as 1977 Dentler was advising the judge that he should
withdraw from the case by December 1978, and setting out a strategy by which this
might be accomplished. Presciently he warned of the dangers of prolonged court
intervention:
When a few remammg tasks have been completed to the best of our
ability, the role of the court will have become superfluous. The mistakes
and mischief wrought by others will continue to pile up at the door of the
court, only to detract from five ~ears of wise and honorable administration
of justice, unless we disengage. 82
From 1982 onwards, he provided the judge with the statistical and other factual
information without which decisions concerning compliance with court orders could
not be taken. He prepared advisory opinions on specific issues preparatory to court
hearings and advised the judge on the politics of the school department, in particular,
the relationship between officials responsible for implementation and elected
477
47X
479
Id.
Morgan v. McDonough No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. August 3 1982) (Memorandum and Draft
Orders Toward Closing the Case) (90 Garrity XLd ..t72).
Morgan v. McDonough, 554 F. Supp. 169 (D. Mass. 1982).
Id. at 174 n. 4.
Morgan v. Nucci, 620 F. Supp. 214, 229 n.22: "it is not beyond the realm of possibility that
the final orders of September 3 1985 might trigger resumption of consent decree negotiations
whereby all or portions of the final orders would become the final judgment in the case".
Dentler (January 24 1977), Notes on Disengaging from the Schools Case. (90 Garrity
XXXVIIf. f39).
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members of the school committee. He proposed himself as special master with
responsibility for oversight of court disengagement, provoking another "rare show" of
agreement as state and school defendants, plaintiffs and plaintiff intervenors united to
oppose the plan.483 Above all, he was central to the process of disengagement by draft
order, providing drafts, comments and suggestions many of which were adopted with
only minor amendment.P"
In interview with the author, Dr Dentler was modest about his own role in the
disengagement process and stressed the contribution of the judge's then law clerk,
Karen Green.485 The success of court strategy owed much to the skill and
determination of the judge, but as the memoranda make clear that strategy was
heavily dependent upon the work of Dr Dentler and for that reason merits special
treatment.
A. Special Master Proposal
Judge Garrity's August 3 draft order contained a number of controversial provisions
but none more so than its provisions for the appointment of a special master. The
draft, adopting a tripartite division of functions, relinquished court jurisdiction in
areas in which compliance had been achieved but divided responsibility for
monitoring compliance in other areas between the State Board and a special master to
be appointed for 1982-84 primarily to monitor student assignments and to resolve
disputes.t"
The use of a special master is permitted by Federal Rules of Procedure in exceptional
cases487 and in the years following Keyes488 had become a recognized part of the
4X3
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Sheehan supra note 268 at 176.
Infra notes 502-524 and accompanying text.
Ms Green had completed a Masters dissertation which had drawn on the ideas of Fisher and
Ury in 'Getting to Yes' (1981) Century Business. Dentler (2006) slIpra note 197.
Morgan v. McDonough, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. Aug.3 1982) (Memorandum and Draft
Orders Toward Closing Case) Part VIII, Part XI (90 Garrity XLd. f72).
Another major issue of controversy was the limitation of the parties to the litigation to
plaintiffs, city and school defendants and State Board of Education; Id. Part II.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a) and (b).
The power to appoint a special master derives from the practice of the English Courts of
Chancery. See Irving R. Kaufman. Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 452 (1958).
Keyes v. School District No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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desegregation toolkit where judges faced uncooperative school authorities4X9 In
Boston Judge Garrity had already used special masters to produce a desegregation
plan490 and was in regular contact with Judge Battisti in Cleveland whose
appointments of a special master and experts had faced extensive litigation.?" The
suggestion that a special master with "authority to resolve disputes, interpret orders
and approve modifications justified by changing conditions" might supervise court
disengagement in Boston 492 came initially from Commissioner Anrig.493 In the event
the parties accepted Robert Bohn as "consent conductor" and the idea temporarily
lapsed only to re-emerge as the judge and his team, by this time minus Marvin Scott
but including law clerk Karen Green, addressed the task of negotiated agreement. 494
The point of interest is this: by 1982 the judge and his expert had worked together on
this case for a period of eight years; their working relationship rested upon mutual
esteem and respect. Dentler's generous tribute to the team nature of the exercise
notwithstanding, what emerges from the documentation is a picture of the expert
acting certainly as the judge's sounding board but more significantly as the architect
of his exit strategy. The terms of the draft order reflect Dentler's recommendations
concerning the tripartite division of functions. The proposal for the appointment of a
special master, if it did not originate with Dentler, was one to which he gave his clear
489 See the comments of the 6th Circuit in Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F. 2d 737,743
(6th Cir. 1979).
For a discussion of the use of masters in schools desegregation see David L. Kirp & Gary
Babcock, Judge & Company: Court-Appointed Masters. School Desegregation and
Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REV. 313, 315 (1981). See also David Aronow. The Special
Master in School Desegregation Cases: The Evolution of Roles in the Reform of Public
Institutions Through Litigation. 7 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 739 (1980).
There is extensive discussion of the use of masters in institutional reform litigation generally.
For a selection of the literature see: Robert E. Buckholz et al., Special Project: The Remedial
Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978); Ellen E. Deason,
Managing the Managerial Expert. 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 341 (1998); Vincent M. Nathan, The
Use of Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation. 10 TOLEDO L. REV. 419 (1979); Wayne D.
Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping
Adjudication, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1986); David I. Levine, The Authority for the
Appointment of Remedial Special Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation: The History
Reconsidered. 17 U.CD. L.REV. 753 (1984).
Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. Feb 7 1975) (Order of Appointment and
Reference to Masters).
Dentler (2005) supra note 260.
Commissioner Gregory R. Anrig, cited by MARSHA MURNINGHAN, COURT DISENGAGEMENT
IN THE BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS: TOWARDS A THEORY OF RESTORATIVE LAW (unpublished
Ed. D. thesis, Harvard University 1983 on file with Kenrick Library, Birmingham City
University) at 108.
In a letter to Judge Garrity dated July 6 1981. Id.
Id. at 107.
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support and a considerable degree of personal enthusiasm for the role. Nevertheless,
the proposal was abandoned. In the final order handed down on December 23 1982,495
responsibility for planning and implementation was given to the 01 but compliance
monitoring went to the State Board. The order established negotiation inter partes as
the primary mechanism for dispute resolution rather than adjudication by the court.
Thus whilst disagreement between the school defendants and the State Board on
planning and implementation matters would continue to be resolved by the court
"with the assistance of the court experts as in prior years,,,496 for all other issues, a
dispute resolution procedure was established with applications to the court to be
entertained only as a last resort once the procedure had been exhausted and then only
subject to specific conditions. 497
The reason for the change is clear; the special master proposal attracted almost
universal opposition, some of which was general - as counsel for the school
committee observed:
To rework a Groucho Marx witticism, the school defendants would
have serious reservations about the appointment of any person as
special master who would be interested in the job49B
Some was undoubtedly ad hominem; Robert Dentler had become associated with the
proposal and he was a controversial figure. Powerful opponents were lobbying against
him. Ultimately however, it is clear and the documentary record confirms that the
judge was his own man. If politics is the art of the possible then Judge Garrity's
political skills moderated Dentler's influence; the court had the wisdom and the
flexibility to give way and confrontation was averted.499 To use Murninghan's
terminology, the August 3 draft order was a "trial balloon" and Dentler was its chief
designer. 500 In producing a "usable alternative" it was a political success and the judge
achieved a positive outcome, albeit not the one the design team initially proposed. 50 I
495
496
497
49H
SOO
501
Morgan v. McDonough, 554 F. Supp. 169 (D. Mass. 1982).
Id. at 174, n. 4.
Id. at 177.
Morgan v. McKeigue, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. 23 Aug. 1982) (School Defendants Comments
and Objections to Draft Final Orders) cited in Muminghan, supra note 492 at ) 26.
Remark attributed to R.A. Butler 'The Art of the Possible' (1971) but now thought to have
originated with Otto von Bismarck, August 11 1867.
Murninghan supra note 492 at 131.
Dentler, (Sept. 3 1982), Draft Order Filings: An Advisory Opinion, With Recommendations
(90 Garrity XXXVIIf. f33).
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B. The Special Master Proposal and the Dentler Memos
Dentler's memoranda on this topic begin in July 1982 with a memo to law clerk
Karen Green regarding the content of the draft order.502 This memo proposed a
tripartite classification for compliance monitoring (matters in respect of which
compliance had been achieved, matters to be monitored by the State Board and other
matters to be monitored by a special master) which was eventually incorporated into
the draft order although the specific areas were modified. At this stage Dentler's
nominee for special master was former senior planning officer James Breeden503
supported by the court expert in a liaison role. In a second memo dated the same day,
however, Dentler queried Breeden's suitability on the basis of his former employment
relationship with the school defendants and suggested himself instead, setting out his
availability and possible terms of appointment.i'" He would need to have "adequate
delegated authority, perhaps defining you as appellate for major disputes over my
judgments on implementation and adjustment issues".505
On July 21 Dentler wrote to Judge Garrity advising that Superintendent Spillane's
appointment procedures raised "grave questions about compliance" with court orders,
calling for "very tough oversighr't.i'" Spillane, he wrote "must experience
supervision, [ ... ], in a way that leads him to conclude that court orders exist to be
followed".507 Five days later Dentler suggested the appointment of himself as special
master with authority to coordinate supervision of the three categories of
implementation.i'" There were potential drawbacks: a) many issues would still need
to be dealt with by the judge and b) special masters usually have "lawyerly
qualifications't.i'" The need for continuing jurisdiction rendered the first problem
moot but in any event "you and I" he wrote "would want to confer periodically
whatever the rules suggested. Our strength derives from eight years of close
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Dentler to Karen (Green), 2 July 1982, Selected Final Order Issues (90 Garrity XXXVlIf.
f32).
A black educator and civil rights leader who had directed the Citywide Coordinating Council
in 1977 and 1978 Dentler & Scott, supra note 197.
Dentler, (July 2 1982) (90 Garrity XXXVlIf. f33).
Id.
Dentler, ( July 21 1982) Spillane'S Administrative Appointments (90 Garrity XXXVllf. f33).
Id.
Dentler (July 26 1982 )(90 Garrity XXXVIIf. f33).
Id.
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cooperation on this case". The second point could be treated "by behaving like the
administrator I am. I have conducted many hearings since 1965 and have
implemented many due process requirements. I even carried out such duties for the
panel of masters in this case.,,510 The title had the advantage of precedent; even the
superintendent had asked for it,511but the crucial point was the necessary authority: "I
should be charged with coordinating and, where appropriate, with reconciling the
actions of the DI and the State, in order to prevent the advent of contradictory or
unilateral decisions".512
In his final memo on the subject, written on July 30, Dentler repeated his interest in
the role, which he would take on in preference to his other commitments and raised
again the issue of the title:513
I do not like "Disengagement Administrator" because it will be
deemed frothy by the media and because it lacks parsimony.
"Administrator" is acceptable, if rather bloodless. My preference is for
"Special Master". This has continuity with the case which appeals to
me and may ramify for those I must supervise. The rules about special
masters do not contain anything I can see which makes the title
inappropriate, particularly when the order will spell out duties and
authority. If I am missing a nuance, the role could be entitled
"Administrative Master," perhaps. Only the first of the above seems
objectionable, and I will abide by your preference. 514
c. Opposition Mounts
Judge Garrity published his Draft Final Order on August 3 1982.515 The same day
Dentler briefed him that Superintendent Spillane's "bifurcation strategy" was aimed at
110
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The New York Times quoted Dr Spillane: "Maybe it's time for us to say that maybe we
should have no part of it. Let's put all the responsibility on the School Department. Appoint
me special master to the court directly responsible to the Judge". "Boston School
Superintendent Asks that City Scrap Desegregation PIan", New York Times, June 6 1982, at
22 cited in Muminghan, supra note 492 at 114.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Dentler,(July 30 1982) (90 Garrity XXXVIIf. f33).
Id.
Morgan v. McDonough, No. 72-9ll-G (D. Mass. August 3 1982) (Memorandum & Draft
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eliminating the possibility of appointment of a special master and warned that the
court would have to assert its authorityr'!"
[ ... ] Spillane does not share [school committee counsel's] aim of
closing the case. He is heavily preoccupied with consolidating his
hegemony over the system. The court's role is in anticlimax. Its
concerns can be ignored or gotten around, and on all other occasions it
can serve as a useful diversion of blame. If a consent decree would
commit him to comply with standing policies, it would reduce his
freedom of action, not enlarge it. A toothless tiger of a final court order
- one in which a weak if well intentioned commissioner with only a
year or two remaining in office shared responsibility with him for
monitoring compliance is preferable. [... ]
[ ... ] the court will have to choose early in September between
Spillane's bifurcation strategy and its own draft order. Only something
like the latter would offer a chance to consolidate the descgregativc
gains of the last eight years. Its issuance would begin to convince
Spillane that the constitution is much more than a quaint source of
managerial inconvenience.517
Dr Spillane was not the only opponent of the special master proposal. In a file note
Judge Garrity recorded a visit from Dr Silber, President of Boston University, the real
purpose of which was to block the appointment of Dr. Dentler as special master. m By
this time, however, the judge had already concluded that the scale of the opposition
was too great to fight, and had communicated this to Dentler a week before Dr
Silber's visit:
[A]pproximately a week ago at a meeting with Dr. Dentler I told
Dentler that I did not want him to decline or defer acceptance of other
professional engagements and consultations, which he told me were in
the offing, in order to remain available for appointment as special
master in the Boston schools case. The prospects of Dr. Dentler's
serving as special master are very remote independently of Dr. Silber's
statements to me yesterday.l'"
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Memo to File (August 20 1982) (90 Garrity LXVII fl3). Robert Dentler details some of the
background to Dr Silber's enmity towards him and Dr Scott in his privately published
personal memoir, ROBERT A. DENTLER, THE LOOKING GLASS SELF (2002) 243-250 (on file
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When the State Board offered to assume all external monitoring responsibilitiesf"
Dentler recommended acceptance and withdrawal of the draft order which it was clear
none of the parties supported.r"
Every attorney communicates a strong vested interest in continuing
one or more parts of the status quo ante. [ ... ]. No party reports any
enthusiasm for relinquishing jurisdiction in the proposed small areas of
the case and several object strenuously, neglecting the fact that the
areas proposed have been concluded in terms of real policy action for
now. No party supports in any way the proposal to finn up and make
penn anent the role of the department of implementation. No party
wants a special master. Several parties continue to posit movement
toward a draft consent decree and depict the court as having impeded
its development. 522
At the hearing on September 8, Judge Garrity announced in court that he was
abandoning the special master proposal: "[E]veryone in the case has opposed the
creation of the special master, and the Court simply yields to that unanimous
opposition",523 but as Dentler pointed out, with the emergence of a usable alternative
in the form of the State Board proposal a "precious" objective had been achieved.r"
IV. Da Capo: Legitimacy and the Court Expert
In the course of a hearing on April 15 1975, Judge Garrity expressed concern about
suspected obstruction of his orders:
[D]oes the Court anticipate that there will be sand thrown in the wheels
and obstacles erected to the formulation and implementation of this
plan? Of course I do. There are people who will do everything in their
power to frustrate this court order [... ] I have no illusions about getting
the cooperation of some people but that does not mean that I am going
to be here contesting with those who would obstruct the Court's order
520 State Board Filing: (Aug. 27 1982). Cited in Dentler, Sept. 3 1982: Draft Order Filings: An
Advisory Opinion With Recommendations (90 Garrity XXXVIIf. f33).
Id.
Id.
Transcript of Hearing of Sept 8 1982, Morgan v.McDonough, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass.1982)
(84 Center for Law and Educ.).
Dentler, (Sept.3 1982), supra note 520.
521
522
523
524
97
on a dail~ basis, if need be. This thing IS going through despite
obstacles. 25
For the judge, what was at stake in Boston was respect for the rule of law and
meaningful compliance with the orders of the federal court. With the support of the
Court of Appeals he brushed aside what were in effect strategies of opposition
couched in terms of legitimacy.P" Legitimacy, however, goes to the heart of the rule
of law and from the point of view of legitimacy, a schools desegregation suit itself
rested on a knife-edge. The criticism that the role given to the federal judiciary by
Brown v. Board of Education527 fostered an illegitimate judicial activism has been
much heard.528 Conservative attempts to 'rein-in' the Supreme Court are commonly
justified by the premise that too ready an assumption of an activist role exposes the
judiciary to charges of impropriety which themselves do much to bring the rule of law
into disrepute.Y" The paradox then is, that when a judge actuated by considerations of
"legitimacy" employs means which take her outside of the scope of accepted
adjudicative procedure in order to secure what she considers to be legitimate goals,
the process upon which she has embarked may itself be vulnerable to similar
. f illezi . 530accusations 0 1 egitimacy.
Did Judge Garrity's relations with his experts compromise his neutrality? Whether
Judge Garrity was unduly reliant on his experts cannot of course now be established.
The judge covered his tracks well and the paper trail is one-sided only. Some factual
points can be made with confidence but the conclusions to be drawn are less clear.
525 Transcript of Hearing of April IS 1975,80, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F.Supp. 216 (D.Mass.
I975)(No. 72-911-G).
Section II supra.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S.294 (1955) (Brown II).
For recent formulations of the case against judicial activism see generally Jeremy Waldron,
The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, IS YALE L. 1. 1346 (2002). Other recent
contributions to the literature include RANHIRSCHL,TOWARDSJURISTOCRACY:THE ORIGINS
ANDCONSEQUENCESOF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM(2004); Ross SANDLER& DAVID
SCHOENBROD,DEMOCRACYBy DECREE:WHATHAPPENSWHENCOURTSRUNGOVERNMENT
(2003); R BORK,COERCINGVIRTUE:THEWORLDWIDERULEOFJUDGES(2003).
See ROBERTF. NAGEL,UNRESTRAINED:JUDICIALEXCESSANDTHEMINDOFTHEAMERICAN
LAWYER, 1-19, 48-51 (2008) (suggesting that the reasons the Court remains an 'activist
institution' despite thirty-five years of Republican appointments can be located in the shared
values and methodology of the legal community).
See generally TOM R. TYLER,WHY PEOPLEOBEY THE LAW(2006) (exploring the normative
value of legitimacy in securing compliance with the law and arguing that 'the basis of
legitimacy is the justice of the procedures used by legal authorities'). Id. 272.
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The judge received extensive and numerous private briefings. He acquired and indeed
positively sought out knowledge which was not disclosed to the parties or made
available for contesting via the adversarial process but 28 U.S.c. § 455(b)(I) applies
to "disputed evidentiary facts" and the judge took the view that this did not apply at
the remedy stage.531 He refused to define his experts' role and then compounded the
refusal by failing to make transparent the extent of their influence upon his decision-
making, at least until the final stages of the case,532 but Judge Tashima's guidelines do
not represent First Circuit law.m Reilly v. United States, which now does, supports a
similar "panoply of procedural safeguards" where a court uses a technical advisor but
both decisions post-date the Garrity era, and are driven primarily by the adversarial
ethic.534 In any event, it seems that appellate courts have been prepared to accept
deviations from procedural norms where the circumstances are unusual and the judge
"did nothing wrong". 535
How the First Circuit would have responded can now only be a matter of conjecture
but the difficulty then as now is the application of appearance of bias tests where a
federal judge uses experts as technical advisors. How exactly should the court treat ex
parte communications and the potential appearance of "coziness" when the
relationship is permitted by law and indeed encouraged in difficult or complex cases?
Public confidence in the judicial system depends as much upon perceptions of the
efficiency of its procedures and the reliability of its outcomes as upon perceptions of
judicial neutrality but the hypothetical informed and reasonable observer of
"appearance standard" jurisprudence+" may be more receptive to these arguments
than the ordinary men or women who lived through the Boston events, sent their
531
532
534
Dentler (2006), supra note 197.
In relation to the final orders the judge did begin to explain his methodology. See Morgan v.
Nucci, 620 F. Supp. 214, 229 (D. Mass. 1985).
231 F.3d. 572 (9th Cir. 2000) (Judge Tashima dissenting); applied in TcclrSearch, L.L.c. v.
Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360 (CA Fed.Cir.2002).
Reilly v. U.S., 863 F.2d 149, 156-160 (lst Cir.1988) (parties should be given an opportunity
to object to appointment of technical advisor on grounds of bias or inexperience, technical
advisor should be given a written 'job-description' and should file an affidavit attesting to his
compliance but should not necessarily be required to write a report.).
See discussion supra note 238 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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children on the buses and saw Dentler and Scott on their televisions as the
representatives of the court with an alien and unwelcome agenda.537
Here then lies the problem. As Justice Kennedy reminds us, the federal courtroom
commands respect as a place where justice is underpinned by a strict ethical code.53!!
The requirements of judicial independence are at the center of that code and it is
axiomatic that mere absence of bias is not enough. Federal courts along with the rest
of the common law community have struggled to find a formula which both "reflects
the reaction of the ordinary members of the public to the irregularity in question" yet
at the same time screens out claims which are groundless and can themselves threaten
the court's independence.i '" The Reilly court referred to the need to ensure "just
adjudication of a dispute without dislodging the delicate balance of the juristic
role.,,540 When a judge uses a technical advisor and the problems are exacerbated by
the issue of efficiency, the task may become simply too difficult.
One of the answers is to bring the advisor into the adversarial process. Judge
Tashima's procedural requirements represent a step in this direction but the question
is whether they go far enough.?" The United Kingdom Court of Appeals, grappling
with these issues, has now directed that even in admiralty and patent cases in which
technical assessors have traditionally been used, "the principle needs to be adapted to
the procedure" and requires not only disclosure of the advice received but also that the
parties be afforded an opportunity to contend that it should or should not be
followed.542
The judicial neutrality issues however still remain and jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which now binds UK domestic courts casts doubts
537
542
Judge Garrity authorized Dentler & Scott to give interviews and "people knew who we were".
(Dentler (2006)).
See Anthony M. Kennedy, Judicial Ethics and the Rule of Law, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L. 1. 1067
(1996).
Webb v. The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 51 (a decision of the High Court of Australia).
Reilly v. U.S., 863 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir.1988).
AMAE v. State of California, F.3d 572, 6ll(9th Cir. 2000) (discussed supra note 242 and
accompanying text).
"The Bow Spring" and "The Manzanillo rr. [2004] EWCA Civ. 1007 (followed in "The
Global Mariner" and "Atlantic Crusader" [2005] EWHC 380 (Admlty). The English Court of
Appeals took the view that such changes were necessary to bring UK procedure into line with
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. See Deirdre Dwyer, The Future of
Assessors under the CPR [2006] C.J.Q. 219, 225-229 (hereinafter' Assessors').
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on the extent to which the practice of receiving advice from an assessor or expert who
does not form part of the tribunal and has no say in the final decision satisfies the
requirement of a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6( I) of the European Convention.s.n
For this reason and despite an initial enthusiasm U.K. courts have been reluctant to
implement a provision in the Civil Procedure Rules intended to extend the use of
technical advisors in civil proceedings.F'"
Another solution is not to give judges things to do with which the adversarial process
struggles and in this connection, a schools desegregation suit is the "polycentric'Y'''
conflict which Lon Fuller regarded as outside the limits of adjudicarion.i'" Fuller may
have underestimated the capacity of legal process to respond to social change but as
Professor Molot suggests, his description of the traditional judicial role retains a
paradigmatic value:
When we view contemporary litigation using Fuller's framework, we
see that some of the most important controversies in civil procedure
today arise where judges stray from their traditional role and cease to
rely on affected parties to frame disputes or to look to an identifiable
body of law in resolving those disputes.I"
If the way in which judges respond to new situations is as important as the decision
to respond in the first place and federal courts are to adapt to the age of the expert, the
543 See Borgers v. Belgium (1993) 15 E.H.R.R. 92; Kress v. France [2001] E.Ct.H.R.382
(discussed in Dwyer, supra note 542 at 228).
CPR r.35.15(3) An assessor shall take such part in the proceedings as the court may direct and
in particular the court may (a) direct the assessor to prepare a report for the court on any
matter at issue in the proceedings; and (b) direct the assessor to attend the whole or any part of
the trial to advise the court on any such matter.
See generally Dwyer (Assessors) supra note 542.
i.e involving 'a multiplicity of variable and interlocking factors, decisions on each of which
presuppose decisions on all the others' and thus unsuitable for adjudicative process'. See
MICHAEL FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTIONTO JURISPRUDENCE 1379 (7'h ed. 2001) (noting
that the term is Michael Polyani's - THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY 170 (1951) and quoting STONE,
SOCIAL DIMENSIONSOF LAW & JUSTICE 653-654 (1966».
See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication. 92 HARV. L. REV. 393-403 (1978).
This paper was first presented to Harvard Law School's Legal Philosophy Discussion Group
in 1957 but not published until 1978 by which time it had been overshadowed by Professor
Chayes' reconceptualization of the nature of judicial process to accommodate the civil rights
class actions of the 1960s and 1970s as new 'public law' actions. See Abram Chayes. The
Role a/the Judge in Public law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.1281 (1976). As Professor Molot
suggests, with the rise of modern mass tort litigation Chayes' model is itself now outdated,
presenting new challenges to the academy to develop new models that will help judges
discharge their responsibilities in accordance with traditional values. See Jonathan T. Molot,
An Old Judicial Role For a New Litigation Era. 113 YALE L.J. 27, 29 (2003).
See Molot, supra note 546 at 118.
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challenge is on to devise a model of process that can accommodate the role of the
technical advisor within the framework of traditional adjudicative values.548
The Boston case was undoubtedly an extreme case and desperate times call for
desperate measures. Judge Garrity's decision to assume personal oversight of the
desegregation of the Boston public schools was a courageous response to a failure of
civic leadership on the part of a judge who was determined to give meaning to his
judicial mandate to uphold the Constitution of the United States. He needed help in so
doing and in a very real sense in that context the ends that he sought must be the
measure of his means. If the tightrope that he walked as he tried to reconcile imposing
the will of the court with the demands of due process threatened at times to undermine
the legitimacy of his authority, it is testament to his political skills that he avoided
challenge on due process grounds.r" If politics is the art of the possible, then Judge
Garrity was or became perforce a politician but politicians as much as lawyers
recognize the legitimating force of procedure. 550 Political operator or no, it is doubtful
whether the judge could have succeeded as he did had he not himself been able to
inspire in his courtroom a profound respect for the commitment to fair procedures in
terms of both substance and appearance which lies at the heart of legal ideology in a
liberal society.
548
549
550
For some suggestions, see Robert L. Hess, Note, Judges Cooperating with Scientists: A
Proposal for More Effective Limits on the Federal Trial Judge's Inherent Power to Appoint
Technical Advisors, 54 VAND. L. REv. 547, 586 (200 I) ("[G]reater checks and limits are
needed to guide the development of technical advisor jurisprudence"). See also Siegel, supra
note 251 at 209-214 (recommending modifications to the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges and Rule 104(a) Fed. R. Evid.); Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses:
Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59 (1998)141-155 (making
recommendations for selection and appointment of and communications with expert
witnesses) and Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific
Evidence 110 HARV. L.REv. 941,953-957 (1997).
Iam of course using the term "due process" in its widest sense.
See eg ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 2 (1990): 'The democratic integrity of
law ... depends entirely upon the degree to which its processes are legitimate.' and general
discussion in Christopher 1. Peters, Adjudication as Representation. 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312
(1997). For a recent contribution to the literature see Tyler, supra note 530 at 272 (exploring
the nonnative value of legitimacy in securing compliance with the law and arguing that 'the
basis oflegitimacy is the justice of the procedures used by legal authorities'. Id. 272.
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Appendix: Research Exercise - South Boston High School: Questions
for Dr. Reid.
This research exercise was undertaken in the hope that it would be possible to identify
a direct link between the experts' advice and Judge Garrity's courtroom behavior. The
exercise focuses on the examination in court of South Boston High School (SBHS)
principal, Dr Reid.
The excerpts below are from the court transcripts for the hearings which took place on
22, 24, 25 and 26 November but are organized by reference to Dentler's list of
questions. Each question is followed by extracts from the relevant testimony.
1. Have you or others in your office prepared (written) guidelines for the
conduct of teachers and staff within SBHS this year?
Dr Reid giving evidence was asked to identify and enter as group exhibit 20 a packet
of "headmaster's bulletins". Led by counsel for the school committee, he referred
specifically to Bulletin No.3, entitled Policy on Discipline, which dealt with the
teacher's role; Bulletin No.4, Procedure on Discipline, also dealing with the teacher's
role; Bulletin No. 14, dealing with matters of general security; and Bulletin No.4,
d 1· . h . f d 551ea 109 WIt suspension 0 stu ents
2. What plans have you developed since August for use in preventing or
reducing racial tensions between students?
On the same day the following exchange took place:
Mr Tierney (for school defendants): Now, Doctor, at [an]
administrators' workshop, was there discussed the developing of
programs for teachers' workshops that were to follow at individual
schools?
Dr Reid: There was discussion of preparation for Phase 2 as of
September, yes.
551 Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 24 1975, 22-23, Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-G (D.Mass.
1975) (Center for Law & Educ.)
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Mr Tierney: And furthermore, were there meetings dealing with safety
and security planning?
Dr. Reid: There were.
Mr Tierney: Did you attend those meetings?
Dr. Reid: I did.,,552
Two days later on November 26 1975 in Judge Garrity's colloquy with Dr Reid and
following immediately after Dr Reid's answer to Q12 below the judge picked up the
point for amplification:
Judge Garrity: With respect to your administration, or your superiors
in the department generally, what assistance have you sought from
your superiors in the administration with respect to the reducing of
racial tensions or the easing of racial problems at South Boston High
School?
Dr. Reid: We have talked about removing youngsters who tend to
foment trouble. We have followed the due process procedure. Some
have been referred to the community superintendent, and we assume
that unless conditions improve, these youngsters will be recommended
for separation from South Boston High School and some different
process for their education.
Judge Garrity: I am thinking now along a broader topic, not just the
suspension or disciplinary problem, but have you sought assistance
from your superiors in the School Department with respect to the
easing or reduction of racial tensions at South Boston High School as
demonstrated by these suspensions and fistfights and racial epithets,
etc?
Dr. Reid: We have talked within the faculty and with members of the
higher administration about alternative programs with the high school,
what can be done to improve the situation, and curriculum-wise, in
regard to youngsters, in regard to physical improvements within the
building, in regard to education materials of one type or another. We
have discussed all of these things at one time or another with
persons.l'"
3. Have you made use of any training, program development assistance, or
other expert consultation since August for help to your administration,
552
553
Id at 24
Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 26 1975, 59-60, Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-G (D.Mass.
1975) (Center for Law & Educ.).
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faculty, staff, and student leaders in preventing or reducing conflict
within your school?
On November 22 Judge Garrity picked up these points:
Judge Garrity: In this testimony and affidavit from Mr. Brociner about
the CCC Mediating Board, 554 his affidavit states that you were at a
meeting at which this was discussed and it says that at this meeting
you, Dr. Reid, asked for the faculty's thoughts on the use of the CCC
as a mediator in trying to resolve the racial difficulties at the school.
Did you make a recommendation to the faculty with respect to this
matter?
Dr. Reid: I did, sir.
Judge Garrity: What was the recommendation'?
Dr. Reid: The recommendation was that they should seriously consider
talking it over with the Faculty Senate and coming to some decision,
and my personal opinion was that we should go along with the Triple
C.
Judge Garrity: You recommended they do this, that they have the
Mediating Board in?
Dr. Reid: That is right, sir, but I think the decision should be partially
the faculty's decision. ,,555
The matter was returned to on November 26
Counsel asked Dr Reid what use had been made of human relationships workshops.
Dr Reid replied:
My faculty has been involved in human relationships workshops, I
think, since January of 1974, voluntary, some compensated for in time,
some in money, some in credits, many of them on their own, at their
own expense and their own time. I think they have had a surfeit of
human relations. I think if somebody could come in and persuade
them that they have somebody who really could provide some good
solid human relations training, whatever that may be, that they might
554 The CCC (Citywide Coordinating Committee) had responsibility for monitoring compliance
with the court plan
Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 22 1975, 205-206, Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-G (D. Mass.
1975) (Center for Law & Educ.).
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be somewhat receptive, but I don't think any routine human relations
plan is going to appeal to the faculty.F"
4. Have you requested assistance in conflict resolution or intergroup
relations from Gillettslc), the First National Bank, UMass Boston, or
other outside institutions since August, 1975?557
In his opening statement on November 22 Dr Reid sua sponte mentioned reading and
math programs developed with the University of Massachusetts "over the summer".
He continued:
We have an active program with the Gillette Company, with the
Federal Reserve Bank, and I think they feel that they are doing
everything that is reasonably possible within the time available and
within their mental and emotional capacity to do these things, and I
feel that people are trying to force other things upon them which,
perhaps, they cannot absorb at this time, with the other things that they
have going. 558
556 Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 26 1975, II Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. 1975)
(Center for Law & Educ.).
557 The University of Massachusetts had been paired with SBHS under the college-public school
pairings plan set up by Dentler as a mechanism of enrichment for magnet programs. See
ROBERT A. DENTLER & MARVIN B. SCOTT, SCHOOLS ON TRIAL: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF THE
BOSTON DESEGREGATIONCASE,34 (1981). The Gillette Company Safety Razor Division and
Federal Reserve bank were paired with SBH under a similar scheme designed to secure the
involvement of the Boston business and financial community in the reform of the Boston
public school system. Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D.Mass. 1975) Order Concerning
South Boston High School Dec 9 1975 (90 Garrity XLd Misc. Postscript Orders 1975-76 f69).
This had been facilitated by the formation in January 19750f the Trilateral Council in January
1975 by the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, the School Department, and the national
Alliance of Businessmen, but its origins precede the court order. See 1. BRIAN SHEEIIAN, TilE
BOSTON SCHOOL INTEGRATION DISPUTE: SOCIAL CHANGE AND LEGAL MANEUVERS, 127
(1984). The 'pairing systems' were encouraged by Judge Garrity but not, as Sheehan states,
(id) 'incorporated' in the 1975 Remedy Order which was handed down in June of that year.
See Morgan v. Kerrigan 401 F.Supp. 216,247- 248 (D. Mass. 1975): "In the court's view it is
important to the success of these efforts that the agreements between individual colleges or
universities and the school department be the result of negotiations by both parties and be
tailored to the particular roles settled on by the parties in each instance. Therefore the court
has refrained from mandating any form of agreement or terms that a contract must include.
The importance of this effort to the success of the court's plan for desegregation of the schools
and particularly to the voluntary component of this plan, however, leads the court to reserve
jurisdiction to make further orders in this area should they become necessary.
The commitments of businesses primarily through the Boston Trilateral Task Force to
continue and enlarge programs of support to the schools through similar pairings, and of the
Metropolitan Cultural Alliance to continue its innovative and enriching programs and focus
them of aiding in the peaceful desegregation of the schools are also major contributions."
SSM
Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 22 1975,197-198, Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-G (D.Mass.
1975) (Center for Law & Education).
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No further details of this are given.559
5. What communications system operates between you, others in your
office, and faculty, staff, and student leaders, and police, as devised to
prevent or reduce conflict and to increase safety within both of the
buildings under your charge?
On the opening day Judge Garrity posed the question: "What led to the decision to
have the police inside the school this year?"
Dr Reid: I think you could say, very definitely, it was the faculty
insistence that the school would open with police or they would not -- I
got the impression - they would not work.
Judge Garrity: Was this something that [ ... J was voted upon or
presented to you informally or formally or how?
[ ... J
There followed a lengthy exchange between the judge and Dr. Reid as to the numbers
of police officers in the school (90 officers at anyone time), how they were deployed,
what they did. Finally Judge Garrity asked the specific question: "Do you have an
assistant or liaison between you and the police? Is that any particular person?" to
which Dr Reid replied:
"Yes, sir, I have Sergeant Donovan who is the Boston Police liaison.
He is in communication with both the Boston and the State Police. We
usually have a plainclothesman, a Lieutenant-Detective, who comes in
on a two-week assignment and who is the technical liaison. I know
both the commandinfr officers well enough so that there is no problemin communication.I" 0
559 Id.
Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 26 1975, 199-202 Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-G (D.Mass.
1975) (Center for Law & Education).
51>0
107
6. How frequently have you met since September, 1975, to plan with the
Parent Racial/Ethnic Council for SBHS and L Street Annex ?'? Do you
make agenda entries for these meetings?
On November 25 Mr Van Loon (counsel for the black plaintiffs) was examining Dr
Reid
Mr Van Loon: Dr Reid, directing your attention, then, to an item just
referred to by the Court, the election of the racial-ethnic parent
councils, was such a council elected for South Boston High last year?
Dr Reid: 1974? 1975, rather? Phase 1 year?
Mr. Van Loon: Yes.
Dr. Reid: No, there was no such council elected.
Mr. Van Loon: Did black parents elect representatives?
Dr. Reid: There was an ad hoc biracial group.
Mr Van Loon: [... ] [... ]Was the reason that a racial-ethnic council was
not formed at least at South Boston that the white parents refused to
elect representatives to it?
Dr. Reid: [... ] I would have to check the record. I think we had
insufficient black representation and no representation - no official
representation from the white community.
[ ...] [ ...]
Mr. Van Loon: Thank you, Doctor. Is there a multi-ethnic racial
council in operation at the school this year?
Dr. Reid: There is.562
561 See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F.Supp. 1141,1144 (D. Mass. 1975)The annexe was "a
remodelled wing of a municipal bathhouse to which about two-thirds of the ninth graders have
been assigned."
Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 25 1975, 63-66, Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-G (D. Mass.
1975) (Center for Law & Educ.).
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7. Have (you) asked to meet with, or have you been asked to meet with, the
Community District Advisory Council for District 6 concerning safety
within South Boston High School?
At the end of examination of Dr Reid, Judge Garrity put additional questions to him,
including this:
Judge Garrity: Right. Changing the subject again, I have reference to
the parent councils and the community district advisory council. Are
you familiar with the community district advisory council structure?
Dr. Reid: Relatively so. I think I have only been to one meeting of that
group.
Judge Garrity: Do you know who the president or chairman is?
Dr Reid: No, I do not.
Judge Garrity: [... J When was the meeting with the community
district advisory council, approximately?
Dr. Reid: Approximately a month ago.
Judge Garrity: And is there another meeting scheduled? If you know.
Dr Reid: I don't know about the community. We have a meeting
scheduled for Monday night, I believe. Mr Dunn would be able to
answer those questions, I believe.
Judge Garrity: And when you speak about Monday a meeting with
whom?
Dr. Reid: With the South Boston School biracial parent group563
8. Have the problems in the schools under your charge been discussed by
the Principals Council of District 6 since September, 1975? Describe, if
yes.
The following colloquy between the judge and Dr Reid on November 26 followed on
immediately after the last line in the colloquy quoted in illustration of Q7 above:
563 Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 26 1975, 39-40, Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-G (D. Mass.
1975) (Center for Law & Educ.).
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Judge Garrity: Is there a council of principals in Community District
6?
Dr. Reid: There is.
Judge Garrity: And has it met?
Dr. Reid: It has.
Judge Garrity: Have you attended the meeting?
Dr. Reid: I have.
Judge Garrity: And how often has it met, if you know?
Dr. Reid: We are regularly scheduled once a month, but Mr
McDonough perhaps could be more informative on that. 564
Judge Garrity: At what time once a month? The first Tuesday or
Thursday or something? Is there a particular regular day? If you know.
I will agree with you, Mr. McDonough is the one that could better
speak, but I wondered if you [ ... ]
Dr. Reid: As I recall, I think it is on the calendar for the last Friday in
the month, from 1:15 on.
Judge Garrity: What was roughly the agenda or subject matter of
discussion with the council of principals when it met?
Dr. Reid: I am sorry, I can't recall.
Judge Garrity: Well, let me change the subject, because I was going to
say that is probably more for him.565
9. Describe the chain of command under you within the two buildings
under your charge and the chain as it moves out from you, including all
parties within your office, faculty, district office, and headquarters.
On November 24 Dr Reid was still giving evidence in relation to the "headmaster's
bulletins". Mr Tierney referred Dr Reid to Headmaster's Bulletin No.4 dated 2 Sep
75 and the words "Each teacher is expected to handle his own problems insofar as it is
564 South Boston District Community Superintendent Joseph McDonough, brother of school
committee chairman John McDonough.
Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 261975,40-41, Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-0 (D. Mass.
1975) (Center for Law & Educ.).
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possible before seeking help." Dr Reid then explained the chain of command III
detail. 566
10. What alternative programs have you developed for receiving and
assisting fearful or conflict-prone students this year?
Cross-examining Dr Reid, Mr McMahon, counsel for the Boston Teachers Union
(BTU), introduced as an exhibit a report and recommendation from the SBHS
summer planning team in collaboration with the University of Massachusetts. The
following exchange took place.
Mr McMahon: The introduction portion contains a so-called checklist
for the identification of disruptive students on page 16?
Dr Reid: Yes, there is such a thing.
Mr. McMahon: It also contains a checklist of so-called examples of
disruptive behavior.
Dr. Reid: There is such.
[...]
Mr. McMahon: Now on page 17 there are a series of general
recommendations. Could you tell us what general recommendations
have been implemented?
Dr. Reid: There has been some testing done by the University of
Massachusetts and in a few cases by the 766 coordinator. The tutorial
services are available through the volunteer program and through
teachers' individual efforts.
[...]
Mr McMahon: Would you tum to page 19, Doctor, and in the second
item, entitled Psychological Services, I note that there are six sub-
items: Testing, Recommendations, Student Counseling, Family
Counseling, Group Counseling, Internships, and Psychological
Services. Can you tell me if any student counselling in terms of
psychological services is offered at the school?
Dr. Reid: It is available.
566 Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 24 1975, 20-22, Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-0 (D. Mass.
1975) (Center for Law & Educ.).
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Mr. McMahon then proceeded to question Dr Reid about each of the
recommendations in detail. Some, he said, were available, some not directly, others
had not proved effective. He then continued:
Mr. McMahon [... J if you would look at page 18, and again at
Subparagraph B-6 beginning, "There are certain categories o£ students
who would not benefit from our proposal. For these students, we
suggest the following alternatives." Then there follow five alternatives.
Now first, would you characterize those students that we have been
describing in court as the disruptive core groups as being students who
would not benefit from the proposal that is contained in Exhibit 24'1
Dr. Reid: Who would not benefit? No. I think they would be benefited
and other students would benefit.
Mr. McMahon: You think there are some students who are presently in
school and are chronic troublemakers who would not benefit?
Dr. Reid: I think that would have to await the outcome of the program
[ ... J
Mr. McMahon: Was there a proposal by several teachers, and again
transmitted to you by the faculty senate, to develop a procedure for the
identification of the so-called chronic troublemaker?
Dr. Reid: There was.
Mr. McMahon: Was that proposal implemented?
Dr. Reid: I have implemented it to the extent that I feel I can justify
and document the implementation.
Mr. McMahon: And in fact has a list identifying chronic
troublemakers of both races been developed?
Dr. Reid: I wouldn't say that. I have sent a list of 25 students who
have been suspended three or more times to the community
. d 567supennten ent.
,67 Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 24 1975,74-86 Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-G (D. Mass.
1975) (Center for Law & Educ.).
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11. What have you developed as a code of discipline and how do you
administer it, in lieu of a citywide code? Do you have copies of regulations
for your students?
On November 26 at the end of Dr Reid's examination in chief and cross-examination
by the parties, Judge Garrity put a series of questions to Dr. Reid. lie did not directly
ask "what do you have by way of a code of discipline'?" but the answer emerged in
response to another question:
Judge Garrity: There was reference in your testimony about
immediate suspension for the possession of weapons, I think. What is
covered by the term weapon? Someone said that he was suspended for
having a fingernail file, and I wondered [... ]
Dr. Reid: That would be classified as a weapon, sir.
Judge Garrity: Well, can you give an additional definition of the word
weapon?
[...]
Dr. Reid: This is printed in the student handbook. It is also posted in
the main lobby. I quote: "All persons entering the main building or L
Street must pass through the metal detectors as a condition to entering
the building. Students and others must surrender items listed in the
Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 269 (Annotated) Paragraph 10 and 12,
plus but not exclusive of the following: firearms of any kind.; any
knives, razors, or other objects sharpened into blades; clubs; athletic
equipment, such as baseball bats, hockey sticks; umbrellas; karate
sticks; moon chucks, or rods of any kind; pipes, brass knuckles, and
other metal objects; screwdrivers, wrenches, hammers, or other metal
tools; chains; whips; ropes, or any combination or objects fashioned
into such, combs and picks with metal teeth; rattaills, scissors; metal
nail files; hat pins; mace and other chemicals such as spray paint and
deodorant; bottles and cans; alcohol, illegal drugs, fireworks.
Possession of any of the above may result in suspension."
Judge Garrity: Well thank you. And is that definition disseminated to
students and teachers?
Dr. Reid: It is, Sir.
Judge Garrity: And in what way?
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Dr. Reid: Through the handbook, a copy of which is given to each
student, and a copy is given to each family. It is posted in the lobby. 'ihX
12. Have you attempted to get action toward expelling any students this
year? If not, why not?
Robert Dentler's memo used the word "expelling". That word was not used directly in
questions put to Dr Reid by the parties or by Judge Garrity or in Dr Reid's replies.
The issue of discipline was raised on a number of occasions with frequent mention of
"suspension". In particular, it was established that fighting attracted a mandatory five-
day suspension. After the lunch recess, Garrity resumed his colloquy and began
asking Reid about suspension:
Judge Garrity: Turning now briefly to the suspension procedure, if you
know offhand, have there been any suspensions for the use of racial
epithets?
Dr. Reid: There have.
Judge Garrity: And they would be shown in these records, I assume.
Dr. Reid: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Garrity: With respect to the suspension procedure, do
understand that you personally determine the period of suspension?
Dr. Reid: On review I do. Mr. Gorovitch initially says, "You are out
for three to five days or until we talk with your parents," or "until your
parent comes up," I should say.
Judge Garrity then went on to ensure that students received due process before
suspension and Dr Reid reassured him on this569
This did not deal directly with Dentler's proposed question but finally, after a long
discussion with Attorney Fremont-Smith about the Home and School Association,
Garrity returned to Dr Reid:
568 Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 26 1975, 35, Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-G (D. Mass.
1975) (Center for Law & Educ.).
Transcript of Hearing of Nov. 26 1975, 45, Morgan v. Kerrigan No. 72-911-G (D. Mass.
1975) (Center for Law & Educ.).
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Judge Garrity: Now, I am almost through here. Have you, Doctor, or
any other person in your administration, taken action to expel a student
this year as distinguished from suspending them?
Dr. Reid: We have not taken action to expel a student.
Judge Garrity: And should I conclude from that that in your opinion
there are no students whose conduct warrants expulsion as
distinguished from suspension?
Dr. Reid: I believe there are students whose conduct may warrant an
alternative site for education. Expulsion, which is the prerogative of
the School Committee, removes the youngster from education
completely. I think there should be some intermediate step between
suspension and expulsion, and that is what we have talked with the
administration at some length about.570
570 Id., at 58-59.
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Part Two: Race and Education in Boston
I. Introduction
In his remedial order of June 5 1975 Judge Garrity announced that he intended to do
more for the schools of Boston than the elimination of segregation and the effects of
discrimination.57I His plan would show "a common concern with equality and
excellence throughout all institutions and groups in the entire greater Boston area and
lay a basis for improving the quality of education for the total city."m In
acknowledging the link between discrimination and educational quality and
specifically in identifying the importance of educational enhancement in a
desegregation remedy, Judge Garrity went further than any of his predecessors 111
federal desegregation suits.m His plan became the prototype for a new type of
desegregation planning in which educational concerns were ostensibly as important as
issues of student assignment.I" To assist him in his project he secured the
appointment as court experts of two educational sociologists, Drs. Robert Dentler and
Marvin Scott, respectively Dean and Associate Dean of Education at Boston
University.Y' As educators with experience in desegregation planning, the two
sociologists shaped the focus of his plan and became key to its implementation.
Ultimately however, the educational component was a failure. In the judge's
terminology, the case was first and foremost, a "race case" and not an "education
case.,,576
He identified the problem at an early stage. On April 10 1975 speaking from the
bench, Judge Garrity sought counsel's help in relation to the Court's power to make
"educational orders" as opposed to "race orders" i.e. orders "whose connection with
racial discrimination and racial desegregation is less direct and clear than the Court's
power to direct that certain racial mixes be achieved in the particular schools.'?" At
issue was the question of sex discrimination in the selection process for admission to
511
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Morgan v. Kerrigan 401 F. Supp. 216, 223-4 (D. Mass.1975).
Id.
See infra note 632and accompanying text.
Id.
See 401 F.Supp. at 227.
See Transcript of Hearing of April 10 1975 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F.Supp. 216 (1975)(No.
72-911-G).
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the prestigious Latin Schools. The court had been asked to enter an order requiring a
single pool of qualified applicants followed by assignment at random to either the
Latin School or the Latin Academy. Observing that "this is a race case, not a school
case primarily" the judge stated the issue that was going to give him the most
difficulty in formulating an order: Supreme Court jurisprudence protects equality not
education. 578 In other words, although Brown was about education and education is
"the very foundation of good citizenship", the federal constitution confers no right to
education per se but only the right to equal education which, in this context meant
education without discrimination.V" Judge Garrity explained: "[ ... ] once the state
undertakes to supply education, [ ... ] then it must be available without discrimination
among the races. There is a constitutional right to equal protection. That is what this
case is all about. ,,580
Implementation of the court order in the face of the direct opposition of local officials
forced the Judge to engage directly with the intricacies of school administration in
Boston and ultimately to require its complete restructuring. As the period of court
supervision became protracted and the likelihood of judicial withdrawal appeared
increasingly remote, the judge became vulnerable to accusations of interfering in
matters of educational policy with which he was ill-equipped to deal. SKI Initially, the
wide discretion entrusted to federal district judges in connection with schools
desegregation by the Brown decision insulated Judge Garrity from reversal by the
superior courts. Seven years after the remedy decision, however, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals which had hitherto consistently supported the judge's determination
to outface the defiance of elected school officials, for the first time fired a warning
shot.582 Matters of educational policy were primarily the responsibility of the local
officials charged with administering the school system. In straying into the field of
general educational policy, the district court would run the risk of exceeding its
578
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Id(quoting San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973).
Id. (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.SA83, 493 (1954).
Transcript of Hearing of April ID 1975 supra note 576.
See Donald J. Jensen, Desegregation in Boston: The Federal Court as School Administrator
(1981) Paper presented to the 1981 annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association in New York City (copy on file with the author).
Morgan v. Mc Donough, 689 F.2d 265, 277 (lst Cir.1982).582
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legitimate role. "Desegregation" said the First Circuit, "is not a mandate to equalize
schools except insofar as inequality reflects racial bias." 5X3
By the early 1980s the attempt to bring about structural change in the Boston public
schools was in trouble; a coalition of plaintiffs, school defendants, teachers and
parents combined to frustrate court orders for school closings.i'" Support for racial
mixing ebbed, undermined by growing disillusionment with the ability of the
desegregation process to bring about lasting improvements to the quality of education
experienced by black children. Influenced by the radical ideas of Derrick Bell and
Ronald Edmondsf", plaintiffs' counsel Larry Johnson began actively to question the
nature of the desegregation process and to advocate a "freedom of choice" plan
focusing on educational equity as opposed to "desegregation." In so doing, he
fragmented the plaintiffs' case and frustrated the consent decree negotiations begun
by State Commissioner Anrig as a way of terminating court jurisdiction, but largely to
no avai1.586 By this time, the law of the case was firmly established. The case was a
race case and not an education case. The consequence was that, however sincere the
judge's concern with educational improvement might initially have been, the
requirements of desegregation as mandated by the Supreme Court set limits to the
extent that this concern could be realized.
In the fall of 1975, Robert Dentler had explained the purpose of federal court
supervision: "(C)ourt jurisdiction will continue indefinitely until the judge decides
that equal protection, which in education must mean conditions for learning, has been
accomplished and is self-maintaining.v'Y but in constitutional terms this was an equal
protection case. A remedy for constitutional violation depended upon the finding and
elimination of the historical bases of unequal treatment. As Jensen points out, a
statement that conditions must be improved is not the same as saying that education
must be improved.f" The ability of the judge to bring about educational improvement
5~3
5X6
Id.
See infra Part II Chapter 3.
See ego Ronald R. Edmonds Desegregation Planning and Educational Equity 17 TIIEORY
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Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
See supra Part I Chapter 2.
Robert Dentler, Improving Public Education: The Boston School Desegregation Case, 7
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was circumscribed by the overriding imperative of legal process which was to provide
a remedy for constitutional violation within the ambit of the principles formulated by
a Supreme Court increasingly concerned to encourage judicial disengagcmcnt.Y"
Thus to criticize the judge as some have done for his failure to bring about long-
lasting educational reform is to misunderstand the nature of the task upon which
Judge Garrity was engaged and the legal matrices within which he had to operate.5lJO
Dentler himself came fairly quickly to understand the limits of what was going to be
permissible. Reflecting on what he had been able to achieve in Boston, Dentler's
regret was that he had not been able to accomplish more to enhance the quality of the
educational experience of children in Boston's public schools. Judge Garrity, he said,
adopted the phrase "show a deep concern." "I learned later what that phrase meant to
lawyers - it does not mean improvements to teaching and learning.Y"
II. Structure
Part Two of this work explores the relationship between race and education in the
Boston schools' desegregation case. It notes that whilst the intention of the judge was
to bring the two together in his desegregation plan, the goal of educational
enhancement was subordinate and ultimately abandoned because the case was a race
case and not an education case.
The first chapter focuses on the Boston Plan, specifically the relationship which those
who devised it sought to achieve between educational enhancement and
desegregation. It identifies those aspects of the plan which were intended to have an
"educational enhancement" component and considers to what extent achievement of
those aspects could be said to have been thwarted or frustrated.
The second chapter focuses on case law, specifically the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court in the key decisions following Green592 which attempted to provide the detailed
590
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See infra Ch. 2.
See infra note 613 and accompanying text.
Robert Dentler, Interview with author Lexington, MA, Sept 21 2006 (hereinafter "Dentler
2006").
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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assistance which the federal judiciary required if they were to give meaningful effect
to the broad imperatives of Brown 1 & Brown II.593 It argues that the key to
understanding the relationship between these two conceptualizations (vrace" and
"education") lies in shifting understandings of the purpose of desegregation and a
tension between conflicting underlying imperatives, namely those of remedial legal
process and the so-called "harm-benefit thesis" of social science. 594
In Millikin v Bradley (Millikin II) the Court ruling that compensatory programs
designed to remedy the consequences of intentional discrimination were permissible,
seemed to lend approval to the new type of desegregation planning which had begun
in Boston and which would prioritize educational enhancement as a desegregative
goal.595 At the heart of desegregation jurisprudence however, was a commitment to
the centrality of "fault"; in other words, educational enhancement was permissible
only to the extent that this could be said to be necessary to remedy deliberate
discrimination on the part of state agencies. From this point of view, educational
enhancement necessarily had both an in-built life span (limited by reference to the
school lifetime of students in the education system at the time that the intentional
discrimination was ordered to cease) and determinable boundaries to be identified by
reference to issues of causation. This latter raised difficult questions such as to what
extent could it be said that, for example, the educational underperformance of
African-American children could be attributable to the lingering vestiges of
intentional discrimination within the public school system.I"
Judge Garrity's plan was formulated in 1975 at a time when the changing political
profile of the US Supreme Court bench had yet to find its expression in schools'
desegregation jurisprudence. As his involvement with the Boston public schools
continued into the 1980s and the appointment of Chief Justice William Rehnquist
gave control of the Supreme Court to its conservative wing, the ability of the judge to
5~3
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require the inclusion of educational enhancement as a key element of desegregation
planning diminished to the point of extinction.597
In 1985, Judge Garrity returned control of much of the Boston public school system
h h I . 598 H . d . . dent assi dto t e se 00 committee. e retame supervision over stu cnt assignments an
faculty hiring but relinquished jurisdiction over the former after the First Circuit
vacated his injunctive orders in 1987.599In 1994, two years after the Morgan case was
finally closed and with a school committee now committed to preserving a unitary
non-segregated public school system, the relationship between race and education was
again litigated. 600 The Controlled Choice student assignment plan adopted in 1989
preserved racial quotas for the examination schools on affirmative action grounds and
faced equal protection challenge from a white pupil denied access to the Latin School
which reserved 35% of its seats for black and Hispanic applicants. Judge Garrity
avoided ruling on the constitutionality per se of race-conscious assignment policies
but the First Circuit, two years later, held that "noble ends cannot justify the
deployment of constitutionally impermissible means" and struck the Latin School's
admission's policy as too broadly drawn.601 Boston school committee abandoned the
use of race as an assignment factor in 1999 but has continued to defend its assignment
policies in federal courts, most recently against plaintiffs asserting that facially race-
neutral policies concealed invidious discriminatory intent. 602
The relationship between race and education in Boston is explored contextually in
chapter 3 of this section by reference to the specific issue of school closings and is
picked up and developed in relation to the Latin schools in the final section of this
work where it forms the basis for concluding reflections concerning the implications
for debates concerning the so-called "limits" of rights discourse.
597 A President Nixon appointment to the Supreme Court, William Rehnquist was nominated to
the position of Chief Justice by President Reagan following the retirement of Chief Justice
Warren Burger and took office on September 26 1986
See Morgan v. Nucci, 620 F. Supp. 214, 217-218 (D. Mass. 1985).
See Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F. 2d 313, 315-17 (1st CiT. 1987). The process of court withdrawal
was incremental.
McLaughlin v. Boston School Committee, 938 F. Supp. 1001,(0. Mass 1996); 952 F. Supp.
33 (D. Mass 1996).
Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, (809 (1st Cir. 1998).
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III. School Closings: The Problem of "White Flight'"
With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to identify the Milliken decisions as poised
on the fault line between education and race that was to open up in schools
desegregation jurisprudence. In Milliken I the Supreme Court had refused to recognize
the constitutionality of an interdistrict plan for the desegregation of city schools where
there was no evidence that white suburbs were implicated in the intentional
discrimination that constituted the constitutional violation.603 The ensuing difficulty of
effecting a racial mix of black and white students in a city such as Detroit where
absence of white students from inner-city schools made racial balance impossible to
achieve, encouraged desegregation planning which focused on educational
enhancement, in the form of magnet school and compensatory education programs,
rather than physical integration of black and white students. The problems of Detroit
repeated themselves in many of the urban centers of the north, Boston included, as
white flight to the suburbs coupled with the declining birth rate amongst the white
population (the so-called "white pill") reinforced residential separation between
suburb and city. 604 For Judge Garrity and Robert Dentler in Boston, school closings
became a key part of the answer.
Anticipating the decision in Millikin v. Bradley, the judge had expressly ruled out a
metropolitan solution, limiting his plans for racial redistribution to the city of Boston
alone.605 Thus in accordance with established precedent, the court plan was essentially
a racial balance plan; the racial composition of each school was to reflect that of the
district within which it was located, subject to a permissible variation of plus or minus
ten percent.l'" Whereas blacks and other minorities represented 36 percent of total
enrolment in 1970, by 1975, this figure had increased to 53 percent and by 1980 had
reached 65 percent.607 The declining numbers of white children became a major
obstacle to the success of the plan; there simply were not enough white students in the
603 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Millikin I).
See infra Ch.3 .
Millikin I, 418 U.S. 717; Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F.Supp.216 (D. Mass. 1975) Sct' ADAM
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Boston Municipal Research Bureau, The State of the Boston Public Schools: A Pessimistic
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public school system. Analysis of the Boston desegregation process as of September
1979 undertaken by the Boston Municipal Research Bureau showed that "only 35
percent of the 149 city schools [ ... J complied with the court's desegregation standards
for all races in their respective districts. Only 22 percent of all schools met the court's
criteria for two of the three racial groups, 37 percent met the criteria for just one race,
and 17 percent did not meet the standards for any race.,,60H
For Judge Garrity and court-expert Dentler the appropriate response was to eliminate
spare capacity by closing or consolidating under-used schools. The 1975 court plan
called for the closing of twenty school facilities mainly at elementary level. Judge
Garrity explained the significance for desegregation as follows:
A major reason for closing schools is that desegregation is more easily and
economically achieved through the consolidation of student bodies. Many
of the city's elementary schools in black areas have in the past been
overcrowded; many elementary schools in white areas have been
underutilized, e.g., when a new school was constructed to replace an old
one in a predominantly white neighborhood, the school committee
accommodated parents protesting the closing of the old one by keeping
them both open. Should school facilities be uniformly used to capacity, an
excess of several thousand available seats at the elementary school level
would remain. Thus a number of the older elementary schools can be
closed, with accompanying savings of the costs of operating and heating
those schools. Elementary schools will be kept open whose locations
enable busing to be minimized overall, and which permit the more
efficient assignment of students by geocodes, accomplishing
desegregation and minimizing the need to split geocodes. Uniform
utilization of facilities throughout the city will also tend to equalize the
availability of the system's resources to all students/''"
The issues of school closings and facilities use became major obstacles to the
withdrawal of Court supervision, bringing together a coalition between plaintiffs and
defendants who conceptualized their opposition on educational grounds and argued
the relevance of student achievement as a measure of desegregation success.I'" By
1982, the withdrawal of support for court-ordered desegregation by Larry Johnson,
counsel for the black plaintiffs, was popular with many black parents who had
become disillusioned with the court emphasis on issues of student assignment and
60X
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school closings with little to measure in terms of improvement in quality to off-set the
consequent disruption and instability.611 The court plan which had achieved neither
integration nor improvements in quality was widely deemed a failure; the aims of
lawyers and their clients had apparently diverged and the Court seemed deaf to the
argument that the purpose of desegregation was to enhance the educational
opportunities of minority children. In relation to these issues, the requirements of
desegregation seemed not only unrelated to educational objectives but actually
inimical thereto. The search for a United Facilities Plan preoccupied the Court for
over ten years in the course of which the rejection by Garrity on Dentler's advice of
the School Superintendent's plan for "linkage" and "beacon" schools illustrates the
distance that had opened up between the two different conceptions of the purpose of
desegregarion.t'f For Judge Garrity, accuses Metcalf, the "sine qua non was
integration. If the results boosted the system's scholastic achievement, fine; he
sincerely hoped they would, but his primary interest was elsewhere."Il"
IV. The Latin Schools: Elitism and Educational Disadvantage
The presence within the public school system of elite examination schools which
recruited students by competitive examination raised difficult questions concerning
race, privilege, educational advantage and indirect discrimination.614 Technically
public schools, their reputations for academic excellence meant that, as the Judge later
remarked, they were "much more than that.,,615 The Boston Latin School was and still
is the oldest public school in the United States.'t'" its foundation predates that of
Harvard College by one year, and it lists amongst its alumni an impressive number of
America's great and good including the names of Benjamin Franklin, Cotton Mather,
fill
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The third examination school, Boston Technical High, did not present the same problems as
the Latin Schools. It achieved "rapid compliance" with court desegregation requirements. the
entrance examination operating primarily to safeguard the requirement of numeracy necessary
for students hoping to benefit from a scientific and technical education. See ROBERT A.
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See Garrity J., McLaughlin v. Boston School Committee. 938 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (D. Mass.
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Samuel Adams, Charles Sumner and John Hancock. The origms of Boston Latin
Academy are more recent; the school was founded in IX77 as Girls' Latin School. in
response to citizen and parent pressure for the establishment of preparatory college
training for girls. Both schools became co-educational in response to state legislation
in the early 1970s; as Judge Garrity recognized, their reputation ensures their
graduates access to power and influence within the city and controversy over selection
criteria and procedures which continues to this day.hl7
At the time of the Boston liability order, both schools were predominantly white in
terms both of enrolments and faculty."!" Although the judge accepted that there was
no evidence of specific discriminatory acts, the Latin schools were not exempted from
the requirement to desegregate. As the First Circuit affirmed, they were an integral
part of the Boston public school system and presumed tainted by the constitutional
violations affecting the rest of the system."!" Successful students were likely to have
attended elementary schools which ran "advanced work classes" and which were over
80 percent white.?"
Because the case was a race case and not an education case, the principle of selection
itself was not in issue. As the First Circuit observed, "it is not unconstitutional per se
for a city school system to operate an elite school even though low income or
minority children may be under-represented in the student body. "h21 However, the
Constitution does prohibit methods of selection which are overtly discriminatory or
1117 See McLaughlin v. Boston School Committee, 938 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Mass. 1(96), Wessmann
v. Gittens, 996 F. Supp. 120 (D.Mass. 1998) revd 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1(98); Boston's
Children First v. City of Boston, 62 F. Supp.2d 247 (D. Mass. 1(99) (ItT" 375 F.3d 71( Ist Cir.
2004); Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 98 F. Supp. 2d III (D.Mass.2000), appeal
dismissed 244 F.3d. 236 (I st Cif. 2004). judgment aff'd, 375 F.3d. 71 (I st Cir. 2004 Boston's
Children First v. Boston School Committee. 183 F. Supp. 2d 382 (D. Mass.2(02) atTd 375
F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2004); Boston's Children First v. Boston School Committee. 260 F. Supp. 2d
318 (D. Mass. 2003) aff'd 375 F.3d 71 (I st Cir. 2004).
Morgan v. Hennigan. 379 F.Supp. 410,468 (D. Mass. 1974). Dentler & Scott's ligures for
1975 were: Boston Latin Academy: 82% white; Boston Latin School: 88% white. See Dentler
& Scott April 23 1975. A Fresh Look at Desegregating Boston's Public High Schools 90
Garrity XXXVIIf. fl8 ..
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir, 1976) (citing Keyes v. School District No. 1.521
F.2d 465 ( 10th Cir, 1975).
Morgan v. Kerrigan. 509 F.2d 580. 594 (1st Cir. 1975).
Kerrigan. 530 F.2d 401.424 (citing Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School District. 501
F.2d. 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1974».
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apparently neutral but operate with intentional discriminatory effect.622 The difficulty
in Boston then was to devise selection criteria which would maintain the elite
character of the school as the First Circuit instructed.Y' yet achieve the desegregation
enrolment targets for minority students who, as a class had been deliberately assigned
by race to schools with facilities, programs, curricula and materials that were inferior
to those offered by white schools and who were "failed, suspended, expelled and
remanded into classes for the mentally retarded and the socially maladjusted at rates
three times higher than the rates for whites.,,624
Dentler's perspective was that of a social scientist who saw desegregation in
educational terms; for him a race case was necessarily an education case. For Judge
Garrity, the case was primarily a race case. This study explores their relationship in
terms of a dialogue between the discourses of law and social science. The relationship
between the two and the consequences for the actions of the judge and the
development of the Boston public schools are issues which are raised again in the
final section of this work.
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Chapter One: The Boston Plan
I.A New Type of Plan
The desegregation plan ordered by Judge Garrity on May 10 1975 for implementation
in the Boston public school system for the coming school year with its emphasis on
"educational quality" represented what Dentler has termed the "third generation" of
desegregation plans.m The first phase of desegregation planning which took place in
the South in the aftermath of Brown 11was a period of gradualism.v" The federal
judiciary were feeling their way; desegregation in the non-residentially segregated
South was seen as largely a matter of freedom of choice; desegregation planning was
amateurish by reference to what was to follow.(>27 Gradualism ended in 1965, the
Supreme Court famously declaring that the "time for 'deliberate speed' had run
out,,628 and requiring affirmative action to eliminate dual systems "root and
branch.,,629
Desegregation planning became more sophisticated in urban school districts such as
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, N. C. where segregation in schooling was as much a
reflection of housing policies and patterns of residence as of intentional action on the
part of school authorities. Judge McMillan's response which received Supreme Court
sanction in 1971 became a precedent for northern school desegregation and
inaugurated a second generation of planning in which district courts turned to
professional educators and sociologists for assistance as court experts and advisers.Y''
Morgan v Kerrigati'" represented a third generation of desegregation planning in
which Dentler claimed a concern with 'quality' would characterize the "offspring of
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka" in a positive way.m After Morgan, he
wrote, "every federal case concerning school desegregation will be more than what
some lawyers call a 'race case'." 633
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A key passage written in 1975 sets out his view of the role of educational planning in
schools desegregation: "Every case will be a case involving detailed educational
planning to insure equal protection under law." Equal protection, he continued, must
involve improvement in the quality of public instruction and that improvement must
be measured in terms of conditions appropriate to the learning needs of all children.f>.l4
"School segregation is after all a symptom of failure to serve the whole public and
failure to serve all children, white, black and other minorities effectively.,,635 The
Boston case, he said, was not alone in recognizing the interdependence of
desegregation and improvement of learning. Denver and Minneapolis had set the new
trend.f>36The Boston order, however, which went further in improving conditions for
learning than any previous order, represented the pattern which future desegregation
planning would follow.637
This chapter examines the educational philosophy of the Boston plan, and outlines its
major features, specifically those which were intended to enhance the quality of the
educational experience of students in Boston's public schools. It begins by explaining
the overall educational philosophy of the plan and attempts to uncover the extent of
the contribution of Robert Dentler to the development of the Judge's thinking in this
area by reference to the archival record, with particular reference to the Dentler/Scott
memos.
Interviewed in 1994 right at the end of the Boston schools' case, Judge W Arthur
Garrity Jr. explained that Morgan v. Hennigan63K and the subsequent twenty years of
court supervision of the Boston public schools sought to do three things: i) correct the
racial imbalance in school populations for the purpose of establishing equity of
educational opportunities for all students; ii) mandate the improvement of the climate
of the schools and iii) order conditions that might result in an increase of student
634
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achievement in the public schools.639 It was his concern with the last of these three
objectives which made the Boston plan unique.
As O'Donnell in his study of the effects of desegregation upon the Boston public
schools emphasizes, the judge's concern with issues of educational equity and
excellence was genuine.T" Whilst public opposition crystallized round the issue of
"forced busing", as the judge emphasized at the time and repeated in his interviews
with O'Donnell after the case was closed, the justification lay in educational
enhancement; what was important was what the student would find at the end of the
bus ride.641 Speaking from the bench during a hearing on February 7 1975 Judge
Garrity observed that "a desegregation plan (must) not simply be a physical
reshuffling of students [ ... ] [There must be a] deep concern for the educational
dimensions of all these proposals [and] the necessity of [ ... J considering [ ... ] the
quality of education.,,642
II. Robert Dentler and School Desegregation Planning: A Lifelong
Speciality
The judge had learnt the connection between desegregation and educational
enhancement from Robert Dentler who had agreed to act as court expert because of
his "life-assignment" to educational cnhancement.?"
Dentler's experience in desegregation planning began in 1963 when, as an associate
professor of sociology and education, teaching in the Teachers College Department of
Social Foundations at Columbia University, New York, he became involved in the
development and direction of an Institute of Urban Studies with a mission to restore
639 See generally Mark D. O'Donnell, The Effects of Court-ordered School Desegregation on the
Public School System of Boston Massachusetts. Unpublished Ph.D Thesis. University of
Connecticut (1996) (on file with author).
Id. at 7 J.
Id at 71: "Judge Garrity believed that racial balance in student and staff populations, the
equitable distribution of funds and programs, school climate and the development of curricular
excellence were of equal importance in a school desegregation pian."
Transcript of Hearing of Feb 7 1975 Morgan v. Kerrigan No 72-911-G (D. Mass.) at 67(cited
in Report of the Masters Mar 31 1975 at 19 (See 90 Garrity XXXV lid. f13).
See Dentler (2006) supra note 591.
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the connection between the college and the schools of New York City.Il.J.jAs one of
his first projects, he was invited by New York State Commissioner James Allen to
join a small commission to plan for the racial desegregation of the public schools of
New York City, at that time, the nation's largest district containing 1,000 schools and
a million students. Among the other members of the commission was psychologist
Kenneth Clark from City College of New York whose doll studies had formed part of
the evidentiary base relied upon by the Social Science brief in Brown I h.J5and who
fostered in Dentler a life-long commitment to desegregation work. Invited to serve as
commission research and staff writer, Dentler and the small team of researchers he
recruited produced the Allen report: Desegregating the New York City Public Schools
which became the opening salvo in the political struggle to desegregate New York's
public schools in the period between 1963 and 1970.
Although most of the report's recommendations were not carried out, Dentler, who sat
in on all Commission meetings, gained valuable experience concerning remedial
options and the role of demographic analysis in desegregation planning, not least the
importance of obtaining full and reliable data on issues such as school enrolments,
racial/ethnic composition of students and faculty and program/curricular matters.?"
The report's commitment to the value of educational imperatives as part of
desegregation planning remained with him throughout the rest of his career.M7 Chief
amongst these imperatives was the importance attached to the role of administrative
decentralization and community control as mechanisms of an effective desegregation
plan.648
In October 1964, with the aid of federal funding, Dentler transformed the Institute of
Urban Studies into an enhanced Center for Urban Education, one of the new regional
educational laboratories established under Title IV of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 and specializing in desegregation planning and community
644 See ROBERT DENTLER, THE LOOKINGGLASS SELF: A MEMOIR, 174-200 (2002) (copy on file
with Archives & Special Collections Dept. Healey Library Univ. of Massachusetts Boston
MA).
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control through decentralization.649 Between 1963 and 1972, Dentler worked on
school desegregation tasks in Hackensack, New Jersey; New York City, White Plains,
Glen Cove, Buffalo and Rochester, New York; Bridgeport and Stamford,
Connecticut; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and other cities including Los Angeles and
San Bernadino, California with varying degrees of success. hSO
By 1972, however, the political climate was changing and the supply of federal funds
for desegregation work was drying up. In Dentler's words, "the steam had gone out of
northern district quests for racial equity in the schools't.?" Exhausted by the demands
of school desegregation work and seeking a refuge from its "rigors and setbacks",
Dentler took up the position of Dean of Education and Professor of Education and
Sociology at the University of Boston, thinking, he says, mistakenly, that Boston with
its civil rights traditions and relatively small ethnic minority concentrations would
allow him to leave desegregation planning behind him.hs2 He brought with him
however his reputation as a seasoned educational planner with hands-on experience of
desegregation planning.
On 15 March 1972 black plaintiffs assisted by the Harvard Center for Law &
Education, and pro bono lawyers Foaley Hoag and Eliot filed suit in the Boston
federal district court alleging persistent 14th Amendment violations on the part of the
school committee in the running and maintenance of the Boston public schools. The
case of Tallulah Morgan et al. v. James W. Hennigan was assigned at random to
Judge W. Arthur Garrity Jr. The main hearing was held in February 1973 with a brief
reopening of the case later that spring.653
Judge Garrity's liability decision in Morgan v. Hennigan was handed down on 21
June 1974.654 Concluding that the members of the Boston school committee and the
superintendent of schools had "knowingly carried out a systematic program of
segregation affecting all of the city's students, teachers and school facilities" and had
"intentionally brought about and maintained a dual school system," the Judge ordered
649
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654
Id.
Id.
Id.. at 194.
u., at 195.
Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974).
Id.
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into effect the State Racial Imbalance Plan for the school year starting in September
1974 as a temporary measure and instructed the school committee to prepare a plan
which would satisfy constitutional imperatives.f"
Devised by Charles Glenn, Director of the State Board of Education's Bureau of
Equal Educational Opportunity, to give effect to the requirements of the
Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 and ordered into implementation by the
state Supreme Judicial Court, the Phase I plan as it became known affected 80 of the
200 (approx.) schools of the Boston public school system and incorporated an element
of student reassignment and compulsory busing for approximately 17,000 students,
notably by pairing schools in the black area of Roxbury with those of the white area
of South Boston.656 Nevertheless, as a racial balance plan, it did not meet the
constitutional standards mandated by the Supreme Court which required not "racial
balance" but the elimination of dual systems and racial ideruifiablity/''" Accordingly,
Judge Garrity directed the Boston school committee to "to begin forthwith" the
formulation and implementation of plans to eliminate every form of racial segregation
and its vestiges in the public schools of Boston.h5!!
When it became obvious that not even the threat of contempt proceedings would
induce members of the school committee to produce an acceptable plan, Judge Garrity
began exploring the possibility of appointing a special master to undertake the task.
His first overture was to the Dean of Harvard Graduate School of Education, Paul N.
Ylvisaker who, recognizing the sensitivity of the task, turned the job down on the
grounds of a possible conflict of interest. 659
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Id., at 482.
The school committee was resolutely opposed to any plan that involved busing students out of
their neighborhood schools - for an account of the attempt to implement the Racial Imbalance
Act see 1. MICHAEL Ross & WILLIAM M. BERG, I RESPECTFULLY DISAGREE WITII TIlE
JUDGE'S ORDER: THE BOSTON SCHOOL DESEGREGA nON CONTROVERSY 63-150 (1981 ).
See Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 435-438 (1965). The
Massachusetts Act defined a racially imbalanced school as one which was more than 51%
black. There was no objection to a school which was more than 51% white.
Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. at 484.
As Dean, he was also Director of the Harvard Center for Law & Education which was
supporting the NAACP and the plaintiffs in the Morgan case. See Ross & Berg, sI/pm note
656 at 372-3.
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The judge then approached Dentler, by this time one of only 100 or so desegregation
planners in the country who "magnetized by his manner of courtesy, integrity and
intellectual acuity" agreed to help for "two or three months.,,660 In Dentler's opinion,
the scale of the Boston dispute required a panel of masters to preside over court
hearings and devise a constitutionally acceptable remedial plan for the judge's
consideration. Dentler recommended a number of individuals, including Charles V.
Willie and Francis Keppel, both of whom were experienced educators and were
subsequently appointed by the judge, but advised that he himself would be of most
assistance in the capacity of court-appointed expert, in which role, acting jointly with
his Associate Dean, Dr Marvin Scott, an African-American with experience of inner-
city teaching and desegregation planning, he would provide technical assistance for
both the judge and the panel of masters.?"
On December 18 1974, by which time it was clear that not even contempt proceedings
would produce an acceptable desegregation plan from the school committee, Judge
Garrity announced in court that he was thinking of appointing an expert.662 The
following day, Dean Dentler wrote to the judge proposing the appointment of Dr
Marvin Scott as his assistant ("he and I have worked together long enough to have
each other's confidence"), and setting out a proposed framework and terms of service
as Court-Appointed Experts on Boston School Desegregation Planning.t'" Dentler and
Scott would attend court in accordance with the judge's schedule. Their external
contacts would be the planning professionals working on the Boston case and their
counterparts in other cities. As Dentler's assistant, Scott would collect materials, and
travel for that purpose as requested, conduct special analyses and interviews on
request, share in reports to the judge and in progress statements to the press and assist
660
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Dentler, supra note 644 at 237.
Id.
Transcript of hearing of 18 December 1974,56 Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp.410 (D.
Mass.1974).
By order of the district court issued on October 31 1974 the School Committee was required
to file a plan for student desegregation in accordance with guidelines set out in the order by
December 16 1974. On the deadline date members of the school Committee voted against
submission. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for civil contempt on December 27. On December
30 Garrity issued an order of contempt and imposed sanctions in the form of daily fines, non-
participation in committee discussions orders and instigated an inquiry into the possibility of
suspension of two of the defendants from legal practice. See Ross & Berg, supra note 656 at
333-346.
See Dentler, Dec. 19 1974, Proposed Framework and Terms for Service as Court-Appointed
Expert on Boston School Desegregation Planning 90 Garrity XXXVIlf. f2.
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in the production and co-authorship of reports to the court. 664 Dentler would attend on
the judge to make oral reports as required and would make weekly progress reports in
writing during each of the 20 weeks from January through May.oos At the direction of
the judge, he and Scott would produce a draft version of a final written report which
would contain a critique of the proposed Phase II plans and set out final
recommendations.P'" Calculating on the basis of an initial commitment of 65 days for
Jan 2 through May 30 1975, Dentler and Scott would, with the permission of (Boston
University president) Professor Silber, continue to carry out a portion of their regular
duties for the university, their salary being adjusted pro rata accordingly. Their per
day consulting fee would be the same as their pre-tax salary from Boston University,
namely $192 in the case of Dr Dentler, and $100 for Dr. Scott. The total cost to the
court for the 65 day consultancy would be $25,000 including expenses for 3000 man-
hours of productive work, an hourly rate, he calculated, of $20.77 for Dentler and
$14.62 for Scott.667
On January 31 1975, Garrity by order appointed Dentler and Scott as court-experts to
assist the evaluation of student desegregation plans already filed and the formulation
of a new plan should the filed plans prove inadequate.t'" A week later, on February 7,
following publication of a draft order and a hearing to consider objections, came the
formal order for the appointment of a panel of. Masters.669 This tactic of
dissemination of draft order together with notice of hearing was to set a precedent for
what came to be a defining characteristic of his management style particularly in later
years as he struggled together with Dean Dentler to find a way of extricating the court
from continuing involvement with the supervision of the Boston public schools.?"
With three plans on the table (the Boston school department plan, 671 the plaintiffs'
plan and a plan submitted by the Boston Home and School Association (BHSA), the
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Id. The costs would be paid by the defendant school committee.
Morgan v. Kerrigan. Order Appointing Experts No 72-911-G (D. Mass.lan. 13 1975).
Morgan v. Kerrigan Designation of Masters and Notice of Hearing on Draft Order No. 72-
911-G (D. Mass. Feb. 7 1975).
See supra Part I.
This had been drawn up by officials of the School Department. primarily Planning Director
John Coakley, was voted down by the School Committee but submitted to the court on 16
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panel of Masters commenced hearing on February 10 1975 for a period of two weeks
following which they issued their final report on March 31 1975. They then retired
from the case leaving to the judge and his experts the task of carrying out any
necessary revisions. Further assistance was provided by two law clerks, Tom Hayes,
recruited specially for the task of assisting the Masters and experts, and Terry
Seligman, Judge Garrity's regular law clerk, together with Martin Walsh of the
Community Relations Service of the U.S. Department of Justice. Dentler in a series of
memos to the masters had offered in-depth critiques which, incorporated in the Final
Report, found the school committee plan inadequate (largely because of the reliance
on parental free choice), the plaintiffs plan "educationally deficient, unwieldy and
arbitrary" and the BHSA plan "vague and unduly burdensome to minorities",672 and
had advised the masters in relation to school closings and matters of student
transportation. His advice and recommendations were central to the main themes of
the plan as originally drawn and as it came to be adapted following hearings into an
avalanche of objections which greeted the plan on its submission to the court on
March 31.673
The Masters' plan was essentially a redistricting and student assignment plan. As
originally drawn it proposed a restructuring of the city's schools into a ten district
system (subsequently revised to nine) to include one city-wide district with magnet
schools and magnet programs, and mandatory busing of approximately 10,700 to
14,900 students.V"
When, in the course of court hearings, it became apparent that the information
concerning school enrolments upon which the masters had based their calculations
was unreliable, Judge Garrity directed his team to carry out revisions based upon new
figures which indicated a total requirement of 85,001 seats system-wide.l'" Dentler
and Scott later discovered that this figure, which included more than 5,000 names of
672
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December 1974 by counsel who subsequently resigned from the case. Judge Garrity denied a
motion by the committee to have the Plan removed from consideration by the Court. See Ross
& Berg, supra note 656.
See Morgan V. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401,407 (1st Cif. 1976).
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students who had attended no more than five times between September and April and
2,000 names which had been counted more than once (under as many as three
identification code numbers), was no more reliable than the earlier information.i"
The struggle to obtain accurate and up to date information concerning the number of
students in the Boston public school system at anyone time was to bedevil the court's
planning efforts. Dentler later took the view that the failure to obtain from the school
defendants valid, reliable and complete information concerning not just enrolments
but on every aspect of school organization from programs and procedures to staffing
and facilities constituted one of the most substantial mistakes of the exercise and its
"cruelest lesson;" no amount of good planning could succeed if the information upon
which it is based is incomplete or inaccurate.677
III. The Boston Plan and Educational Quality
Charged by the judge with the task of assisting the panel of four Masters, two of
whom were educators but without specific desegregation experience, for the purpose
of devising a desegregation plan that would comply with constitutional standards,
Dentler had drawn up outline criteria for gauging effectiveness. 6n In a series of
memoranda he critiqued the plans on the table using his criteria as a frame of
reference.t" Heading the list was the requirement of educational improvement: a
plan, he wrote "should manifest ways in which its implementation would improve the
teaching and learning conditions characteristic of the system.,,6S0 Whereas the BIISA
plan offered no design for this, the School Department plan contained useful
proposals including those for magnet schools and programs which were subsequently
676
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Id., at 47.
See Ross & Berg supra note 656 at 374-5: Judge Garrity appointed four masters to conduct
hearings and prepare a desegregation plan. The masters were: Jacob Spiegel (presiding
officer), a recently retired State Supreme Judicial Court judge, Edward McCormack, Jr.,
former state attorney general; Frances Keppel, former U.S. Commissioner of Education; and
Charles Willie, professor of sociology and education at Harvard University. Though eminent
in their field, none of the appointees was experienced in desegregation planning.
See Dentler, Memo to the Masters Tentative Outline of Criteria ji)r Gauging Effectiveness ol
Planning Proposals Feb 4 1975. 90 Garrity XXXVlIf f17: The memos were submitted to the
Court on February 4 1975.
See Dentler, Memo to Masters Feb 4 1975 90 Garrity XXXVII f. f17. The other principles
included: ethnic mix to reflect the system's present mix of students, educational equity, such
that each local school would be affected by the plan in roughly similar ways, fiscal soundness,
clarity and durability.
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adopted by the masters.i'" Significantly for the subsequent development of the case,
the plaintiffs' plan made no explicit provisions for improving educational services in
the Boston public schools and was rejected by the masters on those grounds.6x2 The
failure to address these matters right from the very beginning was to mean that when,
in the early 1980s, the plaintiffs switched tactics and sought to address educational
equity issues, their change of direction was too late; despite Dentler's best efforts, by
that time the case was firmly established as a "race case" as opposed to an
"education" case.
IV. The Sociological Connection between "Race" and "Education."
For Judge Garrity and for all lawyers following the decision of the Supreme Court in
Green the purpose of the desegregation remedy was to dismantle the layers of racial
duality with the intention of establishing a unitary system of public school instruction
and administration.'Y As far as Dentler was concerned this was "legal euphemism";
what was at issue was a system of institutional racism which was "welded onto the
walls and doors of schools and built into the subculture and personalities of those who
inhabit them and run them.,,684 Desegregation was a tool for attacking the roots and
branches of structural dominance in teaching and learning systems and to be effective
required the political will to be as rigorous and as comprehensive as the case
required.l'"
When the Judge came to consider the extent of his powers to include educational
matters within the scope of his remedial plan, Dentler spelled out for him what he
considered to be the sociological as opposed to the legal relationship between "race"
and teaching and learning in a schools desegregation suit. 6X6 Drawing on both
6MI
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See Dentler Memo to the Masters Application of Criteria to Boston HOllie and School
Association Plan of /120175 Feb 4 197590 Garrity XXXIIf f17.
See Morgan v. Kerrigan 401 F. Supp. 216.223-224: [the plan failed to) "reflect a sufficient
concern ... for the educational implications of plan design."
Green v.County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.70 (1968).
Dentler supra note 624 at 23.
Id.
Dentler, April II 1975 Race Case or Race and Education Case 90 Garrity XXXII£. f17.
(emphasis in the original) For a discussion of the difference between sociological and legal
conceptualizations see infra Ch.3.
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research and his own experience he explained the dangers of desegregation planning
orders which were insufficiently comprehensive:
The conditions under which public instruction and learning occur may
be thought of as a triangle within a square. The three points of the
equilateral triangle are a) teacher and program, b) student and c)
parent. The four sides of the surrounding square are a) school
administration; b) the student's peer groups; c) the adult community at
large, including the agents of government; and d) the resource base,
including facilities, equipment, transport and communications support,
materials and total adequacy of the physical environment. oK7
Segregation, he advised, disrupts the model, distorting relations and eroding the
equitable distribution of resources. In Dentler's view both social and behavioural
research indicated conclusively that if the equal education objectives of desegregation
were to be achieved, planning could not be limited to matters of staff and student re-
assignment.i'" Where desegregation has been seen solely in terms of re-assignment
coupled with safety and transportation issues, the effects on equalizing teaching and
learning have varied "from negligible to damaging". Equal education depends upon
orders which were "planful" and "comprehensive:"
Where a defendant will not or cannot figure out how to plan to
establish the administrative, peer group, community and resource
conditions that will make equal education possible, the court should do
so or should recognize that it may become an unwilling partner to the
act of discrimination. 689
Dentler was careful to limit his advice to sociological perspectives. He left what he
termed the "semantics of the case law" to others "better qualified" than he on those
matters.690 For the judge of course, however great his personal desire to enhance
teaching and learning in the Boston public schools, his over-riding imperative had to
be that of legitimacy, deriving as it must for any member of the federal judiciary in
his position, in the first and last analysis from the jurisprudence of precedent. Thus for
the judge it was exactly the semantics of the case law which were important, to which
~X7 Id.
~X8 Id.
6S9 Id.
690 Id.
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he had to attach the ultimate significance and which, would ultimately circumscribe
his ability to bring about improvements in the quality of education in Boston's
schools.
v. Key Features of the Plan
The plan announced by the court on May 10 1975 for implementation in September of
that year (the so-called Phase II Plan) generated widespread hostility and provoked
renewed scenes of violence on the streets.691 This was due largely to the fact that the
plan was seen and presented by its opponents in terms of compulsory busing. In fact,
busing was but one element of a complex remedy which drew upon a range of
desegregation techniques "hammered out nationwide,,692 and sanctioned by the
Supreme Court in the course of the previous decade. The novelty of the Boston plan
lay not so much in its remedial content as in the comprehensiveness of its design and
he i . f .. 693t e intensity 0 court supervision.
In his liability decision of June 21 1974,694 Judge Garrity found intentional racially
discriminatory practices on the part of school authorities in the following areas: a)
facilities utilization, planning and construction, b) definition of school district
boundaries; c) student assignment policies which included feeder patterns controlling
enrolments at specific high schools, open enrolment and controlled transfer policies
and exceptions thereto, and d) staff hiring promotion and assignment policies. The
finding of intentional segregative policies in parts of the system gave rise to a
presumption which had not been rebutted, that these policies infected the elite
citywide examination schools and vocational schools and prograrns.T"
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The judge's order to the masters called for a system-wide plan that included the
vocational and examination schools, athletic and other programs and made provision
for bilingual education, and special needs which in this context included advanced
work classes.696 The plan should include a recommended program and timetable for
implementation and could extend to the use of magnet schools designed to enhance
the attractiveness of specific schools and programs.t'" The attraction of the magnet
school in desegregation was the potential for promoting voluntary racial integration
via the educational pull of enriched programs and facilities. By the early 1970s the
concept was firmly established in the tool kit of the desegregation planner. m
A. Districting and Assignment
At the heart of the Court Plan was a reorganization of the Boston public school
system into a number of geographically defined community school districts within
which resident students would be assigned to schools on the basis of geocoding, a
mapping system that had been devised by the city for use by the police department to
communicate the location of calls for radio control cars and sold to the school system
for use in Phase I.699 On this basis clusters of geocode units would be assigned within
each school district to particular schools, by reference to already prepared data
concerning the ethnicity and grade level of prospective students residing within each
geocode unit. 700
Dentler and Scott's recommendation had been for a system of individual assignment
whereby students would be assigned to individual schools on the basis of ID number,
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See Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins Il), 495 U.S. 33 (1990): "'Magnet schools' as generally
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address, school grade and ethnicity.i'" Judge Garrity however, conscious of the
attraction to parents of a system which allowed students to attend school with their
immediate neighbors, opted for the geocode method. 702
The masters recommended a comprehensive restructuring of the school system into
nine community districts,(subsequently telescoped by the judge into eight to take
account of downward adjustments in student numbers), supplemented by a tenth
citywide district composed of designated 'magnet schools', i.e. schools offering
distinctive programs of instruction designed to be attractive to students residing
anywhere within the city.703 Each district was to be headed by a district
superintendent who would serve as chief school officer and would chair the district
council of principals and heads which would have responsibility for internal
monitoring within the district. 704Thus the key to desegregation in Boston lay in the
twin techniques of districting and student assignment. So far as possible, the districts
were drawn "like slices of a pie, each wedge including black neighborhoods toward
the pie's center and white communities toward the edge".705 Assignment was to be
carried out in such a way that the racial composition of each school would be
reflective of that of the community district within which it was situated plus or minus
a given percentage.i'" Where necessary, desegregation was to be achieved by busing.
The Masters' plan had called for between 10,000 to 15,000 students to be bused, as
opposed to the 17,000 bused under Phase 1.707 Under the plan eventually ordered by
701 Their recommendations were based on their previous experience, Dentler with Harrisburg
Pennsylvania schools in 1971 and Scott with a student record system at Boston University.
See Dentler & Scott supra note 673 at 40-41.
See Morgan v .Kerrigan, 40 IF. Supp. 216, 240 n.12: .. 'Gcocodcs' arc the 800-odd areas, each
several blocks in size, into which the school department has divided the city for planning
purposes [... ] The units were devised originally for police reporting purposes and vary in
geographical area and also in student population, ranging from a few to several hundred
students?" See also Dentler & Scott supra note 673 at 41
See Dentler & Scott, supra note 614 at 29-44.
Id.
See O'Donnell supra note 639 at 77 (citing Martin Walsh, Director, Community Relations
Service U.S. Justice Department.).
The degree of variation was initially 10%, but this was later modified by the Judge to 25% as
the shortage of white students in the system made desegregation more difficult to achieve. See
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 420-241 (D. Mass.) (1975).
Morgan v. Kerrigan, Report of the Masters, 51-52 (copy on file with Archives 7 Special
Collections, Healey Library, University of Massachusetts 90 Garrity XXXVlld. f13).
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Judge Garrity this number was increased to 25,000 to take account of corrections to
the data upon which the Masters had worked.70R
Whilst the task of developing assignment guidelines provided Dentler and his team
with their most demanding task in intellectual terms709 and became the focus of the
popular opposition which manifested itself in rioting and disorder on the streets of
Boston, other aspects of the plan concerning facilities and the desegregation of faculty
and administrative staff were equally contentious.i'" The issue of school facilities in
particular was central to the task of equalizing the quality of educational opportunity
for all students throughout the city. Thus the plan directed the immediate closing of
22 schools and the removal from use of 10 others closed in 1974.711 It provided for
programs of construction of new facilities and for the repair and renovation of others
and called for the prompt completion of programs already in hand. The consequent
political struggle provides the focus for the third chapter of this section.
B. Educational Enrichment
Underpinning the court plan was recognition of a general perception on the part of
educators and politicians alike that urgent action was required to arrest the continuing
deterioration of Boston's public schools. Dentler's conviction that effective
desegregation planning required a central role for measures of educational
enhancement was broadly shared by the educational planners of the school
department who had produced the "official" school committee plan and whose
recommendations of magnet schools and programs as mechanisms of educational
70H Figures taken from O'Donnell supra note 639 at 77 but (fDentler & Scott supra note 614 at
27 (noting the need for revisions and explaining the view taken by the Masters that 'the
Boston case was never a case about busing', ie "over 30,000 out of an alleged 90,000 students
had been taking buses, subways and taxis from home to public schools in Boston for many
years prior to 1974.").
See Dentler & Scott supra note 673 at 41: "Development of the guidelines for assigning
students proved to be the most demanding intellectual task confronting the court. None of the
planning proposals had treated this problem more than cursorily. Assignment of students in
1974 had been carried out using incomplete guidelines, with poor results in terms of errors
and delays. When the masters retired from the case, therefore, Judge Garrity assigned Tom
Hayes, the law clerk who had assisted the masters, the task of formulating guidelines on a full-
time basis. It took him, even with a mind that worked as logically and smoothly as that of a
chess master, about 400 hours to complete the puzzle."
For accounts see J. ANTHONYLUKAS,COMMONGROUND:A TURBULENTDECADEIN TilE
LIVESOFTHREEAMERICANFAMILIES(a Pulitzer prize-winning account). See also Formisano
(for a historian's response) and Ross & Berg supra note 691 (drawing largely upon
contemporary newspaper reports).
Morgan v. Kerrigan 401 F. Supp. 216, 245-247 (D. Mass. 1975).
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enrichment were subsequently adapted and incorporated by the masters and approved
by the Court.712 Even members of the Boston school committee, apparently
implacably opposed to the "forced busing" aspects of the court plan, were happy to
support the magnet idea as a "freedom of choice" alternative.U'' The plan endorsed by
the committee and submitted to the court on January 27 (as opposed to the school
department plan voted down by the committee but submitted by counsel on December
16) contained proposals for a network of 55 magnet schools.i'" Whilst the masters
rejected these proposals as too ambitious to be workable, they were attracted by the
concept in principle and asked Dentler and Scott to draw up lists of schools at all
levels with existing programs of magnetic quality or the potential for magnetic
development. 715
Their recommendation, which was adopted by the masters and with some
modifications formed part of the court plan, was that the recommended schools
should form a separate city-wide district, offering seats to students at elementary,
junior and high school level on a city-wide basis though with the first 20% of seats
reserved for residents of the district within which the magnet was sited.m The aim
was to provide a mechanism for enhancing the connection between city and
neighborhood community which in the experts' vision was where the key to
educational enhancement would be found.717 As the masters' report explained:
The Citywide District should constitute the source of dynamism
toward quality desegregated education for the total system. [ ... ] [T]his
District can revive the educational vitality of the city, enable the
exercise of preferences by citizens, and contribute fundamentally to the
system.,718
Magnetic programs were part of on overall strategy which took democratization and
decentralization as the way to enhance the quality of education in Boston's public
schools. Thus the masters' plan, on Dentler's advice, contained a number of
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Dentler & Scott supra note 675at 22.
Id.,at 122-3.
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This figure was later increased by Judge Garrity to 25%. See Dentler & Scott supra note 673
at 124.
See Dentler & Scott supra note 673 at 122.
See Dentler & Scott supra note 673 at 127 (citing Report of the Masters at 17).
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additional provisions designed to foster community involvement and active
participation which were incorporated into the May 10 Court plan. The lynch-pin was
a combination of voluntary college-public school pairings and court-ordered
structures of citizen participation, monitoring and reporting.
C. College-School Pairings.
Dentler had made the suggestion to the masters that Boston's colleges and universities
could make a contribution to the enhancement of educational quality on the basis of
his experience in New York where he had headed up just such a scheme of providing
assistance to the public schools between 1965 and 1972.719 The masters secured
promises of support from twenty presidents, vice presidents and principals and
Dentler drew up a list of potentially suitable pairings based on magnet program
themes and college expertise. The scheme was then extended from the magnets to
community district schools and endorsed by the judge who stated that the objective
was to improve and equalize learning outcomes by means of staff development and
training, the design of teaching, materials and methods and concentration on
. I· 720commumty re ations.
Whilst Judge Garrity endorsed the masters' recommendation for formalization via
contracts or memoranda of agreement, and ordered the school department to "use its
best efforts" to negotiate acceptable terms, he did not mandate any particular form or
terms, almost certainly mindful of the potential for challenge before a superior
court.72I He was similarly restrained in relation to the Boston Trilateral Force, a forum
of Boston's great and good established in 1974 and the Metropolitan Cultural
Alliance, an organization committed to the value of educational enhancement as an
aid to peaceful desegregation. He invited their continuing support but attempted no
order in this respect. Thus the main structural underpinnings of the court plan for
quality enhancement rested not upon court order but on the shaky foundation of
voluntarism and goodwill.722
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See Dentler, supra note 644 at 210.
Morgan v. Kerrigan. 401 F. Supp. 216, 247 (D. Mass. 1975).
Id.
See Dentler (2006) supra note 591.
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D. Community Involvement
The second plank of the strategy to harness community support for the desegregation
process took the form of structures of parents' committees intended to link together
into a citywide system of parent and student participation which would facilitate
peaceful implementation of the court plan. Informed by the Community Relations
Service of the U.S. Justice Department on the success of parent participation in
desegregation schemes elsewhere, notably Denver, CO, the judge adopted the
masters' recommendations for the establishment of a Citywide Coordinating Council
with responsibility for monitoring implementation of the court's orders and for
community District Advisory Councils that provided a structure for community
participation.Y' These were to be supplemented by racial-ethnic parent and student
councils ("RPCs" and "RSCs") which had been established to deal with racial
problems and particular problems at individual schools in Phase I of the remedy stage.
Membership of RPCs and RSCs was determined by elections, representatives from
the RPCs and RSCs would sit on the District Councils with guidelines to ensure racial
and ethnic diversity.724 With the backing of court authority, these units were much
more than the well-understood parent-teacher or home and school association and
their power to interfere with classroom matters later became a source of contention as
far as teachers were concerned.725
VI. The Missing Elements: Teaching and Learning
Judge Garrity was careful to note that in relation to both the use of magnets and
community monitoring groups, he was resorting to desegregative techniques whose
use was well-supported in desegregation case law. The novelty of the Boston plan lay
not in its content so much as in the comprehensiveness of its design and in the
difficulties of its implementation.f" Writing in 1981 Dentler and Scott noted the
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Kerrigan. 401 F. Supp. 216, 248.
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See Dentler, supra note 673 at 203-204 (claiming that a year after an acceptable monitoring
plan was filed with the court, the effect of negative teacher response was to dilute its impact:
"The concept of monitoring remains timid, parental approaches toward classrooms are hedged
in with a thicket of advance notices and permissions, and any semblance of evaluation is
rejected. The hegemony of classroom teachers is preserved and the school department has no
recorded obligation to do anything in particular with the results.").
See supra notes 624 - 633 and accompanying text.726
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plan's limitations; it did not specify the machinery for implementation which had to
be worked out on an incremental basis over a period of years as the planning unit of
the School Department was transformed initially into an Office of Implementation
and then into a Department of Implementation which could ultimately be trusted with
responsibility to take over the task of monitoring implementation of the court plan.m
Most crucially however, in the context of quality enhancement, the court plan
contained no specific measures for the improvement of teaching and learning per se.
The plan, they wrote, emphasized structural remedies to the neglect of functional
concerns. Thus the plan contained no provision for retraining an 'overwhelmingly
white and insular' body of 5,000 teachers in methods that would facilitate multiethnic
instruction and promote the learning of both white and black students in the ethnically
mixed and academically diverse desegregated public school system that it sought to
create.728
The reason for this was not difficult to understand. As Judge Garrity was constantly to
iterate, the case was a race case and not an education case and reform of pedagogy per
se did not feature in the jurisprudence of desegregation. Matters of teaching and
learning were best left to be determined at local level by officials with responsibility
to local electorates. Federal court intervention was appropriate only to remedy the
consequences of deliberate constitutional violation and plaintiffs had so far not made
the case that deficiencies in the academic outcomes of African-American students
could be directly attributable to intentional state discriminatory practices.729
Thus, given the state of federal desegregation jurisprudence at the time, parent power
represented a legitimate mechanism by which a measure of quality could be injected
into the Boston public schools without infringing sensitive considerations of
federalism and the primary accountability of locally elected officials. Parental
involvement, reasoned the judge and his advisors, would generate the interest and
general awareness of what was going on in the public schools that would lead to
727
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See Dentler & Scott supra note 673at 43.
Id., at 45-46.
See infra Ch. 2 (discussing the scope of the desegregation mandate); Anne Richardson Oakes,
From Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional Adjudication: The Meaning of Desegregation
in Social Science Research and Law. 14 MICH. J. RACE& L. 61 (2008).
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political pressure for the increased resources that in turn would promote better
teaching and learning. Thus the court plan, comprehensive as it was by the standards
of its time and expressly committed to the enhancement of education, rested upon a
central assumption concerning the relationship of court-ordered integration and
d h· h 1 1· ble i . 710resource an ac ievement outcomes t at was ater to prove unre ia e In practice. -
When in 1981 the number of white students in the system had dwindled, increased
resources had not been forthcoming and the academic achievement of African-
American children was coming to be perceived as an issue, support for the court plan
ebbed.731 Parents began to lose confidence in the ability of court desegregation plans
to bring about real improvements in the academic achievements of African-American
children. Counsel for the black plaintiffs and El Comite (the organization of Hispanic-
speaking parents) changed tactics, demanding equalization of resources and facilities
but to no avail. The "semantics of case law" ensured that the case was a race case and
not an education case.
The next chapter exammes the meaning of "desegregation" III Supreme Court
jurisprudence
730
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See infra Ch. 2.
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Chapter Two: From Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional
Adjudication: The Meaning of Desegregation in Social Science
Research and Law
I.Introduction: The Paradox of Desegregation Jurisprudence
In 1979, after a decade of urban school desegregation, Judge Harvie Wilkinson wrote:
The problem is that we are no longer certain what kind of question
public school desegregation really is. Twenty years ago we were
convinced it was a matter of showing southern school segregation to be
morally wrong. But with busing, good moral arguments exist on both
sides. To the extent that desegregation has become less a moral
quest~on,. or at le~st more a moral standoff, ." is .also le~s c1earlr,~a
constitutional requirement the Supreme Court ISentitled to Impose. .-
The loss of faith with the desegregation process which took place in Boston in the
1980s was underpinned by confusion about what exactly the process of desegregation
was intended to achieve. It raised questions about what the Constitution might or
might not require: how does a right not to be discriminated against tum into a
requirement for racial balance? What is wrong with freedom of choice and the
neighborhood school? Why must children be bused and schools closed? The Boston
plan made specific provision for educational enrichments but the Court refused to
consider matters of teaching and learning or to take into account disparities in
academic outcomes.i" When the burdens of busing, school closures and teacher lay-
offs seemed to fall disproportionately upon the black community which had sought
desegregation, their leaders returned to the issue which Brown v. Board of
Education.i" had supposedly resolved and asked once again: what exactly is the
relationship between racial isolation and educational opportunity for African-
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1. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: TUE SUPREME COURT AND SCIIOOL
INTEGRATION 1954 - 78, 132 (1979).
See supra Ch. I.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown f). Technically there were four cases
which were consolidated on appeal to the Supreme Court: Belton v . Gebhart, 87 A.2d. 862
(DeL Ch. 1952) (on appeal from Delaware), Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan.
1951) (on appeal from Kansas), Briggs v, Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (on appeal
from South Carolina), and Davis v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 103 F. Supp. 337
(E.D. Va, 1952) (on appeal from Virginia).
Following the Supreme Court's ruling that the provision of "separate but equal" education was
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the case was adjourned for the Court to hear
argument concerning the remedy. The remedial ruling came one year later in Brown v. Bd, of
Educ, (Brown If), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In this text, references to "Brown" should be taken as
references to both Brown I and Brown II.
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Americans?735 To seek answers to these questions in key aspects of this branch of
Equal Protection jurisprudence is to discover what desegregation analyst David J.
Armor has termed "the desegregation dilemma", namely the apparent paradox that
Brown, the case which declared the constitutional incompatibility of racial
discrimination, came itself to require purposive racial discrimination as an aspect of
effective relief. 736
As Professor Graglia suggests, the history of the law of race and schools since Brown
has seen the Supreme Court convert a prohibition of segregation into a requirement of
integration.v" In the process, he argues, a decision that stood as authority for a
prohibition on all forms of racial discrimination became the basis for a new form of
racial discrimination.r'" Public schools were required to conform to requirements of
racial balance.r'" Access to schools was once again controlled by reference to
considerations of race.740 A constitutional mandate to desegregate to prevent
discrimination became the affirmative requirement to discriminate to secure
integration, despite the assurance given contemporaneously with Brown I that the
Constitution did not require integration.i"
Most commentators have concluded that it was the need to provide an effective
remedy that pushed the Court in the direction of affirmative action.742 Two challenges
in particular required an effective response. The first was the attempt by elected
officials in Southern states to subvert the effect of Brown, initially by outright
opposition and then by the adoption of policies which were overtly race-neutral but
735
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See infra Part III
DAVID1. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCl100l DESEGREGATIONANDTIlE LAW 3. (1995).
Lino A. Graglia, 'From Prohibiting Segregation to Requiring Integration: Developments in
the Law of Race and the Schools since Brown', in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE 69 (Walter G. Stephan, and Joe R. Feagin, eds.,1980) (hereinafter Graglia,
Developments). See a/so LINO A. GRAGUA, DISASTER BY DECREE: TilE SUPREME COURT'S
DECISIONSON RACE ANDTHE SCHOOLS (1976)(hereinafter Graglia, DISASTER BY DECREE).
See Graglia, Developments, supra note 737 at 69-96.
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Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955) ("Nothing in the Constitution or in the
decision [in Brown I] takes away from the people freedom to choose the schools they attend.
The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids
discrimination").
See Graglia, Developments, supra note 737 at 75. See also Armor, supra note 736 at 27-28.
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which operated in practice to perpetuate segregation.T ' Freedom of choice
assignment plans fell into that category.i'" By 1968, noting that ten years after Brown,
a "freedom of choice" policy had made virtually no changes to the racial composition
of the schools of New Kent County (VA),745 a unanimous court declared that "such
delays are no longer tolerable" and imposed on school boards a duty to take
affirmative action to establish a "unitary non-racial system".746
The second challenge was the need to respond to segregation in urban areas where
racially identifiable schools were a reflection of residential segregation coupled with
neighborhood school policies. In a case from North Carolina, the Court had accepted
racial balance as a criterion of desegregation and compulsory busing as an appropriate
response to this kind of situation.I'" By the time that Judge Garrity came to order his
remedial plan for Boston, compulsory reassignment of pupils to secure racial balance
in the public schools had become the norm in northern school desegregation planning,
despite its unpopularity with white parents whose withdrawal to the suburbs made
racial balance in urban schools impossible to achieve.74K
Whatever the justification, it is undeniable that the objective of racial integration as a
mechanism for the enhancement of the life opportunities of African-Americans is, or
ought to be, a social policy objective requiring political decisions involving the
allocation of public resources and judgments as to what results could thereby be
743 Practices included the pupil placement laws and freedom of choice plans explained in Green I'.
County School Bd. of New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S.430, 431-433 (1968).
See Green, 391 U.S. at 437- 438.
Under a Virginia pupil placement law adopted after Brown, students were automatically
reassigned to schools previously attended unless they specifically applied for permission to
change. See Green, 391 U.S. at 433.
391 U.S.430, 439. See also 441, 442: The New Kent School Board's "freedom-of-choice"
plan cannot be accepted as a sufficient step to 'effectuate a transition' to a unitary system. In
three years of operation not a single white child has chosen to attend Watkins school ami
although 115 Negro children enrolled in New Kent school in 1967 ( up from 35 in 1965 and
III in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in the system still attend the all-Negro Watkins
school. In other words, the school system remains a dual system. Rather than further the
dismantling of the dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and their
parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School Board. The Board
must be required to formulate a new plan and, in the light of other courses which appear open
to the board, such as zoning, fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a
system without a "white" school and a "Negro" school, but just schools.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
See generally Robert A. Dentler, School Desegregation Since Gunnar Myrdal's American
Dilemma in THE EDUCATIONOF AFRICAN AMERICANS 27-49 (Charles Vert Willie et at. cds.,
1991); Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society 80
MINN. L. REV. 825, 825-873 (1996).
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achieved. This is exactly the kind of decision in respect of which politicians turn to
the work of social scientists, but it is not normally one within the purview of the
federal judge. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court appeared to require federal
judges to take on the task of implementing social policy objectives for reasons which
were not clear and in a manner which was not directly articulated.i''"
In this chapter I explore the meaning of desegregation for both lawyers and social
scientists and its consequences for desegregation planning. I argue that, whereas for
social scientists desegregation was a process of social change and required
integration, for lawyers, desegregation was a remedy and its content shaped by the
nature of the litigation process. That the two conceptions of social science and law
came together for a period of twenty-five years or so following the Brown litigation
should not divert attention from the fundamental underlying differences which
contained within themselves the basis for divergence, and underpin the reluctance of
current members of the Supreme Court to sanction race-conscious remedies which are
not directly linked to issues of constitutional fault.75o
In Part One I outline the general argument by reference to what I term the "underlying
imperatives" of social science and law. By this I refer to the values of social policy
reform and remedial process that underpin these respective disciplines and which
determine the disciplinary boundaries within which solutions legitimate to that
discipline must be framed. The disciplines of law and social science were brought
together as a matter of conscious policy on the part of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 7S I the organization formed in 1909 which
749 See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND TIlE
UNFULFILLEDHOPES FORRACIALREFORM18-19 (2004).
See e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (Thomas 1., concurring).
Technically, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund Inc., later known as the LDF, which was set up
as a separate organization headed by Thurgood Marshall in 1939, achieved financial
independence in 1957, and finally broke with the NAACP in 1978 following an unsuccessful
lawsuit by the NAACP to compel the LDF to drop the NAACP initials from its name. For a
personal account see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: LEGAL BATTLES OF HIE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 517 (2004). For a history of the NAACP and its involvement in
school desegregation cases see MINNIE FINCH, THE NAACP: ITS FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (1981);
LANGSTON HUGHES, FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: THE STORY OF TIlE NAACP (1962); ClIARLES
FUNT KELLOGG, NAACP; A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TIlE
ADVANCEMENTOF COLORED PEOPLE (1973). The LDF played no part in the Boston case but
NAACP General Counsel Nathaniel Jones acted for the black plaintiffs in Morgan v.
Hennigan, his successor Thomas Atkins taking over from Harvard Center for Law and
Education counsel Larry Johnson in the later stages of the litigation.
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became the nation's premier civil rights organization largely because, as George
Washington University law professor Robert S. Cottroll et al. suggest, it recognized
and harnessed the power of litigation to initiate social change.i" Two issues relating
to NAACP litigation strategy have particular significance for the development of
desegregation jurisprudence: first the decision to litigate for integration as opposed to
educational equity, and secondly the strategic use of social science statements with
which to lobby the US Supreme Court.
In Part Two I consider the main contours of this strategic use by reference to four
such statements. Sociologists Chesler et al 753 have drawn on the influential work of
Professor Abram Chayes754 to argue that the effect of social science in schools
desegregation litigation has been the development of "new legal theory", in the course
of which the remedial imperative may be said to have moved from a "private law"
conception of litigation as assertion of individual rights in favor of a "public law"
conception of litigation as correction of social grievance. 755 I consider the extent to
which the Court's desegregation jurisprudence can be said to have been influenced by
social science conceptualizations of the harm of segregation and the benefits of
integration. I argue that, whereas some of the earlier decisions may be consistent with
such an argument, in later years this is no longer the case. With the benefit of
hindsight I argue that the earlier cases represent the aberration and that, with the
disengagement cases of the 1990, we see a reversion to a private law model which
probably never really went away and in respect of which the extent to which social
science can influence legal content is necessarily circumscribed.i'"
The decision to press for integration as opposed to educational equity I deal with in
Part Three when I return to the questions with which this chapter opened and consider
the claim that Brown should have been decided differently.
752 ROBERT.J COTTROL. ET AL. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 51 (2003).
MARK. A. CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT: MOBILIZING EXPERTS IN TIlE SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION CASES (1988).
See Abram Chayes,. 'The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation', 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281.
(1976).
See CHESLER ET AL, supra note 753 at 27-61
For the "disengagement cases" see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 V.S.467 (1992) and Missouri v.
Jenkins (Jenkins Ill), 515 V.S. 70 (1995) (discussed infra Part II).
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Whatever the impact of social science on the content of legal doctrine, in practical
terms the remedial imperative inherent in the litigation process required judges and
social scientists to interact at district court level in the construction of a desegregation
remedy. I return to the relationship between social science and law in my conclusion.
In the uncertain content of the term "desegregation" itself, I identify a framework for
analysis which sees the court expert as fundamental to the process by which federal
district judges gave meaningful content on a pragmatic basis to the process of
desegregating the nation's schools.
II. Law and Social Science in Schools Desegregation
Much has been written about the underlying ambiguities of the Brown I reasoning and
the difficulty of identifying a constitutional justification for the decision.757 In over-
ruling the decision in Pless/58 which underpinned the racial segregation laws of the
South, the Supreme Court made clear that in the field of education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" had no place,759 but failed to make clear the nature of the harm of
segregation. Although, as Professor Ronald Dworkin has suggested.i'" the scope for
reliance in constitutional adjudication upon matters of empirical evidence is
necessarily limited, the reference in footnote 11 of Brown 1 to the research of seven
social scientists on the social and psychological effects of segregation upon black
children has inaugurated a debate about the impact of social science which continues
to characterize school selection jurisprudence to this day.761 Since Brown I, lawyers
have continued to argue, with varying degrees of success, that the federal judiciary
should take notice of social science research regarding the causes and consequences
757
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See Owen Fiss, (1971) 'The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case - Its Significance for Northern
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Desegregation: Legal Realism. Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the
Supreme Court', 42 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 57 (1978); James S. Liebman,
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REV. ISO (1955); Wilkinson, (1981) supra note 732.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Brown v. Bd. of Edue. (Brown I). 347 U.S. 483,495 (1955).
Ronald Dworkin,. Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights - The Consequences of
Uncertainty in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Ray C. Rist &
Ronald J. Anson eds., 1977).
See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. I, 127 S.Ct. 2738
(2007) (discussed infra Part II).
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of racial isolation and its impact upon the psychological and educational development
of African-American children.762
The result has been the emergence of what Judge John Minor Wisdom has referred to
as a "love match" between social science and law.763 Lawyers have relied upon social
science research to substantiate claims of constitutional harm and the effectiveness of
the desired relief; social scientists have provided the empirical bases upon which
schools cases have been fought.764 Social scientists have addressed federal courts on
matters such as the changing demographic patterns of cities, the causes of "white
flight", the relationship between state policy, patterns of residence and the racial
identifiability of schools765 and the extent to which the under-achievement of African-
American children constitutes a "lingering vestige" of discrimination.i'" In this kind
of litigation more than almost any other, lawyers have looked to social science to
translate issues of social fact into constitutional issues and constitutional requirements
into social remedies.
As Charles T. Clotfelter points out, however, it is important to bear in mind that
lawyers and social scientists have differing conceptions of what constitutes
segregation and what the process of desegregation might require.I'" In social science
research, the term "segregation" is used descriptively. Segregation occurs when black
children are educated separately from white children. In this sense, the terms
"segregation" and "racial isolation" are synonymous and integration is the appropriate
social policy response.i'" For lawyers, however, the term refers to state-mandated or
sponsored discrimination on the grounds of race, which gives rise to a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee. To be successful, a plaintiff must
establish an element of fault on the part of the state or state actors, and seek a remedy
which is specifically tailored to respond to harm which is a direct consequence of the
762
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constitutional violation.i'" It is the legal emphasis on issues of causation which ties
this branch of Equal Protection jurisprudence to the empirical evidence afforded by
social science research.
A. The Differing Imperatives of Social Science and Law
Although the term does not appear in either case, desegregation following the Brown
decisions came to represent the American commitment to deliver on the promise of
equal opportunity for all. The process of public school reform brought together social
scientists and lawyers with different understandings of what the word meant and what
the purpose of the exercise might be. I argue here that these differences reflect the
fundamentally different imperatives of social science and law.
As education professor Diane Ravitch points out, the way in which words are defined
"is far more than a semantic exercise" but reflects important underlying assumptions
concerning values and policy goals.770 To that extent, the act of definition becomes in
itself a statement of policy with the capacity to have important strategic
consequences. I argue that, whereas both professionals speak in terms of
desegregation as process, for social scientists the underlying imperative is one of
social change requiring integration measured in terms of racial balance 771 and inter-
racial exposure.772 The integration imperative is underpinned by what Armor has
termed the "harm-benefit thesis of social science", i.e. the thesis "that school
segregation is harmful and desegregation is beneficial to the educational and social
outcomes of schooling".773 On this view, full integration in terms of student
769 See Justice O'Connor on equal protection analysis in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 226 (1995) ("All racial classifications imposed by whatever federal, state or local
government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words,
such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests.") See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308-09
(2003).
Diane Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties of Meaning in 'SHADES OF BROWN: NEW
PERSPECTIVESONSCHOOLDESEGREGATION'31 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
This ties the racial mix of a school to that of its surrounding district within specified
permissible limits of deviation. See Armor, supra note 736 at 159 (noting that what is
important is the possibility of "meaningful interracial contact"); see also Clotfelter, supra note
767 at 201.
This measures the extent to which white children and black children are able to mix with each
other in the same school or classroom. See Christine H. Rossell, The Effectiveness of School
Desegregation Plans, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 75
(Christine H. Rossell, et al. eds., 2002).
Armor, supra note736, at 4.
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population, faculty and educational programs, and also of resource allocation,
addresses the psychological and educational harm of segregation and enables African-
American children to compete on an equal footing not just in the classroom but also in
terms of wider life opportunities. In social policy terms, integration was the way to
respond to the disparity between the condition of "the Negro" 774 in American society
and the American ideal of equal opportunity for all, which Gunnar Myrdal had
identified as representative of the "American dilemma".775
For lawyers, however, the process of desegregation is remedial and governed by what
are well-understood constraints concerning the nature and limits of remedial relief.
The underlying imperative is that of legitimacy, the need to keep within the proper
compass of the law and of judicial process which ultimately must tie judicial
intervention to the remedial process.
The judicial function in constitutional litigation is to declare the nature and extent of
constitutional rights and to provide a remedy which must be tailored to the nature of
the right. Attention to the requirement of legitimacy in constitutional adjudication
must also require a court to pay due respect to the limitations which considerations of
federalism and the separation of powers place on the nature and extent of the judicial
role. In this chapter I refer primarily to those aspects of legitimacy arising out of the
nature of the remedial process which can be expressed by reference to the maxim ubi
ius ibi remedium (where there is a right there must be a remedy).776 The principle has
two related ideas: the existence of an actionable right which will usually require the
identification of fault on the part of a defendant, and the requirement for a remedy
which must address the fault either by giving effect to expectations which have been
774
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Iuse this term self-consciously to reflect contemporary usage.
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY xlvii (1944): The ever-raging conflict between on the one hand, the valuations
preserved on the general plane which we shall call the •American creed,' where the American
thinks, talks and acts under the influence of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the
other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and group living, where personal
and local interests; economic, social and sexual jealousies; considerations of community
prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of persons or
types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses and habits dominate his
outlook. Id. at xii.
See Marbury v.Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).776
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aroused or, more usually, by providing recompense or restitution in respect of loss
which has been sustained.777
In lawyers' terms, desegregation is a remedy for a constitutional violation. The action
is usually couched in terms of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which provides that "no state shall. .. deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws".778 The question
then is: what constitutes the violation and what must be done for the purpose of
affording relief?
In Brown I, the Court's declaration was clear but its reasoning ambiguous. State-
mandated separate provision of schooling for black and white children must cease
because a) separation offends the Constitution per se;779 b) governmental
discrimination by race causes psychological damage to black children 780 and c)
governmental discrimination by race deprives black children of the educational
benefits of mixing with white children."! Brown /I directed federal courts to
supervise implementation of the remedial process but was similarly vague as to how
this was to be done.782 The Court invoked the exercise of equitable discretion but gave
little guidance to federal judges as to how that discretion was to be exercised.V
Since then the Court has attempted to provide remedial guidelines which, at times,
have been couched in the very widest terms. It has authorized desegregation plans for
. 1 b 1 784 1 busi 78S . hid 786 dracia a ance, compu sory usmg, magnetic se 00 s an programs an even
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U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § I.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) at 495 "Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal."
Id. at 494. "To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
Id. at 493 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents
for Higher Educ. et al., 339 u.s. 637 (1950) (discussing the "intangible" benefits for a law
student of mixing with white students, i.e "his ability to study, to engage in discussions and
exchange views with other students and, in general, to learn his profession".).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. at 300 (1955).
Id.
Swann 402 U.S. I (1971).
Id.
See Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), 495 U.S. 33,40 (1990).
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programs of educational enhancement.i'" apparently on the basis that it shared the
social science view of the curative effects of racial integration although it has never
made this clear. It has, however, continued to assert, as it did in Swann, the remedial
imperative that "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy". m In
other words, the issue of fault as defined in legal terms remains central to the
definition of the remedy. Thus in the absence of fault, as the Court made clear in
S 789 d .. K 790 . f raci l i lati h d c. fwann an agam m eyes, Issues 0 racia ISOanon or t e un er-perrormance 0
African-American children are simply not the Court's concern.i"
In legal process of this kind it is, of course, the plaintiff who seeks relief, and the role
of the court to that extent is passive; it either grants or refuses to grant the relief
sought. In this connection and with the benefit of hindsight, the decision of the
NAACP to abandon claims for "equal education" and press for "racial integration"
has been criticized. Professor Derrick Bell goes so far as to offer an alternative
response to Brown which would have upheld the legality of Plessy, specifically for the
purpose of giving full effect to its premise of "equality".792 I offer a brief outline of
NAACP strategy and deal with Bell's arguments below.
My argument in general terms is that, for a period of twenty-five years or so following
Brown, the social science imperative of integration and the legal remedial imperative
coincided in the identification of racial balance or integration as the appropriate
remedy for segregated schools. Desegregation during this period meant integration,
and integration could justify race-conscious action. The coincidence was, however,
temporary and was undermined as demographic changes coupled with white flight
frustrated the attempt to integrate and cast doubt upon the assumptions that racial
integration per se was a necessary aspect of equal education. New questions were
asked concerning the extent to which the continuing academic under-achievement of
African Americans should be regarded as a "vestige" of discrimination sufficient to
warrant the adoption of affirmative action policies and the retention of court
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Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken If), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
Swann, 402 U.S. 1(1971) 16.
Id., "Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering
assignment of students on a racial basis". Id. at 28.
Keyes v. School District No.1, Denver, Colo, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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Bell, supra note 749 at 20.
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supervision. As social scientists argued amongst themselves, the causal value of their
research in legal terms was correspondingly reduced. Reluctant to act on the basis of
inconclusive "pedagogical sociology''I'" and anxious to set limits to the duration of
the remedial process, the Rehnquist Court turned to those other aspects of legitimacy,
federalism or states' rights and the separation of powers to justify federal court
di 794isengagement.
The result was that the jurisprudence of schools desegregation returned to the more
familiar territory of the "color-blind Constitution,,795 and the negative imperative of
non-discrimination by reference to race. No longer prepared to accept that integration
per se constituted a legitimate constitutional goal, the Court struck down affirmative
action policies unlinked to official segregative action.796 The re-appearance of
racially-identifiable schools in a way that reflects demographic issues, as opposed to
intentional state discrimination, has been termed "resegregation" and the accusation
made that the Court has betrayed the legacy of Brown.797
B. Resegregation and Race-Conscious Policies
The issue of so-called resegregation perpetuates the dialogue between social science
and law by posing new constitutional questions about the harms of racial isolation and
the benefits of integration.i'" In cities where active court supervision of the
desegregation process has ceased, school boards which have voluntarily adopted race-
conscious assignment policies or quotas have been challenged in the courts by white
students denied a place at over-subscribed schools on the grounds of their race.799 The
793 Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 404 (8th Cir. 1994) (Beam
Circuit Judge, dissenting).
See infra Part II D.
See Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, SIS U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Millikin v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
See. for example, GARY ORFIELD AND SUSAN E EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: TIlE
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996); DERRICK BELL, SILENT
COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES fOR RACIAL
REFORM (2004); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: the Court's Role 81 N.C. L.REV.1597. (2003)
See infra Part ]1.
See McLaughlin v. Boston School Commission, 938 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Mass. 1996)
(discussing Boston School Commission policy); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F. 3d. 790 (I st
Cir.1998); Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D. Mass. 1999)
(BCF I); Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 98 F. Supp. 2d III (D. Mass. 2000) (BCF
II); Boston's Children First v. Boston School Comm'n, 183 F. Supp. 2d 382 (D. Mass. 2002)
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ensuing litigation once again raises the social policy questions concermng the
educational purpose of racial integration which were not answered in Brown I: is
integration a necessary ingredient of equal education? Or conversely: what is the harm
of racial isolation and how will integration advance the educational opportunities of
minority children?
III. Lobbying the Supreme Court: The "Harm-Benefit Thesis" as
Litigation Strategy
The two affirmative action cases from Seattle and Kentucky which have recently
come before the Supreme Court represent the latest attempt in the endeavor to link
social science research with constitutional or legal imperative. SOD The court was asked
to test the issue of constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies by reference
to the harm to be prevented and the goal to be achieved. The school boards argued
that racial balance is necessary in order to enhance the educational opportunities of
African-American children.80l The white parents' groups who were the petitioners in
these cases opposed this on the grounds of unconstitutional racial preference.t'" At
issue, once again, were the alleged "harm" of racial isolation and the educational
benefits of integration. The court was asked to consider exactly what the
constitutional relationship was between racial integration and the equal opportunities
of African-American children803.
As has become typical in schools cases, the litigation set expert against expert. The
school authorities' argument that race-conscious policies promote educational benefit
was supported by an amicus curiae brief submitted by 553 social scientists who
testified to the educational benefits of racially integrated schools and the harmful
educational implications of racial isolation. 804 In a rival brief for the plaintiffs, social
scientist and desegregation expert Armor, together with the academics Themstrom
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(BCF III); Boston's Children First v. Boston School Comm 'n, 260 F. Supp. 2d 318 (D. Mass.
2003) (BCF IV); Anderson v. City of Boston, 375 F.3d 71 (1st Cir.2004).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007).
Id.
Id.
Id., at 2746.
Brief for 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1-2, Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. V. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127 S, Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-
915).
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and Thernstrom critically reviewed the research in the field, concluding that evidence
of either short-term or long-term benefit is "simply lacking".805 There is, in their view,
"no evidence of a clear and consistent relationship either between desegregation and
academic achievement" or "between desegregation and longer-term outcomes such as
college attendance, occupational status and wages [ ... ]"806 In terms of social
outcomes such as "racial attitudes, prejudice, race relations and inter-racial contact,"
they suggest that the impact of racial balancing policies on white students is likely to
be negative.807
The Seattle and Kentucky brief represented the fifth in a series of statements which
have been submitted to the Supreme Court in schools cases, starting with Brown I
where Earl Warren's footnoted reference to the work of social scientists began a
debate concerning the influence of social science on Supreme Court jurisprudence in
school desegregation cases. 808
A. The Topeka Brief and the Harm of Segregation
The NAACP argument as set out in the Appellate Brief submitted to the Supreme
Court on behalf of the Plaintiffs made two assertions which, it claimed, represented
the consensus of social scientists: 1) Distinctions or classifications based upon race or
color reflect a myth of Negro inferiority which has no basis in fact, and 2) State-
enforced segregation harms the psychological development of African-American
children who interpret separation as connoting inferiority and are deprived of the
benefits of an integrated education.f'"
Attached to the brief in the form of an appendix was a social science statement with
32 signatories who claimed to be "some of the foremost authorities in the area of
American race relations",810 and represented a spectrum of expertise from sociology
and anthropology, through to psychology and psychiatry.
80S Brief for David J. Armor et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Parents Involved
in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127 S, Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915).
Id.
Id.
Brown v. Bd. ofEduc (Brown l), 347 U.S. 483, n.ll (I954}.
Brief for Appellants at 5, Oliver Brown, et al., Appellants, v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, KS et
al., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id.
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The decision of NAACP lawyers to use social science to mount a direct attack on the
constitutionality of segregated education has been well-documented.HII The so-called
"Jim Crow" laws812 of the South were legitimated by the Supreme Court decision in
Plessil3 which held that separate facilities for blacks were not inherently
objectionable: "laws permitting, and even requiring, [racial] separation ... do not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other."SI4 Moreover, the Court
held that while the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to enforce equality
before the law, "it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon
color, or to enforce social, as opposed to political equality.,,815 Enforced racial
separation connotes black inferiority only because "the colored race chooses to put
that construction upon it".816
Early NAACP challenges had had some success in requmng states to eliminate
substantial disparities in the provision of facilities and educational opportunities, but
left intact the racist assumptions upon which Plessy rested.817 Under the leadership of
Thurgood Marshall, NAACP lawyers worked with social scientists to develop a
strategy which would disrupt these assumptions by demonstrating a) that the biology
of race and racial inferiority was unsound, b) that the causes of racial inequality were
HII HERBERT HILL AND JACK GREENBERG, CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO DESEGREGATION:A STUDY OF
SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN LIFE ); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY555-557, (1975) (describing fissures within NAACP over the usc of social science
data); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (describing early stages of litigation that led to the 1954
decision in Brown); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOODMARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
197 -205 (1998) (describing NAACP's decision to submit psychologist Kenneth Clark's "doll
study" as evidence of segregation's harmful effect on black children); Louis Menand, 'Civil
Actions: Brown v. Board of Education and the Limits of Law', NEW YORKER Feb. 12 2001 at
91.
See, e.g., C.VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2001) (the classic
account of these state laws).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,544 (1896).
Id., at 544.
Id.
Id.
See Missouri ex rei. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The Gaines court believed that
the "separate but equal" doctrine rested "wholly upon the privileges which the laws give to the
separated groups within the State". Id. at 349. Missouri's failure to provide a law school for
blacks constituted a manifest denial of equal protection, even though the State offered the
black applicant a scholarship to attend a law school in an adjoining State. Id. at 345. "The
basic consideration is not as to what sort of opportunities other States provide, or whether they
are as good as those in Missouri, but as to what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white
students and denies to negroes solely upon the ground of color" ld., at 349.
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social and econormc, and c) that segregative practices reflecting scientifically
unsound assumptions reinforced the psychological perceptions of young black
children concernmg their own inferiority and so operated as a structure of
subordination.t"
The "sociological argument" that they developed drew heavily upon the work of
sociologists such as Kenneth and Mamie Clark, whose "doll studies" indicated the
negative effects of racism on young children.t'" and Gunnar Myrdal, whose American
Dilemma (1944) had done much to familiarize the American public with sociological
. h . b d' I . 820 Iarguments concermng t e connection etween race an SOCIa oppression. n
sociological terms, the argument went, equalization of resources and materials would
not of itself provide black children with an equal education because in a dual system,
black schools, however well-resourced, would continue to be regarded as inferior.82I
Calculation of the "harm" of segregation was more than a matter of resources; the
intangible social and economic consequences rendered a dual system inherently
discriminatory.
The Topeka arguments were trialed in two cases (Sweatt and Mel.aurin) which
preceded the Brown litigation and reached the Supreme Court in 1950.822 NAACP
lawyers assembled expert testimony from social scientists, sociologists, psychologists
and educators who all testified to the psychologically harmful potential of
segregation.Y'' The novelty of the approach was recognized in the opening words of
the Sweatt Petitioner's Brief:
XI H
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See sources cited supra note 811.
See, e.g. Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie K. Clark" Segregation as a Factor on the Racial
Identification of Negro Pre-school Children: A Preliminary Report, 8 1. EXPERIMENTAL ED. 8
161 (1939). For further discussion see Cottrol et al., supra note 752 at 124. See also Kluger,
supra note 811.
Myrdal, supra note 775.
See sources cited supra note 811.
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and Mel.aurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S.
637 (1950).
See Kluger, supra note 811 at 256 (discussing the trial court evidence). In Sweatt v. Painter,
the court received evidence on the psychological effects of segregation from Robert Redfield,
Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Chicago. An amicus brief
submitted on behalf of a group of 187 law professors (The Committee of Law Teachers
Against Segregation in Legal Education) made the argument that racial segregation was
unconstitutional per se. See Kluger supra note 811, at 275. See also Tushnet, supra note 811,
at 70, 82, and 105.
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This case is believed to present for the first time in this Court a record
in which the issue of the validity of a state constitutional or statutory
provision requiring the separation of the races in professional schools
is clearly raised. It is the first record which contains expert testimony
and other convincing evidence showing the lack of any reasonable
basis for racial segregation [...]824
The argument had some success. Both Sweatt and McLaurin were "equalization"
cases and the Court was not required to address directly the constitutionality of
Pless/<.25 Nevertheless, by emphasizing the importance of the "intangible" benefits as
an aspect of equality, the Court signaled its receptiveness to the sociological
argument. In Sweatt, where a black applicant was denied access to the University of
Texas Law School, the court referred to qualities "which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school", and included matters
such as "reputation of the facuity, experience of the administration, position and
influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige", as
aspects of equal educational opportunity.Y" In Mel.aurin, Chief Justice Vinson for the
Court laid particular emphasis upon the need for black students to mix with their
white counterparts.Y' Thus when shortly afterwards the NAACP Board of Directors
announced its resolution to seek desegregation in all future education cases, the
structure of the arguments which were later deployed in Brown I was largely in
place.828
Whether the decision of the Supreme Court was thereby influenced is a matter of
some debate.829 The words of Chief Justice Warren are well-known: "to separate
[children] from others of a similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (No.2).
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,636 (1950).
Id., at 634.
McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637,641 (1950). "Our society grows increasingly complex,
and our need for trained leaders increases correspondingly. Appellant's case represents the
epitome of that need, for he is attempting to obtain an advanced degree in education, to
become, by definition, a leader and trainer of others. Those who will come under his guidance
and influence must be directly affected by the education he receives. Their own education and
development will necessarily suffer to the extent that his training is unequal to that of his
classmates. State imposed restrictions which produce such inequalities cannot be sustained."
Id.
The resolution was announced in July 1950 following a conference of lawyers convened by
Marshall to "map [oo.J the legal machinery for an all-out attack" on segregation. See Tushnett.
supra note 811 at 136.
See Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the
Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN.L.REV.793 (2002).
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generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone".H3o His quotation of the
lower court831 and the famous footnote 11 which referenced the work of seven social
scientists 832 to support his rejection of Plessy invited an affirmative conclusion from
which he himself subsequently backtrackedf' and which has garnered opposition
from both contemporary and subsequent academic commentators.Y"
As Dworkin and others have commented, the task of constitutional adjudication is a
search for values which ought not to be dependent upon matters of empirical research
particularly when researchers themselves do not agree. H35 The validity of the "doll
studies" upon which the Topeka brief had drawn was itself challenged more or less
immediately by subsequent researchers.t" while the Coleman Report of 1966
sponsored by the U.S. Office of Education failed to find either the expected resource
disparities between black schools and white schools or a discernible relationship
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Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. (Brown 1),347 U.S. 483. 494 (1954).
Id.: "Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon
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of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A
sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of
law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly]
integrated school system".
Id., at 495, n.ll (citing K. B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINAnON ON
PERSONALITYDEVELOPMENT (1950); PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING (Helen Leland Witmer &
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Kluger, supra note 811 at 706 (quoting Warren C.1.: "it was only a footnote, after all.")
See Mody, supra note 829 (discussing the literature).
See Dworkin, supra note 760. See also Edmond Cahn, 'A Dangerous Myth in the School
Desegregation Cases', 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157-158 (1955) ("[I] would not have the
constitutional rights of Negroes - or of other Americans - rest on any such flimsy foundation
as some of the scientific demonstrations in these records"); Herbert Wechsler, 'Towards
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law'. 73 HARV.L. REV. 1(1959).
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(2005)(discussing research critical of the "doll studies". The "doll studies" conducted by
Professor Kenneth Clark and his wife and fellow sociologist Mamie, claimed that black
children in New York when given a choice of playing with a black or white doll showed a
clear preference for the white doll. When asked to draw "the nice doll" the children again
opted for the white. The Clarks drew the conclusion that black children in a segregated school
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supra note 811 at 317-18).
832
833
834
835
836
165
between distribution of resources and academic achievement.Y' Its conclusion, that
the major causes of under-achievement of both blacks and whites lay not in
segregation but in the socio-economic class of their parents, undermined the harm-
benefit thesis which produced the Topeka argument and brought about a split in the
social science community.v" In the years that followed, social scientists were no
longer necessarily prepared to testify that racial separation constituted a denial of
equal educational opportunity.V"
Nevertheless, the Topeka statement set a strategic precedent which was followed in
the years after Brown as the focus of desegregation moved to the north where there
was no overtly discriminatory legislation. Here the NAACP needed social scientists to
establish the causal connections between official policy and school and faculty
composition required for a finding of constitutional violation.
B. Social Science and Desegregating the North: The Columbus
Brief and "The Web of Institutional Discriminations"
The hope that the Supreme Court would extend recognition of the social science
harm-benefit thesis to the schools of the North, where racial identifiability reflected
the heavy concentrations of the black urban population rather than state-mandated
racial separation, evaporated after the Court ruled in Keyes that de facto segregation
was not a constitutional violation per se. 840Chesler et al. describe Keyes as "the last
nail in the coffin of the harm theory of northern school desegregation'Y" Although,
as Justice Powell pointed out, social science research confirmed that segregation in
biracial metropolitan areas is largely a function of residential patterns,842 the Supreme
Court majority was not prepared to accept that racial separation per se offended the
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Armor, supra note 736 at 66 (discussing James. S. Coleman,.et al.,Equality of Educational
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Professor Coleman himself refused to testify from this data in support of desegregation. See
Chesler, et al., supra note 753 at 41,42,43.
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Keyes v. School District No.1" 413 U.S. 189 (1972).
Chesler et aL., supra note 753 at 46.
Keyes. 413 U.S. at 223 (Powell J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he familiar
root cause of segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is
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on the racial composition of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by
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Constitution.843 What was required was an officially mandated or produced dual
system, involving proof of two things: segregative purpose causing segregative
effect. 844 Causal analysis assumed central importance in northern schools
desegregation jurisprudence: "where Plaintiffs proved that the school authorities had
carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the
students, schools, teachers and facilities within the school system, it is only common
sense to conclude that there exists a predicate for a finding of a dual school
system".845 Following the Detroit schools case846 which was the immediate
predecessor for the Boston case, social science testimony on the causes and effects of
racial separation and particularly the interrelationship between schools and their
surrounding neighborhoods became a standard feature of NAACP-LDF litigation
strategy, not simply in relation to issues of liability but also to support a claim for a
system-wide remedy.847
The Keyes court had been generous in one respect: the Court held that a finding of
intentional discrimination in one part of the school system gave rise to a presumption
that the discrimination is system-wide, shifting the burden to the school authorities to
prove that segregated schools were not "the result of intentionally segregative acts".848
However, when the Detroit case reached the Supreme Court in 1974, causal analysis
moved centre-stage as the Court refused a metropolitan solution to a city-district
problem. 849 The plan, which involved busing from the (black) city to the (white)
suburbs, was not acceptable because the out-of-district suburbs were not implicated in
the urban-district violation.V" A remedy which involved desegregation across district
843 Keyes. 413 U.S. at 205.
Id., at 205,208 (stating that "the essential elements of de jure segregation [arc] stated simply,
a current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action" [... ] H[w]e
emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto
segregation [... ] is purpose or intent to segregate". See also Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S.229, 240 (1976».
Keyes. 413 U.S. at 201.
Bradley v. Millikin, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), decided at district court level on
September 27 1971; this reached the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time in 1974: Millikin v.
Bradley (Millikin I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
See supra note 818and accompanying text.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189,208(1973).
Millikin I, 418 U.S. 717 at 744, 745.
Id.
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lines was only permissible where the plaintiffs could show "a constitutional violation
within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district".~51
Two cases from Ohio in which the Court was asked to sanction system-wide remedial
plans were the occasion for the second social science statement submitted to the
Supreme Court. 852In Dayton / the court, whilst emphasizing the importance of tying
relief to acts of discrimination, was prepared to recognize the existence of
"incremental segregative effect" which might justify a system-wide rernedy.f" When
Dayton If and Columbus854 reached the Supreme Court on the remedy issue, the
Social Science Statement attached as an appendix to the Columbus Respondents'
Briet55 had 38 signatories, whose background was not psychology or social
psychology as in Brown, but who were primarily identifiable as sociologists, or
political or educational scientists.V? The purpose was to lend support to the NAACP
claim for a system-wide remedy by asserting the cumulative effect of a "web of
institutional discriminations" as the basic cause of school and residential
. 857 Th h h b fit" h .. h b'segregation. e statement recast t e " arm- ene It' t esis into tree asic
claims: 1) that patterns of residential segregation were attributable to the actions of
public authorities, including school boards; 2) that the relationship between school
segregation and residential segregation was interdependent; and 3) that neighborhood
school policies and attendance zones which produce racially identifiable schools can
and do contribute to residential segregation and thus can be regarded as
discriminatory.858 In a section headed "Conclusions Social Science Can and Cannot
Supply", the social scientists set out two important caveats: 1) the cumulative effect
for which they were arguing was not susceptible to a "but for" test (i.e. would the
851
X52
Id.
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Day/on 11),443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Day/on I), 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (Rehnquist r.,
dissenting). Rehnquist stated that [when a constitutional violation has been found) the District
Court [ ... )must determine how much incremental segregative effect these violations had on
the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presently constituted, when that
distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of such constitutional
violations. The remedy must be designed to redress that difference, and only if there has been
a system wide impact may there be a system wide remedy." Id., at 420 (citing Keyes, 413 U.S.
526(1979».
Day/on II, 443 U.S. 526; Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
Brief for Respondents, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S.449 (1979) (No. 78-610).
See Chesler et al., supra note 753 at 25. The list of signatories included Robert A. Dentler.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 855, at 13a.
See id., at 3a, 7a,and IOa-14a.
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segregation have occurred "but for" the discriminatory acts complained 00,859 and 2)
there was an absence of consensus about matters such as the terms of the debate, the
appropriate measurement techniques and theoretical formulations and the
trustworthiness of empirical results.t'"
The assertion of "an emerging consensus" concerning a preference for system-wide
relief was apparently enough for the Dayton 11and Columbus majorities'" (there is no
direct or indirect reference to the statement in the majority opinion in either case), but
not for Justice Rehnquist whose criticism of the district court's "cavalier approach to
causality and purpose" continued to emphasize the importance of a "but for" approach
to issues of violation and remedy.862 Thus awareness of a likely segregative effect
should not be regarded as intentional discrimination, and remedies must be tailored to
the violation. In his view "the fundamental mission of [desegregation] remedies is to
restore those integrated educational opportunities that would now exist but for
purposefully discriminatory school board conduct".863
c. The Harm-Benefit Thesis and Unitary Status: The Freeman
and Jenkins Briefs
The inability of social science to provide precise answers to questions concerning the
exact relationship between specific discriminatory acts and alleged lingering effects
represented significant limits to the utility of the "harm-benefit" thesis in the
termination cases of the 1990s. In Brown II, the Court had directed school boards "to
effectuate a transition to a racially non-discriminatory school system" and directed
district judges to maintain jurisdiction during the transition.I'" The Green Court recast
X59 !d., at 18a: The brief argues: "[sjocial scientists cannot answer such questions with precision.
The questions can be rephrased to call for stating what the present would be like if the past
had differed in certain specified respects. This is reminiscent of the grand 'what if' games of
history[ ... ] The present state of empirical knowledge and models of social change docs not
permit precise specification of the effects of removing particular historical actions. Although
many of the causes of segregated outcomes are known, this knowledge is not so thoroughly
quantified as to permit precise estimates of the effects of specific discriminatory acts on
general patterns of segregation." Id., at /9a.
Id., at 25a.
Id. Research indicated that system-wide desegregation plans which minimize the
possibility of 'white-flight' were more successful at establishing stability in student
enrolments and thus more likely to succeed than plans which were limited "to the immediate
vicinity of a ghetto or barrio." Id., at 25a-26a.
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449. 515. (1979).
Id .• at 524,( Rehnquist J.dissenting).
Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. (Brown II) 349 U.S. 294, 301(1955)
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the goal of desegregation in terms of "unitary status": "the transition to a unitary non-
racial system of public education was and is the ultimate end to be brought about".K65
In the case of Board of Education v. Dowell,866 the Court required a two-part inquiry
for unitary status and federal court withdrawal: I) had the school district complied in
good faith with the court order, and 2) had the vestiges of past discrimination been
eliminated "to the extent practicable,,?867 In considering the latter point, the District
Court should consider not only student assignments but "every facet of school
operations - faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities and facilities".H6H
The question in Freeman was whether the District Court could relinquish jurisdiction
incrementally even though full compliance with a desegregation order might not have
been achieved.869
The Social Science Statement submitted by way of an amicus briel-X7ore-articulated
the "harm-benefit thesis" in terms of the benefits of desegregation: "desegregation is
generally associated with moderate gains in the achievement of black students and the
achievement of white students is typically unaffected.,,871 "Its benefits extend beyond
the classroom to the larger issues of integration in employment, higher education, and
housing".872 It acknowledged the association with "white flight" but asserted that the
relationship between school segregation and residential segregation is reflexive;
desegregated schools can influence housing choice and desegregation plans, including
extensive court-ordered plans, can foster long-lasting demographic stability. 873 At its
best, it concluded, desegregation is not simply a process of placing black and white
children together in a school, but is a matter of developing techniques, including those
of educational innovation that will further the goals of racial integration.Y"
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Green v. County Sch. Bd.,391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968).
Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
Id. at 249,250.
Id., (citing Green, 391 U.S. at 435)
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,417 (1992).
Brief for NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467 (1992) ( No.89-1290) See generally Armor, supra note736, 71-76.
Brief for NAACP et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 870 at 51
(quoting Willis D. Hawley & Mark A. Smylie, The Contribution of School Desegregation to
Academic Achievement and Racial Integration in Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy
284-285 (Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor eds. 1988).
Id., at 58
Id., at 44-50
Id., at 72-73
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However, as Armor suggests, the acknowledgement that effective desegregation is
dependent upon certain conditions, without which the promised benefits will not
necessarily be delivered, weakened the impact and deprived the "harm-benefit" thesis
of some of its moral authority. 875 Upholding the power of the District Court to
withdraw from supervision incrementally, the Supreme Court was not to be deflected
from strict causal analysis.V" In a rare unanimous decision, the Court affirmed what it
said was implicit in its earlier ruling in Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v.Spangler: "racial
balance is not to be achieved for its own sake, but is to be pursued only when there is
a causal link between an imbalance and the constitutional violation."x77 Justice Scalia,
in concurrence, noted the difficulties of attributing the existence of racially
imbalanced schools to constitutional violations "dating from the days when Lyndon
Johnson was President or earlier."s78
The inclination of the Court to move its jurisprudence to a post-desegregation climate
was the occasion for the fourth social science statement to be submitted to the Court,
this time in a case which considered the harm-benefit thesis in terms of educational
under-achievement. In Jenkins III, the issue was whether the State of Missouri should
continue to fund quality education programs established to compensate for the
reduction in achievement levels of minority children attributable to prior de jure
segregation. 879 The Millikin II Court had accepted the argument that the harms of
unconstitutional segregation could include educational harm as well as racial
isolation. 880 The remedial plan ordered into effect in Missouri had been described as
the most ambitious and expensive remedial program in the history of school
desegregation.f" The total cost for the quality education programs alone had
exceeded $220 million.882 The class plaintiffs now opposed a partial termination
875 Armor, supra note 736 at 73.
Freeman v. Pitts 503 U.S. 467 (1992)
Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). In Spangler the Court held that once
a unitary system had been achieved there was no duty to maintain racial balance where the
imbalance was the result of demographic forces rather than constitutional violation. ld., at
435-37.
Id., at 506 (Scalia J., concurring) See also id. at 503 (Scalia J. concurring) ("Racially
imbalanced schools are hence the product of a blend of public and private actions and any
assessment that they would not be segregated, or would not be as segregated. in the absence of
a particular one of these factors is guesswork. ")
Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins 111). 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
Millikin v. Bradley (Millikin 11). 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
Jenkins lll. 515 U.S.70, 78.
Id.. at 76.
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order, arguing that the fact that student achievement levels as measured by annual
standardized tests were still "at or below national norms at many grade levels"
constituted a vestige of discrimination which had yet to be fully eliminated.!!!!3
Submitted as an appendix to a social science amicus brief and entitled Educational
Remedies for School Segregation: A Social Science Statement, the purpose of the
statement was to caution against application of a crude causal analysis in relation to
the "vestiges of segregation.t'F" The documented under-achievement of minority
children, it argued, reflects a culture of low expectations on the part of teachers and
students alike, and is associated with the high concentration of economic poverty in
urban school districts. Both of these factors have their origins in decades of racial
segregation and continue to affect behavior and achievement patterns long after the
unconstitutional discriminatory practices have ceased.885 To be effective, the scientists
argued, remedial programs needed to be long term, and the educational components
should be rigorously monitored and evaluated by recognized indicators which include
standardized testing of student outcomes.f'"
D. Does the Court Take Note? The Harm-Benefit Thesis and a
Public Law Remedial Model
The extent to which desegregation jurisprudence at Supreme Court level has, or
indeed should, take account of social science has generated considerable debate.m
Apart from Footnote 11 in Brown, it is difficult to identify any clear evidence that
social science submissions have had a direct impact on the jurisprudence of the
Court.888 However, as Professor James Ryan points out, in a political climate
supportive of the goal of integration, the Court was apparently prepared to accept the
remedial benefits of integration for minority students more or less without question. !!X9
883
8X4
u.. at 72.
Brief of Anderson et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Missouri v. Jenkins, 515
U.S. 70 (1995) (No. 93-1823), reprinted in Mark A. Smyllie et al., Educational Remedies/or
School Segregation: A Social Science Statement to the u.s. Supreme Court in Missouri v.
Jenkins, 27 THE URBAN REVIEW ( No.3) 207( 1995).
Smyllie, supra note 884 at 212.
Id.. at 220-224.
For a recent review of the literature re Brown see Mody, supra note 829. For recent
discussions of the later case law see James E Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science
Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases 81 NiC. L. REV. 1659 (2003).
Ryan, supra note 887.
Ryan, supra note 887 at 1666.
XXS
XX6
X87
172
Indeed, the relaxed approach to issues of causation evident in the presumptions of
Green,890 Swann,891 and Keyes892 more or less assumes the "web of institutional
discriminations" which the later Columbus social science statement argued made
education a "pervasive governmentally organized activity".893
There is, however, no doubt that in the termination cases of the 1990s, the Court
accorded higher priority to disengagement than to social science-based arguments
concerning the continuing harms of segregation. In Dowell the Court upheld a finding
of unitary status even though, as the dissent pointed out, the conditions likely to inflict
the "stigmatic injury condemned in Brown I" persisted and there remained "feasible
methods of eliminating such conditions" 894 In Freeman,895, the Court sanctioned
partial and incremental withdrawal from desegregation supervision, and in Jenkins III
it permitted termination of remedial programs which had been in place for seven years
on the basis, despite the findings of the district judge to the contrary, that "white
flight" and the continuing disparities between the achievements of minority and
majority students must be attributable to "external factors, beyond the control of the
[school committee] and the State".896 The social science statement was more or less
ignored. Justice Thomas, concurring, was overtly dismissive of the value of social
science evidence generally in schools cases: "[T[he judiciary is fully competent to
make independent determinations concerning the existence of state [discriminatory]
890
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Green v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971).
Keyes v. School District No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
Brief for Respondents at 7a, 13a, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (No.
78-610). See also Green, 391 U.S. 430; Swann, 402 U.S. at 26 (establishing the presumption
that any present segregation was the result of prior acts of segregation); Keyes, 413 U.S. at
208 (establishing the presumption that a finding of intentional acts of discrimination in one
part of a school district warranted a presumption that other parts of the district were similarly
affected).
Bd. ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (199l)(Marshall, 1., dissenting).
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II/) 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995). The trial court had specifically
found that de jure segregation "caused a system-wide reduction in student achievement" in the
Kansas City, MO schools and developed a remedial plan. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F.Supp. 19,
24 (W.D.Mo. 1985), affd Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986).. The Eighth
Circuit upheld the district court's later decision denying the school district's motion for a
finding of unitary status: Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 404 (8th Cir. 1994). Dissenting
from the denial of a request for rehearing en banc and objecting to the district court's
establishment of a student achievement goal, gauged by results from standardized tests, Judge
Beam wrote "in my view, this case as it now proceeds, involves an exercise in pedagogical
sociology not constitutional adjudication" Id., at 404 (Beam 1. dissenting). The Supreme Court
ordered the district court to "sharply limit, if not dispense with, its reliance on" student
achievement as measured by test scores (Jenkins III 515 U.S. at 101).
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action without the unnecessary ... assistance of the social sciences."g97 Lower courts
"should not be swayed by the easy answers of social science, nor should they accept
the findings and the assumptions of sociology and psychology at the expense of
constitutional principle'Y" The Civil Rights Project has these remarks in mind when
it attributes the decline in the momentum of desegregation to changes in Supreme
Court jurisprudence. "Since the Supreme Court changed desegregation law in three
major decisions between 1991 and 95, the momentum of desegregation for black
students has clearly reversed in the South, where the movement had by far its greatest
success." In consequence, it charges, federal courts have changed from being "on the
leading edge" of desegregation activity to become "its greatest obstacle".899
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X9X
X99
Jenkins III. 515 U.S. at, 122 (Thomas J., concurring).
Id.,at 122-123.
Erica Frankenberg et al., A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the
Dream? 5-6 (2003) (Available at
http://www .civiIrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg031 AreWel.osingthc Dream. pdf.)
See e.g. Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. I, 237
F.Supp. 2d. 988 (E.D.Ark. 2002) (for Jenkins-induced skepticism regarding social science
testimony in termination cases); see also Davis v. School District of Pontiac, 95 F. Supp. 2d.
688,697 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (dismissing social science information).
In Pulaski, the district court holding that plaintiffs had not come forward with evidence to
attribute the achievement gap to unconstitutional conduct of the school board commented:
" sociologists and educators have recognized for over a decade that there arc a host of
factors, completely unrelated to the effects of de jure segregation, that also arc
responsible for the minority student achievement gap. Some of these other factors
include low birth weight, poverty, whether the student is raised by a single parent,
parental interest and involvement, and peer influence. Complicating this issue still
further is the fact that the achievement gap 'exists across the country in prior
segregated school districts and school districts that have not discriminated against
minority students. '" 237 F. Supp.2d. at 1037 (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F.
Supp. 1151, 1158-64 (W.O. Mo. 1997».
The court continued: "How does a trial court go about determining, with any degree of
precision, the percentage of the achievement gap (assuming there is any) that is
causally related to de jure segregation (which ended many decades carlicrj-aftcr
somehow excluding the host of other socioeconomic factors that are universally
recognized as also contributing to the achievement gap? Reviewing the reported cases
in which brave souls have undertaken this task puts one in mind of trying to nail jelly
to a wail." Id.
In Davis the court was dismissive of the information value of social science evidence:
"even now, with the perspective of almost three decades, historians, sociologists and legal
scholars vigorously disagree over the socio-economic, demographic and educational impact
busing has had on our communities. As in so many areas of debate, current perspectives on
the impact of busing appear divided along the lines of the old adage, 'Where you come in is
where you go out' " Davis. 95 F.Supp. 2d. at 695
Accord Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F. 3d.790, 804-808 (1st Cir.1998) (finding that a post-
termination race-conscious admissions policy for the Boston Latin schools was not justified
by the prior history of de jure segregation, was critical of the expert testimony, dismissing all
of their conclusions as methodologically unfounded, and expressing its own ineptitude with
the statistical information presented: "we do not propose that the achievement gap bears no
relation to some form of prior discrimination. We posit only that it is fallacious to maintain
that an endless gaze at any set of raw numbers permits a court to arrive at a valid etiology of
complex social phenomena").
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Chesler et al.90o have suggested that school desegregation remedial jurisprudence
evidences a tension between two models of adjudication described in Chayes' much-
cited article published in 1976.901 Chayes argued that the traditional conception of the
civil lawsuit as a vehicle for settling disputes between private individuals about
private rights does not fit class action suits in constitutional matters which are
primarily concerned with grievances about the operation of public policy.902 In the
traditional conception, the "private law model", the focus of judicial inquiry is on
issues of intent (intentional infringement of plaintiffs' rights) and the remedial
purpose is restitution or compensation.Y' The orientation is retrospective; the court
asks "what are the consequences for the parties of specific past instances of conduct'?"
and tailors relief to remedy those consequences. In the school desegregation class
action, however, issues of intent lose their centrality and the orientation of inquiry
becomes essentially forward-looking. The relief sought is usually injunctive, and
fashioned by reference to the likely consequences of policy implementation and
official behavior.Y" The consequence is that in a public law model, remedial
outcomes depend upon a process of fact-evaluation more akin to legislative than
judicial process as traditionally conceived:
"the whole process begins to look like the traditional description of
legislation. Attention is drawn to a "mischief', existing or threatened,
and the activity of the parties and court is directed to the development
of on-going measures designed to cure that mischief. Indeed, if, as is
often the case, the decree sets up an affirmative regime governing the
activities in controversy for the indefinite future and having binding
force for persons within its ambit, then it is not very much of a stretch
to see it as,pro tanto, a legislative act".905
E. Pedagogical Sociology and Judicial Activism: The Search for
Legitimacy
Brown 11 required the federal judiciary to step outside a traditional role of
adjudication and assume responsibility for tasks of management and supervision. The
900
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CHESLER,supra note 753.
Chayes, supra note754.
Id, at 1302.
Id., at 1285.
The court is asked "to enjoin future or threatened action or to modify a course of conduct
presently in train or a condition presently existing" (Id,at 1296).
Id,at 1297.905
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widespread expansion of the process, described by Chayes.I'" into fields such as
prisons, housing and mental health, underpinned by a widespread cynicism verging on
nihilism concerning the autonomous nature of legal reasoning, has generated what
Professor Mark Yudof has described as a "crisis of legitimacy" in relation to judicial
activity.Y' In this context, he suggests, an attraction of social science evidence is its
capacity to defuse arguments concerning the irrational nature of judicial reasoning; if
processes of legal reasoning could not themselves be described as "scientific", they
could at least claim to be of social benefit, as determined by the objective processes of
" . ific" d' . l' 908scienti IC lSClP meso
In desegregation litigation, the submission of sociological information and data for the
judge's information became unremarkable to the point of routine; yet, as CahnlJ09
points out, the so-called Brandeis brief,910 when used as a strategy of attack, is a two-
edged sword."!' In an adversarial process, "shrewd, resourceful lawyers can put a
Brandeis brief together in support of almost any conceivable exercise of legislative
judgment".912 The politicization of social science research in schools desegregation
cases did much to undermine faith in its claims of objectivity and maturity and
engendered a growing perception of a crisis of legitimacy on the part of the social
sciences themselves.V'' The dissent's dismissal of "pedagogical sociology" in Jenkins
III articulates the growing mistrust on the part of the judiciary concerning the value of
testimony from the "soft sciences" in constitutional matters.i'"
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Chayes, supra note 754.
Yudof, supra note 757 at 67.
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Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.L. REV. 150,154 (1955).
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, ASSISTEDBY JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK, WOMEN IN INDUSTRY:DECISIONOF
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN CURT MULLER V. STATE OF OREGON: UPIIOLDING
THE CONSTITUTIONALITYOF THE OREGON TEN HOUR LAW FOR WOMEN AND BRIEF FOR TIlE
STATE OF OREGON(1908)available at hup://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/ww/organizations-ncl.php.Thc
brief was filed by future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in Muller V. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412 (1908», and argued the need for special protection for women on health and safety
grounds in support of an Oregon statute that purported to restrict women's working hours. The
Brandeis brief contained two pages of legal argument accompanied by approximately 100
pages of sociological and economic data. The style was replicated in the NAACP's brief in
Brown I. See generally PAUL L ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 75-101,
134-172 (1972 ).
See Cahn, supra note 909 at 154.
Id., at150, 154. See generally. ROSEN, supra note 910 at 75.
Yudof, supra note 757 at 71.
Jenkins v . Missouri (Jenkins Ill). 19 F. 3d 393, 404.(8th Cir. 1994).
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Chesler et al. suggest that what was at stake in school desegregation cases was a battle
over a point of view: what kind of a problem is racial inequality?" S It was also a
battle about responsibility. The NAACPILDF use of social science evidence in school
desegregation cases was a strategy designed to persuade the Court to conceptualize
desegregation in terms of outcomes rather than intentions:"!" From this point of view,
the affirmative action requirement of Green917 and the racial balance criterion of
Swann918 represent public law models of adjudication whereby the Court, apprised of
a social problem requiring address, sanctioned orders which required policy
formulation and implementation.I'" In the northern cases however, the Court drew
back from the logic of this approach. By preserving the de jure/de faCIO distinction
and refusing to accept the social science based argument that segregation was a
"harm" per se, the Court returned to a private-law model at least as far as issues of
liability are concerned.Y" Millikin II, in which the Court refused to sanction a
metropolitan remedy for an intradistrict violation, is fully consistent with this
approach. 92) In remedial terms, however, as the Ohio cases demonstrate, the Court
continued to sanction system-wide remedial decrees characteristic of a public law
results-oriented approach922 until the I990s termination cases, by which time the
priority of the Court was no longer social change but legitimacy and the propriety of
continuing judicial supervision of state affairs.923
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CHESLERET AL.. supra note 753, at 203.
Id.,at 37.
Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.I (1971).
See also Fiss, supra note 757.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
Millikin v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746-752 (1974).
See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton Il), 443 U.S. 526 (1979),and Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979): "where a racially discriminatory school system has
been found to exist, Brown II imposes a duty on local school boards to 'effectuate a transition
to a racially non-discriminatory school system' Brown II was a call for the dismantling of
well-entrenched dual systems' and school boards operating such systems were 'clearly
charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch'. Each
instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty continues the violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.") (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.294, 301 (1955) and
Green v. County School Board, 349 U.S. 430,437-438 (1968).
See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). See also Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II!), 515 U.S.
70 (1995).
923
177
F. The Changing Priorities of Constitutional Adjudication
The Court has never articulated a theory of desegregation which can adequately
explain either the contradictions inherent in the above account or the role that social
science should play in constitutional adjudicationY" In an attempt to do both,
Dworkin has distinguished between what he terms the causal and interpretive
judgments of social sciences.925 The former, he argues, derive from observation and,
without a mechanical model of causation, rest upon statistical correlations which are
susceptible to fluctuation and have no resonance in the normal vocabulary of
constitutional adjudication.Y" However, judgments about the nature of a community's
response to a particular social phenomenon or practice - such as segregation- are
interpretive judgments of the kind regularly employed by the judiciary in
constitutional adjudication: "interpretive judgments are not foreign to the judge; they
do not draw on a kind of technology that is for him arcane. On the contrary, they draw
upon the same kind of skills, and are indeed identical in their structure, with the
judgment that a judge makes when he draws from a line of precedent a
characterization that seems to him a more sensitive characterization of the precedents
than any other".927
If, as Dworkin argues, the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution is a
commitment that the government, in making political decisions, will treat each
individual with equal concern and respect, and the judicial decision to require
government to take affirmative action to desegregate reflects the Court's judgment
that the political process at any particular time cannot be relied upon to secure that
guarantee,928 then two things become clear and an explanation for the changing
attitude of the Court emerges. Interpretive judgments of social science may have done
much to convince the federal judiciary, first of the social consequences of "the Negro
problem", and the value of integration as an appropriate response and. secondly, of
924 (Yudof, supra note 757 at 87) ("Indeed it has done all that is within its power to obfuscate the
underlying bases of its decisions"). See also id., for discussion of theoretical models; James S.
Liebman, Desegregating Politics: 'All-out' School Desegregation Explained. 90 (OlUM. L.
REV. 1463 (1990); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies 79 Gm. L.J.
1357 (1991) (stating that "The remedial process in public law litigation is a practice in search
of a theory".).
Dworkin, supra note760, at 20-26.
Id.
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926
927
92K
Id. at 21.
See id., at 24-26.
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the "web of segregation" that renders political process an unreliable mechanism of
change. Justice Thomas's comments in Jenkins lII, however, reflect a clear perception
that, forty years after Brown, the interpretive assumptions of "Negro inferiority"
which underpinned the judicial mandate for affirmative action were outdated, while
the causal judgments concerning segregation's lingering effects were no longer
sufficiently reliable to warrant continuing departure from the norms of federalism and
judicial deference to elected legislatures which otherwise set limits to the legitimacy
of judicial interference with state and federal affairs. 929
In the schools affirmative action cases which came before the Supreme Court in the
2006-2007 Term,930 hopes that the Court would afford a favorable reception to social
science submissions, as it had in the case of the University of Michigan Law School
admission policies were dashed.931 Despite extensive social science submissions on
both sides, the plurality chose not to enter the debate, basing their decision upon the
primacy of the "color-blind constitution" in a non-desegregation situation. 93~
The affirmative action cases differ from the desegregation cases in that they do not as
yet directly engage the question of remedy. At issue is the legitimacy of policies of
racial preference in the pursuit of racial diversity and the extent to which, more than
fifty years after Brown, a Court in retreat from an activist model of adjudication
should be willing to lend constitutional legitimacy to integrative social policies
underpinned by contestable social science.933 For the Seattle Court, the distinction
929 Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins Ill), 515 U.S. 70, 114, 138 (1995) (Thomas J .• concurring). "It
never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is
predominantly black must be inferior. We must forever put aside the notion that simply
because a school district today is black. it must be educationally inferior."
See Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1.127 S.Ct. 2738.
Grutter v. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 982 (2003). The majority opinion accepted the testimony of
amici who included business and military leaders as well as social scientists concerning the
educational benefits of racial diversity. "The Law School's claim of a compelling interest is
further bolstered by its amici who point to the educational benefits that flow from student
body diversity" Id, at 333. "These benefits are not theoretical but real. as major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace
can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people. cultures. ideas and
viewpoints" Id. at 333-34. "High-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United
States military assert that, 'based on [their[ decades of experience. a 'highly qualified. racially
diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to
provide national security" Id. at 331.
Parents Involved in Cmty Sch.127 S.Ct. at 2255-8. 2765-68.
Id .• at. 2778-9 (Thomas J.• concurring) (stating that the constitutionality of the school boards'
race-conscious policies should not be left "at the mercy of elected government officials
930
931
932
933
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between "integration" and "desegregation" was clear. School boards act
unconstitutionally if they seek to perpetuate the 'hard won gains' of the desegregation
era by race-conscious programs to combat "resegregation" which is not directly
attributable to state action.934 The divisions within the Court were predictable. For
Justice Breyer, the school board plans "represented local efforts to bring about the
kind of racially integrated education" that was the promise of Brown.935 Justice
Kennedy was prepared to recognize the compelling nature of state action to further
the nation's "historic commitment" to equal educational opportunity for all;936 but, for
Justice Thomas, once again the "tenuous,,937 or "far from apparent,,93~ link between
racial balance and improved educational outcomes for black children did not justify
unconstitutional race-based experiments to achieve socially desirable ends: "this
Court does not sit to 'create a society that includes all Americans' or to solve the
problems of 'troubled inner city schooling'. We are not social engincers".9J9
934
935
936
evaluating the evanescent views of a handful of social scientists. To adopt [such an approach 1
would be to abdicate our constitutional responsibilities."
The Grutter majority had been careful to bolster its reliance on social science with the opinion
of business and military leaders on the benefits of racial diversity, while Justice Thomas in
dissent dismissed the "faddish slogan of the cognoscenti" with counter-research citations with
contrary outcomes. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350, 364, Thomas J., dissenting).
Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007)
Id, at 2800, (Breyer J.,dissenting).
Id, at 2797(Kennedy J., concurring) ("This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill
its historic commitment to creating equal opportunity for all its children").
Id., at 2778 (Thomas 1. concurring) ("Given this tenuous relationship between forced racial
mixing and improved educational results for black children, the dissent cannot plausibly
maintain that an educational element supports the integration interest, let alone makes it
compelling").
Id. at 2776 "The dissent asserts that racially balanced schools improve educational outcomes
for black children. In support, the dissent unquestioningly cites social science research to
support propositions that are hotly disputed among social scientists. In reality, it is far from
apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits, much less that integration is
necessary to black achievement".
Id.at 2779, n.14. The court stated:
"regardless of what Justice Breyer's goals might be, this Court does not sit to 'create a society
that includes all Americans' or to solve the problems of 'troubled inner city schooling'. We
are not social engineers. The United States Constitution dictates that local governments cannot
make decisions on the basis of race. Consequently, regardless of the perceived negative effects
of racial imbalance, I will not defer to legislative majorities where the Constitution forbids it"
Id
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas directly articulates the view that the "actual" gain
in these cases lies not in the elimination of racial imbalance but in the elimination of state-
enforced separation. "The dissent's assertion that these plans are necessary for the school
districts to maintain their 'hard-won gains' reveals its conflation of segregation and racial
imbalance". (Id, at 2770, n.3). His opinion continues: "In the context of public schooling,
segregation is the deliberate operation of a school system to 'carry out a governmental policy
to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race' In Brown, this court declared that
segregation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment[ ... ][but] racial imbalance is not segregation." Id. at 2769 (quoting Swann v.
937
938
939
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IV. Education versus Integration in Boston
One of the main arguments employed by the Boston school committee to justify its
opposition to court-ordered desegregation was that of usurpation of power:9.Jo Judge
Garrity's court plan and orders941 took power which the constitution had given to
elected state officials; yet, as Judge Frank Johnson has explained, so-called "judicial
activism" in cases like this was a function of abdication of civic rcsponsibilityi"
Federal judges faced with official opposition were left very largely to their own
devices. The Supreme Court had declared war on "gradualism" and "freedom of
choice" and other overtly race-neutral policies which masked attempts to subvert the
effect of Brown, and had declared the parameters of the broad remedial powers of
district courts to fashion appropriate decrees where school authorities default; but it
left the detail to be worked out by district judges on a case-by-case basis.
As Judge Frank Coffin has pointed out, the process was unfamiliar and far from
standardized.943
940
941
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I , 6 (1971). "Outside the context of
remediation for past de jure segregation, 'integration' is simply racial balancing". Id., at n.2.
Morgan v. Kerrigan,530 F .2d 40 I (I st Cir.1976).
I have been unable to ascertain an exact figure. The court records are not complete. Forrnisano
gives a figure of 415 orders in eleven years: RONALD P. FORMISANO, BOSTON AGAINST
BUSING: RACE, CLASS ANDETHNICITY INTHE 1960s AND 1970s 2 (1991 ).
Frank M. Johnson Jr., The Role of Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation. 32 ALA. L.
REV.271, 279 (1981). Johnson asserts:
"the remedy for judicial activism is a recognition that this trust is not one solely for the
judiciary. As long as government officials entrusted with responsibility for constitutional
governance disregard that responsibility, the judiciary must and will stand ready to intervene
to the extent necessary on behalf of the deprived. To avoid this intervention, all that
government officials need to is confront their responsibilities with the diligence and honesty
that their constituencies deserve. Conscientious, responsible leadership will in most instances
make judicial intervention unnecessary." Id.
Frank M. Coffin, The Frontier of Remedies: A Call for Exploration, 67 CAL.L. REV. 983,985
(1979). It could also be extremely complex, presenting reviewing courts with considerable
difficulties, vide the Fourth Circuit's abdication in Swann: "we understand that the record in
the case is voluminous, and we would note at the outset that we have been unable to analyze
the record as a whole. Although we have carefully examined the district court's various
opinions and orders, the school board's plan, and those pleadings readily available to us, we
feel that we are not conversant with all of the factual considerations which may prove
determinative of this appeal. Accordingly, we here attempt, not to deal extensively with
factual matters, but rather to set forth SOme legal considerations which may be helpful to the
Court." Swann, 431 F. 2d at 147.
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The judge must find the best way to accomplish a goal, seeking help
not only from the parties but from court-appointed experts and masters
and from citizens' committees. In this case, the district judge was
concerned with such things as bus routes and distances, appropriate
white-black-other minority ratios from specific schools, magnet
schools, enrichment programs, methods of transfer between schools,
teacher recruitment, and pairings of colleges and universities with
specific secondary schools. All of these issues ordinarily would be
appropriate grist for the relevant educational policymaking body, here
the Boston School Committee. Indeed, the function is very close to
legislative decision-making. Because the legislative authorities would
not act, however, the district judge was forced to move beyond the
traditional role ... and fashioned his own remedy.i'"
The immediate precedent for the Garrity orders came from the Southern state of
North Carolina, where District Judge James B. McMillan faced a residentially
segregated urban school system and a school committee unable or unwilling to
produce an acceptable plan. Judge McMillan's appointment of education expert Dr
James Finger as court advisor was a tactic which was subsequently followed by Judge
Jack Weinstein in New York as well as by Judge Garrity in 80ston.1)45 The court-
ordered Finger Plan which adopted "racial balance" as a criterion of desegregation
and compulsory busing as a strategy received Supreme Court approval in 1971 and
provided a blueprint for Northern school desegregation.f"
944
945
Coffin, supra note 943 at 985.
Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. Of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C'.1970) (vacated in
part, Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F .2d 138 (4th Cif. 1970), aff'd in
part, Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.I (1971). See BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE AND THE SUPREME COURT
(l986)(discussing Judge McMillan's order); see also DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING
WRITING AND RACE: THE DESEGREGATlON OF THE OIARLOlTE SCIIOOL (1995)( for a general
account).
As Schwarz points out the choice of Dr Finger reflected the practical difficulties faced by
judges and counsel in securing assistance from local educators who were unwilling to testify
for fear of antagonizing the school board. SCHWARZ, sl/pra at 14. It seems that the first
appointment of an educational expert in a schools case was by Judge Bohanon, supervising the
desegregation of the public schools of Oklahoma City. He appointed education experts Dr
William R. Carmack, Dr. Willard B. Spalding and Dr. Earl A. McGovern to carry out a study
and file a desegregation report which the court then adopted. See Dowell I'. Sch. B.d of Okla.
Cuty Pub. Sch., 244 F. Supp. 971, 973 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
For Judge Weinstein's orders, see Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.
N.Y. 1974); see also the discussion by Special Master Curtis J. Berger, A~my from the
Courthouse and into the Field: the Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707. For
Judge Garrity's appointment of experts, see Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F.Supp. 216 (D.Mass.
1975).
Hart v. Crnty Sch.Bd., 383 F.Supp. 699 (D.C.N.Y.1974).946
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Judge Garrity's court plan implemented, in September 1975, was essentially a student
assignment and redistricting plan on the Swann model, with additional educational
enrichment features of the kind later approved in Milliken 1I.947 The "political
dynamite'Y" of both plans which provoked controversy on the national stage and
rioting on an unprecedented scale on the streets of Boston was the requirement for
compulsory transportation of students.f'" Busing in Boston became the focal point for
school committee-led opposition to court-ordered desegregation. Both the state plan.
ordered into effect in September 1974, and the court plan which took effect the year
required the busing of students out of their neighborhoods to schools in another part
of the city.950 The arrival of buses carrying black children into white, mainly Irish
working class South Boston triggered the riots which made Boston the worst symbol
of white racism outside the South and saw state troopers join city police on the streets
and in the schools in the effort to restore order. 951
A. The Campaign for Racial Balance in Boston
The lawsuit filed against the Boston school committee on March 2 1972 on behalf of
black plaintiffs did not come out of the blue.952 Dissatisfaction on the part of black
parents with the poor level of instruction available to their children predated the
Morgan litigation by more than one hundred years. Although de jure segregation had
never existed in Massachusetts, the city of Boston had maintained separate schools for
black children since 1820.953 In 1849, the case of five-year old Sarah Roberts became
947 Millikin v. Bradley (Millikin 11), 433 U.S.267, 275-76, 279 (1977); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U .S.I (1971); Kerrigan, 40 I F .Supp.216.
Schwarz, supra note 945, at 17.
See 1. ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN TIlE LIVES OF THREE
AMERICAN FAMILIES (1985); see also FORMISANO, supra note 941; J.MICIIAEL Ross &
WILLIAM M. BERG, 'I RESPECTFULLY DISAGREE WITH TilE JUDGE'S ORDER'; TIlE BOSTON
SCHOOLDESEGREGATIONCONTROVERSY(1981).
Kerrigan, 401 F.Supp. at 239. The Court plan required the busing of approximately 21,000
students: This number was an estimate based upon analysis by the court-appointed experts.
School committee figures had grossly over-estimated the numbers of students in the system.
See ROBERT A. DENTLER & MARVIN B. SCOTT, SOIOOLS ON TRIAL: AN INSIDEACCOUNTOF
THEBOSTONDESEGREGAnON CASE, 27-28 (1981 ).
In October of 1974, Governor Sargent's request for federal assistance resulted in the 8200
Airborne Division, stationed in Fort Bragg, (N.C.) being placed on stand-by alert. See Ross &
BERG,supra note 949 at 263).
Announcing his Phase II plan for implementation at school opening in autumn 1975, Judge
Garrity noted that 166 state and local police officers continued to be stationed inside South
Boston High, with 134 stationed in the vicinity during school hours. Morgan v.Kerrigan, 401
F. Supp. 216,225 (D. Mass. 1975).
Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.1974).
See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (Mass. Dist, Ct.1849).
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a cause celebre when her father took action in the state courts to secure her admission
to a white schoo1.954 The black school that she attended was badly run down. An
evaluation committee had reported to the city that "the school rooms are too small, the
paint is much defaced" and the equipment was "so shattered and neglected that it
cannot be used until it has been thoroughly repaired".955 Sarah had to walk past five
white elementary schools to reach it.956The action was argued on her behalf by anti-
slavery campaigner Charles Sumner, who advanced the argument of racial
stigmatization which, one hundred years later, found approval in BrowII.957 The case
was ahead of its time and failed in the state Supreme Judicial Court, Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw articulating the principles of "separate but equal" which the Plessy
court subsequently adopted.f'" The case symbolized the underlying assumption on the
part of black parents that, in a dual system which separated white children from black,
the education offered to their children would be inevitably inferior.
In June 1961, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination examined the
issue of student allocation. Its finding that there was no intentional discriminatory
practice on the part of the school committee was rejected by NAACP leaders who
called upon the black community for support by boycott action.9s9 On February 26
1964, following a nationwide week of boycotts, a "Freedom Stay Out" day in Boston
was supported by 22,000 students; a figure which represented over 20 per cent of the
city's 92,000 student population.F" The following month saw the establishment of the
Kiernan Committee with 21 members drawn from the ranks of university presidents,
religious leaders and representatives of labor and business, with a remit to assist the
state Board of Education to carry out a study of racial imbalance in Commonwealth
schools.961 The Committee's report, published on April 15 1965, identified fifty-five
schools in the state, forty-five in Boston itself, which were racially imbalanced,
954
955
956
957
9SM
959
960
961
Id.
Quoted in KLUGER,supra note 811 at 75.
Roberts. 59 Mass. at 20 I.
Brownv. Bd. ofEduc. (Brown 1).347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. at 209, as approved in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537,544 (1896).
See Ross AND BERG,supra note 949, at 47, 48.
Id., at 49.
Id.
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defined as having over fifty percent minority enrolment.i'" In terms of educational
effect, the report concluded that racially imbalanced schools caused serious
educational damage to black children by "impairing their confidence, distorting their
self-image and lowering their motivation". 963 Moreover, the inferior educational
facilities in predominantly black schools further reduced the opportunities of black
children to prepare for the "professional and vocational requirements of our
technological society".964
In 1965, when Governor John Volpe signed into law the Racial Imbalance Act (RIA),
Massachusetts became the first state to mandate racial balance in its public schools. 965
In the course of the next seven years, neither the State Board of Education nor the
federal government was able to make the Boston School Committee produce an
acceptable plan.966 The State Board finally produced its own plan which the state
Supreme Judicial Court ordered into implementation for September 1974 and which
Judge Garrity adopted as an interim measure until the Court could devise a
desegregation plan in accordance with Supreme Court mandate. Busing was integral
to both State and Court plans and, given the city's residential patterns, an unavoidable
desegregation technique, as defendant School Committee Chairman Kerrigan himself
testified.967 However, as Dentler and Scott point out, the concept of "forced busing",
962 MASS. STATE BD. OF EDUC., BECAUSE IT Is RIGHT - EDUCATIONALLY; REPORT OF TilE
ADVISORY COMMITTEEON RACIAL IMBALANCEANDEDUCATION 2, (1965).
Id., as quoted in Ross & Berg, supra note 949, at 50.
Id.
MASS. GEN.LAWS ANN. eh. 71 SS 37C, 370 (2008).
The State Board withheld state aid, giving rise to action in the statc courts by the school
committee to release the funds and annual bills in the legislature for the repeal of the RIA. See
Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F.Supp. 410, 439 (D. Mass. 1974). A complaint by a black parent to
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination produced a "cease and desist" order
against the Committee and enforcement proceedings in the Superior Court which remanded
for a consideration of moot ness as the complaining student had graduated. See id., at 450. On
May 28 1974 an MCAD Commissioner reported that the discriminatory practices continued
and had not been eliminated. See id., at 451. Abortive attempts by Federal officials to secure
compliance resulted in the withholding of Federal funds and enforcement action by the
Department of Health Welfare and Education (HEW). Id., at 421. Following a complaint by
HEW, Administrative Law Judge Ring found the city in violation of federal statute. Id. "Judge
Ring's decision was affirmed, with minor exceptions, by the final reviewing authority in
HEW, In the Matter of Boston Public Schools, April 19, 1974, which found that the city had
been guilty of de jure segregation ", Id. For a general account see Ross AND BERG, supra note
949, at 63-66.
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216,226 (D. Mass. 1975) (quoting Committee Chairman
Kerrigan, "There is no way it [desegregation] can be done without the forced busing of
children").
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like the neighborhood school, was essentially a fabrication.i'" There was nothing
remarkable about school buses: they had been a fact of Boston school life for many
years prior to 1974,969 while school committee zoning practices had ensured that the
"neighborhood school" was a reality only in those parts of the city where residential
segregation was firmly entrenched.Y'' The rallying calls of "forced busing" and the
"neighborhood school" were ostensibly neutral objectives behind which lurked the
racism which the black plaintiffs and their lawyers sought to expose: "just as the myth
of neighborhood schools gave its believers something 'neutral' to support, so busing
gave them something 'neutral' to oppose".971
Judge Garrity retained active oversight of the desegregation process in Boston for ten
years. The Court plan which he ordered into implementation was an ambitious
attempt to overhaul and modernize the outdated Boston public school system, and
much was achieved. By the early 1980s, however, the project was in trouble; a
coalition of plaintiffs, school defendants, teachers and parents combined to frustrate
court orders for school closings. Support for racial mixing ebbed, undermined by
growing disillusionment with the ability of the desegregation process to bring about
lasting improvements to the quality of education experienced by black children.
Influenced by the radical ideas of Derrick Bell and Ronald Edmonds,972 plaintiffs'
counsel Larry Johnson began actively to question the nature of the desegregation
process and to advocate a "freedom of choice" plan focusing on educational equity as
opposed to "desegregation". In so doing, he fragmented the plaintiffs' case and
frustrated the consent decree negotiations that had been begun by State Commissioner
Anrig as a way of terminating court jurisdiction, but largely to no avail. By this time,
the 'law of the case' was firmly established. The case was a "race" case and not an
96~
969
970
971
972
DENTLER & SCOTT, supra note 950, at 27.
Id. On their figures "over 30,000 out of an alleged 90,000 students had been taking buses
subways and taxis from home to public schools in Boston for many years prior to 1974". Id.
School Department figures for the school year 1972-73 showed that 10% of elementary, 50%
of intermediate and 85% of high school students rode to school. See Memorandum from
Robert Dentler to the Masters: Commentary on Busing and Student Transport, (Feb.24 1975)
(90 Garrity XXXVIIe. f.16).
Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 473 (D. Mass. 1974).
DENTLER AND SCOTT, supra note 950, at 27.
See, e.g., Ronald Edmonds, Desegregation Planning and Educational Equity, THEORY INTO
PRACTICE 12 (1978); Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518. (1980).
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"education" case.973 The consequence was that, however sincere the judge's concern
with educational improvement might initially have been, the requirements of
desegregation as mandated by the Supreme Court set limits to the extent that this
concern could be realized, raising questions concerning the gains that Brown had been
able to achieve.
B. Lawyers versus Clients: Should Brown Have Been Decided
Differently?
In 1976, Derrick Bell, himself a former NAACP/LDF staff attorney, published an
important article asserting a conflict of interests between NAACPI LDF attorneys and
the black plaintiffs whom they claimed to represent.Y" Black plaintiffs, he argued,
wanted the best education for their children, but litigators were committed to a
strategy of integration as racial balance and paid insufficient attention to making black
schools educationally effective.975 A court desegregation plan requiring the
transportation of students over long distances in the interests of racial integration
which failed to materialize could not command the confidence of black parents, if the
schools and the education they provided were of poor quality.976 Though not the first
to make these arguments, Bell's article - in effect advocating a return to the
neighborhood school policies in force in most school systems prior to desegregation -
reignited a debate about tactics within the NAACP/LDF which dated back at least to
1935, when W.E.B. Du Bois warned that "the Negro needs neither segregated schools
nor mixed schools. What he needs is Education.,,977
As Yudof points out, whilst in the pantheon of constitutionally protected values the
status of equal educational opportunity is secure, consensus breaks down in the task of
translating the general into the particular.Y" Equal opportunity in the context of
education can mean one of three things: equal access (which requires absence of
discrimination); equal resources (requiring equal inputs in terms of financial
973
975
976
977
978
See Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F.2d 265 (lst Cir.1982) (observing that absent racial bias,
dislike of a desegregation proposal on educational grounds was not a valid reason for rejecting
it.).
Derrick A. Bell Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation', 85 YALEL. J.470 (1976).
Id., at488.
Id., at 480.
W.E.B. Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools", 4 J. NEGRO EDUc.328, 335 (1935).
Mark Yudof, Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX.L. REV.411, 412 (1973).
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expenditure and availability of resources) or equal outcomes (measured in terms of
academic achievementj.V" As a litigation strategy, the third will always be the least
attractive, being dependent upon social science evidence, that has been heavily
politicized. The argument received short shrift in Jenkins ilion the basis that the
District Court had not identified "the incremental effect [of] segregation [ ... ] on
minority student achievement, i.e. it had not paid enough attention to the fact-finding
exercise necessary to establish the required direct causal link between segregative acts
and continuing educational harm.98o In the absence of such a link, continuing
achievement disparities must be attributable to external factors which were not the
court's concern:
just as demographic changes independent of de jure segregation will
affect the racial composition of student assignments, so too will
numerous external factors beyond the control of [the school
committee] and the State affect minority student achievement. So long
as these external factors are not the result of segregation, they do not
figure in the remedial calculus. Insistence upon academic goals
unrelated to the effects of legal segregation unwarrantably postpones
the day when [the school committee] will be able to operate on its
own.981
The initial NAACP strategy was one of equalization. The campaign to challenge the
disparities in expenditure between white schools and black schools in state courts on
matters such as, for example, teachers' salaries had received piecemeal success, but
left individual teachers exposed to victimization while the ability of the state to rely
on endless permutations of possible factual situations made litigation an expensive
long-term strategy.982 The decision to press for access in federal courts represented a
change of tactic;983 the immediate success of Brown deflected attention from the
underlying assumption that integration in the form of access to white schools would
of itself bring about the objective of educational enrichment.9~4 Had the NAACP
979
9KO
981
982
983
Id.
Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins 111),515 U.S. 70,101 (1995).
Id., at 102.
See Cottrol et al., supra note 752 at 54. The tactic was to confront the State with a "Hobson's
choice": abolish the dual system or face bankruptcy. See also Tushnet, supra note 811, at 2;
Kluger, supra note 811, at 132; Greenberg, supra note 811. The NAACP's first major victory
in a federal court was Missouri ex. Rei. Gaines v, Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
For a discussion see Robert L.Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICII. L.
REV. 237 (1968).
Tushnet, supra note 811, at 105-37.984
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continued to press for educational equity, the argument goes, the difficult questions of
the legitimacy of race-conscious action unlinked to fault would not have arisen. As it
was, the statement that "separate" was inherently unequal invited the conclusion that
all that needed to be done was to integrate. Once that had been accomplished, official
responsibility for the education of African-Americans was prima facie dischargcd.T"
In the early 1970s, disenchantment with the failure of desegregation to bring about
measurable improvements in the quality of education experienced by many black
children prompted a new strategy focusing on funding. School expenditure is funded
in most states by means of local property taxes. The variation in property values
within a particular state, coupled with residential patterns which concentrate black
families in poor urban areas and white students in wealthier suburban areas, can lead
to serious disparities in the funding available to black students relative to white
students.986 Bell wrote that "many, including myself, decided that given the difficulty
of integrating black and Latino students with their swiftly fleeing white counterparts,
we should concentrate on desegregating the money".987
School funding suits had some initial success in state courts in California, the state
Supreme Court ruling that the public school funding system which relied heavily on
local property taxes and caused substantial disparities among individual school
districts in the amount of revenue available per pupil invidiously discriminated
against the poor and violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.988 The hope that equalized expenditure suits might substitute for racial
integration suits was dashed when the U.S. Supreme Court, in a case from Texas,
ruled that education was not a fundamental right and wealth was not a suspect
classification.f" Thus the Texas system attracted mere rationality scrutiny as opposed
to strict scrutiny, and prevailed despite substantial disparities in local school resources
985
987
988
989
See generally, DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM, 20-28,186 (2004).
See generally DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (2001).
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and differences in tax effort throughout the State.990 Per Justice Powell, the system --
which was similar to those employed in virtually every other state - was not the
product of purposeful discrimination against any class but, instead, was a responsible
attempt to arrive at practical and workable solutions to educational problcms.T"
v. Conclusion
The immediate answers to the questions with which this chapter opened can be
concisely stated: all these actions were necessary because the Constitution so
required. Where official action and policy had resulted in a dual system and freedom
of choice would perpetuate the status quo, affirmative action was a mandate, not an
option.992 Racial balance in terms of student assignment and faculty composition were
indicia of desegregation and achievement might require school closings.,)9) Magnet
schools and educational enrichment programs were legitimate techniques of
enhancing "desegregative attractiveness.t'F" The latter might be required to combat
lingering vestiges of segregation in which case however detailed fact-finding must be
scrupulously undertaken and the duration must be limited.995 The curriculum was a
legitimate area for scrutiny but, in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent,
teaching and learning were pedagogical issues which were properly left to the State;
the case was a "race" case, not an "education" case. Desegregation was not a mandate
1· h 1 996to equa ize se 00 s.
990 Id., "The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged
state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest. We hold that the Texas
plan abundantly satisfies this standard." Id., at 55.
Id., at 55. School finance litigation has had some success at state level but as Professor Ryan
contends, it continues to be "hamstrung by the obstacles created by poor race relations and the
Court's desegregation jurisprudence." lames E. Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, 109 YALE L.
1.249, 255 {I999). See also Godwin Liu, The Parted Paths of School Desegregation and
School Finance Litigation, 24 LAW AND INEQ. 24 (2006).
Green v. Cty Sch. Bd.. 391 U.S. 430, 438-40 (1968).
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971).
Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins J/I) 515 U.S. 70, 100-103 (1995) (stating that the district court
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Chapter Three: The Politics of School Closings.
This chapter explores the work of the court experts by reference to the tension
between the imperatives of race and education as played out by what Dentler came to
call the "politics of school closings." 997
I. Introduction
A. The Long Search for a Unified Facilities Plan
On April 22 1985 Judge Garrity apologized to the assembled court room for being
late; whenever the Unified Facilities Plan was on the agenda, he said, it took him half
an hour to find the previous versions and the orders relating to it. The court had so fur
entered no less than 20 orders on this matter but the parties' failure to even commence
compliance with court orders was by now the principal obstacle to the closing of the
case.998 Moreover, what the court had in front of it he termed a "Unified Facilities
non-Plan"; it was a maintenance plan whereby the urgent critical needs of the schools
across the city could be met but it had nothing to say regarding desegregation except
in the "dim distant future" and it was not going to be approved.F"
Within six months, however, the court had bowed to political realities. "A bird in the
hand is worth two in the bush" the judge explained; "[hjaving sought a UFP for nearly
a decade, it would seem unwise at this juncture to embark on a new search".lOoo
Facilities planning was an essential component of the desegregation plan 1001 and the
judge had been trying to get one in place since May 1977I!)02 but, us former
superintendent of schools Robert Wood later pointed out, for many parents and
partisans of the "neighborhood school" the UFP, as it was termed, was code-speak for
school closings and this had become "an almost certain lightening rod for community
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opposition and emotion.,,1003 As plaintiffs' attorney Larry Johnson drew towards the
coalition of black and Hispanic parents and teachers which opposed school closings
and began to argue instead for better facilities, Superintendent Wood put together a
compromise plan which he thought that he could sell to parents and the school
committee whilst at the same time satisfying the requirements of the court. On the
advice of the experts Judge Garrity turned it down; "[b ]ecause it did not meet the
targets the Court experts had anticipated, all agreement and support for the plan
disappeared in a flash.,,1004 With it went the Superintendent's credibility with the
school committee; by the time the First Circuit had ruled on the school committee
appeal, Robert Wood was out of office.lo05
Superintendent Wood was dismissed on August 21 1981, a victim of the costs of
compromise. Among the official reasons given for his dismissal were "negligent
administration of the 1979-80 School Department budget." and "[gjeneral
dissatisfaction by the majority of the School Committee with the Superintendent in
the performance of his duties." 1006In his efforts to please his school and parent
constituency by avoiding school closings the Superintendent had paid insufficient
attention to the effect upon the overall budget which stood in deficit to the tune of
between 18 to 20 million dollars. The taxpayer, claimed school committeewoman
Palladino, could not support the system the superintendent envisioned.Y" The politics
of school closings had claimed his scalp.
B. The Wood Plan
Judge Garrity's orders relating to facilities began almost on day one when the court
plan as announced required the closing of twenty schools. lOOKThe search for a long-
1003
1006
Robert Wood, Looking Back Without Anger: Reflections on the Boston School Crisis 120 NEW
ENG. 1.PUB. POL'y 19,32 (2005).
Wood, supra note 1003 at 33.
Id. Judge Garrity's orders were upheld by the First Circuit in Morgan v. Nucci, 689 F. 2d 265
(I st Cir. 1982) See infra note 1146 and accompanying text.
See.J. MICHAELRoss & WILLIAM . BERG,"I RESPECTFULLYDISAGREEWITIITilEJUOOE'S
ORDER:THEBOSTONSCHOOLDESEGREGATIONCONTROVERSY(1981) 696-697.
Other reasons stated were "inadequate leadership in the area of occupational-vocational
education data" and "[p]oor administration in the office of Curriculum and Competency in the
preparation, evaluation and presentation of reading test score data [... ]." Ross & Berg suggest
that the Superintendent had also been caught up in the "old style" politics of patronage. Id.
Id.
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 245 (D. Mass. 1975).
1004
1005
1007
1008
192
range plan began later, in May 1976, when the court required specific repair programs
and construction projects to begin during the following summer, ordered the city and
state to appropriate the necessary funds and directed the school city and state
defendants as joint planners to undertake long-range planning for future
construction.l't" On the basis of a Memorandum of Stipulations agreed by "the joint
planners",IOID the Superintendent of Schools and the plaintiffs and providing that the
mayor and state defendants in consultation with the superintendent would devise a
long-range construction, renovation and school closing plan together with a statement
of desegregative impact and budgetary proposals, Judge Garrity's order of May 6
1977 required a ten-year UFP to include an analysis of the anticipated impact on
desegregation and equal educational opportunity to be filed by September I of that
year.IOII Superintendent Fahey eventually filed a plan on November 25 but the plan
was unacceptable to the court because it was not "unified" and was not acted upon.IOl2
Superintendent Fahey's replacement, Robert Wood, took office in July 1978 as the
school department's nineteenth superintendent and the first to be appointed from
outside the system in sixty-six years.IOl3 No stranger to the politics of desegregation in
Boston, (he had served as chair of the court-ordered Citywide Coordinating Council
(CCC) which monitored implementation of the court's desegregation orders),1014 his
commitment to integration was not in doubt. In his view the Boston public school
system was at that time the only large city system with sufficient numbers of white
students still in the system for integration to be a real possibility but he made plain to
the committee that his task as he saw it would be to assert the recently strengthened
management authority of the superintendent and to persuade the Court to withdraw
from what he considered to be its policy of micro-management of the school
system.IOIS
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Wood, supra note 1003 at 20. His appointment was confirmed on July 18 1978. See 1. BRIAN
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Id: "My interest was encouraged by the recent enactment of Chapter 333 of the General Laws
of Massachusetts, initiated by then School Committee chair David Finnegan. Chapter 333
increased the management authority of the Superintendent over the entire school system,
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In April 1979 Judge Garrity ordered the joint planners to "face up to the consequences
of sharp declines in public school enrolment in Boston and in the school-age
population of the city" and submit by way of a revised UFP a comprehensive plan for
school facilities, to include a space/program matrix for the school year 1980/81 and a
specification of the geo-codes from which students would be assigned to elementary
schools, to show how desegregation would be sustained as the school population
continued to decline.1016 Specifically he directed the elimination of not less than half
the excess seats in elementary schools which he "conservatively" estimated at
10,0001017 but in the hearings which followed this figure together with the formula to
be adopted became the "factual issue most keenly contested."IOIl!
The issue was complicated by the requirement to make provision for the additional
space requirements of the bilingual programs, advanced work classes (for the
examination schools), kindergartens, special needs programs and remedial classes
which were required by the court plan or upon which state and federal funding
depended.Y" The court had set overall capacity ceilings for each facility but
assignable capacities were determined by a space/program matrix devised by DI data
. ffi l': hi d . bl 1 1020processmg 0 icers lor t IS purpose an were apprecia y ower.
As the joint plaintiffs, led by attomey Larry Johnson, began to argue against school
closings and in favor of facilities equalization, the judge required increasingly refined
1019
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space matrices for each facility and finally directed that facilities planning and
educational planning were to go "hand in hand.,,1021
Under the Wood administration, school department responsibility for the UFP lay
primarily with former civil rights activist and African-American Episcopalian priest
James Breeden, who had served with the superintendent on the CCC and was now in
charge of the newly formed Office of Policy and Planning, required 10 act in
conjunction with John Coakley and the Department of Implementation which had
responsibility for student assignments and transportation. 1022Under Dr Breeden's
direction a UFP Manual for District Planning Activities dated April 23 1979 was
accepted as a blueprint, providing "a basis for producing an outstanding UFP which
will merit the support of all interested parties",I023 the court setting another deadline
of December I 1979 for production of a final plan.,o24
Dentler had a high opinion of Dr Breeden: "[w ]hen we saw a draft [of his final plan]
in August, we reported to Judge Garrity that excellence in planning had come 10
Boston at last"I025 but as he later observed, he lacked a basis of support in the 'white
school establishment' .1026 When Breeden went public with his proposals the
consultation process "put the school committee, the city council and the November 2
mayoral elections between him and his final version.,,1()27 As school committee and
public opinion hardened against the closings of schools, Superintendent Wood moved
to limit the political fall_out.lo28
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When it came, on December 3 1979, the "Wood plan" as it now was contained no
long-range planning for expenditures or space-utilization but consisted largely of
proposals to close a reduced number of schools (ten instead of Breeden's proposed
sixteen)1029 and to consolidate others in accordance with "beacon school" and
"linkage" plans. The former were district magnets intended as an alternative to the
regular community district school and were regarded by the court as incompatible
with the court desegregation plan despite provisions that no transfers to beacon
schools would be permitted unless the court-set racial ratios in the 'sending 'school
were preserved and the effect of the transfer would be to enhance desegregation at the
beacon school. 1030
The linkage proposals attempted to draw the sting of school closings by a
combination of deferment plus pairing of elementary schools one of which would be
closed at an indefinite date in the future but the second would not.I031 Both sets of
proposals were opposed by plaintiffs' counsel Larry Johnson who regarded them as
diverting funds for the purpose of dealing with "white flight" with no showing of
educational or other benefit as an aspect of equal protection and were eventually
rejected by the court. 1032Neither the "white citizenry" nor the black population of
Boston, he argued, would support a majority black system if they saw no educational
benefit flowing there from.1033
In effect the plan was a political compromise designed to defuse community anxieties
concerning the loss of "neighborhood schools" and the loss of white students from the
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testimony of Dr Wood, who raised the specter not only of white flight but that the white
citizenry in the city would not support a majority black school system, and I think they
certainly will not support a majority black school system if they don't sec the educational
benefits flowing therefrom."
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system 1034 but it pitted the court experts and the school superintendent directly against
each other and in so doing rendered the judge vulnerable to the charge of interfering
in educational matters properly left to the city and the state. In recommending that ten
rather than sixteen schools be closed in the first round and a new pattern of school
assignments, Dr Wood, who had written the final court submission himself in
longhand, thought he had achieved a political consensus which he could deliver to the
various interest groups involved. The rejection of his efforts he later attributed to a
lack of experience on the part of the court, the lawyers and the experts which had
failed to bridge the "gap between the Boston desegregation case and the knowledge
about and reform of pedagogy.t''Y"
"As the months went by," he wrote, "I realized that neither the court, nor its experts,
nor the participating lawyers were managers. None had worked in large organizations,
public or private, and none were knowledgeable about implementation, let alone
momentum.v'Y"] ... J "I welcomed the chance to inject some of my past professional
experience in urban planning, and Breeden employed two of my former MIT
colleagues to demonstrate, using simultaneous equations, that our "moderate plan"
fulfilled the court's earlier order. When I introduced the equations in court, the judge
rebuffed my testimony. 'That's something for Dr. Einstein.' he observed. 'It is not
evidence.' For the first time I learned first-hand the difference between fact and
evidence". 1037
In the following section the experts' briefing which preceded the rejection by the
court of the Wood plan is uncovered in narrative fashion via the Dentler and Scott
memos.
1034 See Morgan v. Nucci, 689 F.2d 265, 270 n.3 (1st Cir, 1982): "The record discloses that the
number of whites in the Boston schools dropped from 53,503 in 1973-74 to 25,206 in 1978-
79. The number of black and other minority students slightly increased during this period from
40,054 to 40,559."
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II. The Dentler & Scott Memos
A. The Burden of School Closings
The perception that the burden of school closings fell unduly on black children was
not new. In its response to the 1977 UFP the court-ordered Citywide Parents Advisory
Council (CPAC) which had not been party to the planning process commented that
the plan was "based upon inaccurate and insufficient data," its decisions ignored
"educational, desegregation and community factors," the recommended pattern of
school closings "burdened minority children unfairly" while the economic arguments
for closing had not been made out and the long term implications for Boston generally
had been overlooked.!038
In a memorandum dated February 21 1978 Dentler explained that this perception went
right back to the initial arguments over the masters' plan which were now revived and
applied specifically in opposition to the proposal to close Roxbury High School. The
community organization, Freedom House, had written to the judge alleging a definite
pattern to terminate schools in the black community tantamount to "Educational
Genocide,,!039 and Sandra Lynch, counsel for the state board, had warned Dentler that
attorneys for the black plaintiffs intended to use this as the main plank of their
. . !040opposition arguments.
In this memorandum, Dentler presented for the judge what he termed "the facts on
racial equity in school closings" as they had developed since adoption of the court
plan.!04! In the first place, he pointed out, from the point of view of the court plan, the
concept of a "black community" was inherently problematic; no school district was
designed to preserve or establish racial or ethnic hegemony and every district included
a predominantly black settlement.' 042As of December 1977, black students comprised
44 percent of the total number of students enrolled in the Boston public schools as
opposed to 41 percent white and 15 other minorities giving a standard of 44/56 plus or
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minus ten percent for determining issues of racial equity.lo43 On that basis, he wrote,
Freedom House's assertion was just plain wrong; the proportion of school facilities
closed within black residential areas pursuant to court orders since 1975 equaled the
proportion of black students in the system as a whole and this remained true in
relation to the facilities which the experts now proposed for closing. In relation to the
construction of new facilities only two instances could be criticized on racial equity
grounds. Both had been removed from court orders following consensus stipulations
from all parties, and one would be eliminated in the near future.1044
Dentler conceded that there was some validity to the claim that black students had
walk-in access to fewer facilities overall than white students but this, he explained.
was a historical product of the practice of siting schools adjacent to expanding white
neighborhood settlements and not a function of the orders of the court.I045 Given that
both communities would continue to decline in size (his projections indicated a
similar figure of 10,000 fewer students for both blacks and whites in ten years time,
"the matter of closing schools in order to consolidate students desegregatively" he
concluded, "constitutes a far greater contribution to fostering equal opportunity and
preventing any form of educational genocide than does exempting particular facilities
from being closed because they happen to be located within historic [black]
Roxbury."lo46
A year later, the issue of "white flight" and the potential for "resegregation" could not
be ignored. The question was whether this could be attributed to implementation of
the court plan. The school department produced for the first time a detailed analysis of
student withdrawals and on February 1 1979 Dentler and Scott in a commentary for
the judge noted that whilst out-migration and declining birth rates constituted
uncontrollable economic and demographic forces, the loss of 20,000 white students
over a period of five years was undoubtedly attributable to "educational,
programmatic and institutional defects" resulting in wholesale transfers out of the
1043 Id.
1044 Id.
1045 Id.
1046 Id.
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system. ]047 The parochial courts, they claimed, could not escape their share of
responsibility. Back in 1974 Cardinal Medeiros had asserted his commitment to the
implementation of racial balance and in January 1975 the Archdiocesan Board of
Education had issued a policy statement to the effect that the parochial schools would
only accept transfers of white students for the purpose of improving the racial
balance. ]048This, it seemed, was being ignored:
"If the parochial schools obeyed the directives of the Cardinal, for
example, 1,355 white students, or 25 percent of the total for the period,
would have been unable to switch from public schools into the
parochial schools in Boston and around its fringes.,,]049
If the "self-defeating" sources of attrition were not rectified, they warned, by 1985 the
result would be a "resegregated, very predominantly black and other minority public
school system".
B. The Politics of School Closings and Court Strategy
There were two main tools for responding to demographic change built into the court
plan: school closings and revision of the geocode unit attachments but the former
created instability and the upheaval of the second was becoming politically
impossible. Between February 1978 and April 2 1980 when the court rejected the
Wood plan, Dentler sent Garrity memos specifically on the subject of school closings
supplemented by others addressing the related issue of student assignments, the
space/program matrix and geocodings together with other on-going aspects of the
court plan such as transfers, transportation, advanced work classes for the
examination schools and teacher and administrative staff desegregation whilst all the
time briefing the judge on the progress of the developing political coalitions.
The following narrative now picks up the political situation in February 1979 when
Dentler summarized what he had learned from meetings and telephone calls during
the previous week with James Breeden, John Coakley and DI associates, and Muriel
1047 Dentler & Scott, Detailed Analysis of Student Withdrawals Feb I /978(90 Garrity XXXVllf.
f27.)
Jan 271975 Statement of Policy on Admission of Students from Boston Public Schools issued
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Cohen, education reporter for the Boston Globe.lo50 The school committee, he
reported, had again failed to "bite the bullet of decision on school closings."I051 A
"coalition of opposition" that included the teachers union, home and school
association, Boston Association of School Administrators(BASAS), and the Citywide
Parents Advisory Council (CPAC), as well as mini-coalitions of parents, teachers and
students from a number of the schools scheduled for closing was threatening James
Breeden's planning efforts with a" rising coastal tide of opposition."I052
On March 12 1979 Dentler wrote three "advisories" for the coming hearing. The first
concentrated on strategy. The two primary premises for disengagement, he wrote, had
been shattered.1053 In the first place, he feared, the 01 would never be able to
accomplish its full court mandate. For the school committee and the superintendent
"policy planning, significant revisions in the status quo, monitoring activities, and the
provision of valid and reliable public information" were functions that were "too
vital" to be left to "the valiant workers in the 01.,,1054
The second premise of the preceding summer had been that of cooperation with the
aims of the court but hopes that the newly elected committee would, with Dr. Wood
and Dr. Breeden, and its new constituency of coalesced parents and teachers,
"accomplish compliance through its own initiatives" now amounted to "little more
than a politically engineered and legally talented manipulation of public images". 1055
With the issue of school closings, it had become apparent that "the constituency has
not changed except to become larger, better organized, more vocal, and ever more
deeply given over to pursuit of the status quo." 1056
"On Monday, March 12", he continued "attorneys for the school
committee will file with the court a report recommending that no
schools be closed for September 1979. The grounds will be that the list
of 11 elementary schools, with three alternates, prepared by the 01
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(Department of Implementation), if closed, would not affect further
school desegregation significantly. In this way, the superintendent and
the committee with their attorneys, can seek to preserve the status ~uo
and cloak their objective in the language of the aims of the court".IO 7
The court, he recommended, "should not play this game." Instead its strategy should
reflect the premise that the court already put in place "constitutional and workable
remedies" and would sanction alternatives only when satisfied that the remedies had
been put to work by the defendant. 1058The court could say that it was satisfied with
progress in the Citywide District 9, plus community district high and middle school
assignments and kindergarten assignments, thus narrowing the "zone of dispute" to
community district elementary schools. 1059Here concern should go not to school
closings but to the need for the defendants to initiate proposals for the desegregation
of those ten elementary schools that have continued to remain minority segregated in
the extreme.I060
"(T)he remedial tools the court has fashioned [... ] include district
boundaries, grade structures, ethnic ratios for each district, geocode
unit attachments to specific schools that are modifiable, allowances for
special programs, school closings and replacements and renovations,
magnet schools, and new methods of student recruitment and transfer.
None of these tools has been used by the defendant in an effort to
[ ] 1061desegregate any of the above elementary schoo 1s, ... .
If the defendant wished to maintain a system that had, "by its own count, more than
11,000 empty elementary school seats", in Dentler's view it must bear the burden of
satisfying the court as to how it proposed to tackle the desegregation of the remaining
segregated schools.lo62 The court should now require attorneys for the defendants to
set the date by which the plan for the ten elementary schools would be filed.1063
In a second memo he reiterated for the judge the importance of school closings for the
desegregation remedy and for court disengagement noting that although a total of 60
1057 Id.
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schools and annexes had been closed by order of the court between September 1974
and September 1977, seven schools from the list initially prepared by the school
department for their December 19 1974 desegregation plan (subsequently rejected by
the school committee) continued in operation.Y" It had been conceded by the mayor
at the time that failure to close the schools would leave a surplus of elementary seats,
then predicted at 5,000, and the Boston Finance Commission had repeatedly criticized
the Boston School Committee on fiscal grounds for "the severe and costly
underutilization of many elementary buildings citywide.,,1065
In his third memo entitled "School Closings and Openings: Framing the Issues"
Dentler set out to provide background information and advice for the coming
hearing.I066 The court should focus on community district elementary facilities and
address two issues:
First, is the court plan for school desegregation as well as the court
plan for implementation feasible? Second, will the steps be taken after
four years that will begin to bring to an end to what Superintendent
Robert Wood declared [ ... ] this week to be "four years of siege"? 1067
If the plan were feasible then the closings proposed by 01 represented only minimal
forward movement. The DI had reported 11,137 empty seats in the elementary
schools and identified 14 elementary schools with enrollment of 2,239 for closing
which would contribute "20 percent movement.,,1068 If the plan or its implementation
were infeasible, then the parties owed the court an indication of this and an alternative
proposal before students were assigned under the terms of existing orders for
Septemberl979.1069 However:
[i]f the plan of the court is feasible and if the school defendant fails or
refuses to take action, then the court will need to consider how to treat
the second issue. Shall it make an order that generates movement
toward elementary school desegregation, in lieu of actions by the
1064 Dentler, March
XXXVIIf. f27).
1065 Id.
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school committee? Shall it continue involvement in other facets of the
case but act as if movement toward desegregation is eventually going
to emanate from the defendant? Or, shall it declare a victory and
rationalize the persistence of racial segregation in one out of every four
school facilities in the system? 1070
Two days later, Dentler reported on a visit with Superintendent Robert Wood in his
office at his request.l'"' Dr Wood, he said, was considering proposals to put to the
court at the hearing on March 16 concerned with reorganizing the Department of
Implementation., particularly in relation to planning, monitoring, public information
or liaison, and computer operations management functions. His view was "that the 01
is organizationally 'sui generis,' that it does not conform with the principles of
modern public administrative organization and that its functions overlap those of
other units in confusing ways" and he wanted the experts' responses. Dentler reported
that he and Scott had indicated that whilst intramural processes were generally the
superintendent's own concern the 01 was designed to carry out functions ordered by
the court, and so wherever he proposed to relocate those functions, "liaison with the
court's agents would then follow as day follows night and changes would need to be
reviewed and approved by the court."I072 Dr Wood, he concluded, was engaged in
"political engineering;" his objective was to deliver for the school committee (and
specifically school committee chair David Finnegan) "visible economies in
administration of the system, while giving the system their dual imprimatur." The
effect however was to undermine the 01: "[a]s the political engineering widens,
stupefaction deepens in the ranks.,,1073
On March 20 Dentler reported that the superintendent had formed a special panel of
experts with a view to planning that would "'bring existing court orders in conformity
with changes in school population and the demography of the city. ",1074 The
underlying political strategy here, in Dentler's opinion, was to promote the view that
the court plan was unworkable and thereby outflank the court:
1070
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The letter marshals every available argument, including several that are
contradicted by evidence from the department of implementation
submitted in November, 1978, to allege that the court's orders need to
be modified. Dr. Wood tried the beginnings of this strategy out on Dr.
Scott and me during a meeting in November, and we replied then that
we had no brief for or against his approach, except that the orders have
yet to be implemented. We added that, so far as we could determine,
the student desegregation plan remained technically feasible in every
particular, including the various modifications that had been
introduced durin~ 1975, 1976, 1977, and early 1978, but that it awaits
full execution.107
Dentler was particularly concerned that the effect of this strategy would be to draw
the DI into supporting a "part time panel of experts located considerable distances
from Boston [and] unable to process the history and demographic details [of] the
court orders that are foundational to their assignment." 'There is some hypothetical
limit on the number of directions in which the DI can face at anyone time, perhaps"
he wamed.1076
Dentler had studied Dr Breeden's draft for a UFP Manual1077 and recommended that it
be adopted by the court with the provision that the draft UFP complete with a
hypothetical geocode unit attachment and student assignment plan from the DI be
supplied to the court not later than October 1 1979 "so that the court can examine for
compliance with its racial-ethnic composition guidelines for every district and every
school."lo78 Between April and June, Dentler and Scott continued to comment on
errors and infeasibilities in court filings, suggest draft proposals for court orders and
to urge the court to hold its line:
In our opinion, no court action at this time would confirm the
acceptability of non-compliance with standing court orders. Partial
remedial actions, whether of the kind we outlined in a previous
memorandum or of the kind suggested by the state board, will generate
extreme public confusion, contribute to stimulating a new politics of
defiance that could unseat the superintendent, and produce assignments
that have to be redone yet again next year for at least 1,000 elementary
students. While our approach places the remedy into the forward year
1075
1076
1077
1078
Id.
Id.
See discussion supra, note 1023 and accompanying text.
Dentler, April 24 1979 Unified Facilities Plan Manual Draft of March 29 1979 (90 Garrity
XXXVIIf. f27) See also Dentler 26 April 1979 Proposed Revision of UFP Draft Order Id.
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of 1980 and imposes no sanctions at this time, it does make progress
toward court disengagement feasible. It also demonstrates support for
the current position of the superintendent and the beleaguered
department of implementation.Y'"
On August 6, Dr Breeden's UFP materialized. Dentler and Scott summarized their
impressions for the judge.1080 The draft, they wrote comprised "the most coherent,
logically developed facilities document we've seen in nearly five years from any
source.,,1081 Its workmanship and fidelity to the principles of the court plan merited
congratulations. 1082Two issues needed watching; the "uneasy and delicate balance"
between community and magnet schools which the popularity of the latter threatened
to upset 1083and the list of facilities proposed for closing which required "painful
judgment calls." Dr Breeden's proposals here made "excellent sense" and paralleled
their lists prepared for the court over the years.1084 Breeden's proposals for boundary
changes, however, were potentially troublesome particularly those in relation to the
boundary between Districts Five and Six, or Dorchester (65% black) and South
Boston (37% black). His aim was to distribute black and Hispanic students more
evenly by reducing the "exceptionally large" size of the former but Dentler and Scott
sensed trouble ahead:
We urged him to couch this proposal-if it endures his next round of
planning-in terms other than improving racial balance and to show
how changes in the boundary can lead to providing better and more
equal instruction for students.108S
In this context timing was a sensitive issue:
Breeden urges that the date be set for immediately after the November
2 elections in the city. [ ... ] he liked our suggestion that perhaps the
Court should leave the date setting with [counsel for the school
committee] Simonds and should obtain his commitment through a
1079 Dentler & Scott, April 1979 Commentary on State Board Filing of April 5 and Final Advisory
on Pending Student Assignment Issues for 1979 (90 Garrity XXXVIIf. f28).
Dentler & Scott, August 13 1979 Progress Report on Unified Facilities Plan (UFP) (90
Garrity XXXVIIf. f28).
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query in court. We think that November 16 should be the last possible
date, but that it would help to get this from Simonds rather than impose
it. Breeden thinks interest groups will begin stirring the planning pot
hard in Septernber.l'f"
C. The Linkage and Beacon School Proposals
By November, under the influence of the DI, the so-called "Beacon" and "Linkage"
proposals had emerged. The Linkage concept was a plan to defer school closings and
then to phase them in over a period of five years. Dentler quoted from John Coakley's
briefing paper:
"[linkage schools] are sets or two (or three) proximate elementary
schools which are combined for purposes of enrolment. Usually one
school is a 'base' school and the other is a 'support' school. The
geocodes for the two schools are combined; children residing in the
geocoded area are assi~ned to the set of Linkage Schools (e.g. the
Barrett/Gardner set)." I08
The primary purpose was to provide stability during a period of enrolment decline by
means of a guarantee that one school out of the set would remain open but for Dentler
the effect was the reverse:
the concept builds uncertainty into the situation by leaving ambiguous
which facilities will persist and thus prevail. It is closely analogous to
what the school committee did for thirty years in building new plants
but then failing to shut down the schools they were planned to replace,
leaving the latter in a permanent zone of uncertainty. 1088
There was a secondary allegedly desegregative purpose. Coakley's claim was that
linkage schools maximized classroom desegregation:
For example, if in the first few years one school[ ... ] is the home for
first and second graders and the other is the home for third, fourth, and
fifth graders, then each grade level in the set can be arranged so as to
b . b h d . ibl 1089nng a out as muc esegregation as POSSI e.
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Dentler's advice was that the strategy here reverted to the pre-1974 model of "city-
wide patchwork quilts" of multiple and varying grade structures which the court in its
liability opinion had condemned for their segregative effect.lo9o
Other features of the plan were similarly retrograde. The proposal to designate the
principal of one linked school to be the Senior Administrator of a set and the other to
be the Junior Administrator would contravene the court plan requirement for each
community district school facility to be headed by an administrator at the rank of
principal or headmaster.l'[" The envisaged reduction of 1,560 seats was far short of
the 3,000 reduction required by the court while the "Third-Site Programs" of field
trips, school exchanges and teacher center visitations recommended for activation
within Linkage Schools that failed to meet racial-ethnic guidelines had been ruled out
by the Panel of Masters in their Final report of April 1975 and had been declared
unconstitutional by a federal district court in the Denver, Colorado desegregation
case.lon
As for "Beacon Schools", these were magnet schools within community districts
designed to enable the latter to compete with the citywide magnets which were better
resourced and oversubscribed.Y" Beacon Schools, Dentler pointed out, had been
central to the January 1975 plan drawn up by John Coakley for the school committee.
They represented the "dream of preserving neighborhood schools" and the
voluntarism that the masters had found unacceptable. The proposals in his view were
attempts to revive failed and rejected schemes that divert attention
from the standing and urgent requirements: (I) that the number of
available seats correspond at least roughly to the expected numbers of
students; (2) that a facility is a single, free-standing school with a
permanent principal as its leader; and (3) that geocode units be
IOW
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attached to schools in ways that accomplish compliance with variable
racial-ethnic guidelines for each district. 1094
It was, he commented, an "appalling paradox" that these "diversionary proposals"
should have come from a DI, created in order to achieve compliance with court
orders. Had they come from a different source, "they would hardly be worthy of
consideration." 1095
D. Commentaries on the Wood UFP
Despite Dentler's views, the Beacon and Linkage proposals found their way into the
Wood plan which was filed with the court on December 3 1979.
Between then and April 2 1980 when the plan was rejected, Dentler wrote eleven
memos on the subject. On 6 December Dentler sent Judge Garrity what he said was
the first in a projected series of commentaries he intended to send during December
on the issue of the Wood UFP.1096 The superintendent was querying the reliability of
enrolment projections in the absence of new census data. Dentler's response was
decisive; the projection model used in the (consultant) Harbridge House studies and
the state board report did not depend upon census data. The current practice
throughout the United States was to rely on the age cohort or grade cohort method.
There was no reason why Boston should not do the same.1097
Moreover, the Wood plan did not comply with court orders. In the first place the plan
was not long-range but restricted to "'the immediate issue of school closings for
1980. '" This was itself violative of the court order but by incorporating into the plan
new modes of student assignment and the linkage, and beacon proposals, the
superintendent had violated his own asserted rcstriction.F''" The result was "that the
Wood UFP is not long-range except in the injection of concepts aimed at confounding
appraisal of the expected effects of his plan." 1099
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In the second place, the Wood plan was not a Unified Facilities Plan; "it did not come
to the court with the school committee "as obligor," after they sought that role;
because the state and the city got it from Wood too late to share in reviewing and
unifying it; and because it does not include the data on facilities included in the
Breeden Plan. ,,1100 It did not include the specifics about funding replacements,
renovations, and repairs, "which are foundational to facility planning" and omitted
from the models for appraising reassignment effects "the only one that [had]
pertinence for the aims of the court", namely the 01 simulations showing the effect on
within district, school- by-school compliance with racial/ethnic guidelines of the
revised geocode unit attachments.'!"
Finally "as the shadow of propaganda falls farther and farther across this sunset of a
plan," Dentler noted Wood's prediction that the reassignment model that "had at least
a remote bearing on desegregation" would produce "a 72 percent increase" in
transportation but that on his figures this translated into 534 additional riders or the
equivalent of 11 additional yellow-bus trips each way overall. 1102How this amounted
to 72 percent, or what it was 72 percent of, Dentler could not say.1103
Dentler's preliminary advice, which was intended to meet the "criteria of clarity and
simplicity" was to conduct the three days of hearings "without revealing a single one
of the dispositions of the court, relying wholly upon the parties" and to issue an order
in early January, adopting the UFP as published by the school department in October,
with minor modifications which should however include the deletion of the proposal
of support schools. The court should say "that future closings are part of the return of
autonomy of the school committee and superintendent and that the list of closings
satisfies the court." The court order should require the DI to revise the geocode unit
attachments between January 15 and March 30, under the supervision of the court
experts as in previous years (a final sacrificial act) and should not critique the Wood
plan but should express "special appreciation for the Wood administration's
1100
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achievement in executing such an outstanding pian." 1104The effect might then be to
show the court's responsiveness to the concerns of parents and to "bring the long
politics of closings to an end in a way everyone can comprehend; to make a short
ending to an otherwise endless fugue; and to lay a definite basis for court
disengagement. ,,1105
A week later in a second commentary 1106Dentler repeated his view that the Wood
plan "is the front end of the Breeden plan with Coakley's nostrums added.,,1107
Adoption and implementation of the plan would not have substantial desegregative
impact but would be the "least clamorous option available", and would be acceptable
to exercise, with stipulations which included dropping the beacon school and linkage
school proposals, revised geocoding for all elementary schools in districts 1-7, state
and city commitment to repairs, renovations, replacements and a written assurance
that similar planning would be conducted annually by the school committee in each
year from 1980 to 1985.1108
In a third memo written two days later, 1109Dentler suggested a third, "more
intriguing option", namely court approval of the Wood plan "wherever it offers to
meet the standard of workability, with court introduction of additions in order to go
the remainder of the distance."lllo The latter he fleshed out in a fourth memo of
December 16 1979 setting out detailed proposals to increase the number of schools
scheduled for closing from thirteen to eighteen thus raising the number of seats to be
eliminated from Wood's figure of 2,864 to a potential 5820, a figure approximating to
the 50% cut ordered by the court. III I He continued to advise that the concepts of
linkage and beacon schools should be rejected.
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On December 18 1979 in a "Comprehensive Report on Facilities Planning and
Student Assignments" 1112 Dentler summarized for the judge both the rationale for
school closings and the history of progress to date together with the objections to the
Wood plan. Crucially, he pointed out, the planning process had spanned eight months
of an election year. A financial crisis was brewing; Dr Wood's plans now required
expenditure which neither the city nor the state would support and of which the public
was apparently blissfully unaware:
"No media coverage took place that revealed the urgency of reducing
the scale of the system. No public discussion of continuing non-
compliance took place. As in 1973, all discourse focused upon
preventing further "white flight" from Boston's public schools. ,,11l3
Federal legislation required that school desegregation be implemented with fiscal
prudence yet, in Dentler's view, in Boston only the federal court showed concern in
this respect.'!" According to a National School Boards Association survey out of a
sample of the 180 largest urban systems, the Boston public school system was now
the eighth most costly in the nation. A "phased reduction of the scale of the system,
beginning with facilities and extending to staff' would correspond with the need for
financial prudence but "no elected official, appointed officer, or attorney" made the
case:
It is not that closings in themselves produce great savings. It is that
renovation and repair outlays are saved for years to come and that all
other educational expenditures can be refitted to the reduced scale of
the system. 1115
The impasse resulting from the December hearings had become total. The Boston
Teachers Union (BTU) wanted to retain capacity "for the advent of a future massive
return of students to the public schools", and opposed the enrolment projections. The
Home and School Association was fostering "strong parental identification" with the
schools scheduled for closing whilst the plaintiff had joined with El Comite (the
1112 Dentler, December 18 1979 Comprehensive Report on Facilities Planning and Student
Assignments (90 Garrity XXXVIIf. f29).
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Hispanic parents' group), CPAC, and the BTU, to challenge the space/program matrix
which was the basis for identifying the facilities listed for closure.'!"
Court orders in January 1980, he suggested, should focus on the closings in his list
together with the geo-code revisions necessary to ensure "timely assignments in
compliance with racial/ethnic guidelines".1117 That said, however, facilities planning
should be able to continue without court orders; the court should:
"conclude its proactive role by going half of the ultimately inevitable
distance. It should go the half that enables close approximation of its
guidelines. If the joint party planners in reading a draft order want to
substitute from this list, however, they should be welcomed to do so as
long as they approximate the 56% criterion shown in Table 1 (of his
memo).11I8
In the new year, Dentler returned to the theme of financial prudence, briefing that
serious school department analysis of the costs of closings had yet to be
undertaken.U'" Savings from closings needed to be set against the costs of keeping
schools open. Relevant factors for these purposes would include: the dollar value of
the land and buildings if freed up for alternative uses, the personnel costs involved in
maintaining half-empty schools, the costs of maintaining old facilities, and the impact
of inflation should investments in major renovations and replacements be deferred.
Moreover, the argument that savings from closings were offset by new costs of
additional busing did not stand up. The percentage of students bused in Boston had
increased since 1975 from 35% to 52% but this was largely self-induced;
reassignments had been avoided "like the plague". How then, he asked could this
"self-induced expansion" be used "to rationalize the economics of keeping schools
open?,,))20
Finally, he pointed out, despite the closure of 40 schools between 1974 and 1977, and
the loss of more than 10,000 students from the public school system, Boston's school
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operating costs had increased each year. In the 1980s, he warned, "this kind of caprice
in public education" would not be tolerated:
Stiff retrenchments will occur, or this public service itself will
collapse. No one in 1985 ought to have a basis in historical fact for
alleging that the advent of constitutional law laid the conditions for the
destruction of public education. Evidence of prudence will prevent
such false and embittering claims. 1121
Three days later he was briefing the judge on the parties' criticisms of the Harbridge
House enrolment projections, pitching his comments at a general level in order to
"guide the thinking of the court." 1122 A few days earlier he had submitted to the judge
a detailed commentary on the filing by attorney Robert Pearlman for the BTU as the
basis for the BTU's arguments concerning the facilities plan. 1123 He now reiterated
his position that whilst the objections raised by the parties had some merit, they had
no "noteworthy implications" for facilities planning and did not undermine his
commitment to the validity of the projections which he would 'elucidate in
discussion' if required. 1124 There was nothing, he concluded, that "should lead the
court away from attention to the extreme and growing discrepancy between declining
enrolments and assignable capacities. ,,1125
In the next two weeks Dentler continued to brief the judge on the issues relating to the
hearings scheduled for January 11 and 16 1980. On January 8 Dentler reported on
Superintendent Wood's 'Schedule ofInvestments for his UFP noting that although the
allocation for 1980-81 appeared to under-benefit facilities in black and hispanic
neighborhoods in 1980-81, this was remedied in the following year's allocation, but
the schedule identified no allocation rationale in spite of proposals from his
predecessor in 1977 and Dr Breeden in 1979.1126
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Moreover, the number of excess seats was still in dispute. Dentler prepared a
summary statement on the number of excess seats in all Boston public school
facilities as of December 1979. His figures showed a total of 14,557 out of 83,577,
11,639 of which were at elementary levell127 representing a utilization of 73 per cent.
The court however needed to get a "factual grasp of the 'great cushion' of reserve
seats." A 25 per cent allowable surplus gave a surplus total of 4,850 but this figure
failed to take account of the fact that court ceiling capacity in 1979 was 88,675 giving
a reserve cushion of 5,098 seats missing from the DI space/program matrix. 'The
'great cushion' thus equals 4,850 + 5,098, or 9,948 seats not counted as excess." 112K
Closing 18 elementary schools as he recommended would reduce the total official
excess from 14,557 to 9,657.1129
In a separate memo the next day he repeated his view that the Wood Plan did not go
far enough; Il30it did not begin to reach the standard agreed to in hearings in March
1979. It did not contribute to upgrading the quality of ongoing facilities while the
number of seats to be eliminated did not even match the projected decline in
elementary students from 1979 to 1981.The acceptability of the plan depended upon
court approval of the Linkage concept, which, as he had previously advised, was
constitutionally and educationally undesirable. 1131
On January 21 1980 for the purpose of establishing a "starting point for analysis" the
court issued a procedural order to record its understanding of assignable capacity,
enrolment, surplus,excess and one-half excess seats in the elementary schools and
ordered objections to these figures with supporting reasons to be filed by January
28.1132
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E. Fighting on Two Fronts: The Equalization Issue
At the same time as the court was endeavoring to gain an accurate estimate of the
number of projected excess seats, the joint plaintiffs ( ie the black plaintiffs and the
Hispanic parents' group El Comite) led by attorney Johnson were urging the court in
December and January hearings to order the equalization of facilities and programs, to
the extent of requiring that ancillary programs available in one district elementary
school be made available in all elementary schools in the same district.1133 A joint
filing of March 5 1980 asserted that many facilities failed to meet appropriate
standards and that the school closures proposed by Dr Wood would result in the
"sacrifice" of ancillary program spaces. 1134In a lengthy memo Dentler advised that
whilst the deficiencies deserved "close analysis and planning" most of them related to
facilities identified for closing for that very reason by "every official and independent
expert.,,1135 Keeping them open would not solve any problem, short-term or long:
None of the ten schools proposed by school defendant can be brought
up to plaintiffs standard by other than inordinate outlays of public
funds.1136
Similarly the joint plaintiffs' argument regarding loss of ancillary places failed to
consider that most of the schools to be closed had never had those spaces in the first
place.1137 Moreover the decline in absolute numbers of elementary students to be
enrolled annually from 1980 to 1985 would outpace the capacity to develop new
ancillary programs or maintain old ones. As the elimination of seats by closings
would not match the projected surplus for the coming years by virtue of shrinking
numbers there was ample capacity to accommodate ancillary spaces identified or to be
identified in space matrix planning. Contrary to the claims of the joint plaintiffs, state
and federal regulations did not require a separate room for Title I classes.113K There
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would be ample spaces for reading programs and library collections by September
1981; "The number of schools lacking [these] for one year will be seven at most, after
20 years in which at least 40 schools lacked them." 1139
Finally the joint plaintiffs had raised concerns that the new UFP would result in a
utilization rate of about 88 percent, when that rate should not exceed 80 percent. 1140
This, commented Dentler, would be true a) if the school system were stable, but in a
shrinking system "88 percent can become 80 percent within a year just by watching
the shrinkage", b) if the 25 per- cent buffer which guaranteed that the utilization rate
could not exceed 75 percent did not exist, or c) if overcrowding were a real possibility
which was not the case here. On the contrary "[w]e are now so far from that
circumstance as to make the entire concept of utilization rates irrelevant.v""
In conclusion, his recommendation was that the motion should be denied but that the
judge should include the requirement that the establishment of standards for
advancing equalization of facilities should be built into the long-term UFP.1142
F. Cutting the Gordian Knot
On March 11 four days before the scheduled hearing Dentler sent a summative
advisory recommending 1) that the ten facilities proposed for closing for 1980 by
Wood should be approved at once but the court should require a revised UFP for a
date such as November 15 1980 to show plans for closing the 15 other substandard
facilities which would become excess between 1980 and 1985 and which had
appeared "on virtually every list ever prepared" or for "upgrading them at inordinate
expense to the city," 2) that a revised geocode plan limited to what was required to
achieve compliance with racial/ethnic guidelines should be approved, 3) the joint
plaintiffs motion should be denied and 4) permission to prepare 1980-81 assignments
should be announced.I''"
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On March 21 the judge announced his decision.'!" The court's order he said was not
a rejection of a UFP because no such plan had been filed. Enormous progress had
been made but Dr Wood's November 30 1979 report implied wholesale amendments
to previously unchallenged court orders and had changed the planning process
radically. The purpose of the order was to rule on the implied amendments so that
UFP planning could resume and a UFP be filed by July 1 1980.1145
The order added two additional schools to the list of ten scheduled for closing,
rejected conditionally the assignment plan for 1980-81 and rejected outright the
space/program matrix and the "beacon" and "linkage" proposals. Attorneys for the
school and city defendants moved for a stay and appealed the orders. Attorney Larry
Johnson on behalf of the black plaintiffs opposed the stay initially but subsequently
changed his mind. 1146 On May 2 1980 the district court entered the stay of its school
closing orders, opposed only by the state board.1147
G. Desegregation and Educational Planning: The First Circuit's
Warning
The appeal took two years to reach the First Circuit by which time the joint planners'
had produced new proposals to close some 26 elementary schools so that the issues
relating to school closings were mooted.1148 However, the fact that the linkage and
beacon proposals could be resubmitted entitled the appellants to review of these
aspects of the decision.1149 Regarding the beacon proposals Judge Garrity's April 2
Memorandum had suggested three main reasons for rejection: 1) by favoring selected
schools only they "would more likely create educational gaps and inequities within a
community district than eliminate the perceived gap between community district and
citywide district elementary schools, 2) the beacon program would be "top- heavy
with administrators and awash in paperwork and would accomplish very little not
presently attainable under extant court orders" and 3) the beacon concept which was
essentially a transfer plan "was misleading in that it appeared to offer parents choices
1144
1145
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1147
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See Morgan v. McDonough. Memorandum of Decision 72-911-G (D.Mass. April2 1980).
Id.
Morgan v. Mcfronough, 689 F.2d 265, 273 n.11 (Ist Cir. 1982).
Id.
McDonough, 689 F. 2d 265, 272-274. The delay was due largely to "inexcusable delays in
transcript preparation." Id. at 274 n.14.
McDonough, 689 F.2d at 273.1149
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that would often be unavailable and magnet programs that don't exist and are not
planned.,,115o In the First Circuit's words, the judge was "simply skeptical that the
proposal would succeed.,,1151
Bearing in mind the last minute nature of the proposals which were on key points
incomplete the First Circuit was prepared to be supportive of the judge who, they said,
could reasonably take the view that the proposals were a "distraction" from the school
closings essential to the desegregation remedy.1152 However, it fired a shot across his
bows; the decision was open to the interpretation that the judge was rejecting the
proposals simply because he disliked them on educational grounds.T" If this were
correct, the judge would have erred; remedial orders must be narrowly tailored and
courts must be deferential whenever possible to the "reasonable proposals" of school
system officials. 1I 54 In particular, it warned,
[a] court has no constitutional mandate to dismiss a program merely
because it believes the program would be "awash in paper work" or
"top-heavy with administrators." Nor may it reject a program on the
ground that all schools must be of equal quality (or mediocrity).
Desegregation is not a mandate to equalize schools except insofar as
inequality reflects racial bias.'!"
In relation to the linkage plans a similar case could be sustained. The district court's
stated reasons for rejection were that the proposals undermined key provisions of the
desegregation plan, specifically the requirements that schools have uniform grade
structures and be supervised by a principal located on the premises, and the geocode
as a method of desegregative student assignment.P'" Underlying the court's analysis
was a concern that in a context of declining birth-rates and proliferating special
programs the linkage proposals would "introduce an element of rigidity into student
assignments" with negative consequences for implementation of the the desegregation
plan in future years 1157but as school department appellants argued and the First
5KO
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Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F.2d 265, 278 (Ist Cir. 1982).1157
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Circuit sympathized, the court's fears in this respect were "simply not supported" by
the evidence:
The linkage proposal [ ... ] explicitly provides for a principal at each
linked school as required in the desegregation plan. Uniform grade
structures [ ... ] are preserved within each pair of linked schools, as are
geocodes since the geocodes for each school are simply combined to
achieve the geocode for each linked pair of schools Factors such as a
declining birthrate and the growth of special programs [ ... ] will affect
any proposal to close schools [ ... ] 1158
On this occasion due to the late emergence of the linkage proposals and the failure of
the school defendants to comply with "repeated district court requests" to support the
proposal with specific motions to modify the court plan the judge would be upheld but
ultimately the appellants had raised a substantial issue; judgments concerning the
likely effect of the proposals on matters such as student recruitment or stabilization
were for city and state officials and not the judge whose sole concern must be with
desegregation.U'" School closings were necessary for this purpose but, said the First
Circuit,
[t]he particular method or formula used to accomplish such closings
[ ... ] if developed in good faith and in the absence of record evidence
that desegregation would be impaired, may be an occasion for
deferring to the local authorities' interest in "managing their own
affairs.,,116o
What the judge himself had conceded to be a "well-intentioned" proposal should not
be overturned simply on the basis of speculation concerning the effect of
demographics and the proliferation of special needs programs which were "beyond
anyone's ability to control and do not appear to be of constitutional moment." 1161
Were the proposals to reappear, the First Circuit would expect the judge to re-examine
them in a manner consistent with these views.1162
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III. The Aftermath: Equalization versus Integration
Following Judge Garrity's memorandum of decision of April 2 19XO the joint
planners resumed their discussions as the judge directed but the school year 19XO-X I
became "the most crisis-ridden since the implementation of desegrcgation'v''" as an
acute financial crisis compounded by the effects of Proposition Two and a Half
limiting property taxation to two and a half per cent of the market value and passed
overwhelmingly by the Massachusetts electorate in November 1980 threatened the
viability of the Boston public school system.1164
In court filings and hearings Attorney Johnson continued to oppose proposals for
school closings and reductions in the teaching force. Dentler's advice was dismissive;
the filings had become "so fragmented and so thin on the usc of reason" that he
despaired of the future.1165
Johnson's argument was that staff reductions at two particular middle schools
reflected "the classical syndrome of segregated, unequal education" whereby under-
enrolments of predominantly black students, are followed by staffing reductions and
lead to over-crowding and cuts in the numbers of programs, which in tum lessen the
attractiveness of the school to students and parents (particularly whites). 1166The result
is a denial of equal education to the black students assigned to the school.I167 Dentler
accepted this as a "powerful closing argument" but disputed its applicability. There
was no "trend" here he advised; the schools had been in violation of the racial, ethnic
guidelines since 1975: "These are facilities where whites have not reported or
withdrawn every year". Both were poor facilities in serious need of replacement.
Keeping staff at these schools out of context with others, would mean adopting the
Derek Bell-Ron Edmonds (sic) (equalization) policy.116x The motion was
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See Ross & Berg supra note 1006 at 693-4.
At the beginning of the school year, an estimate that the budget of $195 million would run out
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February. See Ross & Berg at 708-719. 52% of the school department budget carne from state
funds -Id at 716.
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diversionary. "At this rate of decline," he asserted "the court will be deliberating on
virtual nonsense claims by 1une of 1981." 1169
Three days later, his advice was even more direct. In a preparatory to the January
hearings into the new occupational resource center ordered by the court Dentler
advised the judge not to dodge the equalization issue.117o The Court, he wrote has
"taken on" educational issues correctly and necessarily. [... ]1171and must "yield no
portion of its urgently appropriate jurisdiction, which extends to the 'expression of a
deep educational concem.",1172 Forthrightly he summed up the dangers of Johnson's
position:
We cannot allow the defendants to weasel out of this realm, and we
cannot allow misguided plaintiffs or intervenors to twist Brown into an
argument for "separate and equal." There is far more than one sentence
in the 1975 order at stake. There is a question of constitutional law at
the base of this debate. Desegregation must come to mean racial justice
that operates affirmatively to improve the learning environment of
black, white, and other minority students above all else.1173
On March 13 1981 the joint planners filed another UFP but this was simply an interim
plan for school closings and consolidations for the 1981-82 school year necessitated
by the city's fiscal crisis and was rejected by the court as a partial UFP only.
Thereafter, facilities planning became part of negotiations among the parties,
sponsored by the State Board, designed to arrive at a consent decree which would
terminate the litigation.1174
Attorney Johnson participated in the initial stages but by the fall of 1981 his
attendances had fallen off and in February 1981 he walked out of the consent decree
negotiations which he claimed were "unresponsive to his clients' needs" and did "not
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afford Plaintiffs equality of bargaining power with the School Defcndants.,,1175
Thereafter he announced that he was abandoning the integration endeavor in favor of
an alternative "education plan" which would be based upon freedom of choice. 1171>On
Sept 9 1982 he filed a motion for a freedom of choice desegregation plan which he
claimed was "but one component of a broader proposal" but the latter never
materialized and the court was unable to consider it.1177When Judge Garrity gave
NAACP counsel Thomas Atkins permission to appear as co-counsel for the plaintiffs
to argue the integration case, the tension between "race" and "education" which had
been at the heart of desegregation jurisprudence since Brown I and was still
unresolved was plain for all to see.
IV. Conclusion: Law, Race and Education in Boston
In the politics of school closings in Boston we see clearly the contlicting
interpretations of the connection between the desegregation endeavor and educational
opportunity that was inherent in the landmark decision in Brown.ll7X For
integrationists like Dentler and Scottl179 racial mixing was the necessary condition for
enhancement of the educational opportunities of African-Americans but as the white
population of the nation's major cities declined and urban public school systems
became increasingly black, the NAACP/LDF strategy of prioritizing integration over
educational enhancement came increasingly into question.
In his personal memoir published in 2002, Derrick Bell, looking back on a lifetime
committed to fighting racism by both professional and academic means, recalled a
meeting which had taken place in Boston in the aftermath of the Morgan liability
decision between the civil rights lawyers handling the case and black community
leaders representing parents who were skeptical of the benefits of busing when the
1175 Cited in Marsha Murninghan, Court Disengagement in the Boston Public Schools: Toward a
Theory of Restorative Law, 109 (unpublished Ed D. Thesis, Harvard University)(on tile with
Kenrick Library Birmingham City University).
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Morgan v. McDonough, Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Freedom of Choice No.72-
911-G (D. Mass. Nov. 12 1982) (90 Garrity XLd. f72).
Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Interview with Marvin B Scott, Butler University, Indianapolis, Ind. Sept. 25 2007
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white schools to which they would be sent were of poor educational quality and
situated in low-income areas of the city where hostility to blacks was deep-seated. IIXO
"The lawyers" he wrote" - most of them black - listened politely, then
told the community leaders that the law required and they would seek
orders sending their children to white schools whether or not parents
wished them to go. As the community leaders feared, the desegregation
that followed was both dangerous and traumatic for the black children
who were bused to white schools. [ ... ] [A] generation of children paid
the price for that error.,,1181
As Bell recalled, his anger at the lawyers' "rigidity" and "insensitivity" was tempered
by the realization that as NAACP Legal Defense Fund counsel he himself had given
similar advice to black parents.1182 However, a growing perception that the symbolic
value of integration was not worth the costs and disruption of busing had led him to
advocate an about turn in desegregation planning. Communities, he argued, should
focus less on racial assignment and more on issues of substantive educational
benefit. 1183
The Boston plan was essentially a racial balance plan but in a situation of declining
enrollments and excess capacity pupil integration could not be achieved without
school closings with corresponding increases in busing and reductions in the numbers
of teaching and administrative staff which the system could support. Thus a racial
balancing strategy came to polarize in opposition to each other two prima facie
complementary goals of desegregation: pupil integration and equal employment
opportunities for school faculty and administration.
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These problems were not unique. In Atlanta, GA, where the pupil ratio had declined
from approximately 70% white and 30% black to 17% white and 83% black, and
enrolments had declined from a peak of about 115,000 students to 87,900, the system
losing about five to seven thousand students a year, the bulk of the departing students
being white, a coalition of forces led by a court-appointed bi-racial committee
approved a settlement or compromise plan which seemed to abandon the goal of
"integration" on the pragmatic grounds that there simply weren't enough white
students to go round. Where the preponderance of blacks throughout the system was a
function of patterns of residence rather than de jure segregative policy, continued
insistence on pro-rata distribution of white minority students ran the risk of fatally
compromising the biracial character of the city.1l84
The apparent gams of the Atlanta settlement which had traded student and staff
redistribution in return for an increased role for black leaders in relation to
administrative and staff assignments found resonance in Boston with a black
community which had grown weary of compulsory busing and re-assignment. IlXS
When, attracted by the ideas of Bell, Attorney Johnson, on behalf of the Morgan
plaintiffs, joined the alliance of Hispanic parents and teachers and administrators who
had come together in coalition to oppose school closings and withdrew opposition to
the school defendants' motion for a stay of Garrity's school closing orders, Dentler
suspected that he hoped for a similar trade-offl186 but by then he was too late; as the
Fifth Circuit observed, "[t]he need for elimination of 'half-empty' schools to promote
1184 See Calhoun v. Cook 332 F. Supp. 804, 808 (D.C.Ga. 1971): "Of paramount significance,
however, is the obvious result. Atlanta now stands on the brink of becoming an all-black city.
A fruit-basket turnover through bussing to create a 30% white-70% black uniformity
throughout the system would unquestionably cause such a result in a few months time.
Intelligent black and white leadership in the community realizes and fears it. Responsible
citizens both in and out of the school system are deeply concerned with preservation of the
biracial identity of the city. Without it, the ultimate goal of equality in all its aspects is
doomed and Atlanta's position of leadership is severely threatened."
For the Atlanta Settlement Plan see Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F. 2d 680 (5th Cir. 1974)
(discussed in Barbara L. Jackson, Desegregation from a Black Perspective, in Yarmolinsky
supra note 1183 at 209-216.). Cl Charles V. Willie, The Future of School Desegregation in
Willie supra note 1179 at 55-56 and Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature: A
Local Legal History in the Salience of Interracial Conflict 151 U. PA. L. REV 1913,1915
(2003) (arguing that desegregation suits require analysis in terms of class as much as race:
"The Atlanta narrative demonstrates, in particular, the social agency of black middle-class
decision makers who rejected the integration-oriented remedy favored by LDF over the
objections of a group of working-class and poor plaintiff class members.")
See Dentler & Scott, supra note 997 at 93: "Our informed but unproven assumption is that
Wood achieved a trade-off with Johnson: in exchange for supporting or not blocking a stay,
the Joint Plaintiffs were promised a full share in 'educational planning'."
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desegregation [ ... ] is so far ingrained in the history of this case - both at its liability
and remedial stages - as to be effectively 'the law of this case.' Absent an affirmative
showing by appellants that this tool is without desegregative utility, we will not
disturb district court orders premised on this theory.,,1187
Moreover the issue of school closings crystallized a tension over how educational
planning should be carried out and what educational professionalism did or should
require. For Superintendent Wood and his MIT-trained professionals, the court and its
experts were out of their depth. For Judge Garrity and his advisors educational
planning was governed by the desegregation mandate the scope of which was entirely
a matter of law and determined by reference to precedent.
Thus in the politics of school closing in Boston we find juxtaposed in relation to one
goal, the educational enhancement for African-American children, two differing
conceptions of how and by whom educational enhancement was to be achieved. The
Boston desegregation plan was designed on the premise that only a comprehensive
remedy addressing not only the social segregation of students and teachers but also
those other deficiencies in "curriculum, instruction, materials, administration,
financial operations, transportation, and facilities" by which public school systems
failed minority children would achieve a worthwhile educational result'!" For
Dentler, it followed that remedies that failed to "deal deeply enough" in the sense of
failing to tackle head on the issue of implementation would generate new disputes and
tum out to be self-defeating. In Boston, as he later reflected, "we did not carve deeply
enough. We made strong structural but not operating refonns,,1189
In Dentler's model, social scientists and educators who wished to make enduring
contributions to desegregation should pay attention to the fundamentals of educational
planning which meant putting in place proper school management information
systems, undertaking professional fiscal planning and cost/benefit analyses and
ultimately paying attention to learning outcomes as an aspect of inequity.119o While
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desegregation meant "integration" the connection with "educational improvement" for
him was clear:
Desegregation works to lift the rock of custom that ordinarily covers
the realm of public schooling. As the rock is lifted and the sunlight of
litigation and judicial review shines beneath, the twisted creatures of
administrative corruption and venality, program mediocrity, racial,
ethnic and socio-economic deprivation and public neglect, teacher
despair and burnout, parental impotence and ignorance, building
dilapidation and filth, and learning failures all crawl out and scuttle
about in clear public view. [ ... JIn this respect, desegregation becomes
a process through which a city or a suburb [ ... ] reconsiders its history
and revisualizes its future.' 1191
What he failed to factor in was the character of the jurisprudential matrix within
which the desegregation process was operating. In particular,
. .
In urging a
"comprehensive remedy" he failed to appreciate two important things about the nature
of the constitutional process in which he was caught up. In the first place the inherent
unsuitability of the courtroom for designing and monitoring the planning activities
that Dentler required lent support to the claims of the school professionals that court
interference was undermining their work. In the second place the indeterminate nature
of the desegregation remedy rested upon what proved to be a fragile fault line
concerning the relationship between race and education. The two came together when
desegregation was conceptualized in terms of integration but unraveled when support
for the latter fell away.
In the final chapter of this work the fragility of the relationship between race and
education is explored first empirically by reference to the "problem" of the Latin
schools and then theoretically by reference to the so-called "limits" of rights
discourse.
1191 See Robert A. Dentler, Elementary and Secondary Education and Desegregation in THE
EDUCATION OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS, 44 (Charles V. Willie et al. eds. 1991).
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The Limits of Rights Discourse in Boston: Toward a Theory of the
Court Expert in Schools Desegregation Suits
I. Introduction: Was it all Worthwhile?
Thirty years after Judge Garrity ordered Boston's city schools to desegregate,
researchers reported that "[djespite growing racial and ethnic diversity in the region,
high levels of segregation exist between minority groups and whites ..1192and "school
segregation continues to be a major obstacle to equal opportunity for minority
children in the Boston metropolis."!"? The problem, they claimed, is the city/suburb
divide and is compounded by poverty. According to their figures, almost 90% of
public elementary schoolchildren in the region's suburbs are white, compared with
13.6% in Boston itself where 50% of the total number of public elementary school
enrolments is black and 30% are Hispanic.P'" Moreover, "racial and ethnic minorities
attend schools with higher levels of poverty and live in worse neighborhoods, while
whites reap the benefits of more privileged schools and residential areas".1195 With
figures like these the questions must be "was it all worthwhile'?" or "where did it all
go wrong?"
The answer this time does not lie in school committee policies. When the First Circuit
vacated all outstanding court orders in the area of student assignments, it did so in part
because it was satisfied that school committee default was no longer an issue. As
Judge Garrity himself had confirmed, the defendants had "proved in many ways their
commitment to desegregation and intention to complete implementation of the student
desegregation plan".1196 Shortly after the First Circuit's decision, Mayor Raymond
Flynn hired two consultants, both of whom had been closely associated with the
district court desegregation plan, to develop a new student assignment plan for the
1192 John R. Logan et at. Segregation in Neighborhoods and Schools: Impacts on Minority
1193
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Children in the Boston Region I. (2003) (available
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Boston public schools.1197 Their Controlled Choice Plan (CCP) was approved by the
Boston school committee (BSC) on February 27 1989 with the intention to preserve
and continue the desegregation project clearly stated in the preamble:
A well-designed and implemented Controlled Choice plan will work to
eliminate all vestiges of unlawful segregation, prohibit future
discriminatory assignment practices and will create a more equitable
framework within which parents, students and educators can operate an
educationally diverse and distinguished system of public schools [ ... J
Controlled Choice is a constitutionally defensible and permissible
strategy because it guarantees equitable school desegregation.'!"
As part of the strategy to preserve the desegregation legacy, the BSC voted to
continue in place the examination school admission policies and racial percentage
guidelines established in 1975 by the district court plan which reserved 35% of
admissions for black and Hispanic students.'!" At the time that this figure was set, it
corresponded demographically with the racial balance of the city's student population
but since then the percentages of black and Hispanic students in the system had
steadily increased to 65% for the school year 1987-88, rising to 71% by school year
1995_96.1200
In that year, Judge Garrity granted to Julia McLaughlin, a white student denied a
place at the Boston Latin School (BLS) because of the operation of the set-aside, a
preliminary injunction on the basis that her challenge on equal protection grounds was
likely to succeed. 1201 As Supreme Court jurisprudence then stood, the plan was
almost certainly insufficiently narrowly tailored to withstand the strict scrutiny which
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(noting that the set-aside had been voluntary since Sept. 28 1987; See Morgan v. Nucci, 831
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racial classifications required.1202 On the basis of illustrative predictions, the judge
commented that within the next six years, the effect of abandoning the set-aside
would be to "convert BLS into an overwhelmingly white and Asian-American school
with a black and Hispanic enrollment of about 15%".1203 By corresponding effect
several district middle schools would become overwhelmingly black and Hispanic.1204
"By such a change" he predicted," the system-wide de jure segregation of the 1970s
would probably be succeeded, at least in the middle schools, by runaway de facto
segregation in the 1990s and beyond.,,1205
Predictions that the elite schools would disrupt the desegregation endeavor were not
new. As the judge observed, the First Circuit in 1987 had been aware that findings of
compliance in state monitoring reports were directed to the assignment process rather
than to actual enrollments.V'" It had been the opinion of the State Board however, that
remaining deficiencies were not necessarily within the school defendants' control.
With regard to the middle schools in particular, it considered that non-compliance was
"inevitable": "The impact of admissions to [exam schools] Boston Latin School and
Latin Academy at the 7th grade is such that compliance cannot be achieved for white
enrollment in all district middle schools.,,1207
Interviewed in 2005 Robert Dentler commented:
We have had deep difficulties with the Latin School - and it was the
last order to be entered in the case. The racial set-aside was eliminated
by the judge's own orders and the number of black and Hispanic
students has just glunged towards zero. So we're back where we were
when I came in.12 8
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Given the opportunity by the judge to "prune" the memos he had written on the
Boston schools case before they went on deposit with the University of Massachusetts
and thus came into the public domain, Dentler retrieved and destroyed a memo which
for him represented a mistake: "I recommended and wrote at length to try to
document my case, that we eliminate the Boston Latin School." 1209Back in 1975
when the masters tasked with fashioning a permanent remedy retired after six weeks,
they recommended that schools should be closed but "[w]e never got to the fine grain
of which schools to c1ose- that was left to Scott and me. The only shocker on the list
was Boston Latin School.,,1210 The Boston Latin School represented for him a
personal failure and one which taught him "what the limits were;" it taught him
important lessons about the nature and limits of what judicial process could
achieve.1211
II. The Latin Schools and the Limits of Judicial Process
As Dentler recounted, he formed a view of the "relative academic mediocrity" of the
Boston Latin School as a member of the Boston Secondary Education Commission
formed in 1973 and funded by the Ford Foundation on which he served for two
years: 1212
I had been on a city commission appointed by Mayor White to look at
secondary schools and I had been on the sub-committee to look at the
Boston Latin School and I had learned from that that it was an
educational relic. It was, by modem schooling [ ... ] a piece of junk.
So, I said, "it's a piece of junk - totally segregated. It doesn't perform
its historic function (which was to feed gifted students to Harvard and,
later, to MIT). "it doesn't do that any more - that's been preempted by
superior suburban high schools where the privileged had moved
anyway. lean 't assign people to go there." "I can't even make it a
magnet in which people volunteer and apply in order to desegregate it.
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So I don't know how to fit it into a permanent plan. And so, we should
scrap it.,,1213
The judge's response was to float Dentler's proposal in court hearings which lasted
two days.1214 The transcript of the hearing of April 23 1975 records what John
Coakley, Senior Officer for Implementation, later called Judge Garrity's "gratuitous
comments".1215 From the bench the judge expressed his surprise to learn "that the
performance of the graduate of the Latin Schools is not that remarkable when
compared to the performance of graduates from public schools elsewhere in
Massachusetts.,,1216 He had been informed, (he did not say by whom) that on a
comparison of the SAT (Scholastic Aptitude Test) scores of Latin School graduates
with those of graduates from all of the Greater Boston area, "you do not find that the
Latin School students excel. They do just about as well. They are just about on a par
with the SAT scores of public high schools generally." 1217If that were true, and the
Latin Schools' graduates were that much superior to the average high school
graduates in the city, it must follow, he suggested, that that the SAT scores of the
latter were below the average obtaining in the Greater Boston area. If the statistic
were valid, the conclusion must be that the Latin Schools generally were
overrated.V"
As the judge went round the parties, it became obvious that, despite the fact that, in
Dentler's words, the case was "fairly airtight," the closing suggestion was
unacceptable.Y'" As he later recognized, Dentler had displayed "insufficient
understanding of the place of that school in New England's imagination. This was
Benjamin Franklin's school- it was an unthinkable thought that I had had.,,1220
As he recalled, the parties united in opposition to the proposal; seven of the nine
attorneys were graduates of the Boston Latin School and their "loyalty was
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impeccable".1221 Even the plaintiffs were opposed; "Tom Atkins" (NAACP counsel
for the black plaintiffs)" was an intellectual giant and he made the case for keeping
Boston Latin alive." "[T]he plaintiffs said "we didn't bring this case to close the most
prestigious school in New England, we brought this case so that more of us could go
there.,,1222
The proposal was dropped; as the judge explained to Dentler, the logic of his proposal
was consistent with the other orders but he could not, in a case with nine attorneys,
support a proposal that had no-one to speak for it: 1223"[t]he judge said, 'Nobody's
running with you. Sorry Dean, but what we do in an equity case when no-one is there
is we dump the idea",.1224
Dentler explained the lesson that he had learned:
I learned about the constraints from this process. I learned the judge's
necessary dependency upon the offices of the Bar and I realized there
wasn't anything that we were going to do that left no-one in the
C' [ ]1225ourt scorner. . ..
The episode left Dentler as a "nameable enemy,,1226 whom the judge excluded from
immediate discussions concerning the future of the Latin School:
So, I spent a lot of misplaced energy pressing that cause and when the
judge came to prepare the remedy, he didn't discuss it [i.e. how to
desegregate the school] with me at all - he kept it to himself and he
sought the counsel of an old friend and colleague who was then
president of the Boston Latin alumni - and he certainly never
mentioned that to me. I saw the man go in to his office and wondered
what on earth that was - but the judge kept his advisors quite
separate.1227
In the years to come the Latin schools continued to feature on the list of desegregation
problems. Not only were they overpopulated by white students but by creaming off
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the dwindling number of white students within the public school system they also
served to frustrate the desegregation endeavor. Moreover the schools "continued to
resist change at every turn.,,1228 The following narratives focus on two episodes. The
first concerns the treatment of the examination schools in the desegregation plan and
the problem of reconciling "integration" in the sense of racial balance, with retention
of the principle of selectivity which might operate to disadvantage minority students.
The second concerns the proposal made by the school department in 1985, just as the
judge was attempting to conclude the Morgan case, to add a sixth grade to the Latin
Schools. The aim of the proposal was to facilitate access to the Latin schools by
students from within the Boston public school system but the net result was to
increase the number of white students. Both narratives reprise the theme of
"influence" as developed in Part I and from that point of view the first which features
the role of Dr Scott is of particular interest. However this is not their main purpose
and the focus on the Dentler and Scott memos is correspondingly reduced.
The main function of the narratives is rather to herald the theme of limits which is the
primary focus of this chapter. When Robert Dentler spoke of "limits" as constraints,
he was referring to the conventions of adversarialism which put the litigation parties
in the driving seat of common law process and allocate to the judge as umpire a role
of passive response. Judge Garrity's oversight of the Boston schools case tested the
limits of that response in a political context willing to tolerate deviations from judicial
norms but the problem of reconciling educational elitism and equal opportunity which
the Latin schools represented is primarily the dilemma concerning the place of
affirmative action 111 rights-based constitutional arrangements. When the
desegregation mandate can no longer be regarded as compelling justification for race-
conscious policies, arguments resurface that competition between rights-holders will
be determined by considerations of political power. The rapidity with which the gains
of the desegregation era were seen to be lost or overturned when court supervision
was withdrawn undermined not only the NAACP tactic of constitutional litigation as a
mechanism for social change but confidence generally in the norms of liberal theory.
The final part of this chapter returns to this debate which becomes then the context for
1228 Dentler & Scott, supra note 1212 at 30.
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the outline of a theory of the role of the court expert in a desegregation suit with
which this work concludes.
III. The Desegregation Plan: the Set-Aside and the Problem of
Selection
Under the desegregation plan the exam schools became magnets but the proposals
regarding grade structure, desegregation requirements and selection criteria generated
new controversy. The masters had recommended phasing out grades seven and eight
at the Latin Schools to create a 9-12 grade program in conformity with the grade
structure in the rest of the public school system and that the three exam schools be
desegregated in the same way as the other magnets i.e. that their student populations
be in line with citywide racial/ethnic composition.V'" Moreover the schools were
selective and the masters had recommended retention of the SSA T scores currently in
use together with grade point averages or percentiles on grade point standings as
selection criteria. 1230Dentler and Scott however were opposed in principle to selective
examination and were skeptical of the value of the SSAT 1231scores then in use. There
were no studies of the predictive value of the SSA T; the examination schools had
adopted it only recently and the Harvard Law and Education Center had complained
to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination that its use was racially
biased and unvalidated.1232 Once again attorneys for the plaintiffs joined in the chorus
of opposition, revealing as Dentler and Scott later wrote, "their belief and that of at
least some black parents in the desirability of strictly academic selectivity. It became
evident within a few weeks that many Bostonians believed devoutly in the efficacy of
elite schools. ,,)233
In the event, the judge adopted a compromise designed by his clerk Terry Seligman
and the Latin School Alumni Associations as amicus curiae. 1234The sixth grades at
the Latin Schools were to be phased out after one year but the seventh and eighth
grades were preserved. At least 35 per cent of the intake at the three examination
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schools, Boston Latin School, Boston Latin Academy and Boston Technical High,
was to be composed of black and Hispanic students, (as opposed to the requirement
for other citywide schools to enroll at least 44% black and other minority students,
plus or minus 10%) but desegregation was to be confined to the entering classes "in
order to preserve the strengths of the schools' sequential curriculum.v'<" HA gradual
desegregation of the entering classes," recorded Judge Garrity, "will allow the school
department the opportunity to identify and recruit increasing numbers of black and
Hispanic students who are qualified to attend and succeed at the examination
schools" .1236
In relation to selection criteria the School Department was permitted to use SSA T
scores alone or in combination with grade point averages or standings "so long as the
criteria chosen result in entering ih and 9th grade classes at least 35 percent black and
Hispanic,,1237. The court invited the school department to develop racially neutral
admissions criteria which could be shown "to identify accurately students who can
benefit from the examination schools' programs.,,1238
The order was approved by the First Circuit as a temporary expedient but the district
court was instructed to take special care "to safeguard the elite character of the
examination schools" in future. 1239"With this instruction" wrote Dentler and Scott,
"the stakes of our tent of opposition were pulled and we fell into compliance.,,124o
Four months later, the district court approved a so" percentile cut off point for
accepting applications.P" This had been a traditional cut-off point for admission to
the examination schools and was approved by the judge on the basis that continuing
validation studies indicated, at least preliminarily, that the test had some predictive
validity1242 but a year later Dentler and Scott mounted one last challenge. Scott's
briefing memo for the judge indicated that the school committee had failed to take
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verifying action.l243 The study previously undertaken, he said, was unsatisfactory
because a) the sample size was too small and b) it compared test scores with grade
point averages (GPAs) obtained at approximately the same time and thus was a study
of concurrent validity rather than a study of predictive validity.1244 Moreover, both the
GPAs and the test itself raised serious issues. Regarding the former, the manner in
which they were achieved was "less than adequate". 1245
The student's principal is sent a form and asked to fill it out with the
student's grade point average and the Testing Bureau at the school
department does not verify the submission. If a principal fails to submit
a GPA, then the school's computing center assigns the student a mean
GPA of all the students who had their average submitted.1246
Scott's review of results suggested that the test itself had systemic flaws:
[Out] of a possible total of one hundred and twenty to one hundred and
thirty questions, it appears students that have answered approximately
half of the questions correctly tend to fall at the means for those taking
the test. However, the difference between a student's getting one more
question right at this crucial means can result in an eventual ranking of
twenty to thirty places advanced in the ranking. A student who misses
one additional question can drop as low as thirty places in the ranking
[ ... ] 1247It is my feeling that something has to be done concerning this
matter and as usual we have been out done by the school committee in
that the only way to get information on the SSA T or other matters is to
pry and spy.1248
His briefing and recommendation ("that the school committee be ordered to have the
Educational Testing Service, (ETS of Princeton N.J., the originators of the test) under
court supervision, either validate the test as a predictor or recommend another test to
be administered which will determine which students are to be assigned to the
examination schools in Boston,,)1249 formed the basis for the judge's order when it
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1250· .came a month later. Announcmg that the court would explore "m the months
ahead concerns that the basis data underlying the criteria for admission might not
have predictive validity for successful work at the exam schools. [ ... ]," Judge Garrity
referred to Scott's memorandum directly:
[... ] [A] preliminary review of this year's examination results by the
court experts shows [... ] that a large number of students have scores on
the SSA T clustered at or near the mean score for the examination. As a
result, a difference of one correct answer out of the approximately 125
questions on the one exam can affect a student's ranking by 20-30
places. When a difference of a few correct answers out of so many
questions can determine admission or non-admission for a relatively
large percentage of those students who took the exam, it would appear
questionable that the test is accomplishing the purpose for which it is
purchased by the school committee, i.e. to indicate probable success at
the examination schools.1251
Nor does it appear that the possible arbitrariness of the SSA T is
ameliorated to any large extent by the use of GPAs [... ] because as
was noted in the same memorandum, the same GPA weight is given to
grades of doubtful equivalency, eg, a grade of P (for "pass") in a pass-
fail grading system is deemed equivalent to an A-minus in a traditional
grading system. 1252
The judge ordered the city defendants to take steps to validate the test or propose
some other test for selecting candidates for admission to the examination schools1253
but as Dentler and Scott later recounted the Department filed a "perfunctory
justification" and "[njo-one at the Latin schools or in the Department of
Implementation ever moved to devise a better selection procedure.,,1254
IV. Court Withdrawal and the Latin Schools
On December 20 1984 attorneys for the school committee filed with the court two
separate motions to modify the student assignment plan. The first motion contained
ten separate proposed modifications and the second requested leave to create a
1250 Morgan v. McDonough, Memorandum and Orders Modifying Desegregation Plan 19-20, No.
72-911-G (D. Mass. May 6 I977).
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neighborhood school assignment pattern m districts 3 and 4 with desegregation
accomplished only through voluntary transfers. 1255Subdivision 4 of the first motion
sought a modification of the court's orders governing the computation of the
racial/ethnic percentages which guided student assignments and provided a measure
of compliance. The proposal was to exclude from the formulation certain groups of
public school students including the examination school students. 1256Subdivision 6
of the first motion was a proposal to add grade six to the examination schools.1257
Both proposals represented aspects of the school defendants' response to the problems
of achieving compliance with court desegregation orders in a context of dwindling
numbers of white students. Neither proposal had been through the negotiation process
set up by the court in the Orders of Disengagement of December 198i258 with the
result, as the court noted, agreements had to be worked out in open court. 1259
Moreover, the defendants' proposals lacked detail and provided "only the most
cursory analysis of their de segregative impact.,,1260
Judge Garrity dealt with the grade six proposal first. The primary objective of the
school department seemed to be to enable public school students to compete with
private school students without having to undergo the adjustment to a new middle
school in the sixth grade. It was hoped that more public school students would then be
admitted to the Latins but as the plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenors and State Board all
pointed out, assuming that the current racial percentages of those entering the schools
remained unchanged, the effect would primarily benefit white students, ie a
disproportionately greater number of white students would be drawn from the public
middle schools.1261 This could impede meaningful desegregation at non-exam middle
schools and accelerate the current trend toward concentration of white students in the
Latin schools, counsel for the plaintiffs pointing out that "if the proportion of white
students making up the Latin schools' population remains constant, 43% of all white
seventh through twelfth graders in the public schools will be attending these two
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schools by 1988.,,1262 Moreover, plaintiffs argued that the addition of a sixth grade
would exacerbate the disproportionately low rate of retention of black and Hispanic
students at the Latin schools which, together with "the inadequacies of the school
defendants' response" was well-documented in all four of the State Board monitoring
reports.1263
Emphasizing that the court would not interfere with educational quality issues, the
judge deferred a decision pending submission of a factual analysis of the
desegregative impact of the proposals. He did, however, indicate that the school
committee might "want to address further the extensive list of criticisms of the
proposal which have been filed with the court by the citywide and school parent
councils, individual parents, the Latin Schools Associations, the headmaster of the
Latin School and other concerned members of the community.v'<'"
V. Modifying the RaciallEthnic Assignment Guidelines
The proposal to modify the guidelines was dealt with first by Judge Garrity in April
1985.1265 Explaining that the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors opposed the proposals
to exclude magnet students from the computations on the basis that the effect would
be to skew the composition of community district schools and permit them to become
racially identifiable, the judge recognized that there was a case for revision; "dramatic
increases" in bilingual programs and the "very uneven racial/ethnic distribution" in
some districts, rendered strict compliance with the guidelines difficult to achieve. 12M
Obviously assignment guidelines should take into account the limitations on student
assignment possibilities but he suggested that instead of artificially excluding
segments of the student population parties should focus on the original aims as
formulated in the court's June 5 1975 order: "first to make sure that schools are not
identifiably one race, and second, to assure that no racial/ethnic group [... ] is
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disproportionately isolated in any school,,1267 To that end the judge presented his own
proposals in the form of a draft order on the modification of the guidelines, proposing
first an 80% cap on the percentage of each racial/ethnic group which could be
assigned to a school and second to reflect the changes in the demographic make-up of
the city's student population by grouping other minority with white students as
opposed to the original grouping with black students.1268
In the course of the hearings which followed, whilst the school defendants maintained
that unitary status regarding student assignments had been achieved and challenged
the courts' continuing authority in this area, the plaintiffs raised again the
disproportionate enrollment of white students at the Latin schools which they claimed
detrimentally affected desegregation elsewhere and counter-proposed a modification
of the 35% set-aside for black and Hispanic students to bring the exam schools into
line with the other magnets where enrolment was determined by citywide racial/ethnic
percentages plus or minus 5 %.1269
At the hearing of April 22 1985 Mr. Atkins for the black plaintiffs acknowledged the
uniqueness of Boston Latin which was celebrating its three hundred fiftieth
anniversary but asserted that the exam schools ought not to be exempted from the
racial guidelines that applied to all the other magnet schools. Moreover, there were a
number of additional issues which he said were outstanding.l+" The first was the
recurring problem of the extremely high dropout rate for minority students. There was
some suggestion in State monitoring reports that insensitive staff comments, conduct,
or a combination of the two might be exacerbating factors.1271 The second issue was
that of funding; the need to address the problems faced by students coming into the
exam schools including but not limited to the non-white students had been
acknowledged but the appropriate funds had not been forthcoming. 1m Funds were
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also needed for staff development and student support and the advanced work classes
which prepared students in the public school system for the exam schools, should be
brought under the supervision of the schools' heads.1273 Ms Playter for El Comito
echoed the concerns regarding attrition rates then standing at 75-80% for hispanic
students though system-wide the rate was 60% and the attitude of the teaching
staff.1274 Overall, she maintained, the orders regarding support services had never
been implemented properly and hispanic students continued to be heavily under-
represented, enrolments standing at 6% for Boston Latin and 4% at the Latin.1275
VI. Disengagement and Final Orders
In the event, the judge refused an order pending such time as the parties should have
pursued the negotiation procedure required by the disengagement orders of December
19821276 but for the judge and his advisors the priority for 1985 was disengagement.
Dentler himself had been supportive of the 6th grade proposal and had prepared a
preliminary draft order in "draft decision language" after discussion with the judge's
law clerk Michael Barrett in February 1985.1277 He did not accept the arguments that
the Latin schools were disrupting the desegregation project preferring instead to stress
the magnetic role of the schools in attracting white students back into the public
school system:
Plaintiffs' argument that the examination schools draw off too many
white students in a time of declines in white enrollments overall is
rejected:
The two Latin schools now enroll 395 white ih graders or 31% of all
white 7th graders in the system. The three examination schools
combined enroll 346 white 1th graders or 35% of all white Ith
graders in the system. Nearly half of these white students at both grade
levels are cross-overs from nonpublic schools, however. Taking the 7th
graders as an illustration, if 45% of those entering whites came from
nonpublic schools, and if this number were subtracted from the Latins
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in the numerator and from system enrollments in the denominator, the
Latins would now enroll only 20% of the 7th grade whites overall.
Thus, the magnetism of the examination schools Improves
desegregation by enlarging opportunities for black and hispanic
students to enroll in racially de-isolated schools. 1m
As for the 6th grade proposal, he could not resist pointing out the inconsistencies of
the plaintiffs' opposition:
Plaintiffs urged continuation of the exam schools as such and with
grades 7-8 in 1975. It is contradictory to now seek to prevent adding
grade 6 within a framework which continues and does not expand the
seating scope of competitive selection.1279
Dentler also supported raising the set-aside requirement from 35% to 40%. The Latin
Academy had already achieved this and the Latin School could easily do so "hy
admitting a higher ration in grade 6 and then adopting facuity practices of support and
assistance in place of the 'sink or swim' tradition."mo He did not however, support
the proposals to exempt subgroups of students from computing compliance with the
guidelines writing on February 20 that he could "think of no legal as distinguished
from educational reason why any subgroup of students should be set aside".12XI The
court never intended to exempt exam school students from the guidelines and the
Masters' report envisaged that there would be some clustering of special needs'
students.1282 The provision for a plus or minus 0.25% variance was intended to
facilitate a flexible response. His advice therefore
leads from the assumption that the problem with the current rules
governing racial/ethnic guidelines and with the calculation of
compliance per school spring from two sources, demographic and
relational between magnets and community schools, and should he
resolved accordingly - not by exempting subgroups from any
count.1283
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In a "tentative schedule for full disengagement" dated February 11 Dentler had
envisaged an incremental withdrawal with February and March given over to
facilities and student assignments, with a final court order on March 25 and a final
comprehensive court order by June 25.1284The fact that exam school issues were still
under discussion in April threatened serious slippage from the schedule and the
Unified Facilities Plan (UFP) was still outstanding. Moreover, as Dentler reported,
the latest proposals for the latter envisaged an expenditure in the next three years of
$435 million on the Latin schools as opposed to a total of $12.8 million on 63 other
facilities, measures indeed of the hold the elite schools continued to exercise on the
school committee's imagination. 1285
The judge's draft order came in July1286 and final orders on September 3 1985. 1287
Dentler had briefed the judge that neither plaintiffs nor defendants were facilitating
court withdrawal. 1288The plaintiffs wished to preserve what they termed the "helpful
assistance" of state board monitoring but "as one who has done more monitoring in
this case than have attorneys for the plaintiffs" Dentler found this misconceived:
There comes a time in any public service bureaucracy when external
monitoring impedes both effectiveness of service delivery and the
quality of adaptive change. That time has been reached in this case, in
.. 12g9my OpInIOn.
In their "Reply to Comments of Other Parties" the school defendants had asserted
"Plaintiffs simply do not want this case to end".1290 Dentler agreed with this view but
added that it was clear from the defendants' objections and comments that the latter
wanted termination to be on their terms: "in a way that embraces no safeguards and
restores absolute and unconditional regularity laced only with good intentions. ,,1291
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In the event the final orders did not return full control over student assignments
because, as the judge asserted, full compliance had never been achieved.12'i2 What
they did do however was to implement the spirit of Dentler's recommendations made
back in February concerning the need for simplification on the one hand and
leadership from the court on the other.1293 The existing guidelines, he advised, were
"no longer congruent with social reality or logically consistent with the principles that
have become the law of this case.,,1294 Change was essential but could not be a matter
for negotiation amongst the parties:
No change will dishonor the court in the long term and change by
negotiation is inappropriate where one is dealing with standards
. l for i ifvi he closi f h 1295essentia l r JUSh ymg t smg 0 t e case.
His memo of August 9 summarized for the judge the rationale for a revised student
assignment requirement.V" The racial/ethnic compositions of the eight community
districts, originally fairly uniform across the city, now differed widely, their
autonomy had been undermined by a centralization of control in the office of
superintendent, evident in matters such as curriculum, a reduction in the number of
community superintendents from eight to four, and a decline in the influence of
principals' councils and community district advisory councils.1297 Geocode unit lines
had no logical or substantive relation to school sites or residential population
concentrations but no revisions had taken place. The number of special needs students
had multiplied beyond expectation and the uniform grade structure imposed by the
court plan had broken down.1298
His recommendation that a permanent provision which matched assignments to the
racial/ethnic composition of the student population as a whole plus or minus 0.25%
would be "simpler, easier to comprehend and more universalistic than current
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assignment rules,,1299 found its way into the judge's orders. 1300The set aside for the
examination schools however, was preserved and continued in place for thirteen more
years until it finally received its quietus in a First Circuit decision forming part of a
series of cases culminating in the recent cases from Seattle and Kentucky in which the
Supreme Court seriously restricted the extent to which school boards supportive of
integration can put in place race-conscious admissions policies designed to achieve a
student population which is racially diverse. 1301For some commentators these cases
mark the limits of so-called rights discourse, or the ability of the law to bring about
lasting social change.1302
VII. The Limits of Rights Discourse
"Exactly what people don't need is their rights ,,/303
Individual rights, asserts Ronald Dworkin,1304 are "the zodiac sign under which
America was born.,,1305 The ideological commitment to the value of "rights
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what people don't need is their rights. What they need are the actual forms of social life that
have to be created through the building of movements that can overcome illusions about the
nature of what is political, like the illusion that there is an entity called the state, that people
possess rights. It may be necessary to use rights argument in the course of political struggle, in
order to make gains. But the thing to be understood is the extent to which it is enervating to
use it..." Id., at 33.
See in particular TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985) LAW'S
EMPIRE (1986).
RONALD DWORKIN, 'Introduction: The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise' in
FREEDOM' S LAW: THE MORAL READING OFTHEAMERICANCONSTITUTION,31 (1966).
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discourse,,1306 which reaches a high point in his work underpinned the strategy of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to pursue
social change by constitutional litigation. Brown v. Board of Education represented
the vindication of an early vision. 1307More than fifty years later, the opposition of the
political right to perceptions of excessive judicial interference in social policy issues
has been paralleled on the left by growing doubts concerning the long-term value of
this rights-based litigation. Specifically, the perceived resegregation of the nation's
schoolsl308 has induced skepticism on the part of former civil rights attorneys and
activists concerning the traditional claims and assumptions of liberal political
theory.1309
The work of so-called Critical Race Theorists shares with their predecessors in the
Critical Legal Studies movement the intuition that litigation for social change is at
best an unruly horse but at worst an instrument for perpetuating the status quo.13lO In
the concepts of ideology and legitimation they find a language for analyzing the fear
that the "promise of Brown »nn has proved to be a chimera. l3l2 From this perspective
the conceptual framework of legal rights discourse expressed in terms of equality,
1306 By which I mean a commitment to view that the state should offer its citizens individual
guarantees expressed by reference to statements of values or moral principles which are
formulated in universal terms.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, RACIAL TRANSFORMATIONAND TIlE CIlANGING
NATURE OF SEGREGATION (2006) available at
hUp://crab.rutgers.edu/-ccoe/courses/soe/Readings/Racial_ Transformation.pdf. See also
GARYORFIELD& SUSANE. EATON,DISMANTLINGDESEGREGATION:TilE QUIET REVERSALOF
BROWNV. BOARDOFEDUCATION,53-71 (1996).
See Michael 1. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 Va. L.
Rev. 7 (1994)
See Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancie, The Social Construction of Brown v. Board of
Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, WM & MARY L. REV. 547,567
(1995) (arguing that "Brown's relatively slight effect is part of a broader form of social
response- the reconstructive paradox-which holds that the greater the evil, the greater the need
for reform; the greater the reform effort, the more unprincipled and unjust the effort will seem,
and the greater the resistance it will call up.").
"Brown promised a truly equal education for black children in integrated classrooms
throughout the nation. More, it offered the real beginnings of a multi-racial democratic
society. Brown heightened the aspirations and expectations of Afro-Americans as nothing
ever had before. Nearly a century after their professed freedom had been stalled, compromised
and stolen, blacks confidently anticipated being free and equal at last". H. SITKOFF, THE
STRUGGLEFORBLACKEQUALITY:1954-198, at 23 (1981).
See Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical
Legal Essay 23 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 313-15 (1988) (explaining that the effect of a
"new array of insights" derived from Marxist thought was to give him the "intellectual
equipment" to express his frustrations concerning the direction of anti-discrimination law and
practice.),
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objectivity and neutrality and the apparent formalism of the doctrine of stare decisis
upon which it claims to depend become mechanisms for ignoring and thereby
legitimating the economic and social inequalities which represent the structural causes
of minority oppression. 1313 Apparent successes such as Brown 1314become possible
at specific moments of so-called political interest convergence'<" but the
indeterminacy of constitutional rights which gain meaning only in the translation from
the universal to the particular and the fluid nature of legal reasoning render these
gains unstable and vulnerable to erosion in terms of both scope and principle once the
political consensus which gave them birth has changed or broken down. 1316From a
position tantamount to legal nihilism, rights-based litigation is just another forum in
which prevailing political and cultural assumptions operate to entrench the fact of
white dominance; "Law is simply politics by other means".1317
Not all writers are prepared to discard the rhetoric of rights. Patricia Williams for
example has responded movingly to those who criticize the African-American pursuit
of rights; "the mythology" of rights discourse, with its "pantheon of possibility", she
asserts, is not a "dry process of reification" but "the story of phoenix; the
1313 See eg Delgado & Stefancic's critique: "Long ago, empowered actors and speakers enshrined
their meanings, preferences, and views of the world into the common culture and language.
Now, deliberation within that language, purporting always to be neutral and fair, inexorably
produces results that reflect their interests." Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic. Hateful
Speech. Loving Communities: Why Our Notion of "A Just Balance" Changes So Slowly. 82
CALIF. L.REV. 851, 861 (1994).
For critical legal theory see eg MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, (1987)
ROBERTOMANGABEIRAUNGER, THE CRITICALLEGAL STUDIESMOVEMENT(1983).
For critical race theory see eg RICHARD DELGADO R & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (1995); RICHARD DELGADO R & JEAN STEFANCIC CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTlON(2001); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOMOF THE
WELL: THE PERMANENCEOF RACISM(1993); For critical race theory in education see eg RACE
Is ... RACE ISN'T (Lawrence Parker et at. eds 1999); CRITICALRACE THEORY IN EDUCATION:
ALL GOD'S CHILDRENGOT A SONG ( Adrienne D. Dixon & Celia K. Rousseau eds. 2006).
For critical legal theory attack on legal method see eg David Kairys, Legal Reasoning in THE
POLITICSOF LAW: A PROGRESSIVECRITIQUE (David Kairys ed.1982).
Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1984) (Brown J).
When the interests of the black minority converge with those of the white majority.
See Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV.SI8 (1980) (hereinafter "Bell 1980") and Mary Dudziak, Desegregation as a
Cold War Imperative. 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 106-13 (1988)(hereinafter "Dudziak 1988")
(both arguing that the decision to declare segregated public schools unconstitutional was
influenced by Cold War political imperatives which required the United States to be able to
present itself as the home of liberty, human rights, and racial justice by comparison to unfree
Soviet societies.) These ideas are further developed IN MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS: RACE ANDTHE IMAGEOFAMERICANDEMOCRACY(200 I) (hereinafter Dudziak 200 I).
Kairys, supra, note 1313 at 17.
1314
1315
1316
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· f ~ '1' d h ,,1318 H hparthenogenesIs 0 unterti ize ope. owever, t e connection between theory
and practice continues to be problematic. In the work of writers such as Bell and
Delgado and Stefancic we see an attempt to harness the trans formative potential of
rights discourse by the use of narrative to give voice to social experience which has
been excluded from the mainstream.Y'" The intention may be termed an attempt to
fight hegemony with a counter-hegemony'<" by providing a framework within which
new claims can be conceptualized but as they themselves recognize, they have a
struggle on their hands.1321 Delgado and Stefancic in their Critical Race Primer invite
a thought experiment:
As a thought exercise, the reader is invited to consider how many of
the following terms and ideas, mentioned in this book and highly
relevant to the work of progressive lawyers and activists, are apt to be
found in standard legal reference works: intersectionality, interest
convergence, anti-essentialism, hegemony, language rights, black-
white binary, jury nullification. How long will it take before these
concepts enter the official vocabulary of law? 1322
One has only to pose the question to grasp the magnitude of the task. The theoretical
complexity that is demanded engenders both a perception of impenetrability and a
1318 PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 163 (199l) "It is also true that
blacks always believed in rights in some larger mythological sense -as a pantheon of
possibility. It is in this sense that blacks believed in rights so much and so hard that we gave
them life where there was none before; held onto them, put the hope of them into our wombs.
mothered them. not the notion of them; we nurtured rights and gave rights life. And this was
not the dry process of reification, from which life is drained and reality fades as the cement of
conceptual determinism hardens round. but its opposite. This was the story of phoenix; the
parthenogenesis of unfertilized hope." Jd.
1319 See eg the work of Derrick Bell; Richard Delgado. Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:
A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411.2414 (1989)writes:
"Most who write about storytelling focus on its community-building functions: stories build
consensus. a common culture of shared understandings. and deeper. more vital ethics.
Counterstories. which challenge the received wisdom. do that as well. They can open new
windows into reality. showing us that there are possibilities for life other than the ones we
live."
1320 In the work of Antonio Gramsci the notion of hegemony is conceptualized to refer to the
network of attitudes and beliefs which permeate popular values and political ideology and
operates to convince both dominant and dominated classes that existing social relationships
represents the natural order. See SELECTIONSFROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS. 195-196.246-47
(Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith eds. and trans. 1971)
1321 See RICHARDDELGADO& JEAN STEFANCIC. FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL REFORM ANDTHE
LiMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION xvi, 243 (l994) (hereinafter "Delgado & Stefancic, Failed
Revolutions").
1322 RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY; AN INTRODUCTION. 27
(200 I) (hereinafter "Delgado & Stefancic, Critical Race Theory").
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despair that what Catharine MacKinnon has termed a "discourse unto death"Ll23 has
little to offer outside the academy: "Theory begets no practice, only more text."IJ24
A debate about what is or should be the relationship between theory and practice
takes place in a context of what may be seen as a growing alienation between
academic lawyers and practitioners who see little value in "abstract scholarship that
has little relevance to concrete issues, or addresses concrete issues in a wholly
theoretical manner.,,1325 Calls for the development of "theoretics,,1J26 or a "critical
race praxis,,,1327 to "bridge the gap between the theoretical and the practical in
law,,1328 represent both a commitment to the power of theory as a vehicle for change
and a conceptualization of theory as practice which may find its antecedents in
African-American political and literary traditions 1329 but the task of combining
"critical pragmatic socio-legal analysis with political lawyering" mo does not fit
easily within the ethical constraints of the lawyer/ client relationship, nor does
deconstructive analysis of "rights discourse" with its underlying pessimism
concerning the extent to which racism in American society can be overcome resonate
with day to day intuitions of practicing attorneys.l?" Lawyers are practical people
1323 Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman An)'way?, 4
YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM13(1991).
Id.
See eg Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession. 91 MICH.L. REv. 34, 35 (1992) (writing as a federal circuit judge and discussing
the view that "significant contingents of 'impractical' scholars' in 'elite' law schools who are
'disdainful of the practice of law' produce 'abstract scholarship that has little relevance to
concrete issues, or addresses concrete issues in a wholly theoretical manner." Id. "As a
consequence," he asserts "it is my impression that judges, legislators and practitioners have
little use for much of the scholarship that is now produced by members of the academy." Id.).
See Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflections on Race and the Convergence
of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGSL.J. 749, 753 (1992).
Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Praxis in
Post-Civil Rights America. 95 MICH. L. REV. 821,882 (1997). By "praxis" Professor
Yamamoto means "anti subordination action with reflection", Id., at n.249.
Id.
Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflections on Race and the Convergence at
Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGSL.1. 749, 753 (1992).
Yamamoto supra, note 1327 at 875.
See Derrick A. Bell Jr. Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation. 85 YALEL.J 470 (1976) ( pointing out that to litigate a law reform
case, the lawyer needs a flesh and blood client but the social reform interests of the lawyer and
the personal goals of the client may not always coincide.).
See more recently, Professor Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering jar Social Change: What's a
Lawyer to Do? 5 MICH. J. RACE& L. 201,205(1999} responding to Professsor Yamamotu's
call for a 'critical race praxis' (Yamamoto supra note 1318) (observing that the scope for
political lawyering is necessarily limited; in undertaking to act for a particular client an
attorney undertakes to promote the client's best interests which are not necessarily those of the
1324
1325
1326
1327
1328
1329
1330
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with practical skills which they seek to deploy and constitutional rights are the tools
of their trade. If the "tradition of Louis Boudin and Clarence Darrow"m2 is to speak
to the progressive impulse as it has always done, the theory which informs the vision
must be capable of inspiring practice. "Good theory", suggests Catherine MacKinnon,
come out of practice which is "socially lived and engages with the social practices of
oppression.v'<"
Delgado's work and that of Bell has always been "activist" in focus and both continue
to exhort "activists" to soldier on.1334. The preoccupation with theory comes out of
acceptance of the limits of law as a vehicle for social change. Litigation is expensive,
and its unpredictable outcomes mean that in strategic terms it is best employed to
maximize success; this is most likely to happen when social attitudes have been
changed.v''" Delgado's more recent work however demonstrates impatience with
theory which pays too much attention to issues of attitude formation and the social
construction of race to the neglect of the material factors which determine minority-
group access to economic, social and political power. 1336 "The study of 'race' has
supplanted the study of race" he asserts and issues a challenge to theory to return to a
"racial realism" of an earlier generation.1337 In his return to ideas of "interest
convergence", the thesis pioneered by Derrick Bell that the majority group tolerates
advances for racial justice only when it suits its interest we see not only a tool of
1332
group Moreover, in an increasingly multiracial minority population opportunities for contlicts
arise: 'Although minority groups may appear homogenous to the outside observer, this is far
from the case. Internal schisms can prove as troublesome as contlicts between groups'. Id.
See Victor Rabinowitz. The Radical Tradition in the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVECRITIQUE318 (David Kairys ed.1982).
Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory. or What is a White Woman
Anyway? 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
See RICHARDDELGADO& JEAN STEFANCIC- FAILEDREVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL REFORMANDTIlE
LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATlON(1994) at 145 'It is important to us that [law students) not sec
this book as a counsel of despair, for that is not how it is intended'<- and DERRICK BELL,
FACES ATTHEBOTTOMOFTHEWELL: THE PERMANENCEOF RACISM 12 (1992).
For a political scientist's analysis of the limits of the ability of the courts to bring about long-
lasting social policy reform see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, TilE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN THE
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (I991)(concluding: "American courts are not all-
powerful institutions. They were designed with severe limitations and placed in a political
system of divided powers. To ask them to produce significant social reform is to forget their
history and ignore their constraints. It is to cloud our vision with a narve and romantic belief
in the triumph of rights over politics. And while romance and even naivite have their charms,
they are not best exhibited in courtrooms.")ld at 343.
Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent Writing
About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 12, 122-123 (2003)(hereinafter Delgado (2003) (reviewing
FRANCISCO VALDES, JEROME MCCRISTAL CULP & ANGELA P. HARRIS, CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONSANDANEW CRITICALRACE THEORY (2002).
Id
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analysis 1338but the basis of a response to the activist practitioner's query: what's a
lawyer to dO?1339If the key to success lies in the forging of alliances the concept
becomes not merely an explanation as to why certain claims succeeded at certain
times, but a continuing tool of practice for the activist lawyer.
The view has recently been expressed that, after more than half a century of attempts
to enhance the educational opportunities of African-Americans, the obstacles that
continue to thwart the promise of Brown depend upon variables which are so deeply
embedded inside the process of teaching and learning that they are for the time being
at least beyond the reach of legal process.1340 This may be so but if in legal
incrementalism, that is to say, "the slow, painstaking process of establishing and
refining precedent" we find the tool of the lawyer's trade, the history of the search for
educational equity via the courts has been testament to the view that the open-texture
of constitutional rights represents both limit and opportunity in the task of providing
substance to the rhetoric of the doctrine that we call "the rule of law".1341 This was the
path that led to Brown but the story of schools desegregation that followed teaches
that the success of incrementalism is as much a matter of the implementation of rights
as of their elaboration and in a schools case the key to the former has had to be found
in an institutional engagement which has taken lawyers out of their comfort zone. In
other words, the successful implementation of rights to educational equity has
required not only the identification and conceptualization in legal terms of specific
constitutional infringements but also that solutions be devised which were practical
and thus capable of commanding respect. Both tasks have demanded close attention to
matters of educational and pedagogical complexity but as the Boston experience has
1338 See Delgado (2003) supra note 1336 at 121, 138. On 'interest convergence' see Derrick Bell,
Bakke, Minority Admissions and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 76 Cal. L. Rev,3 (1979),
Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma 93 HARV.
L. REV.518 (1980) (hereinafter Bell (1980»: "Translated from judicial activity in racial cases
both before and after Brown, this principle of 'interest convergence' provides: The interest of
blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the
interests of whites. However, the fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a
judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought
threatens the superior societal status of middle and upper class whites." Bell (1980) at 523.
Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyeringfor Social Change: What's a Lawyer To Do? 5 MICII.1. RACE&
L. 201(1999).
See Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law 57 V AND. L. REV.
2417,2450 (2004).
Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want? 22 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301, 319 (1987) (hereinafter "Delgado
1987").
1339
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demonstrated, it has been at the implementation stage in particular that the task of
devising an effective legal remedy has required lawyers to undertake a specific
engagement with norms and practices of another discipline in a way which only
became possible because of the assistance provided by experts who were themselves
professionals in the educational field.1342
Interviewed in 2006, Robert Dentler recounted a conversation with Judge Garrity
which showed his understanding of the importance of solutions in defining the limits
of what he could achieve:
On one occasion I said "we've got to call a deputy marshal or
marshals - we're being defied. I can't stem it and - am I correct - you
can order the marshals in." He said" I can order a platoon of marshals
- about 50 years of age each, haven't fired a gun in years, most of
them have a pot belly - and that will be my force." He said "I don't
like the image of that. Don't you understand that a judge is a wizard?
As in the Wizard of Oz - I'm behind a curtain and orders are obeyed if
the parties believe in your judicial authority. That's my power - and
my power is under intense contest here. You've got to come up with
solutions that don't have to do with you telling me to put the marshals
on the streets please.,,1343
In effect, South Boston High School (SBHS) head Winegar made the same point
when he observed on the record that "[l]awyers and judges are only occasionally
educators. To decide [the Morgan case] on legal grounds only denies us the
opportunity to share the students' educational needs in the legal forum.,,1344
Winegar was complaining about the lack of bilingual teachers at his school;
"[sjurely", he asked "educational quality still has some validity In the District
Court?,,1345 For Dentler who had advised the judge in 1975 right at the very beginning
of the case that where desegregation efforts focused primarily on student and teacher
reassignments and where orders were limited to these matters plus safety and
transportation, the effects on equalizing teaching and learning were likely to vary
1342 See David. M. Engstrom, Civil Rights Paradox? Lawyers and Educational Equity 10 1.L. &
Pol'y 387 (2002) (reviewing LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING
EDUCATIONALEQUITY(Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999).
Dentler (2006) supra note 1213.
Winegar to Dentler, Sept 26 1988, (90 Garrity XXXVIIf. f36).
Winegar, supra note 1344
1343
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"from negligible to damaging,,,1346 the issues of remedial design and implementation
were the key factors that could make or break the effort to achieve quality
desegregated education in urban school districts.1347 As the Coleman report had
warned, lawyers neglected these matters at their peril.1348 The outcome was likely to
be a gap "that is the equivalent of that between curriculum theory and the practical
development of instructional practice". 1349
VIII. Towards a Theory of the Court Expert in Schools
Desegregation Suits
In Brown v Board of Education the Supreme Court established a constitutional basis
for the moral responsibilities of the nation in racial matters.1350 The decision
represented a defining point in the development of race relations in the United States,
but the principles upon which it rested were ambiguous and the process of schools
desegregation which it inaugurated depended for success upon political processes
which the Court could command but not control. The constitutionalization of the
desegregation mandate ensured that the political struggles which it spawned were
played out in the courts, but the inherent ambiguity upon which it rested produced an
open textured jurisprudence in which the requirements of desegregation have
changed, and the link between racial isolation and educational opportunity which had
underpinned NAACP demands for integration could no longer be assumed. Fifty
years after Brown, a Court in retreat from an activist model of adjudication was
unwilling to lend constitutional legitimacy to integrative social policies underpinned
by contestable social science.F"
For Judge Garrity and the lawyers involved in the Boston case at the time, the
immediate answers to the question of what desegregation required were determined
1346
1347
Dentler, April 11 1975, Race Case or Education Case, (90 Garrity XXXVlIf. f17)
Robert A. Dentler, Desegregation Planning and Implementation in Boston, 17, THEORYINTO
PRACTICE,72 (1978 )
!d.at 74 (quoting James S. Coleman. "Racial Segregation in the Schools: New Research with
New Policy Implications" 1975 PH! DELTAKAPPA, 75-78:[o]ne of the peculiarities of the
whole desegregation period has been the lack of interest by advocates on both sides in making
a desegregated system work successfully".)
Id.
Brown v Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (I 954)(Brown I)
Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. 127 S.Ct. 2738,2776-2781 (2007) (Thomas J., concurring).
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by reference to contemporary desegregation jurisprudence which constituted the
parameters of the judge's constitutional mandate but as Forbes Bottomley, himself a
former superintendent of schools in Seattle, Washington, has pointed out, an effective
desegregation plan for a complex public school system such as that of Boston is more
than a matter of jurisprudence. 1352Lawyers may be comfortable with standards
couched in terms of "reasonableness" and "adequacy", but educational planners need
more.1353 Translation from constitutional guidelines to specific proposals of design
and implementation requires both professional expertise and a working relationship
with the educational planners and school officers whose job it is on the ground to give
effect to the orders of the court. Where, as in Boston, school officials are recalcitrant,
and administrative default forces the judge to take over, the relationship can become
"complex and frustrating".1354 The appointment of court experts in Boston extended
the reach of the judge beyond the courtroom and the confines of the adversarial
process and, to that extent, their role was part of the machinery of implementation.
But to the extent that they took on the task of supervising and supplying the
educational planning expertise necessary to devise and implement a workable plan,
they shaped and gave content to the desegregation process in Boston and, to that
extent, their role was more fundamental.
1352 Forbes Bottomley, The Professional Educator in the Desegregation Suit, in LIMITS OF
JUSTICE: THE COURT'S ROLE IN SCHOOLDESEGREGATION. 621 (Howard I. Kalodner,
& James J. Fishman, eds., 1978).
See Bottomley, supra. note 1352 at 633: "as an educational planner Iwould appreciate
having a clear definition of adequacy in at least the following areas: I) the tenable limits within
which students may be assigned to schools 10 achieve constitutionally acceptable
desegregation; 2) the degree to which optional attendance zones, neutral sites, magnet schools,
and alternative programs fit the law; 3) the variance, if any, from the tenable limits which will
be allowable for special education for the handicapped, for the gifted, for kindergarten
children, for athletic and other extracurricular programs; 4) the definition of desegregation
within a school as well as within a school system, such as prohibition against tracking ability
groupings and other segregative assignment; 5) a definition, with tenable limits, of a
desegregated staff, including teachers, administrators, and non-teaching employees; 6) a guide
for the equitable distribution of resources among the schools, including the use of Elementary
and Secondary Act Title I funds; 7) a meaning of 'burden' - that is the measure to which
desegregation may be achieved through the burdening of minority students and minority
communities with school closures, one-way assignments, busing distances and other
inconveniences more than the majority pupils and communities; 8) a definition of 'reasonable'
transportation times and distances; 9) the extent to which metropolitanization may be
considered in a remedial plan; 10) other instructions such as a timetable for submission of the
plan or plans; target date, at least, for implementation; a description for an appeal procedure
for hardship cases; and a process for monitoring the plan, once implemented".
Id.
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In identifying the importance of educational enhancement in a desegregation remedy,
Judge Garrity's plan went further than any of his predecessors in federal
desegregation suits and became the prototype for a new type of desegregation
planning in which educational concerns were ostensibly as important as issues of
student assignment. Ultimately, the educational component fell victim to a
desegregation jurisprudence conceptualized in terms of "race" and not "education".
"Desegregation", said the First Circuit, "is not a mandate to equalize schools".1355
Taking the failure of outcomes as a focus, this work now takes the indeterminacy of
the term "desegregation" as a starting point towards a theory of the role of the court
expert in schools desegregation litigation. If the term "desegregation" is seen as
inherently indeterminate, or, to borrow a term from discourse theory, an empty or
floating signifier whose meaning crystallizes only as the general is translated into the
particular, then a framework for analysis emerges. The desegregation process
becomes a forum for a negotiation between representatives of two professional
discourses with differing and sometimes conflicting understandings and
conceptualizations of what the process might require.
From this perspective, the court expert operates at the interface between two
discursive imperatives: the so-called "harm-benefit thesis" of social science which
seeks integration as a solution to "the Negro problem" and the legal imperative which
prioritizes "legitimacy" and permits "integration" only as an aspect of remedial
process. The two imperatives came together in the context of education, and both sets
of professionals sought enhanced educational outcomes for African-Americans; but,
for lawyers, the harm which shaped strategy was racial discrimination whilst for
social scientists the harm was racial separation.
In the forum of the federal courtroom, the discourses of law and the social sciences do
not meet on an equal footing. The authority of the modern liberal state is defined in
legal terms, and answers to questions of legitimacy are sought by reference to the
concepts and rhetoric of legal discourse. Thus, in terms of an interaction between the
rival discourses of the law and of the social sciences, it is the former which is
1355 Morgan v. Mcfronough., 689 F. 2d, 265, 277. (1st Cir.1982).
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dominant and hegemonic. The discourse of the social sciences acquires political
legitimacy only to the extent that it has been subsumed within the discourse of law.
The role of the court expert can be theorized in terms of mediation or translation, the
task being to give to the federal judge the content that he needs to give meaning to the
otherwise indeterminate signifier "desegregation". The voice of legitimacy is the
voice of the federal judge and his attempts to articulate the boundaries of the term
represent so-called nodal points for the crystallization of meaning.
In this context, the relationship between the judge and the expert is dialectical: the
judge has to guide the expert on "the law". This requires identification of the general
legal principles which regulate the exercise of the judicial function, and the specific
principles of constitutional liability and relief which have been provided by the
Supreme Court and Circuit Courts in previously-decided cases. These give the judge
his "road map"; from these he identifies his imperatives and sets an agenda.
Translation of these imperatives into proposals for practical changes in educational
policy and practice is the task of the expert, who may be a testifying witness or may
be a specially appointed court adviser. Either way, these proposals are acceptable only
to the extent that they can be justifiable in terms of legal discourse. In other words, the
practical proposals of the social scientist must be capable of translation into the
language of the law and justifiable by reference to the legal signifiers to which they
give content. The measure of accomplishment is the scrutiny of the wider legal
community as represented in the first instance by the appellate judges to whose
authority appeal might lie. Ultimately, however, the effect is to bring about a transfer
of power from elected school officials to the wider group of academic and practicing
lawyers and the politicians and representatives of business interests with whom they
interact who collectively make-up the hermeneutic community which Dworkin has
identified as the community of legal discoursc.T"
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, in the years following the case of Brown v.
Board of Education,' the federal judiciary assumed direct responsibility
for supervising the desegregation of the nation's schools. In the Brown case
itself, however, the term "desegregation" is never used, and its meaning
has changed over time. Whereas the issue in Broum was the legality of state
laws mandating educational apartheid, under a sympathetic political re-
gime in the 1960s the Supreme Court extended the requirement to
affirmative "integration" and set performance indicators couched in terms
of "racial balance," By the 1990s, however, it was clear that absent state
fault racial identifiability per se did not offend the Constitution, and
judges were encouraged to disengage from the desegregation process.'
Affirmative action policies designed to perpetuate "integration" rather
than to remedy past discrimination fell victim to the Court's dislike of
judicial intervention in social policy matters.
It is commonly asserted that the Brow" Court was influenced by so-
cial science concerning the "harm" of segregation and the benefits of
integration. In the 1970s, social science research became central to deseg-
regation litigation in the North where segregation was a function of
residential patterns rather than overt legislative discrimination: Designing
1. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 1),347 U.S. 483 (1954). Technically there were
four cases which were consolidated on appeal to the Supreme Court: Belton v. Gebhart,
87 A.2d. 862 (Del. Ch. 1952) (on appeal from Delaware); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.
Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951) (on appeal from Kansas); Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529
(E.D.s.C. 1951) (on appeal from South Carolina); and Davis v. Sch. Bd., to3 F. Supp. 337
(E.D.Va. 1952) (on appeal from Virginia).
Following the Supreme Court's ruling that the provision of "separate but equal"
education was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the case was adjourned for the
Court to hear argument concerning the remedy. The remedial ruling came one year later
in Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (B,oll", /!), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In this text, references to "Brown"
should be taken as references to both Bro .. " I and B,o.1'II /I.
2. Green v. County Sch, Bd., 391 U.S. 430.437-438 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1, 1279-80 (1971).
3. Missouri v.Jenkins Umkills II!), 515 U.S. 70,92-93 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467,489-491 (1992).
4. See il!fra Part II.B.
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a desegregation plan in urban centers such as Detroit, MI, required an
analysis of the relationship between school policies,' faculty assignments
and other administrative practices that the state was responsible for, and
other causes of segregation, notably patterns of residence and demo-
graphic factors for which it was not." Social science evidence on these
matters became a standard feature of desegregation litigation and the use
of social science "experts" at both liability and remedy stages was routine.'
In cities such as Boston, MA, where elected school officials actively
opposed the desegregation orders of the federal court, district judges who
assumed direct responsibility for desegregation planning appointed social
science experts as their personal advisers, raising due process questions of
legitimacy and transparency in an adversarial context."
In Boston itself,Judge W. Arthur Garrity Jr., facing opposition on a
scale unprecedented outside of the South: saw desegregation as an op-
portunity to restructure the decayed public school system and chose
advisers who shared his commitment to "educational enhancernent.?" His
involvement continued for twenty years, but the educational outcomes
were frustrated by the countervailing imperative of "racial balance." In
terms of desegregation jurisprudence, the case was a "race case," not an
"education" case. II
5. For example construction. boundary changes. grade level and feeder pattern
changes
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See generally Anne Richardson Oakes. Legitimacy and the Court Expert: Narra-
tives of Impropriety in a Schools Desegregation Case (Nov. 2008)(unpublished draft
manuscript. on file with the author).
9. See RoNALD P. FORMISANO. BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE ClASS AND E1HNIc-
ITY IN THE 19605 AND 19705 (1991). The extent of the violence invited comparisons with
Little Rock. Arkansas: "Some observers. recalling a dramatic outburst of Southern
opposition to desegregation in 1957. now called Boston 'the Little Rock of the North.'''
Id. at 1. On September 2. 1957 Governor Orvil Faubus deployed the National Guard to
prevent nine black children from attending Little Rock Central High School. requiring
President Eisenhower to send in Federal troops to protect them and place the National
Guard under federal control. See Cooper v.Aaron. 358 U.S. 1.8-10 (1958).
10. In Morgan v. Hennigan. 379 F. Supp. 410. 480-81 (D. Mass. 1974),Judge Garrity
found that the Boston public school system was unlawfully segregated and announced his
Court desegregation plan in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530
E2d 401, 423 (1st Cir. 1976). He appointed as "court experts" Dr Robert Dentler and Dr
Marvin Scott. respectively Dean and Associate Dean of Education. Boston University. Id.
at 227.
11. Transcript of Hearing of April 10 1975, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216
(1975)(No. 72-911-G)(on file with the University of Massachusetts. Healy Library
Archives & Special Collections, Center for Law & Education Papers, Morgan & Hennigan
Case Records 1964-1994).Judge Garrity observed from the bench that "this is a race case,
not a school case primarily" and stated the issue that was going to give him the most
difficulty in formulating an order: Supreme Court jurisprudence protects equality not
education. He stated:
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A. The Paradox ojDesegregation Jurisprudence:
Integration and Discrimination
In 1979 after a decade of urban school desegregation, Judge Harvie
Wilkinson wrote that
The problem is that we are no longer certain what kind of
question public school desegregation really is. Twenty years ago
we were convinced it was a matter of showing southern school
segregation to be morally wrong. But with busing, good moral
arguments exist on both sides. To the extent that desegregation
has become less a moral question, or at least more a moral
standoff, it is also less clearly a constitutional requirement the
Supreme Court is entitled to impose. I!
The loss of faith with the desegregation process that took place in Boston
in the 1980s was underpinned by confusion about what exactly the proc-
ess of desegregation was intended to achieve. It raised questions about
what the Constitution might or might not require: how does a right not
to be discriminated against turn into a requirement for racial balance?
What is wrong with freedom of choice and the neighborhood school?
Why must children be bused and schools closed? The Boston plan incor-
porated specific provisions for educational enrichments, but the Court
refused to consider matters of teaching and learning or to take into ac-
count disparities in academic outcomes." When the burdens of busing,
school closures and teacher lay-offs appeared to fall disproportionately
upon the black community, their leaders returned to the issue Brown had
supposedly resolved and asked once again: what exactly is the relationship
between racial isolation and educational opportunity for African Ameri-
"What is protected? Equality is protected. The right to equal education. What that
means is that once the state undertakes to supply education, well, then it must be available
without discrimination among the races. There is a constitutional right to equal education.
That is what this case is all about." Id.
12. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE. THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-78132 (1979).
13. See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 11. Boston's prestigious examination
schools were not required to achieve the same degree of integration as the city's other
magnet schools although their selection policies, progression rates and teaching and learn-
ing methods were thought to disadvantage black students. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. at 243-
244. Robert Dentler took the view that the schools were educationally poor and recom-
mended to the judge that the schools be closed on educational grounds, but general
opposition forced him to withdraw his recommendation. He removed his advice to the
judge before the chambers papers went into the public domain, deposited with the Ar-
chives and Special Collections at the University of Massachusetts Healey Library in
Boston one year after the Morgan litigation was formally closed in 1997. Interview with
Robert Dentler in Boston, MA. (Sept. 14,2(05). Garrity's comments, noted supra note 11,
were typical of his approach to these issues.
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cans?" To seek answers to these questions in key aspects of this branch of
Equal Protection jurisprudence is to discover what desegregation analyst
David J. Armor has termed "the desegregation dilernma.?" namely the
apparent paradox that Brown v. Board cif Education, the case which declared
the constitutional incompatibility of racial discrimination, came itself to
require purposive racial discrimination as an aspect of effective relief."
As Professor Lino A. Graglia suggests, the history of the law of race
and schools since Brown has seen the Supreme Court convert a prohibi-
tion of segregation into a requirement of integration. \7 In the process, he
argues, a decision that stood as authority for a prohibition on all forms of
racial discrimination became the basis for a new form of racial discrimi-
nation." Public schools were required to conform to requirements of
racial balance." Access to schools was once again controlled by reference
to considerations of race." A constitutional mandate to desegregate to
prevent discrimination became the affirmative requirement to discrimi-
nate to secure integration, despite the assurance given contemporaneously
with Brown I that the Constitution did not require integration."
Most commentators have concluded that it was the need to provide
an effective remedy that pushed the Court in the direction of affirmative
action." Two challenges in particular required an effective response. The
first was the attempt by elected officials in Southern states to subvert the
effect of Brown, initially by outright opposition and then by adopting
policies that were overtly race-neutral but which operated in practice to
perpetuate segregation." Freedom of choice assignment plans fell into
that category." By 1968, noting that ten years after Brown a "freedom of
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATIONAND THE LAW 3
(1995).
16. Id.
17. See Lino A. Graglia, From Prohibiting Segregation to Requiring Integration:Develop-
ments in the Law cif Race and the Schools since Brown, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 69 (Walter G. Stephan & Joe R. Feagin eds., 1980)[hereinafi:er
Graglia, Developments]. See also LINO A. GRAGLlA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME
COURT'S DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (1976)[hereinafter Graglia, DISASTER BY
DECREE].
18.
19.
See Graglia, Developments, supra note 21 at 69-96.
Id.
20. Id.
21. Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 19ss)("Nothing in the Consti-
tution or in the decision [in Brown I] takes away from the people freedom to choose the
schools they attend. The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It
merely forbids discrimination.").
22. See Graglia, Developments, supra note 17 at 75; see also Armor, supra note IS, at
27-28.
23. Practices included the pupil placement laws and freedom of choice plans ex-
plained in Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,431-33 (1968).
24. See irifra note 26 and accompanying text.
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choice" policy had made virtually no changes to the racial composition of
the schools of New Kent County 01A),25 a unanimous court declared that
"such delays are no longer tolerable" and emphasized that school boards
had a duty to take affirmative action to take "whatever steps might be
necessary" to establish a "unitary non-racial system?"
The second challenge was the need to respond to segregation in ur-
ban areas where racially identifiable schools reflected residential
segregation coupled with neighborhood school policies. In a case from
North Carolina, the Court had accepted racial balance as a criterion of
desegregation and compulsory busing as an appropriate response to this
kind of situation." By the time that Judge Garrity came to order his re-
medial plan for Boston, compulsory reassignment of pupils to secure racial
balance in the public schools had become the norm in northern school
desegregation planning, despite its unpopularity with white parents whose
withdrawal to the suburbs made racial balance in urban schools virtually
impossible to achieve."
25. Under a Virginia pupil placement law adopted after Brown, students were auto-
matically reassigned to schools previously attended unless they specifically applied for
permission to change. See Green, 391 U.S. at 433.
26. See Green,391 U.S. at 437-438. The court further noted the following:
The New Kent School Board's "freedom-of-choice" plan cannot be ac-
cepted as a sufficient step to "effectuate a transition" to a unitary system. In
three years of operation not a single white child has chosen to attend Wat-
kins school and although 115 Negro children enrolled in New Kent school
in 1967 (up from 35 in 1965 and 111 in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in
the system still attend the all-Negro Watkins school. In other words, the
school system remains a dual system. Rather than further the dismantling of
the dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and their
parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School
Board. The Board must be required to formulate a new plan and, in the light
of other courses which appear open to the board, such as zoning, fashion
steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a
"white" school and a "Negro" school, but just schools.
See id. at 441-42.
27. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 22, 30 (1971).
28. See ~enerally Robert A. Dentler, School Desegregation Since Gunnar Myrdal's Ameri-
can Dilemma in ThE EDUCATIONOFAFRICANAMERICANS,27-49 (Charles Vert Willie et al.
eds., 1991); Gary Or6eld, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society 80
MINN. LAW REV. 825,825-873 (1996). The precise nature of the relationship between
mandatory desegregation plans and so-called "white flight" has been contested since
Coleman et al.'s 1975 study asserting a causal link. See JAMESS. COLEMANET Al., fuNDS IN
SEGREGATION1968-73 76-80(1975)(cited in Gary Or6eld, Metropolitan School Desegre~ation:
Impacts on Metropolitan Society 80 Minn. Law Rev. 825, 830 (1996»; see also Charles Vert
Willie & Michael Fultz, Comparative Analysis of Model School Desegregation Plans, in SCHOOL
DESEGREGATIONPLANSThATWORK,197-213 (CharlesVertWillie 1984).
IN SCHOOLDESEGREGATIONPLANSThAT WORK 163-173 (Charles Vert Willie ed.1984);
DAVIDJ. ARMOR,WHITE FLIGHTAND THEFUTUREOF SCHOOLDESEGREGATIONI SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION:PAST,PRESENT,AND FUTURE187-226 (Walter G. Stephan and Joe R.
FALL 2008] Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional Adjudication 67
Whatever the justification, it is undeniable that the objective of ra-
cial integration as a mechanism for enhancing the life opportunities
afforded to African Americans is, or ought to be, a social policy objective
requiring political decisions involving the allocation of public resources
and judgments as to what results could thereby be achieved. This is ex-
actly the kind of decision in respect of which politicians turn to the work
of social scientists, but it is not normally one within the purview of the
federal judge. In Brown v. Board cif Education, the Court appeared to require
federal judges to take on the task of implementing social policy objectives
for reasons which were not clear and in a manner which was not directly
articulated.29
In this Article, I explore the meaning of desegregation for both law-
yers and social scientists and its consequences for desegregation planning.
I argue that, whereas for social scientists desegregation was a process of
social change and required integration, for lawyers desegregation was a
remedy, its content shaped by the nature of the litigation process. That the
two conceptions of social science and law came together for a period of
twenty-five years or so following the Brown litigation should not divert
attention from the fundamental underlying differences containing within
themselves the basis for divergence and underpinning the reluctance of
current members of the Supreme Court to sanction race-conscious
remedies which are not directly linked to issues of constitutional fault."
In Part One I outline the general argument by reference to what I
term the "underlying imperatives" of social science and law. By this I refer
to the values of social policy reform and remedial process that underpin
these respective disciplines and which determine the disciplinary bounda-
ries within which solutions legitimate to that discipline must be framed.
The disciplines of law and social science were brought together as a mat-
ter of conscious policy on the part of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),31 the organization formed in
Feagin eds. 1980). For a recent overview, see Christine Rossell, The Effectivmess of Desegre-
~ation Plans, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATIONIN THE 21" CENTURY 67 (Christine H. Rossell et
al. eds., 2002). For the decline in numbers of white students in Boston public schools see
Robert A. Dentler, The Boston School Desegregation Plan in SCHOOL DESEGREGATIONPLANS
ThAT WORK 60-67 (Charles Vert Willie ed.1984) and RoBERT A. DENTLER & MARVIN B.
SCOTT, SCHOOLS ON TluAL: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF THE BOSTON DESEGREGATIONCASE 26
(1981).
29. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS:BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLEDHoPES paR RACIAL REFORM 18-19 (2004).
30. See,e.g.,Missouri v.Jenkins Uenkins II!), 515 U.S. 70 (1995)(Thomas,J., concur-
ring).
31. Technically, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund Inc., later known as the LDF set
up as a separate organization headed by Thurgood Marshall in 1939, achieved financial
independence in 1957 and finally broke with the NAACP in 1978 following an unsuc-
cessful lawsuit by the NAACP to compel the LDF to drop the NAACP initials from its
name. For a personal account see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: LEGAL
BATTLESOF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 517-24 (2004). For a history of the NAACP
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1909 which became the nation's premier civil rights organization, largely
because it recognized and harnessed the power of litigation to initiate
social change." Two issues relating to NAACP litigation strategy have
particular significance for the development of desegregation jurispru-
dence: the decision to litigate for integration as opposed to educational
equity and the strategic use of social science statements to lobby the US
Supreme Court.
In Part Two I consider the main contours of this strategic use by ref-
erence to four such statements. Sociologists Mark Chesler, Joseph Sanders
and Debra Kalmuss" have drawn on the influential work of Harvard pro-
fessor Abram Chaves" to argue that the effect of social science in schools
desegregation litigation has been the development of "new legal theory,"
in the course of which the remedial imperative may be said to have
moved from a "private law" conception of litigation as assertion of indi-
vidual rights in favor of a "public law" conception of litigation as
correction of social grievance." I consider whether social science concep-
tualizations of the harm of segregation and the benefits of integration can
be said to have influenced the Court's desegregation jurisprudence. I ar-
gue that, whereas some of the earlier decisions may be consistent with
such a view, in later years this is no longer the case. With the benefit of
hindsight I argue that the earlier cases represent the aberration and that,
with the disengagement cases of the 1990s, we see a reversion to a private
law model which probably never really went away and in respect of
which the capacity of social science to influence legal content is necessar-
ily circumscribed."
and its involvement in school desegregation cases see MINNIE FINCH, THE NAACP: Irs
FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (1981); LANGSTON HVGHES, FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: THE STORY OF THE
NAACP (1962); CIIARLES E KELLOGG,NAACP: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
IUR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (The Johns Hopkins Press 1973) (1967). The
LDF played no part in the Haston case but NAACP General Counsel Nathaniel Jones
acted for the black plaintiffs in Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), with
his successor Thomas Atkins taking over from Harvard Center for Law and Education
counsel Larry Johnson in the later stages of the litigation. For an account of the dispute
between attorneys Johnson and Atkins in the .\forgall consent decree negotiations see
Marsha Murninghan, Court Disengagement in the Boston Public Schools: Towards a The-
ory of Restorative Law (1983)(unpublished Ed D. thesis, Harvard University)(on file with
Birmingham City University Library, Birmingham City University).
32. RoBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUC..ATlON:CASTE, CULTURE
AND THE CONSTITUTION 51 (2003).
33. MARK. A. CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT: MOBILIZING EXPERTS IN
THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATIONCASES (1988).
34. See Abram Chayes, TIre Role £!f tileJudge ill Public LAw Litigation, 89 HARV.L. REV.
1281 (1976).
35. See CHESLER ET AL, supra note 33, at 27-61.
36. For the "disengagement cases," see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) and
Missouri v.Jenkins UetJkins 111),515 U.S. 70 (1995). See also discussion infra Part I1.C.
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I deal with the decision to press for integration as opposed to edu-
cational equity in Part Three when I return to this Article's opening
questions and consider the claim that Brown should have been decided
differently.
Whatever the impact of social science on the content of legal doc-
trine, in practical terms the remedial imperative inherent in the litigation
process required judges and social scientists to interact at the district court
level to construct a desegregation remedy," I return to the relationship
between social science and law in my conclusion. In the uncertain con-
tent of the term "desegregation" itself I identify a framework for analysis
that sees the court expert as fundamental to the process by which federal
district judges gave meaningful content on a pragmatic basis to the task of
desegregating the nation's schools.
I.LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN SCHOOLS DESEGREGATION
Much has been written about the underlying ambiguities of the
Brown I reasoning and the difficulty of identifying a constitutional justifi-
cation for the decision." In over-ruling the decision in Plessl9 which
underpinned the racial segregation laws of the South, the Supreme Court
made clear that, in the field of education, the doctrine of "separate but
equal" had no place" but failed to make clear the nature of segregation's
harm. Although, as Professor Ronald Dworkin has suggested," the scope
for reliance in constitutional adjudication upon matters of empirical evi-
dence is necessarily limited, the reference in footnote 11 of Brown I to the
research of seven social scientists on the social and psychological effects of
segregation upon black children has inaugurated a debate about the im-
pact of social science which continues to characterize school selection
jurisprudence to this day." Since Brown I lawyers have continued to argue,
with varying degrees of success, that the federal judiciary should take no-
tice of social science research regarding the causes and consequences of
37. See infra Conclusion.
38. See Owen M. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case--Its Significance for Northern
School Desegregation,38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697 (1971); see also Mark G. Yudof, School Desegrega-
tion: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Sdence Research in the Supreme Court,42
LAW& CONTEMP.PROBS.57 (1978);James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-out" School
Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM.L. REV. 1463 (1990); Herbert Wechsler, TowanJ Neutral
Prindples tif Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.L. REV. 1 (1959); Wilkinson, supra note 12.
39. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1895).
40. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. (Brown 1),347 U.S. 294 at 495 (1955).
41. Ronald M. Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences
tif Uncertainty, in EDUCATION,SOCIALSCIENCEAND TIlEJUDICIALPROCESS:AN INTERNA-
TIONALSYMPOSIUM19 (Ray C. Rist & RonaldJ.Anson eds., 1976).
42. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 127
S, Ct. 2738 (2007)(discussed infra Part II.B).
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racial isolation and its impact upon the psychological and educational de-
velopment of African American children.~1
The result has been the emergence of what Judge John Minor Wis-
dom has referred to as a "love match" between social science and law.H
Lawyers have relied upon social science research to substantiate claims of
constitutional harm and the effectiveness of the desired relief; social scien-
tists have provided the empirical bases upon which schools cases have
been fought." Social scientists have addressed federal courts on matters
such as the changing demographic patterns of cities, the causes of "white
flight," the relationship between state policy, patterns of residence and the
racial identifiability of schools 46 and the extent to which the under-
achievement of African American children constitutes a "lingering ves-
tige" of discrimination." In this kind of litigation more than almost any
other, lawyers have looked to social science to translate issues of social fact
into constitutional issues and constitutional requirements into social
remedies.
As Charles T. Clotfelter" points out, however, it is important to bear
in mind that lawyers and social scientists have different conceptions of
what constitutes segregation and what the process of desegregation might
require:" In social science research, the term "segregation" is used de-
scriptively. Segregation occurs when black children are educated
separately from white children. In this sense, the terms "segregation" and
"racial isolation" are synonymous and integration is the appropriate social
policy response. SI) For lawyers, however, segregation refers to state-
mandated or sponsored discrimination on the grounds of race, accord-
ingly violating the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee. To
be successful, a plaintiff must establish an element of fault on the part of
the state or state actors and seek a remedy specifically tailored to respond
to harm that is a direct consequence of the constitutional violation." It is
43. See i'!fra Part II.
44. John M. Wisdom, Random Remarks on the Roll' of Social Sciences in the Judicial
Dedsion-making Process in &11001 Dese~,egation Cases, 39 LAW AND CONTEMP.PROBS. 134,
142 (1975).
45. See discussion infta Part II.
46. Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v. Penick. 443 u.s. 449 (1979).
47. Missouri v.Jenkins Uenkins II!), 515 U.S.70 (1995).
48. CHARLEST. CWTFELTER,AFfER BROWN:THERISE AND RETREATOFSCHOOLDE-
SEGREGATION201 (2004).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Justice O'Connor on equal protection analysis in Adarand Constructors. Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200. 226 (1995)("All racial classifications. imposed by whatever federal,
state or local government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scru-
tiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests."). See also Gruner v. Bollinger.
539 U.S. 306, 308-09 (2003).
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the legal emphasis on issues of causation that ties this branch of Equal
Protection jurisprudence to the empirical evidence afforded by social sci-
ence research.
A. The Differing Imperatives of Social Science and LAw
Although the term does not appear in either case, desegregation fol-
lowing the Brown decisions came to represent the American commitment
to deliver on the promise of equal opportunity for all. The process of pub-
lic school reform brought together social scientists and lawyers with
different understandings of what the word meant and what the purpose
of the exercise might be. I argue here that these differences reflect the
fundamentally different imperatives of social science and law.
As education professor Diane Ravitch points out," the way in
which words are defined "is far more than a semantic exercise" but reflects
important underlying assumptions concerning values and policy goals."
To that extent, the act of definition becomes in itself a statement of policy
with the capacity to have important strategic consequences. I argue that,
whereas both professionals speak in terms of desegregation as process, for
social scientists the underlying imperative is one of social change requir-
ing integration measured in terms of racial balance S. and inter-racial
exposure. 55 The integration imperative is underpinned by what Armor has
termed the "harm-benefit thesis of social science," i.e. the thesis "that
school segregation is harmful and desegregation is beneficial to the edu-
cational and social outcomes of schooling.?" On this view, full integration
in terms of student population, faculty and educational programs, and also
of resource allocation, addresses the psychological and educational harm
of segregation and enables African American children to compete on an
equal footing not just in the classroom but also in terms of wider life op-
portunities. In social policy terms, integration was the way to respond to
the disparity between the condition of "the Negro?" in American society
52. Diane Ravitch, Desegregation: Ulrieties of Meaning, in SHADESOF BROWN:NEW
PERSPECTIVESONSCHOOLDESEGREGATION31 (Derrick Bell ed .• 1980).
53. Id.
54. This ties the racial mix of a school to that of its surrounding district within
specified permissible limits of deviation. See Armor. supra note 15. at 159 (noting that
what is important is the possibility of "meaningful interracial contact"); see also Clotfelter.
supra note 48. at 201.
55. This measures the extent to which white children and black children are able to
mix with each other in the same school or classroom. See Christine H. Rossell, The Effec-
tiveness of School Desegregation Plans. in SCHOOLDESEGREGATIONIN THE 'IWEN1Y-FIRST
CENTURY75 (Christine H. Rossell et al. eds .• 2002).
56. Armor. supra note 15, at 4.
57. Iuse this term self-consciously to reflect contemporary usage.
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and the American ideal of equal opportunity for all, which Gunnar Myr-
dal had identified as representative of the" American dilemma.";x
For lawyers, however, the process of desegregation is remedial and
governed by what are well-understood constraints concerning the nature
and limits of remedial relief. The underlying imperative is that of legiti-
macy, the need to keep within the proper compass of the law and of
judicial process that ultimately must tie judicial intervention to the reme-
dial process.
The judicial function in constitutional litigation is to declare the na-
ture and extent of constitutional rights and to provide a remedy that must
be tailored to the nature of the right. Attention to the requirement of le-
gitimacy in constitutional adjudication must also require a court to pay
due respect to the limitations that considerations of federalism and the
separation of powers place on the nature and extent of the judicial role,
issues I deal with elsewhere. s. In this Article, I refer primarily to those
aspects of legitimacy arising out of the nature of the remedial process
which can be expressed by reference to the maxim ubi ius ibi remedium
(Where there is a right there must be a remedy)." The principle has two
related ideas: the existence of an actionable right which will usually re-
quire the identification of fault on the part of a defendant, and the
requirement for a remedy which must address the fault either by giving
effect to expectations which have been aroused or, more usually, by pro-
viding recompense or restitution in respect of loss which has been
sustained. fil
In lawyers' terms, desegregation is a remedy for a constitutional vio-
lation. The action is usually couched in terms of the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which
provides that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
58. GUNNAR MYRDAl,AN AMERICANDILEMMA:THE NEGROPROBLEMANDMODERN
DEMOCRACYxlvii (1944).
The ever-raging conflict between on the one hand, the valuations preserved
on the general plane which we shall call the "American creed," where the
American thinks, talks and acts under the influence of high national and
Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes
of individual and group living, where personal and local interests; economic,
social and sexual jealousies; considerations of community prestige and con-
formity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of persons or
types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses and habits
dominate his outlook.
Id. at xii.
59. See Oakes, supra note 8.
60. See Marbury v.Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
61. Id.
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the equal protection of the laws.?" The question then is: what constitutes
the violation and what must be done for the purpose of affording relief?
In Brown I, the Court's declaration was clear but its reasoning am-
biguous. State-mandated separate provision of schooling for black and
white children must cease because a) separation offends the Constitution
per se;63b) governmental discrimination by race causes psychological dam-
age to black children b4 and c) governmental discrimination by race
deprives black children of the educational benefits of mixing with white
children." Brown II directed federal courts to supervise the implementa-
tion of the remedial process but was similarly vague as to how this was to
be done." The Court invoked the exercise of equitable discretion but gave
little guidance to federal judges as to how that discretion was to be exer-
cised."
Since then the Court has attempted to provide remedial guidelines
that, at times, have been couched in the very widest terms. It has author-
ized desegregation plans for racial balance, 68 compulsory busing, 69
magnetic schools and programs" and even programs of educational en-
hancement," apparently on the basis that it shared the social science view
of the curative effects of racial integration although it has never made this
clear. The Court has, however, continued to assert, as it did in Swann, the
remedial imperative that "the nature of the violation determines the scope
of the remedy?" In other words, the issue of fault as defined in legal
terms remains central to the definition of the remedy. Thus in the absence
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 1.
63. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1),347 U.S. 294 at 495 (1955)(stating that "Sepa-
rate educational facilities are inherently unequal.").
64. Id. at 494. "To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown
1,347 U.S. at 494.
65. Id. at 493 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and Mclaurin v. Okla.
State Regents for High Educ. Et al., 339 U.S. 637, 438 (1950» (discussing the "intangible"
benefits for a law student of mixing with white students, i.e "his ability to study, to engage
in discussions and exchange views with other students and, in general. to learn his profes-
sion.").
66. Brown v.Bd, ofEduc. (Brown 11),349 U.S. at 300 (1955).
67. Id.
68. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc .• 402 U.S. 1,23-25 (1971).
69. Id.
70. Missouri v.Jenkins Uenkins 11).495 U.S. 33 (1990). '''Magnet schools' as gener-
ally understood, are public schools of voluntary enrollment designed to promote
integration by drawing students away from their neighborhoods and private schools
through distinctive curricula and high quality." Id. at 40.
71. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11),433 U.S. 267 (1977).
72. Swann,402 U.S. at 16.
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of fault, as the Court made clear in Swann" and again in Keyes,74 issues of
racial isolation or the under-performance of African American children
are simply not the Court's concern."
In legal process of this kind it is, of course, the plaintiff who seeks
relief and the role of the court to that extent is passive; it either grants or
refuses to grant the relief sought. In this connection and with the benefit
of hindsight, the decision of the NAACP to abandon claims for "equal
education" and press for "racial integration" has been criticized." Profes-
sor Derrick Bell goes so far as to offer an alternative response to Brown
which would have upheld the legality of Plessy, specifically for the pur-
pose of giving full effect to its premise of "equality?" I offer a brief
outline of NAACP strategy and deal with Bell's arguments below."
My argument in general terms is that, for a period of twenty-five
years or so following Brown, the social science imperative of integration
and the legal remedial imperative coincided in the identification of racial
balance or integration as the appropriate remedy for segregated schools.
Desegregation during this period meant integration, and integration
could justify race-conscious action. The coincidence was, however, tem-
porary and was undermined as demographic changes coupled with white
flight frustrated the attempt to integrate and cast doubt upon the assump-
tions that racial integration per se was a necessary aspect of equal
education. New questions were asked concerning the extent to which the
continuing academic under-achievement of African Americans should be
regarded as a "vestige" of discrimination sufficient to warrant the adoption
of affirmative action policies and the retention of court supervision. As
social scientists argued amongst themselves, the causal value of their re-
search in legal terms was correspondingly reduced. Reluctant to act on
the basis of an inconclusive "pedagogical sociology?" and anxious to set
limits to the duration of the remedial process, the Rehnquist Court
turned to those other aspects of legitimacy, federalism (or states' rights)
and the separation of powers to justify federal court disengagement."
73. Id. "Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially or-
dering assignment of students on a racial basis." Id. at 28.
74. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
75. Id.
76. Notably by law professor and former NAACP counsel Derrick Bell. For an
overview of his contribution to the literature of so-called "Critical Race Scholarship" see
James R. Hackney Jr., Derrick Bell's Re-Sounding: WE.Du Bois, Modernism and Critical Race
Scholarship,23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 141 (1998).
77. BELL,supra note 29, at 20.
78. See infra Part I.B.
79. Jenkins By Agyei v. Missouri, 19 E 3d 393,404 (8th Cir. 1994)(Beam,J., dissent-
ing).
80. See i'!/TaPart 11.0.
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The result was that the jurisprudence of schools desegregation re-
turned to the more familiar territory of the "color-blind Constitution?"
and the negative imperative of non-discrimination by reference to race."
No longer prepared to accept that integration per se constituted a legiti-
mate constitutional goal, the Court struck down affirmative action
policies unlinked to official segregative action." The re-appearance of ra-
cially-identifiable schools in a way that reflects demographic issues, as
opposed to intentional state discrimination, has been termed "resegrega-
tion" and the accusation made that the Court has betrayed the legacy of
Brown."
B. Resegregation and Race-Conscious Policies
The issue of so-called resegregation perpetuates the dialogue be-
tween social science and law by posing new constitutional questions
about the harms of racial isolation and the benefits of integration." In
cities where active court supervision of the desegregation process has
ceased, school boards which have voluntarily adopted race-conscious as-
signment policies or quotas have been challenged in the courts by white
students denied a place at over-subscribed schools on the grounds of their
race." The ensuing litigation once again raises the social policy questions
concerning the educational purpose of racial integration which were not
answered in Brown I: is integration a necessary ingredient of equal educa-
tion? Or conversely: what is the harm of racial isolation and how will
integration advance the educational opportunities of minority children?
81. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896)(Harlan,J., dissenting); see also
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2782
(2007)(Thomas,]., concurring).
82. See Adarand Constructors,lnc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond
v.].A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
83. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 469.
84. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD& SUSANE. EATON,DISMANTLINGDESEGREGATION:THE
QUIETREVERSALOFBROWNV. BOARDOFEDUCATION(1996); DERRICKBELL,SILENTCOVE-
NANTS:BROWNv. BOARDOFEDUCATIONAND THEUNFULFILLEDHoPES FORRACIALREFORM
(2004); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education:
the Court's Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003).
85. See infraPart II.
86. See McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm .• 938 E Supp. lOOt (D. Mass. 1996) (dis-
cussing Boston School Committee policy); see alsoWessmann v. Gittens, 160 E 3d. 790 (1st
Cir.1998); Anderson v. City of Boston. 375 F.3d 7t (1st Cir. 2004); Boston's Children First
v. Boston Sch. Comm. (BCF IV). 260 F. Supp. 2d 318 (D. Mass. 2003); Boston's Children
First v. Boston Sch. Comm. (BCF II1),183 E Supp. 2d 382 (D. Mass. 2002); Boston's Chil-
dren First v. City of Boston (BCF 11), 98 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D. Mass. 2000); Boston's
Children First v. City of Boston (BCF 1). 62 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D. Mass. 1999).
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II. LOBBYING THE SUPREME COURT: THE "HARM-BENEFIT THESIS"
AS LITIGATION STRATEGY
The two affirmative action cases from Seattle and Kentucky that
have recently come before the Supreme Court represent the latest attempt
in the endeavor to link social science research with constitutional or legal
imperative.Y The court was asked to test the issue of constitutionality of
race-conscious admissions policies by reference to the harm prevented
and the goal achieved." The school boards argued that racial balance is
necessary in order to enhance the educational opportunities of African
American children.TThe white parents' groups, the petitioners in these
cases, opposed this on the grounds of unconstitutional racial preference."
At issue, once again, was the alleged "harm" of racial isolation and the
educational benefits of integration. The court was asked to consider ex-
actly what the constitutional relationship was between racial integration
and the equal opportunities of African American children. 'II
As has become typical in schools cases, the litigation set expert
against expert. The school authorities' argument that race-conscious poli-
cies promote educational benefit was supported by an amicus curiae brief
submitted by 553 social scientists who testified to the educational benefits
of racially integrated schools and the harmful educational implications of
racial isolation." In a rival brief for the plaintiffs, social scientist and de-
segregation expert Armor together with the academics Thernstrom and
Thernstrom critically reviewed the research in the field, concluding that
evidence of either a short-term or a long-term benefit of integration is
simply lacking."] There is, in their view, "no evidence of a clear and con-
sistent relationship either between desegregation and academic
achievement" or "between desegregation and such long-term outcomes as
college attendance, occupational status, and wages ... :,9~In terms of social
outcomes such as "racial attitudes, prejudice, race relations and inter-racial
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127 S. Ct. 273887.
(2007).
88.
89.
90.
91.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 2746.
Id.
92. Brief for 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1-2,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos.OS-
908,05-915).
93. Brief for David J. Armor et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Par-
ents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-
908,05-915).
94. Id.
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contact," they suggest that the impact of racial balancing policies on white
students is likely to be negative."
The Seattle and Kentucky brief represented the fifth in a series of
statements submitted to the Supreme Court in schools cases, starting with
Brown I where Earl Warren's footnoted reference to the work of social
scientists began a debate concerning the influence of social science on
Supreme Court jurisprudence in school desegregation cases."
A. The Topeka Brief and the Harm ifSegregation
The NAACP argument as set out in the Appellate Brief submitted
to the Supreme Court on behalf of the Plaintiffs made two assertions
claimed to represent the consensus of social scientists: 1) Distinctions or
classifications based upon race or color reflect a myth of Negro inferiority
which has no basis in fact, and 2) State-enforced segregation harms the
psychological development of African American children who interpret
separation as connoting inferiority and are deprived of the benefits of an
integrated education."
Attached to the brief in the form of an appendix was a social sci-
ence statement with 32 signatories who claimed to be "some of the
foremost authorities in the area of American race relations.?" representing
a spectrum of expertise from sociology and anthropology to psychology
and psychiatry.
The decision of NAACP lawyers to use social science to mount a
direct attack on the constitutionality of segregated education has been
well-documented." The so-called ''Jim Crow" laws I()() of the South were
legitimated by the Supreme Court decision in PlessylOl which held that
95. Id.
96. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1).347 U.S. 483, 495 n.ll (1954).
97. Brief for Appellants at 5, Oliver Brown, et al., Appellants, v. Bd. of Educ. of
Topeka, KS et al.. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (No.1).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., HERBERT HILL & JACK GREENBERG,CITlZEN'S GUIDE TO DESEGREGATION:
A STUDYOF SOCIAL AND LEGALCHANGE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1955); RICHARD KWGER, SIM-
PLE JUSTICE: ThE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BUCK AMERICA'S
STRUGGLEfOR EQUALITY 555-557 (1975)(describing fissures within NAACP over the use
of social science data); MARK V. ThSHNET, ThE NAACP's LEGALSTRATEGYAGAINST SEGRE-
GATEDEDUCATION. 1925-1950 (1987)(describing early stages of litigation that led to the
1954 decision in Brown);JuAN WILLIAMS,ThURGOOD MARSHALL:AMERICANREvOWTIONARY
197-205 (1998)(describing NAACP's decision to submit psychologist Kenneth Clark's
"doll study" as evidence of segregation's harmful effect on black children); Louis Menand,
Civil Actions: Brown v. Board of Education and the Umits of Law, NEW YORKER, Feb. 12 2001,
at 91.
100. See, e.g.,C. VANN WOODWARD,ThE STRANGECAREER OFJIM CROW (2001)(classic
account of these state laws).
101. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 544 (1895).
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separate facilities for blacks were not inherently objectionable: "laws per-
mitting, and even requiring, [racial] separation ... do not necessarily
imply the inferiority of either race to the other.,,102Moreover, the Court
held that while the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to en-
force equality before the law, "it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as opposed to political
equality'?" Enforced racial separation connotes black inferiority only be-
" hid h h . . ,,1()4cause t e co ore race c ooses to put t at construction upon It.
Early NAACP challenges had had some success in requiring states
to eliminate substantial disparities in the provision of facilities and educa-
tional opportunities, but left intact the racist assumptions upon which
Plessy rested. lOS Under the leadership of Thurgood Marshall, NAACP law-
yers worked with social scientists to develop a strategy which would
disrupt these assumptions by demonstrating a) that the biology of race
and racial inferiority was unsound, b) that the causes of racial inequality
were social and economic, and c) that segregative practices reflecting sci-
entifically unsound assumptions reinforced the psychological perceptions
of young black children concerning their own inferiority and so operated
as a structure of subordination. "•.
The "sociological argument" that they developed drew heavily upon
the work of sociologists such as Kenneth and Mamie Clark, whose "doll
studies" indicated the negative effects of racism on young children.!" and
Gunnar Myrdal, whose American Dilemma (1944) had done much to fa-
miliarize the American public with sociological arguments concerning
the connection between race and social oppression. lOR In sociological
terms, the argument went, equalization of resources and materials in a
dual system would not of itself provide black children with an equal edu-
cation because black schools, however well-resourced, would continue to
102. Id. at 544.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Missouri ex tel. Gaines v. Canada. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The Gaines court
believed that the "separate but equal" doctrine rested "wholly upon the equality of the
privileges which the laws give to the separated groups within the State." Id. at 349. Mis-
souri's failure to provide a law school for blacks constituted a manifest denial of equal
protection. even though the State offered the black applicant a scholarship to attend a law
school in an adjoining State. Id. at 345. "The basic consideration is not as to what sort of
opportunities other States provide. or whether they are as good as those in Missouri. but as
to what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white students and denies to negroes
solely upon the ground of color." Id. at 349.
106. See sourcescited supra note 99.
107. See, e.~.• Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie K. Clark. Segrr~ation as a Factor in the Racial
Ident!fication of Ne~ro Pre-scllool Children: A Preliminary Report. 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL ED. 161
(1939). For further discussion see COTTROl ET M .• supra note 32. at 124. See also Kluger.
supra note 99.
108. Myrdal, supra note 58.
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be regarded as inferior.?" Calculation of the "harm" of segregation was
more than a matter of resources; the intangible social and economic con-
sequences rendered a dual system inherently discriminatory.
The Topeka arguments were trialed in two cases (Sweatt and McLAu-
rinllo) which preceded the Brown litigation and reached the Supreme
Court in 1950. NAACP lawyers assembled expert testimony from social
scientists, sociologists, psychologists and educators, all testifying to the po-
tential of segregation to cause psychological harm.": The novelty of the
approach was recognized in the opening words of the Sweatt Petitioner's
Brief:
This case is believed to present for the first time in this Court
a record in which the issue of the validity of a state constitu-
tional or statutory provision requiring the separation of the
races in professional schools is clearly raised. It is the first re-
cord which contains expert testimony and other convincing
evidence showing the lack of any reasonable basis for racial
• 112segregation ....
The argument had some success. Both Sweatt and Mcl.autin were
"equalization" cases and the Court was not required to address directly
the constitutionality of Piessy:" Nevertheless, by emphasizing the impor-
tance of "intangible" benefits as an aspect of equality, the Court signaled
its receptiveness to the sociological argument. In Sweatt, where a black
applicant was denied access to the University of Texas Law School, the
court referred to qualities "which are incapable of objective measurement
but which make for greatness in a law school", and included matters such
as "reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position
and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige", as aspects of equal educational opportunity!" In Mcl.autin,
Chief Justice Vinson for the Court laid particular emphasis upon the need
for black students to mix with their white counterparts.!" Thus when
109. See sources cited supra note 99.
110. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Mclaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637,
641 (1950).
111. See Kluger, supra note 99, at 256 (discussing the trial court evidence). In Sweatt 11.
Painter, the court received evidence on the psychological effects of segregation from
Robert Redfield, Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Chicago.
An amicus brief submitted on behalf of a group of 187 law professors (The Committee of
Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education) made the argument that racial seg-
regation was unconstitutional per se. See Kluger, supra note 99, at 275; see also Tushnet, supm
note 99, at 70, 82,105.
112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)(No. 2).
113. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950).
114. Id. at 634.
115. Mclaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950). "Our society grows increas-
ingly complex, and our need for trained leaders increases correspondingly. Appellant's case
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shortly afterwards the NAACP Board of Directors announced its resolu-
tion to seek desegregation in all future education cases, the structure of
the arguments which were later deployed in Brown I was largely in
I 116pace.
Whether the decision of the Supreme Court was thereby influenced
is a matter of some debate. 117 The words of Chief Justice Warren are well-
known: "to separate [children] from others of a similar age and qualifica-
tions solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
lik 1 b d ,,118 H' . f h I 119way un ley ever to e un one. IS quotation 0 t e ower court
and the famous footnote eleven which referenced the work of seven so-
cial scientists'" to support his rejection of Plessy invited an affirmative
conclusion from which he himself subsequently backtrackedl21 and which
represents the epitome of that need, for he is attempting to obtain an advanced degree in
education, to become, by definition, a leader and trainer of others. Those who will come
under his guidance and influence must be directly affected by the education he receives.
Their own education and development will necessarily suffer to the extent that his train-
ing is unequal to that of his classmates. State imposed restrictions which produce such
inequalities cannot be sustained." Id.
116. In July 1950 following a conference of lawyers convened by Marshall to "map
... the legal machinery for an all-out attack" on segregation. See Tushnet, supra note 99, at
136.
117. See Sanjay Mody. Note. Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science
and the Supreme Courtj Questfor Legitimacy, 54 STAN.L. REV. 793 (2002).
118. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1),347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
119.
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detri-
mental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has
the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually inter-
preted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority
affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of
law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental devel-
opment of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they
would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system".
Id.
120. Id. at 495, FN11. (citing Kenneth B. Clark, ADDRESS AT THE MID-CENTURY
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH: ThE EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND
DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITYDEVELOPMENT (1950); PERSONALITYIN THE MAKING
(Helen Leland Witmer & Ruth Kotinsky eds., 1952); Max Deutscher & lsidor Chein, The
Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation:A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 j.PSYCHOL.
259 (1948); Isidor Chein, What are the PsychologicalEffects of Segregation Under Conditions of
Equal Facilities], 3 (NT'L.J. OPINION AND ATTITUDE REs. 229 (1949); ThEODORE BRAMELD,
EDUCATIONALCOSTS IN DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL WELFARE44-48 (MacIver ed.,
1949); FRANKLINE. FRAZIER,ThE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES674-681 (1949); and
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICANDILEMMA:ThE NEGRO PROBLEMAND MODERN DEMOC-
RACY(1949)).
121. Kluger, supra note 99. at 706 (stating "it was only a footnote, after all.").
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has garnered opposition from both contemporary and subsequent aca-
demic commentators.?"
As Dworkin and others have commented, the task of constitutional
adjudication is a search for values that should not depend on matters of
empirical research, particularly when researchers themselves do not
agree.123The validity of the "doll studies" upon which the Topeka brief
had drawn was itself challenged more or less immediately by subsequent
researchers,124while the Coleman Report of 1966 sponsored by the u.s.
Office of Education failed to find either the expected resource dispari-
ties between black schools and white schools or a discernible
relationship between distribution of resources and academic achieve-
ment.m Its conclusion, that the major causes of under-achievement of
both blacks and whites lay not in segregation but in the socio-economic
class of their parents, undermined the harm-benefit thesis which pro-
duced the Topeka argument and brought about a split in the social science
community. I2b In the years that followed, social scientists were no longer
necessarily prepared to testify that racial separation constituted a denial of
al d . al . 127equ e ucanon opportumty.
Nevertheless, the Topeka statement set a strategic precedent that was
followed in the years after Brown as the focus of desegregation moved to
the north where there was no overtly discriminatory legislation. Here the
NAACP needed social scientists to establish the causal connections be-
tween official policy and school and faculty composition required for a
finding of constitutional violation.
122. See Mody, supra note 117 (discussing the literature).
123. See Dworkin, supra note 41, at 24; see also Edmond Cahn, A Dangerous Myth in
the School Desegregation Cases,30 N.Y.V. L. Rev. 150, 157-58 (1955)("[1] would not have
the constitutional rights of Negroes-or of other Americans-rest on any such flimsy
foundation as some of the scientific demonstrations in these records"); Herbert Wechsler,
Towards Neutral Principlesof Constitutional Law,73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
124. See Roy L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES
70 (3rd ed. Carolina Academic Press 2005) (1950) (discussing research critical of the "doll
studies"). The "doll studies" conducted by Professor Kenneth Clark and his wife and fel-
low psychologist Mamie, claimed that black children in New York when given a choice of
playing with a black or white doll showed a clear preference for the white doll. When
asked to draw "the nice doll" the children again opted for the white. The Clarks drew the
conclusion that black children in a segregated school system suffered from a sense of self-
rejection and a loss of self-worth. Seegenerally Kluger, supra note 106,at 317-18.
125. Armor, supra note 15, at 66. (discussingJames.S Coleman et al., Equality ofEdu-
cational Opportunity (1966».
126. Professor Coleman himself refused to testify from this data in support of deseg-
regation. See Chesler et al., supra note 33, at 41-43.
127. Id.
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B. Social Science and Desegregating the North: The Columbus Brie] and
"The H-eb cif Institutional Discriminations"
The hope that the Supreme Court would extend recognition of the
social science harm-benefit thesis to the schools of the North, where ra-
cial identifiability reflected the heavy concentrations of the black urban
population rather than state-mandated racial separation, evaporated after
the Court ruled in Keyes that de facto segregation was not a constitutional
violation per se.128 Chesler et al. describe Keyes as "the last nail in the coffin
of the harm theory of northern school desegregation.v'" Although, as
Justice Powell pointed out, social science research confirmed that segrega-
tion in biracial metropolitan areas is largely a function of residential
patterns,130the Supreme Court majority was not prepared to accept that
racial separation per se offended the Constitution. 131 What was required
was an officially mandated or produced dual system, involving proof of
two things: segregative purpose causing segregative effect.':" Causal analy-
sis assumed central importance in northern schools desegregation
jurisprudence: "where Plaintiffs proved that the school authorities had
carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial
portion of the students, schools, teachers and facilities within the school
system, it is only common sense to conclude that there exists a predicate
for a finding of a dual school system,"!" Following the Detroit schools
case1.14 which was the immediate predecessor for the Boston case, social
science testimony on the causes and effects of racial separation and par-
ticularly the interrelationship between schools and their surrounding
neighborhoods became a standard feature of NAACP-LDF litigation
128. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1.413 U.S 189.208 (1973).
129. Chesler et al., supra note 33. at 46.
130. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 222-23 (Powell. J.. concurring in part and dissenting in
part)("[T]he familiar root cause of segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas
of our country is essentially the same: one of segregated residential and migratory patterns
the impact of which on the racial composition of the schools was often perpetuated and
rarely ameliorated by action of public school authorities. This is a national, not a southern.
phenomenon. And it is largely unrelated to whether a particular State had or did not have
segregative school laws.").
131. Keyes.413 U.S. at 205.
132. Id. at 205. 208 (stating that "the essential elements of de jure segregation [are)
stated simply, a current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action ...
"[w)e emphasize that the differentiating factor between dejure segregation and so-called de
facto segregation ... is purpose or intent to segregate."). See also Washington v. Davis. 426
U.S. 229. 240 (1976).
133. Keyes,413U.S.at201.
134. Bradley v. Milliken. 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971) was decided at the dis-
trict court level on September 27. 1971. It reached the U.S. Supreme Court for the first
time in 1974 in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1).418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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strategy, not simply in relation to issues of liability but also to support a
I· f id d 135C aim or a systern-wi e reme y.
The Keyes court had been generous in one respect: the Court held
that a finding of intentional discrimination in one part of the school sys-
tem gave rise to a presumption that the discrimination is system wide,
shifting the burden to the school authorities to prove that segregated
schools were not "the result of intentionally segregative acts.,,!36However,
when the Detroit case reached the Supreme Court in 1974, causal analysis
moved centre-stage as the Court refused a metropolitan solution to a
city-district problem.!" The plan, which involved busing from the (black)
city to the ( J.Vhite) suburbs, was not acceptable because the out-of-district
suburbs were not implicated in the urban-district violation.l" A remedy
which involved desegregation across district lines was only permissible
where the plaintiffs could show "a constitutional violation within one
district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district,"!"
Two cases from Ohio in which the Court was asked to sanction sys-
tem-wide remedial plans were the occasion for the second social science
statement submitted to the Supreme Court.!" In Dayton I the court,
while emphasizing the importance of tying relief to acts of discrimination,
was prepared to recognize the existence of an "incremental segregative
effect" which might justify a system-wide remedy" When Dayton IIand
Columbus!42 reached the Supreme Court on the remedy issue, the Social
Science Statement attached as an appendix to the Columbus Respondents'
Brief43 had 38 signatories, whose background was not psychology or so-
cial psychology as in Brown, but who were primarily identifiable as
sociologists, or political or educational scientists.!" The purpose was to
135. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
136. Keyesv.Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S 189,208 (1973).
137. Milliken 1,418 U.S.at 744-45.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton 11),443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S.449 (1979).
141. Dayton Bd. ofEduc. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (Rehnquist,J.,
dissenting). Rhenquist stated that "[When a constitutional violation has been found] the
District Court [... ] must determine how much incremental segregativeeffect these viola-
tions had on the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presendy
constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence
of such constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed to redress that difference,
and only if there has been a systemwide impact may there be a system wide remedy." Id.
at 420 (citing Keyes, 413 U.S. 526 (1979».
142. Dayton II,443 U.S.526; Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v. Penick, 443 U.S.449 (1979).
143. Brief for Respondents, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449
(1979)(No.78-61O).
144. See Chesler et al., supra note 33, at 25. The list of signatories included Robert A.
Dentler.
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lend support to the NAACP claim for a system-wide remedy by asserting
the cumulative effect of a "web of institutional discriminations" as the
basic cause of school and residential segregation.!" The statement recast
the "harm-benefit" thesis into three basic claims: 1) that patterns of resi-
dential segregation were attributable to the actions of public authorities,
including school boards; 2) that the relationship between school segrega-
tion and residential segregation was interdependent, and 3) that
neighborhood school policies and attendance zones which produce ra-
cially identifiable schools can and do contribute to residential segregation
and thus can be regarded as discriminarory." In a section headed "Con-
clusions Social Science Can and Cannot Supply," the social scientists set
out two important caveats: 1) the cumulative effect for which they were
arguing was not susceptible to a "but for" test (i.e. would the segregation
have occurred "but for" the discriminatory acts complained of),147and 2)
there was an absence of consensus about matters such as the terms of the
debate, the appropriate measurement techniques and theoretical formula-
tions and the trustworthiness of empirical results.!"
The assertion of "an emerging consensus" concerning a preference
for system-wide relief was apparently enough for the Dayton II and Co-
lumbus majorities 1<" (there is no direct or indirect reference to the
statement in the majority opinion in either case), but not for Justice
Rehnquist whose criticism of the district court's "cavalier approach to
causality and purpose" continued to emphasize the importance of a "but
for" approach to issues of violation and remedy. ISO Thus awareness of a
likely segregative effect should not be regarded as intentional discrimina-
tion, and remedies must be tailored to the violation. In his view "the
fundamental mission of [desegregation] remedies is to restore those inte-
grated educational opportunities that would now exist but for
purposefully discriminatory school board conduct,"!"
145. Brieffor Respondents. mpra note 148.Appendix at 13a.
146. See id. at 3a. 7a. 10a-14a.
147. Id. at 18a. The brief argues: "[sJocial scientists cannot answer such questions with
precision. The questions can be rephrased to call for stating what the present would be like
if the past had differed in certain specified respects. This is reminiscent of the grand 'what
if' games of history [... J The present state of empirical knowledge and models of social
change does not permit precise specification of the effects of removing particular historical
actions. Although many of the causes of segregated outcomes are known. this knowledge is
not so thoroughly quantified as to permit precise estimates of the effects of specific dis-
criminatory acts on general patterns of segregation." Id. at 19a.
148. Id. at 25a.
149. Id. Research indicated that system-wide desegregation plans which minimize
the possibility of "white-flight" were more successful at establishing stability in student
enrolments and thus more likely to succeed than plans which were limited "to the imme-
diate vicinity of a ghetto or barrio." Id. at 25a-26a.
150. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,515 (1979).
151. Id. at 524 (Rehnquisr.]., dissenting).
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C. The Harm-Benefit Thesis and Unitary Status:
The Freeman and Jenkins Briefs
85
The inability of social science to provide precise answers to ques-
tions concerning the exact relationship between specific discriminatory
acts and their alleged lingering effects significantly limited the utility of
the "harm-benefit" thesis in the termination cases of the 1990s. In Brown
II the Court directed school boards "to effectuate a transition to a racially
non-discriminatory school system" and directed district judges to main-
tain jurisdiction during the transition.!" The Green Court recast the goal
of desegregation in terms of "unitary status": "the transition to a unitary
non-racial system of public education was and is the ultimate end to be
brought about.,,153In the case of Board cif Education v. Dowell,154 the Court
required a two-part inquiry for unitary status and federal court with-
drawal: 1) had the school district complied in good faith with the court
order, and 2) had the vestiges of past discrimination been eliminated "to
the extent practicable'T'" In considering the latter point, the District
Court should consider not only student assignments but "every facet of
school operations-faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities
and facilities.,,156The question in Freeman was whether the District Court
could relinquish jurisdiction incrementally even though full compliance
with a desegregation order might not have been achieved.!"
The Social Science Statement submitted by way of an·amicus brief 58
in support of continuing jurisdiction re-articulated the "harm-benefit
thesis" in terms of the benefits of desegregation: "desegregation is gener-
ally associated with moderate gains in the achievement of black students
and the achievement of white students is typically unaffected.,,159"Its
benefits extend beyond the classroom to the larger issues of integration in
employment, higher education, and housing."?" It acknowledged the asso-
ciation with "white flight" but asserted that the relationship between
school segregation and residential segregation is reflexive; desegregated
schools can influence housing choice, and desegregation plans, including
152. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. (Brown 11).349 U.S. 294. 301 (1955).
153. Green v. County Sch. Bd .• 391 U.S. 430. 436 (1968).
154. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
155. Id. at 249.250.
156. Id. at 250 (citing Green.391 U.S. at 435).
157. Freeman v. Pitts. 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992).
158. Brief for NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents. Freeman v.
Pitts. 503 U.S. 467 (1991) (No. 89-1290). See generally Armor. supra note 15.71-76.
159. Brief for NAACP et al.• as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents. supm note
162. at 51 (quoting Willis D. Hawley & Mark A. Smylie. The Contribution of School De-
segregation to Academic Achievement and Racial Integration in Eliminating Racism:
Profiles in Controversy 284-285 (phyllis A. Katz and DaImas A. Taylor eds.1988».
160. Id. at 58.
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extensive court-ordered plans, can foster long-lasting demographic stabil-
ity,'" At its best, it concluded, desegregation is not simply a process of
placing black and white children together in a school but is a matter of
developing techniques, including those of educational innovation that will
further the goals of racial integration. I',
However, as Armor suggests, the acknowledgement that effective de-
segregation is dependent upon certain conditions, without which the
promised benefits will not necessarily be delivered, weakened the impact
and deprived the "harm-benefit" thesis of some of its moral authority'"
Upholding the power of the District Court to withdraw from supervision
incrementally, the Supreme Court was not to be deflected from strict
causal analysis.l" In a rare unanimous decision, the Court affirmed what it
said was implicit in its earlier ruling in Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spanglerlb5:
"racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake. It is to be pursued
when racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation,"!"
Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion noted the difficulties of attributing
the existence of racially imbalanced schools to constitutional violations
"dating from the days when Lyndon Johnson was President or earlier,"!"
The inclination of the Court to move its jurisprudence to a post-
desegregation climate was the occasion for the fourth social science
statement to be submitted to the Court, this time in a case that consid-
ered the harm-benefit thesis in terms of educational under-achievement.
In Jenkins III, the issue was whether the State of Missouri should be re-
quired to continue to fund quality education programs established to
compensate for the reduction in achievement levels of minority children
attributable to prior de jure segregation.l" The Milliken II Court had ac-
cepted the argument that the harms of unconstitutional segregation could
include educational harm as well as racial isolarion.:" The remedial plan
ordered into effect in Missouri had been described as the most ambitious
and expensive remedial program in the history of school desegregacion.l"
161. Id. at 44-50.
162. Id. at 72-73.
163. Armor, supra note 15, at 73.
164. Freeman v. Pins, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
165. Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). In Spangler the Court
held that once a unitary system had been achieved there was no duty to maintain racial
balance where the imbalance was the result of demographic forces rather than constitu-
tional violation. Id. at 435-37.
166. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494.
167. Id. at 506 (Scalia,]., concurring). See also id. at 503 (Scalia,J., concurring) ("Ra-
cially imbalanced schools are hence the product of a blend of public and private actions
and any assessment that they would not be segregated, or would not be as segregated, in
the absence of a particular one of these factors is guesswork.").
168. Missouri v.Jenkins Uenkins 111),515 U.S. 70,74-80 (1995).
169. Milliken v. Bradley (Mil/ken 11),433 U.S. 267, 287-288 (1977).
170. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 78.
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The total cost for the quality education programs alone exceeded $220
million.": The class plaintiffs now opposed a partial termination order,
arguing that the fact that student achievement levels as measured by an-
nual standardized tests were still "at or below national norms at many
grade levels" constituted a vestige of discrimination which had yet to be
fully eliminated.172
Submitted as an appendix to a Social Science amicus brief and enti-
tled Educational Remedies for School Segregation: A Social Science Statement,
the purpose of the statement was to caution against application of a crude
causal analysis in relation to the vestiges of segregation. 173 The docu-
mented under-achievement of minority children, it argued, reflects a
culture of low expectations on the part of teachers and students alike and
is associated with the high concentration of economic poverty in urban
school districts. Both of these factors have their origins in decades of ra-
cial segregation and continue to affect behavior and achievement patterns
long after the unconstitutional discriminatory practices have ceased. 174 To
be effective, the scientists argued, remedial programs need to be long term
and the educational components should be rigorously monitored and
evaluated by recognized indicators which include standardized testing of
student outcomes.i"
D. Does the Court Take Note? The Harm-Benefit Thesis
and a Public Law Remedial Model
The extent to which desegregation jurisprudence at the Supreme
Court level has, or indeed should, take account of social science has gen-
erated considerable debate. 176 Apart from Footnote Eleven in Brown it is
difficult to identify any clear evidence that social science submissions have
had a direct impact on the jurisprudence of the Court.!" However, as
Professor James Ryan points out, in a political climate supportive of the
goal of integration, the Court was apparently prepared to accept the re-
medial benefits of integration for minority students more or less without
171. Id. at 76.
172. Id. at 72.
173. Brief of Anderson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995)(No. 93-1823), reprinted in Mark A. Smylie et al., Educational
Remedies for School Segregation:A Social Science Statement to the U.S. Supreme Court in Missouri
v.jenkins, 27 Urb. Rev. 207(1995).
174. Smylie,supra note 173.at212.
175. Id. at 220-24.
176. For a recent review of the literature regarding Brown see Mody, supra note 117.
For a recent discussion of later case law see James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social
Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases,81 N.C. L.Rev. 1659 (2003).
177. Ryan. supra note 176.
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question.!" Indeed. the relaxed approach to issues of causation evident in
h . f 179 IHO d IHI It e presumptions 0 Green, Swann, an Keyes more or ess assumes
the "web of institutional discriminations" which the later Columbus so-
cial science statement argued made education a "pervasive governmentally
organized activity.,,18"
There is, however, no doubt that in the termination cases of the
1990s the Court accorded higher priority to disengagement than to social
science-based arguments concerning the continuing harms of segregation.
In Dowell the Court upheld a finding of unitary status even though, as the
dissent pointed out, the conditions likely to inflict the "stigmatic injury
condemned in Brown I" persisted and there remained "feasible methods of
eliminating such conditions,"!" In Fteeman." the Court sanctioned partial
and incremental withdrawal from desegregation supervision and in jenkins
III it permitted termination of remedial programs which had been in
place for seven years on the basis, despite the findings of the district judge
to the contrary, that "white flight" and the continuing disparities between
the achievements of minority and majority students must be attributable
to "external factors, beyond the control of the [school committee] and the
State."!" The Social Science statement was more or less ignored. Justice
Thomas, concurring, was overtly dismissive of the value of social science
evidence generally in schools cases: "[T]he judiciary is fully competent to
make independent determinations concerning the existence of state [dis-
178. Id. at 1666.
179. Green v. County Sch. Bd .• 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
180. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
181. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
182. Brief for Respondents at 7a, 13a, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449
(1979)(No. 78-610). See also Green,391 U.S. 430; Swann, 402 U.S. at 26 (establishing the
presumption that any present segregation is the result of prior acts of segregation); Keyes,
413 U.S. at 208 (establishing the presumption that a finding of intentional acts of discrimi-
nation in one part of a school district warranted a presumption that other parts of the
district were similarly affected).
183. Bd. ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 252 (1991).(Marshall,j., dissenting).
184. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
185. Missouri v. Jenkins Uetlkins II!), 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995). The trial court had
specifically found that de jure segregation "caused a system-wide reduction in student
achievement" in the Kansas City, MO schools and developed a remedial plan. Jenkins v.
Missouri,639 F.Supp. 19,24 (WD.Mo.), aff'd Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir.
1986). The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's later decision denying the school
district's motion for a finding of unitary status. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 404
(Srh Cir. 1994). Dissenting from the denial of a request for rehearing en banc and object-
ing to the district court's establishment of a student achievement goal gauged by results
from standardized tests, Judge Beam wrote "in my view, this case as it now proceeds, in-
volves an exercise in pedagogical sociology not constitutional adjudication." Id. at 404
(Beam.]. dissenting). The Supreme Court ordered the district court to "sharply limit, if not
dispense with, its reliance on" student achievement as measured by test scores. Jenkins Ill,
515 U.S. at 101.
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criminatory] action without the unnecessary ... assistance of the social
sciences.V'" Lower courts "should not be swayed by the easy answers of
social science, nor should they accept the findings and the assumptions of
sociology and psychology at the expense of constitutional principle,"!"
The Civil Rights Project has these remarks in mind when it attributes the
decline in the momentum of desegregation to changes in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. "Since the Supreme Court changed desegregation law in
three major decisions between 1991 and 95, the momentum of desegre-
gation for black students has clearly reversed in the South, where the
movement had by far its greatest success." In consequence, it charges, fed-
eral courts have changed from being "on the leading edge" of
desegregation activity to become "its greatest obstacle,"!"
186. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 121 (Thomas,]., concurring).
187. Id. at 122-23.
188. Erica Frankenberg et al., A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools:Are ~ Los-
ing the Dream? 5-6 (2003), Available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
research/reseg03/ AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf. See, e.g, Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski
County, 237 F. Supp. 2d. 988 (E.D. Ark. 2002)(for Jenkins-induced skepticism regarding
social science testimony in termination cases); see also Davis v. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac, 95 F.
Supp. 2d. 688, 697 (E.D. Mich. 2000)(dismissing social science information).
In Pulaski the district court, holding that plaintiffi had not come forward with evi-
dence to attribute the achievement gap to unconstitutional conduct of the school board,
commented:
Sociologists and educators have recognized for over a decade that there are a
host of factors, completely unrelated to the effects of de jure segregation, that
also are responsible for the minority student achievement gap. Some of these
other factors include low birth weight, poverty, whether the student is raised
by a single parent, parental interest and involvement, and peer influence.
Complicating this issue still further is the fact that the achievement gap "ex-
ists across the country in prior segregated school districts and school districts
that have not discriminated against minority students."
237 F. Supp.2d. at 1037 (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151, 1158-64 (w'D.
Mo. 1997».
The court continued,
How does a trial court go about determining, with any degree of precision,
the percentage of the achievement gap (assuming there is any) that is causally
related to dejure segregation (which ended many decades earlier)-afi:er some-
how excluding the host of other socioeconomic factors that are univenally
recognized as also contributing to the achievement gap? Reviewing the re-
ported cases in which brave souls have undertaken this task puts one in mind
of trying to nail jelly to a wall."
Id.
In Davis the court was dismissive of the information value of social science evi-
dence:
Even now, with the perspective of almost three decades. historians. sociolo-
gists and legal scholars vigorously disagree over the socio-economic.
demographic and educational impact busing has had on our communities. As
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Chesler et al.I"" have suggested that school desegregation remedial
jurisprudence evidences a tension between two models of adjudication
described in Chayes' much-cited article published in 1976.190 Chayes ar-
gued that the traditional conception of the civil lawsuit as a vehicle for
settling disputes between private individuals about private rights does not
fit class action suits in constitutional matters which are primarily con-
cerned with grievances about the operation of public policy.": In the
traditional conception, the "private law model," the focus of judicial in-
quiry is on issues of intent (intentional infringement of plaintiffs' rights)
and the remedial purpose is restitution or compensation. In The orienta-
tion is retrospective; the court asks "what are the consequences for the
parties of specific past instances of conduct?" and tailors relief to remedy
those consequences. In the school desegregation class action, however,
issues of intent lose their centrality and the orientation of inquiry be-
comes essentially forward-looking. The relief sought is usually injunctive,
and fashioned by reference to the likely consequences of policy imple-
mentation and official behavior. 193 The consequence is that in a public law
model, remedial outcomes depend upon a process of fact-evaluation more
akin to legislative than judicial process as traditionally conceived:
The whole process begins to look like the traditional descrip-
tion of legislation: Attention is drawn to a "mischief," existing
or threatened, and the activity of the parties and court is di-
rected to the development of on-going measures designed to
cure that mischief. Indeed, if, as is often the case, the decree
sets up an affirmative regime governing the activities in con-
troversy for the indefinite future and having binding force for
persons within its ambit, then it is not very much of a stretch
to see it as,pro tanto, a legislative act.194
in so many areas of debate, current perspectives on the impact of busing ap-
pear divided along the lines of the old adage, "Where you come in is where
you go out."
Davis,95 F. Supp.2d. at 695.
Accord Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F. 3d. 790, 804 (1st Cir.1998) (finding that a post-
termination race-conscious admissions policy for the Boston Latin schools was not justi-
fied by the prior history of de jure segregation, and criticizing the experts' testimony: "we
do not propose that the achievement gap bears no relation to some form of prior dis-
crimination. We posit only that it is fallacious to maintain that an endless gaze at any set of
raw numbers permits a court to arrive at a valid etiology of complex social phenomena.").
189. CHESLER, supra note 33.
190. CHAVES, supra note 34.
191. Id. at t 302.
192. Id. at t 285.
193. The court is asked "to enjoin future or threatened action. or to modify a course
of conduct presently in train or a condition presendy existing." Id. at 1296.
194. Id. at 1297.
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E. Pedagogical Sociology and Judicial Activism:
The Search for Legitimacy
91
Brown II required the federal judiciary to step outside a traditional
role of adjudication and assume responsibility for tasks of management
and supervision. The widespread expansion of the process described by
Chayes'" into fields such as prisons, housing and mental health, under-
pinned by a widespread cynicism verging on nihilism concerning the
autonomous nature of legal reasoning, has generated what Professor Mark
Yudof has described as a "crisis of legitimacy" in relation to judicial activ-
ity. 1% In this context, the attraction of social science evidence is its
capacity to defuse arguments concerning the irrational nature of judicial
reasoning; if processes of legal reasoning could not themselves be de-
scribed as "scientific," they could at least claim to be of social benefit, as
determined by the objective processes of "scientific" disciplines."?
In desegregation litigation, the submission of sociological informa-
tion and data for the judge's information became unremarkable to the
point of routine; yet, as Cahn'" points out, the so-called Brandeis brief.!"
when used as a strategy of attack, is a two-edged sword."" In an adversar-
ial process, "shrewd, resourceful lawyers can put a Brandeis brief together
in support of almost any conceivable exercise of legislative judgment.T'"
The politicization of social science research in schools desegregation cases
did much to undermine faith in its claims of objectivity and maturity and
engendered a growing perception of a crisis of legitimacy on the part of
the social sciences themselves.i" The dissent's dismissal of "pedagogical
sociology" in Jenkins III articulates the growing mistrust on the part of the
195. Chayes, supra note 34.
196. Yudof, supra note 38, at 67.
197. Id.
198. Edmond Cahn,jurisprudence,30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150,154 (1955).
199. LoUIs D. BRANDEIs,ASSISlEDBY JOSEPHINEGOLDMARK,WOMEN IN INDUSTRY:
DECISIONOf THEUNITED STAlESSUPREMECOURT IN CURTMULLERvs. STAlEOf OREGON:
UPHOLDINGTHE CONSTITUTIONALITYOf THE OREGON 'lEN HOUR LAW fOR WOMEN AND
BRIEf fOR THE STAlE Of OREGON (1908), available at http://ocp.hul.harvani.edu/
ww/organizations-ncJ.php. The brief was filed by future Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), and argued the need for special pro-
tection for women on health and safety grounds in support of an Oregon statute that
purported to restrict women's working hours. The Brandeis brief contained two pages of
legal argument accompanied by approximately 100 pages of sociological and economic
data. The style was replicated in the NAACP's brief in Brown 1. See generally PAULL. RoSEN,
ThE SUPREMECOURTANDSOCIALSCIENCE75-101, 134-172(1972}.
200. See Cahn, supra note 198, at 154.
201. Id. at 154.&egenerall),RoSEN,supranote 199,at75.
202. Yudof, supra note 38, at 71.
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judiciary concerning the value of testimony from the "soft sciences" in
constitutional matters.i"
Chesler et al. suggest that school desegregation cases represent a bat-
tle over a point of view: what kind of a problem is racial inequaliryr'" It
was also a battle about responsibility. The NAACP/LDF use of social sci-
ence evidence in school desegregation cases was a strategy designed to
persuade the Court to conceptualize desegregation in terms of outcomes
rather than intentions;" From this point of view, the affirmative action
requirement of Green'" and the racial balance criterion of Swann207 repre-
sent public law models of adjudication whereby the Court, apprised of a
social problem requiring address, sanctioned orders that required policy
formulation and implementation.T In the northern cases, however, the
Court drew back from the logic of this approach. By preserving the de
jure I de facto distinction and refusing to accept the social science based
argument that segregation was a "harm" per se, the Court returned to a
private-law model at least as far as issues of liability are concerned.i" Mil-
liken II, in which the Court refused to sanction a metropolitan remedy
for an intradistrict violation, is fully consistent with this approach."? In
remedial terms, however, as the Ohio cases demonstrate, the Court con-
tinued to sanction system-wide remedial decrees characteristic of a public
law results-oriented approach 211 until the 1990s termination cases, by
which time the priority of the Court was no longer social change but
legitimacy and the propriety of continuing judicial supervision of state
affairs.?"
203. Jenkins v.Missouri Uenkins Ill), 19 E3d 393,404 (8th Cir. 1994).
204. CHESLERET AL., supra note 33, at 203.
205. Id. at 37.
206. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent, 391 U.S.430 (1968).
207. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
208. See also Fiss, supra note 38.
209. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
210. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744, 746,148,152 (1974).
211. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton Il), 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Colum-
bus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)("Where a racially discriminatory school
system has been found to exist, Brown II imposes a duty on local school boards to 'effec-
tuate a transition to a racially non-discriminatory school system. Brown II was a call for
the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems' and school boards operating such systems
were 'clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary
to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch: Each instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty continues
the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.")(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 341 U.S.
294,301 (1955) and Green v. County Sch. Bd., 349 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968».
212. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). See also Missouri v.JenkinsUenkins IJl),
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
FALL 2008] Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional Adjudication 93
F. The Changing Priorities of Constitutional Adjudication
The Court has never articulated a theory of desegregation which
can adequately explain either the contradictions inherent in the above
account or the role that social science should play in constitutional adju-
dication.i" In an attempt to do both, Dworkin has distinguished between
what he terms the causal and interpretive judgments of social sciences.l"
The former, he argues, derive from observation and, without a mechanical
model of causation, rest upon statistical correlations which are susceptible
to fluctuation and have no resonance in the normal vocabulary of consti-
tutional adjudication. 215 However, judgments about the nature of a
community's response to a particular social phenomenon or practice--
such as segregation-are interpretive judgments of the kind regularly em-
ployed by the judiciary in constitutional adjudication:
"Interpretive judgments are not foreign to the judge; they
don't draw on a kind of technology that is for him arcane. On
the contrary, they draw upon the same kinds of skills, and are
indeed identical in their structure, with the judgment that a
judge makes when he draws from a line of precedent a charac-
terization that seems to him a more sensitive characterization
of the precedents than any other,"?"
If, as Dworkin argues, the Equal Protection guarantee of the Consti-
tution is a commitment that the government, in making political
decisions, will treat each individual with equal concern and respect, and
the judicial decision to require government to take affirmative action to
desegregate reflects the Court's judgment that the political process at any
particular time cannot be relied upon to secure that gusrantee.i" then two
things become clear and an explanation for the changing attitude of the
Court emerges. Interpretive judgments of social science may have done
much to convince the federal judiciary first of the social consequences of
"the Negro problem" and the value of integration as an appropriate re-
sponse and then of the "web of segregation" that renders political process
an unreliable mechanism of change. Justice Thomas's comments in Jenkins
III, however, reflect a clear perception that forty years after Brown the
213. Yudof, supra note 196, at 87 ("Indeed it has done all that is within its power to obfus-
cate the underlying bases of its decisions."). See also id. for a discussion of theoretical
models;James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-out" School Desegregation Explained. 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1990); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public lAw Remedies. 79
GEO.L.j. 1355, 1357 (1991) (staring that "The remedial process in public law Iitigarion is a
practice in search of a theory.").
214. Dworkin, supra note 41, at 2(}-26.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 21.
217. See id. at 24-26.
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interpretive assumptions of "Negro inferiority" which underpinned the
judicial mandate for affirmative action were outdated, while the causal
judgments concerning segregation's lingering effects were no longer suffi-
ciently reliable to warrant continuing departure from the norms of
federalism and judicial deference to elected legislatures that otherwise set
limits to the legitimacy of judicial interference with state and federal af-
fairs.m
In the schools affirmative action cases that came before the Supreme
Court in the 2006-2007 Terrn.i" hopes that the Court would afford a
favorable reception to social science submissions, as it had in the case of
the University of Michigan Law School admission policies, were
dashed.i" Despite extensive social science submissions on both sides, the
plurality chose not to enter the debate, basing their decision upon the
primacy of the "color-blind constitution" in a non-desegregation situa-
. 221
non,
The affirmative action cases differ from the desegregation cases in
that they do not as yet directly engage the question of remedy. At issue is
the legitimacy of policies of racial preference in the pursuit of racial di-
versity and the extent to which, more than fifty years after Brown, a Court
in retreat from an activist model of adjudication should be willing to lend
constitutional legitimacy to integrative social policies underpinned by
contestable social science. m For the Seattle Court, the distinction be-
218. Missouri v.Jenkins Uenkins 111),515 U.S. 70,114,138 (1995)(Thomas,L con-
curring)("It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that
anything that is predominantly black must be inferior. We must forever put aside the no-
tion that simply because a school district today is black, it must be educationally
inferior.") .
219. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127 S. Ct. 2738
(2007).
220. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The majority opinion accepted the
testimony of amid who included business and military leaders as well as social scientists
concerning the educational benefits of racial diversity. "The Law School's claim of a com-
pelling interest is further bolstered by its amid who point to the educational benefits that
flow from student body diversity" Id. at 333. "These benefits are not theoretical but real, as
major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas and viewpoints" Id. at 333-34. "High-ranking retired officers and civilian
leaders of the United States military assert that, 'based on [their] decades of experience, a
'highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to
fulfill its principal mission to provide national security" Id. at 331.
221. Parents Involved in Only. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2755-8, 276H8.
222. Id. at 2778-9 (Thomas, J., concurring)(stating that the constitutionality of the
school boards' race-conscious policies should not be left "at the mercy of elected govern-
ment officials evaluating the evanescent views of a handful of social scientists. To adopt
[such an approach) would be to abdicate our constitutional responsibilities.").
The Grutter majority had been careful to bolster its reliance on social science with
the opinion of business and military leaders on the benefits of racial diversity, while Justice
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tween "integration" and "desegregation" was clear. School boards act un-
constitutionally if they seek to perpetuate the "hard won gains" of the
desegregation era by race-conscious programs to combat "resegregation"
that is not directly attributable to state action.2Z3The divisions within the
Court were predictable. For Justice Breyer, the school board plans "repre-
sented local efforts to bring about the kind of racially integrated
education" that was the promise of Brown." Justice Kennedy was pre-
pared to recognize the compelling nature of state action to further the
nation's "historic commitment" to equal educational opportunity for all;22S
but, for Justice Thomas, once again the "tenuous,,226 or "far from appar-
ent,,227link between racial balance and improved educational outcomes
for black children did not justify unconstitutional race-based experiments
to achieve socially desirable ends: "this Court does not sit to 'create a soci-
ety that includes all Americans' or to solve the problems of 'troubled inner
city schooling.' We are not social engineers.r'"
Thomas in dissent dismissed the "faddish slogan of the cognoscenti" with counter- research
citations with contrary outcomes. See Gruner, 539 U.S. at 350,364 (Thomas.j., dissenting).
223. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
224. Id. at 2800 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 2797 (Kennedy,]., concurring)("This Nation has a moral and ethical obli-
gation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating equal opportunity for all its
children.") .
226. Id. at 2778 (Thomas,]., concurring)("Given this tenuous relationship between
forced racial mixing and improved educational results for black children, the dissent can-
not plausibly maintain that an educational element supports the integration interest, let
alone makes it compelling.").
227. Id. at 2776 ("The dissent asserts that racially balanced schools improve educa-
tional outcomes for black children. In support, the dissent unquestioningly cites certain
social science research to support propositions that are hody disputed among social scien-
tists. In reality, it is far from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational
benefits, much less that integration is necessary to black achievement.").
228. Id. at 2779 n.14.The court stated:
regardless of what Justice Breyer's goals might be, this Court does not sit to
"create a society that includes all Americans' or to solve the problems of
'troubled inner city schooling." We are not social engineers. The United
States Constitution dictates that local governments cannot make decisions on
the basis of race. Consequendy, regardless of the perceived negative effects of
racial imbalance, I will not defer to legislative majorities where the Constitu-
tion forbids it.
Id.
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas direcdy articulates the view that the "actual"
gain in these cases lies not in the elimination of racial imbalance but in the elimination of
state-enforced separation. "The dissent's assertion that these plans are necessary for the
school districts to maintain their 'hard-won gains' reveals its conflation of segregation and
racial imbalance." Id. at 2770 n.3. His opinion continues: "In the context of public schooling,
segregation is the deliberate operation of a school system to 'carry out a governmental policy
to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race.' In Brown, this court declared that
segregation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
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III. EDUCATION VERSUS INTEGRATION IN BOSTON
One of the main arguments employed by the Boston school com-
mittee to justify its opposition to court-ordered desegregation was that of
. f '29 J d G . , I d d 230usurpanon 0 power. - u ge arnty s court p an an or ers usurped
power the constitution had given to elected state officials; yet, as Judge
Frank Johnson has explained, so-called "judicial activism" in cases like this
was a function of abdication of civic responsibility.'" Federal judges faced
with official opposition were left largely to their own devices. The Su-
preme Court had declared war on "gradualism" and "freedom of choice"
and other overtly race-neutral policies which masked attempts to subvert
the effect of Brown, and indicated the broad parameters of the remedial
powers of district courts to fashion appropriate decrees where school au-
thorities default. It left the details to be worked out by district judges on a
case-by-case basis.
As Judge Frank Coffin232 has pointed out, the process was unfamiliar
and far from standardized.i"
Amendment ... [but) [r)acial imbalance is not segregation." Id. at 2769 (quoting Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,6 (1971)). "Outside of the context of
remediation for past dejure segregation, 'integration' is simply racial balancing." Id. at n.2.
229. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 E2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976).
230. I have been unable to ascertain the exact number. The court records are not
complete. Formisano gives a figure of 415 orders in eleven years. See RoNALD P. FORMIS-
ANO,BOSTONAGAINSTBUSING:RAcE, CLASS,AND ETHNICI1YIN THE 1960s AND 19705 2
(1991).
231. Frank M.Johnson,Jr., The Role of Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 AlA.
L. REV. 271,279 (1981).Johnson asserts:
The remedy for judicial activism is a recognition that this trust is not one
solely for the judiciary. As long as government officials entrusted with re-
sponsibility for constitutional governance disregard that responsibility, the
judiciary must and will stand ready to intervene to the extent necessary on
behalf of the deprived. To avoid this intervention, all that government offi-
cials need do is confront their responsibilities with the diligence and honesty
that their constituencies deserve. Conscientious, responsible leadership will in
most instances make judicial intervention unnecessary.
Id.
232. Frank M. Coffin, The Frontier of Remedies: A Cal/for Exploration. 67 CAl. L. REv.
983,985 (1979).
233. It could also be extremely complex, presenting reviewing courts with consider-
able difficulties, vide the Fourth Circuit's abdication in Swann:
We understand that the record in the case is voluminous, and we would note
at the outset that we have been unable to analyze the record as a whole. Al-
though we have carefully examined the district court's various opinions and
orders, the school board's plan. and those pleadings readily available to us, we
feel that we are not conversant with all of the factual considerations which
may prove determinative of this appeal. Accordingly, we here attempt, not to
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The judge must find the best way to accomplish a goal, seek-
ing help not only from the parties but from court-appointed
experts and masters and from citizens' committees. In this case,
the district judge was concerned with such things as bus routes
and distances, appropriate white-black-other minority ratios
from specific schools, magnet schools, enrichment programs,
methods of transfer between schools, teacher recruitment, and
pairings of colleges and universities with specific secondary
schools. All of these issues ordinarily would be appropriate
grist for the relevant educational policymaking body, here the
Boston School Committee. Indeed, the function is very close
to legislative decision-making. Because the legislative authori-
ties would not act, however, the district judge was forced to
move beyond the traditional role ... and fashioned his own
d 234reme y.
The immediate precedent for the Garrity orders came from the Southern
state of South Carolina, where District Judge James B.McMillan faced a
residentially segregated urban school system and a school committee un-
able or unwilling to produce an acceptable plan. Judge McMillan's
appointment of education expert Dr James Finger as court advisor was a
tactic which was subsequently followed by Judge Jack Weinstein in New
York as well as by Judge Garrity in Bostori/" The court-ordered "Finger
deal extensively with factual matters, but rather to set forth some legal con-
siderations which may be helpful to the Court.
Swann, 431 F.2d at 150.
234. Coffin, supra note 232, at 985.
235. Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. Of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265 (WD.N.C.
1970) vacated in part, Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Bd. Of Ed., 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir.
1970), '!Jf'd in part, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). S«
BERNARDSCHWARTZ,SWANN'SWAY:ThE SCHOOLBUSINGCASEAND mE SUPREMECOURT
(1986)(for a discussion of McMillan's order); see also DAVISONM. DOUGLAS,READING
WRITINGAND RACE:ThE DESEGREGATIONOf mE CHARLOTTESCHOOL(1995)(for a general
account).
As Schwartz points out, the choice of Dr. Finger reflected the practical difficulties
faced by judges and counsel in securing assistance from local educators who were unwill-
ing to testify for fear of antagonizing the school board. SCHWARTZ,supra at 14. It seems that
the first appointment of an educational expert in a schools case was by Judge Bohanon,
supervising the desegregation of the public schools of Oklahoma City. He appointed edu-
cation experts Dr William R. Carmack, Dr. Willard B. Spalding and Dr. Earl A.McGovern
to carry out a study and file a desegregation report which the court then adopted. Ste
Dowell v. Sch. Bd. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 244 F. Supp. 971, 973 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
For Judge Weinstein's orders, see Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. N.V.
1974). and for the discussion by Special Master, See Curtis J. Berger, Away from the Court-
house and into the Field: the Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM.L. REv. 707 (1978). For
Judge Garrity's appointment of experts, see Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F.Supp. 216 (D. Mass.
1975).
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Plan" which adopted "racial balance" as a criterion of desegregation and
compulsory busing as a strategy received Supreme Court approval in 1971
and provided a blueprint for Northern school desegregation.i"
Judge Garrity's court plan implemented, in September 1975, was es-
sentially a student assignment and redistricting plan on the Swann model,
with additional educational enrichment features of the kind later ap-
proved in Milliken Ie]7 The "political dynamite't" of both plans that
provoked controversy on the national stage and rioting on an unprece-
dented scale on the streets of Boston was the requirement for compulsory
transportation of students.i" Busing in Boston became the focal point for
school committee-led opposition to court-ordered desegregation.i" Both
the State plan, ordered into effect in September of 1974, and the Court
plan that took effect the year after required the busing of students out of
their neighborhoods to schools in another part of the ciry.?" The arrival of
buses carrying black children into white, mainly Irish working class South
Boston triggered the riots that made Boston the worst symbol of white
racism outside the South and saw state troopers join city police on the
streets and in the schools in an effort to restore order.i"
A. The Campaign for Racial Balance in Boston
The lawsuit filed on behalf of black plaintiffs against the Boston
school committee on March 2 1972 did not come out of the blue.i" Dis-
236. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 E Supp. 699 (D.C.N.V. 1974).
237. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 275-76, 279 (1977); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216.
238. Schwartz, supra note 235, at 19.
239. See j. ANrnONY LUKAS,COMMONGROUND:A TuRBULENTDECADEIN llIE LIVES
OFThREEAMERICANFAMILIES(1985); see also RoNALDP. FORMISANO,BOSTONAGAINSTBus-
ING: RACE CLASSAND ETHNICITYIN THE 19602 AND 1970s (1991); J. MICHAELRoss &
WILLIAMM. BERG,'I RESPECTFULLYDISAGREEWIlli THEJUDGE'SORDER': ThE BOSTON
SCHOOLDESEGREGATIONCONTROVERSY,(1981).
240. See Lukas, supra note 248; see also Formisano, supra note 248; Ross & Berg, supra
note 248.
241. Kerrigan,401 E Supp. at 239. The Court plan required the busing of approxi-
mately 21,000 students. This number was an estimate based upon analysis by the court-
appointed experts. School committee figures had grossly over-estimated the numbers of
students in the system. See RoBERTA.DENTLER& MARVINB. SCOTT,SCHOOLSONThAL:AN
INSIDEACCOUNTOFTHEBOSTONDESEGREGATIONCASE,27-28 (1981).
242. In October of 1974, Governor Sargent's request for federal assistance resulted in
the 82nd Airborne Regiment, stationed in Fort Bragg (N.C.) being placed on stand-by
alert. See Ross &. BERG,supra note 239, at 263. Announcing his Phase II plan for imple-
mentation at school opening in autumn 1975,judge Garrity noted that 166 state and local
police officers continued to be stationed inside South Boston High, with 134 stationed in
the vicinity during school hours. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 E Supp. 216, 225 (D. Mass.
1975).
243. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 E Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974).
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satisfaction on the part of black parents with the poor level of instruction
available to their children predated the Morgan litigation by more than
one hundred years. Although de jure segregation had never existed in Mas-
sachusetts, the city of Boston had maintained separate schools for black
children since 1820.244 In 1849, the case of five-year old Sarah Roberts
became a cause celebre when her father took action in the state courts to
secure her admission to a white school.?" The black school that she at-
tended was badly run down. An evaluation committee had reported to
the city that "the school rooms are too small, the paint is much defaced,"
and the equipment was "so shattered and neglected that it cannot be used
until it has been thoroughly repaired.Y" Sarah had to walk past five white
elementary schools to reach it.247 The action was argued on her behalf by
anti-slavery campaigner Charles Sumner who advanced the argument of
racial stigmatization which, one hundred years later, found approval in
Brown.248 The case was ahead of its time and failed in the state Supreme
Judicial Court, with Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw articulating the principles
of "separate but equal" that the Plessy court subsequently adopted.Y'The
case symbolized the underlying assumption on the part of black parents
that, in a dual system which separated white children from black, the edu-
cation offered to their children would be inevitably inferior.
In June 1961, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimina-
tion examined the issue of student allocation. Its finding that there was no
intentional discriminatory practice on the part of the school committee
was rejected by NAACP leaders who called upon the black community
for support by boycott action.2so On February 26 1964, following a na-
tionwide week of boycotts, a "Freedom Stay Out" day in Boston was
supported by 22,000 students, a figure which represented over 20 per cent
of the city's 92,000 student population.i" The following month saw the
establishment of the Kiernan Committee consisting of 21 members
drawn from the ranks of university presidents, religious leaders and repre-
sentatives of labor and business, tasked with assisting the State Board of
Education to carry out a study of racial imbalance in Commonwealth
schools/" The Committee's report, published on April 15, 1965, identified
fifty-five schools in the state and forty-five in Boston itself that were ra-
cially imbalanced, defined as having over fifty percent minority
244. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1849).
245. Id.
246. Quoted in KLUGER,supra note 99, at 75.
247. Roberts, 59 Mass. at 201.
248. Brown v. Board ofEduc. (Brown 1),347 U.S. 483 (1954).
249. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. at 209 as approved in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 u.s. 537, 544 (1896).
250. See RossAND BERG,supra note 239, at 47, 48.
251. Id. at 49.
252. Id.
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enrollment. m In terms of educational effect, the report concluded that
racially imbalanced schools caused serious educational damage to black
children by "impairing their confidence, distorting their self-image and
lowering their motivation.T'" Moreover, the inferior educational facilities
in predominantly black schools further reduced the opportunities of black
children to prepare for the "professional and vocational requirements of
our technological society"?'
In 1965, when Governor John Volpe signed into law the Racial Im-
balance Act (RIA) Massachusetts became the first state to mandate racial
balance in its public schools.i" In the course of the next seven years, nei-
ther the State Board of Education nor the federal government was able to
make the Boston School Committee produce an acceptable plan.257 The
State Board finally produced its own plan, ordered into implementation
by the state Supreme Judicial Court for September 1974 and which Judge
Garrity adopted as an interim measure until the Court could devise a
desegregation plan in accordance with Supreme Court mandate. Busing
was integral to both State and Court plans and, given the city's residential
patterns, an unavoidable desegregation technique as defendant school
committee Chairman Kerrigan himself testified.i" However, as Dentler
and Scott point out, the concept of "forced busing," like the neighbor-
hood school, was essentially a fabrication. 259 There was nothing
remarkable about school buses: they had been a fact of Boston school life
253. MASS.STATEBD. OFEDUC.,BECAUSEIT Is RIGHT-EDUCATIONAlLY:REPORTOF
THEADVISORYCOMMITTEEONRACIALIMBALANCEAND EDUCATION2 (1965).
254. ld., as quoted in Ross AND BERG,supra note 242, at 50.
255. Id.
256. MASS.GEN.LAWSANN. ch. 71, §§ 37C, 370 (2008).
257. The State Board withheld state aid, giving rise to action in the state courts by
the school committee to release the funds and annual bills in the legislature for the repeal
of the RIA. See Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 E Supp. 410, 439 (D. Mass. 1974). A complaint
by a black parent to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination produced a
"cease and desist" order against the Committee and enforcement proceedings in the Supe-
rior Court, which remanded for a consideration of mootness, as the complaining student
had already graduated. See id. at 450. On May 28, 1974, an MCAD Commissioner re-
ported that the discriminatory practices continued and had not been eliminated. See id. at
451. Abortive attempts by Federal officials to secure compliance resulted in the withhold-
ing of Federal funds and enforcement action by the Department of Health Welfare and
Education (HEW). Id. at 421. Following a complaint by HEW, Administrative Law Judge
Ring found the city "in violation of federal statute." Id. "Judge Ring's decision was af-
firmed, with minor exceptions, by the final reviewing authority in HEW, In the Matter of
Boston Public Schools, April 19,1974, which found that the city had been guilty of de jure
segregation." Id. For a general account see Ross ANDBERG,supra note 239, at 63-66.
258. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 E Supp. 216, 226 (D. Mass. 1975)(quoting Committee
Chairman Kerrigan, "There is no way it [desegregation] can be done without the forced
busing of children.").
259. RoBERT A. DENTLER& MARVINB. SCOTT,SCHOOLSON TRIAL:AN INSIDEAc-
COUNTOFTHEBOSTONDESEGREGATIONCASE27 (1981).
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for many years prior to 1974,260while school committee zoning practices
ensured that "the 'neighborhood school' [had] been a reality only in areas
of the city where residential segregation [was] firmly entrenched.T" The
rallying calls of "forced busing" and the "neighborhood school" were os-
tensibly neutral objectives behind which lurked the racism which the
black plaintiffs and their lawyers sought to expose: "just as the myth of
neighborhood schools gave its believers something 'neutral' to support, so
busing gave them something 'neutral' to oppose.,,262
Judge Garrity retained active oversight of the desegregation process
in Boston for ten years. The Court plan which he ordered into imple-
mentation was an ambitious attempt to overhaul and modernize the
outdated Boston public school system, and much was achieved. By the
early 1980s, however, the project was in trouble; a coalition of plaintiffs,
school defendants, teachers and parents combined to frustrate court orders
for school closings.i" Support for racial mixing ebbed, undermined by
growing disillusionment with the ability of the desegregation process to
bring about lasting improvements to the quality of education experienced
by black children/" Influenced by the radical ideas of Derrick Bell and
Ronald Edmonds.?" plaintiffs' counsel Larry Johnson began actively to
question the nature of the desegregation process and to advocate a "free-
dom of choice" plan focusing on educational equity as opposed to
"desegregation.t'" In so doing, he fragmented the plaintiffs' case and frus-
trated the consent decree negotiations that had been begun by State
Commissioner Anrig as a way of terminating court jurisdiction, but largely
to no avail.267By this time, the "law of the case" was firmly established. The
260. Id. On their figures "over 30,000 out of an alleged 90,000 students had been
taking buses subways and taxis from home to public schools in Boston for many years
prior to 1974." Id. School Department figures for the school year 1972-73 showed that
10% of elementary, 50"/0of intermediate and 85% of high school students rode to school.
See Memorandum from Robert Dentler to the Masters: Commentary on Busing and
Student Transport (Feb. 24, 1975)(On file with the University of MassachusettS,Healey
Library Archives and Special Collections, Garrity Papers, Series XXXVnf-Masters and
Experts:Dentler & Scott Memos 1974-1975 Folder 17).
261. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F.Supp.410, 473 (D.Mass.1974).
262. DENTLER"SCOTT,supra note 259, at 27.
263. For an account see DENTLER"SCOTT,supra note 259, at 93.
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Ronald Edmonds et al., Desegregation Planning and Educational Equity, 17
Theory into Practice 12 (1978) and Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v.Board of Education and
the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv.L. REv.518 (1980).
266. On February 23, 1982, Attorney Johnson wrote to Defense Attorney Simonds
withdrawing from the consent decree negotiations and stating his intention to develop an
alternative plan that would be more responsive to his clients' interests. See discussion in
Murninghan, supra note 31,at 108-09.
267. For an account of the difficultiesof the Consent Decree negotiations, see Mor-
gan v.McDonough, Memorandum and Draft Orders Toward Closing Case No. 72-911-G
(D. Mass. 1982)(on file with the University of MassachusettS,Healey Library Archives and
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"" d "education" 268 Thcase was a race case an not an ucanon case. e consequence
was that, however sincere the judge's concern with educational improve-
ment might initially have been, the requirements of desegregation as
mandated by the Supreme Court set limits to the extent that this concern
could be realized, raising questions concerning the gains that Brown had
been able to achieve.
B. LAwyers li'rsus Clients: Should Brown Have Been Decided Differently?
In 1976, Derrick Bell, himself a former NAACP ILDF staff attorney,
published an important article asserting a conflict of interests between
NAACP/ LDF attorneys and the black plaintiffs whom they claimed to
represent.i" Black plaintiffs, he argued, wanted the best education for their
children, but litigators were committed to a strategy of integration as ra-
cial balance and paid insufficient attention to making black schools
educationally effecrive.i" A court desegregation plan requiring the trans-
portation of students over long distances in the interests of racial
integration which failed to materialize could not command the confi-
dence of black parents, if the schools and the education they provided
were of poor qualiry" Though not the first to make these arguments,
Bell's article-in effect advocating a return to the neighborhood school
policies in force in most school systems prior to desegregation-reignited
a debate about tactics within the NAACP/LDF which dated back at least
to 1935, when WE. B. Du Bois warned that "the Negro needs neither
segregated schools nor mixed schools. What he needs is Education,'?"
As Yudof points out, whilst in the pantheon of constitutionally pro-
tected values the status of equal educational opportunity is secure,
consensus breaks down in the task of translating the general into the par-
Special Collections, Garrity Papers, Series XLd Miscellaneous: Postscript Orders 1978-88
Folder 72).
268. Transcript of hearing on April 10 1975, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216,
226 (D. Mass. 1975)(No. 72-911-G)(on file with the University of Massachusetts, Healy
Library Archives & Special Collections, Center for Law & Education Papers, Morgan &
Hennigan Case Records 1964 -1994). In Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F. 2d 265 (1st Cir.
1982), school committee appellants contended that the district court had exceeded its
legitimate role as the enforcer of a desegregation remedy and strayed into the realm of
general educational policy. The First Circuit observed that absent racial bias, dislike of a
desegregation proposal on educational grounds was not a valid reason for rejecting it. Id. at
276.
269.
School
270.
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
Desegregation Litigation,85 YALEL.J. 470(1976).
Id. at 488.
271. Id. at 480.
272. WE.B. Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools], 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328,
335 (1935).
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ticular.273 Equal opportunity in the context of education can mean one of
three things: equal access (which requires absence of discrimination);
equal resources (requiring equal inputs in terms of financial expenditure
and availability of resources) or equal outcomes (measured in terms of
academic achievementj.i" As a litigation strategy, the third will always be
the least attractive, being dependent upon social science evidence that by
then was heavily politicized. The argument received short shrift in Jenkins
IlIon the basis that the District Court had not identified "the incremental
effect [of] segregation ... on minority student achievement," i.e. it had
not paid enough attention to the fact-finding exercise necessary to estab-
lish the required direct causal link between segregative acts and
continuing educational harrn.?" In the absence of such a link, continuing
achievement disparities must be attributable to external factors which
were not the court's concern:
Just as demographic changes independent of de jure segregation
will affect the racial composition of student assignments, so too
will numerous external factors beyond the control of [the
school committee] and the State affect minority student
achievement. So long as these external factors are not the re-
sult of segregation, they do not figure in the remedial calculus.
Insistence upon academic goals unrelated to the effects of legal
segregation unwarrantably postpones the day when [the school
committee] will be able to operate on its own.276
The initial NAACP strategy was one of equalization. The campaign to
challenge the disparities in expenditure between white schools and black
schools in state courts on matters such as, for example, teachers' salaries
had received piecemeal success but left individual teachers exposed to
victimization while the ability of the state to rely on endless permutations
of possible factual situations made litigation an expensive long-term strat-
egy.277The decision to press for access in federal courts represented a
change in tacric.'" the immediate success of Brown deflected attention
from the underlying assumption that integration in the form of access to
Mark Yudof, Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 Tsx. L. REv. 411,412273.
(1973).
274.
275.
276.
Id.
Missouri v.Jenkins Uenkins II!), 515 U.S. 70, 101 (1995).
Id. at 102.
277. See Cottrol et al., supra note 32, at 54. The tactic was to confront the State with
a "Hobson's choice": abolish the dual system or face bankruptcy. See also Tushnet, supra
note 99, at 102-4; Kluger, supra note 99, at 132; Greenberg, supra note 31, at 58. The
NAACP's first major victory in a federal court was Missouri ex. rei. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S.337 (1938).
278. For a discussion see Robert L. Carter, The J%rren Court and Desegregation, 67
MICH. L. REv. 237 (1968).
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white schools would of itself bring about the objective of educational
enrichrnent.i" Had the NAACP continued to press for educational equity,
the argument goes, the difficult questions of the legitimacy of race-
conscious action unlinked to fault would not have arisen. As it was, the
statement that "separate" was inherently unequal invited the conclusion
that all that needed to be done was to integrate. Once that had been ac-
complished. official responsibility for the education of African Americans
was prima facie discharged.I"
In the early 1970s. disenchantment with the failure of desegregation
to bring about measurable improvements in the quality of education ex-
perienced by many black children prompted a new strategy focusing on
funding. School expenditure is funded in most states by means of local
property taxes. The variation in property values within a particular state,
coupled with residential patterns which concentrate black families in
poor urban areas and white students in wealthier suburban areas, can lead
to serious disparities in the funding available to black students relative to
white students.2"' Bell wrote that "many, including myself, decided that
given the difficulty of integrating black and latino students with their
swiftly fleeing white counterparts, we should concentrate on desegregat-
ing the money.,,!H!
School funding suits had some initial success in state courts in Cali-
fornia, where the state Supreme Court ruled that the public school
funding system's heavy reliance on local property taxes caused substantial
disparities among individual school districts in the amount of revenue
available per pupil and thus invidiously discriminated against the poor and
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2"lThe
hope that equalized expenditure suits might substitute for racial integra-
tion suits was dashed when the U.S. Supreme Court, in a case from Texas,
ruled that education was not a fundamental right and wealth was not a
suspect classification.?" The Texas system attracted mere rational scrutiny
as opposed to strict scrutiny and prevailed despite substantial disparities in
local school resources and differences in tax effort throughout the State.?"
Per Justice Powell, the system -which was similar to those employed in
virtually every other state-was not the product of purposeful discrimina-
279. Tushnet, S14pranote 106, at 105-37.
280. See .Ilenerally DERRICK BElL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN v. BOARD Of EDUCATION
AND TIlE UNFULfilLED HOPES FOR RACIAl REFORM, 2{}-28, 186 (2004).
281. Sec ~encrally DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAl TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNIlY (2001).
282. BEll, supra note 29, at 161.
283. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971).
284. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,55 (1973).
285. Id. "The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is whether
the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest. We
hold that the Texas plan abundantly satisfies this standard." Id. at 55.
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tion against any class but, instead, was a responsible attempt to arrive at
practical and workable solutions to educational problems.l"
CONCLUSION
A. Towards a Theory oj the Court Expert in Schools Desegregation Suits
In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), the Supreme Court es-
tablished a constitutional basis for the moral responsibilities of the nation
in racial matters. The decision represented a defining point in the devel-
opment of race relations in the United States but the principles it rested
upon were ambiguous and the process of schools desegregation it inaugu-
rated depended on political processes which the Court could command
but not control. The constitutionalization of the desegregation mandate
ensured that the political struggles it spawned were played out in the
courts, but the inherent underlying ambiguity produced an open textured
jurisprudence wherein the requirements of desegregation changed and
the link between racial isolation and educational opportunity that under-
pinned NAACP demands for integration could no longer be assumed.
Fifty years after Brown, a Court in retreat from an activist model of adju-
dication was unwilling to lend constitutional legitimacy to integrative
social policies underpinned by contestable social science.?"
For Judge Garrity and the lawyers involved in the Boston case, the
immediate answers to the questions with which this Article opened were
determined by reference to contemporary desegregation jurisprudence;
these actions were necessary because the Constitution so required.i"
Where official action and policy had resulted in a dual system and free-
dom of choice would perpetuate the status quo, affirmative action was a
mandate, not an option.289 Racial balance in terms of student assignment
and faculty composition were indicia of desegregation and achievement
might require school closings.f" Magnet schools and educational enrich-
ment programs were legitimate techniques of enhancing "desegregative
attractiveness.T" The latter might be required to combat lingering vestiges
286. Id. at 55. School finance litigation has had some success at the state level but as
Professor Ryan contends, it continues to be "hamstrung by the obstacles created by poor
race relations and the Court's desegregation jurisprudence." James E. Ryan, Schools, RAce
and Money, 109 YALEL.J. 249, 255 (1999). See also Godwin Liu, The Parted Paths of School
Desegregation and School Finance Utigation, 24 LAW AND INEQ. 81 (2006).
287. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2776-
2781 (2007)(Thomas,J., concurring).
288. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 388 F. Supp. 581, 582 (D. Mass. 1975).
289. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-40 (1968).
290. Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Bd. Of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
291. Missouri v. Jenkins Uenkins 111),515 U.S. 70, 1OG-103 (1995). (stating that the
district court plan was designed to improve the desegregative attractiveness of the Kansas
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of segregation in matters of student achievement, in which case, however,
detailed fact-finding must be scrupulously undertaken and the duration
must be limited.?" The curriculum was a legitimate area for scrutiny but,
in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent, teaching and learning
were pedagogical issues which were properly left to the State. Academic
tracking or ability grouping, however, which might mask discriminatory
intent, would not normally be perrnissible.i"
As Forbes Bottomley, himself a former superintendent of schools in
Seattle, Washington, has pointed out, an effective desegregation plan for a
complex public school system such as that of Boston is more than a mat-
ter of jurisprudence. 294 Lawyers may be comfortable with standards
couched in terms of "reasonableness" and "adequacy," but educational
planners need more detailed guidance.l" Translation from constitutional
guidelines to specific proposals of design and implementation requires
both professional expertise and a working relationship with the educa-
tional planners and school officers whose job it is on the ground to give
effect to the orders of the court.?" Where, as in Boston, school officials are
recalcitrant and administrative default forces the judge to take over, the
relationship can become "complex and frustrating.t'" The appointment of
court experts in Boston extended the reach of the judge beyond the
courtroom and the confines of the adversarial process, and so their role
was part of the machinery of implementation. But in taking on the task of
supervising and supplying the educational planning expertise necessary to
devise and implement a workable plan, they shaped and gave content to
the desegregation process in Boston and, to that extent, their role was
more fundamental.
In identifying the importance of educational enhancement in a de-
segregation remedy, Judge Garrity's plan went further than any of his
predecessors in federal desegregation suits and became the prototype for a
new type of desegregation planning in which educational concerns were
ostensibly as important as issues of student assignment. 298 Ultimately, the
educational component fell victim to a desegregation jurisprudence con-
City, Missouri (KCMSD), School District but was "so far removed from the task of elimi-
nating the racial identifiability of the schools within the KCMSD that {... J it is beyond
the admittedly broad discretion of the District Court."}.
292. Missouri v. Jenkins Uenkins IIf), 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken If), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
293. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 511-514 (D.D.C.1967).
294. Forbes Bottomly, The ProfessionalEducator in the Desegregation Suit, in LIMITSOF
JUSTICE:THE COURT'SROLE IN SCHOOLDESEGREGATION,621,633 (Howard I. Kalodner &
James J. Fishman eds., 1978).
295. See id. at 633.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Robert A. Dentler, Improving Public Education: The Boston School Desegregation
Case 7 SUFFOLKU.L. REV.3,8 (1975).
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ceptualized in terms of "race" and not "education." "Desegregation", said
the First Circuit, "is not a mandate to equalize schools,"?"
Taking the failure of outcomes as a focus, this Article now takes the
indeterminacy of the term "desegregation" as a starting point towards a
theory of the role of the court expert in schools desegregation litigation. If
the term "desegregation" is seen as inherently indeterminate, or, to borrow
a term from discourse theory, an empty or floating signifier whose meaning
crystallizes only as the general is translated into the particular, then a
framework for analysis emerges.?" The desegregation process becomes a
forum for a negotiation between representatives of two professional dis-
courses with differing and sometimes conflicting understandings and
conceptualizations of what the process might require.
From this perspective, the court expert operates at the interface be-
tween two discursive imperatives: the so-called "harm-benefit thesis" of
social science which seeks integration as a solution to "the Negro prob-
lem" and the legal imperative which prioritizes "legitimacy" and permits
"integration" only as an aspect of remedial process. The two imperatives
came together in the context of education, and both sets of professionals
sought enhanced educational outcomes for African Americans; but, for
lawyers, the harm which shaped strategy was racial discrimination whilst
for social scientists the harm was racial separation.
In the forum of the federal courtroom, the discourses of law and the
social sciences do not meet on an equal footing. The authority of the
modern liberal state is defined in legal terms, and answers to questions of
legitimacy are sought by reference to the concepts and rhetoric of legal
discourse. Thus, in terms of an interaction between the rival discourses of
the law and of the social sciences, it is the former which is dominant
and hegemonic. The discourse of the social sciences acquires political
legitimacy only to the extent that it has been subsumed within the dis-
course of law.301 The role of the court expert can be theorized in terms
of mediation or translation, the task being to give to the federal judge the
content that he needs to give meaning to the otherwise indeterminate
signifier "desegregation." The voice of legitimacy is the voice of the fed-
eral judge and his attempts to articulate the boundaries of the term
represent so-called nodal points for the crystallization of meaning.
In this context, the relationship between the judge and the expert is
dialectical: the judge has to guide the expert on "the law." This requires
identification of the general legal principles which regulate the exercise of
299. Morgan v.McDonough, 689 F. 2d 265, 267 (1st Cir. 1982).
300. For a series of essays on the value of discourse theory as an analytical perspective
in social and political analysis see DISCOURSEThEORY IN EUROPEANPoLITICS: IDENTITY
POLITICSAND GOVERNANCE(David Howarth and Jacob Torfing eds., 2005).
301. See CAROLSMART, FEMINISMAND THE POWEROF LAW 4-25 (1989)(for an analysis
of the "power of law" to not only define what constitutes legal discourse but also to as-
similate "truths" from other discourses).
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the judicial function, and the specific principles of constitutional liability
and relief which have been provided by the Supreme Court and Circuit
Courts in previously-decided cases. These give the judge his "road map";
from these he identifies his imperatives and sets an agenda. Translation of
these imperatives into proposals for practical changes in educational policy
and practice is the task of the expert, who may be a testifying witness or
may be a specially appointed court adviser. Either way, these proposals are
acceptable only to the extent that they can be justifiable in terms of legal
discourse. In other words, the practical proposals of the social scientist
must be capable of translation into the language of the law and justifiable
by reference to the legal signifiers to which they give content. The meas-
ure of accomplishment is the scrutiny of the wider legal community as
represented in the first instance by the appellate judges to whose author-
ity appeal might lie. Ultimately, however, the effect is to bring about a
transfer of power from elected school officials to the wider group of aca-
demic and practicing lawyers and the politicians and representatives of
business interests with whom they interact who collectively make-up the
hermeneutic community that Dworkin has identified as the community
oflegal discourse:,02
302. See RONALD DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 52, n.2 (1986) (identifying the philoso-
phical foundations of creative interpretation and paying tribute to the influence of
H.G. Gadamer).
